Bound
Periodical

18558

Kansas City
Public Library

THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

This Volume is for

REFERENCE USE ONLY

11-26—6m—P

JULY.

PAGE

LABOR AND WAGES IN ENGLAND 1
PROF. THOROLD ROGERS, LL.D., UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

THE AIM AND INFLUENCE OF MODERN BIBLICAL CRITICISM 27
REV. DR. E. A. WASHBURN, NEW YORK

NEMESIS IN THE COURT-ROOM 47
FRANCIS WHARTON, LL.D., CAMBRIDGE

REASON, CONSCIENCE, AND AUTHORITY 67
PREBENDARY IRONS, D.D., F.R.H.S., ST. PAUL'S, LONDON

THE ORGAN OF MIND 98
PROF. DAVID FERRIER, KINGS COLLEGE, LONDON

MUSIC AND WORSHIP 126
PRESIDENT POTTER, UNION COLLEGE

CHRIST AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY . . . 144
REV. GEORGE MATHESON, D.D., SCOTLAND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: AT HOME AND ABROAD . . . 172
ROBERT P. PORTER, ESQ., CHICAGO

PHILOSOPHY AND APOLOGETICS 196
PROF. CHARLES W. SHIELDS, PRINCETON COLLEGE

SEPTEMBER.

PROGRESS OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES . 209
PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D., UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE PHILOSOPHIC MOVEMENT IN ITALY 253
PROF. LUIGI FERRI, PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF ROME

PAINTING IN ITS HISTORIC RELATIONS 277
PROF. HENRY COPPÉE, LL.D., LEHIGH UNIVERSITY

PAGE

RELIGION AND MORALITY 302
Rev. Henry N. Day, D.D., New Haven

THE PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN WILL 328
Prof. Henry Calderwood, LL.D., University of Edinburgh

THE LAWS OF WAR IN THEIR BEARING ON PEACE . . 352
Sheldon Amos, LL.D., London

SECULARIZED EDUCATION 377
Prest. Robert L. Dabney, Hampden-Sydney Theol. Seminary

VIRGIL AS A PRECURSOR OF CHRISTIANITY . . . 401
Principal Shairp, D.C.L., University of St. Andrews

NOVEMBER.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S EXPOSITION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY . 421
President Porter, D.D., LL.D., Yale College

UNIVERSITY QUESTIONS IN ENGLAND 451
Goldwin Smith, D.C.L., Toronto

PROFESSOR TYNDALL UPON THE ORIGIN OF THE COSMOS . 471
Mark Hopkins, Ex-President of Williams College

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF AMERICAN PROGRESS . . . 493
Robert P. Porter, Esq., Chicago

THE A PRIORI NOVUM ORGANUM OF CHRISTIANITY . . 517
Lyman H. Atwater, D.D., LL.D., Princeton College

BIMETALLISM 546
Prof. William G. Sumner, Yale College

POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND REVELATION . 579
Principal J. W. Dawson, D.C.L., F.R.S., Montreal

HERBERT SPENCER'S "DATA OF ETHICS" 607
President McCosh, D.D., LL.D., Princeton College

LABOR AND WAGES IN ENGLAND.

THE history of human societies, when history was first attempted, was a narrative of events, told with greater or less accuracy and fairness, but made with little or no effort after the discovery of the causes on which the events themselves depended. In course of time an attempt was made to connect facts with near or contemporary causes, and to sustain the vivacity of the narrative by an exposition, more or less successful, of the motives which dictated a policy or provoked a war. It was because Thucydides sought to trace the real causes which brought about the first great war which permanently influenced the fortunes of the human race (that is, which not only altered the destinies of Hellas, but produced results which still have a force) that he is called a philosophical historian. But though his prediction that his work would be "a permanent possession" to mankind is signally verified, though the student of history is under lasting obligations to this great author, though the narrative is candid and the criticism of men and facts is just, no one who has really studied Greek history believes that his examination of causes is exhaustive, or doubts that, with his help, a competent interpreter of events could fill up the picture more completely than Thucydides himself was able to paint it. We know not only more than he has told us, but more than he could possibly have known. We can tell, for instance, why the passion for municipal independence was so keen and so fatal for Hellas, why it was incapable of developing not only representative but even federal institutions, and why the marvellous growth of its intellectual life was extinguished because it was disabled from

making a similar progress in political and economical civilization. In the same way the sagacious historian of the early Roman empire, that institution which has left deep and permanent marks on the political system of modern Europe, could convey, in a few words, the most vivid impressions of a system of government which was ancient to him and is archaic to us. The art of Tacitus is so perfect, that we seem to see the social Rome of nineteen centuries ago as he conceived it, and to be able, by an effort of the imagination, to people the deserts of the Forum, the Via Sacra, the Palatine, and the Aventine with the throng of men who, having once been free, were living under a despotism from which there was no escape, and which never slept or spared. But he does not tell us, he could not tell us, why the empire became necessary, and why, from a chain of causes, each separately weak, but collectively of adamant, that empire of Rome which gave unity to ancient civilization was to become its inevitable destroyer, and was even to control the revival of civilization many centuries afterwards, and to do so indefinitely. We know why these things have happened and are still vital; and though we may be unable as yet to fully tell the reason why they still influence mankind, our descendants will hereafter detect the process by which the imperialism of Rome was a survival in the nineteenth century, why Germany had a Claudius in its emperor, or an Agrippa in its Bismarck.

Another kind of history, and that of a very fascinating kind, because it gives the vivacity of a drama to the narrative of consecutive facts, is that of which Gibbon and Macaulay are the greatest masters. These eminent writers have so contrived to embellish two of the least attractive epochs in the history of mankind, that they have created, the one an unequalled interest in the story of the process by which the Eastern empire slowly wasted away, the other a dramatic narrative the actors in which, being generally the basest and unworthiest men who ever controlled the destinies of any country, are painted with a vigor and clearness which has never been paralleled. But the monarchs and generals, the priests and the adventurers whom Gibbon describes did not make the history of the Decline and Fall, nor was the Revolution of 1688 the work of those men

who created an aristocratical government on the ruins of the Stuart monarchy. Both histories are dramas in which the principal parts are played by conspicuous men, but in which what may be called the psychology of history is not examined. The empire of the East was not destroyed because Mohammed appeared, or the Latins captured Constantinople, or the Turks became the lords of Central Asia, but for reasons which lay deep in the social condition of Eastern Europe. Nor did the Stuarts fall because James proscribed the bishops, and had a son by Mary of Modena, or tried to create a standing army, or had joined the Roman Church, but by causes which had been growing for more than a century, had sometimes been visible, but were often unsuspected. It is often harder to interpret the origin of political events than to predict the consequences which must ensue from the existence of a certain number of manifest political facts.

There is yet a third school of historians, the method of which has as yet been applied generally, and that with very unequal success, by one writer, but the materials for which have been accumulated with great diligence, and, during the earlier ages of modern civilization especially, in large quantity. It may be fairly claimed for the late Mr. Buckle that he was the first person to insist on the fact that the interpretation of any given epoch in the history of any nation must be obtained from a careful study of the causes, remote as well as near, which have made up the life of the people. It is true that some of Buckle's inferences were rash and even ludicrous, that the materials in his possession were inadequate to the conclusions which he sought to draw, and that he rather showed what the philosophy of history is than applied the canons of that philosophy to the solution of social problems. But he proved at least that history, to be worthy of the name, must be more than a narrative, and even than a drama; that events have no meaning unless they can be traced to causes; and that portraits are not pictures unless the background can be sketched as accurately and as instructively as the principal figure. The work, however, which Buckle prematurely attempted, which no one has yet pretended to resume, will be hereafter assisted by those

researches which have been made into primitive society, primitive law, and early processes of government, for which Jacob Grimm has done so much, and to which large contributions have been made by Sir Henry Maine and others.

I am attempting a humble, but I hope not uninstructive, part in this investigation of the process by which modern societies have been modified and distinguished, when I strive to point out how the economical condition of England has been the result of a number of insulated but co-ordinate causes, some of which can be traced to very remote times, some are of very recent date, and in the present paper seek to show how the existing state of labor and wages in England and the relations of operative and employer have been evolved from a long chain of historical facts. And I venture to think that, if I succeed in making my statement plain, the narrative may be of interest to readers in the United States, who had up to a century ago received their social traditions, with certain necessary modifications, from the old country, but who, after the War of Independence and the heats which the struggle caused and left, were as necessarily cut away from old associations, and who are therefore, in judging of their own social condition, nearly precluded from an historical estimate of that which existed in the days when they were the British plantations, and are still more completely shut out from the knowledge of those facts which have served to modify English life within the century alluded to. It may, perhaps, be added that very little is known in England of English economical history, though in this is probably to be found the only solution of many political problems and of not a few social dangers which press for interpretation or menace the prosperity of that country.

The settlement of England by various tribes of Teutonic origin, who, if they did not destroy, certainly absorbed, the earlier inhabitants of Britain, was effected on the same lines as those which designate the agricultural occupancy of other Aryan peoples. The invariable unit in the social system was the village, the boundaries of which were strictly marked out. As the occupation of England was a gradual conquest, the king or chieftain was always a principal figure in the settlement of the

race, and as these kings soon became engaged in interminable wars, the authority of the king was gradually extended, till at last, and before the Conquest, though the country was far from homogeneous, monarchy in England was wholly different from what it was in France or Germany. The settlement, too, was completed while the invaders were still pagans, and therefore was not accompanied by those prodigious ecclesiastical establishments whose motive was mainly political, and which followed on the struggle between the heathen Slaves and the Christianized Saxons of Eastern Europe. Moreover, as this invasion was an absolute resettlement of the country by races which had never been under the influence of Roman law or Roman civilization, English law and English royalty were at first no way colored by those dogmas which have modified and do modify the social and public life of all the rest of Western Europe. Within the village lay the settler's home ; in it was the authority to which he submitted, or which he might exercise ; out of it, except for the king's service, he had no duties and no rights. He might compensate the most heinous offence against his fellows by a pecuniary fine ; he was allowed to escape with similar penalties if he slew even king or bishop ; but the boundary of his village was sacred. To violate it was the only capital crime, and an offence against the majesty of the mark was punished by some or all of those mutilations and symbolical cruelties which were perhaps accumulated in the sentence pronounced half a century ago on English traitors. The fact that the village system was developed in extreme strictness among the Greeks explains the cause why Hellas had no political unity. The fact that even the acknowledgment of an English king long before the Conquest was not sufficient to weld together the social fragments of England accounts for the dynastic changes of the Danish and Norman victories. It is asserted, perhaps correctly, that England is still persistently parochial. If this be the case—and it can be easily and plausibly maintained—we have a survival of the Teutonic occupation. Mr. Freeman has said, and said truly, that the parish vestry is the lineal descendant of village autonomy. Very few Englishmen are a power beyond the immediate place in which they live

and are familiarly known. I remember my own surprise when, a few years ago, on passing a funeral procession in Regent Street, London, near the clubs, which are an artificial revival of the old Teutonic settlement, I was civilly told by an artisan who met me, "Perhaps, sir, you do not know that there is going the funeral of the great Mr. Grote." When I thanked him, I felt that there was at least one English artisan who knew somebody besides his own vestrymen, and could realize some power which lay outside his parish. It is not without a meaning that this connection between the artisan of to-day and the Saxon of fourteen centuries ago is insisted on. The English have emigrated from their native land more largely than any other race, but till latterly they have not emigrated as a rule directly from the rural districts, but have previously to their emigration become familiarized with such a movement by a more or less prolonged residence in towns.

There were doubtless slaves in Saxon England, some perhaps of British descent, some of the same blood with the newcomers, the latter having been reduced to servitude through their inability to pay the fines with which all offences were visited. But slavery, when the slave is of the same race and color as the owner, is never very severe, and the English slave appears to have been the possessor of a cottage and curtilage, and to have been allowed, with the master's license, to marry. At an early date, earlier than any existing records can define, the slave, serf, or villein's services were fixed at a small payment in labor. The days on which he was expected to toil were a certain number in the year, the disposal of the remaining part of his time being left to his own discretion. He is the progenitor of the landless laborer. But in the Middle Ages he had certain rights or functions which his descendant has lost. Under the presidency of the steward of the manor, he acted as a juryman, presented and convicted offenders, and in some cases gave verdicts which involved capital punishment on the culprit, though, for reasons peculiar to the social history of England, the power of inflicting death passed at an early date to the royal judges.

Land was the cheapest and readiest of all articles of value

with which services could be compensated. Grants of land in ownership, with rights over the land of those who were socially subordinated to the chief owner, were the means by which the king paid his servants or followers or mercenaries, from the days of William the Norman to the age of Anne. Every free person was the owner of land; every serf was, as long as he remained within the manor (and at first he was wholly disabled from leaving it), the owner of some real estate. Everybody cultivated land, from the king to the peasant. The wealth which these agriculturists possessed in farm-stock, live and dead, was generally three times the value of the land on which the stock was employed. The wealthy and powerful, in this possession of movable property, gave considerable pledges for the maintenance of order. Noble and peasant were equally concerned in upholding the king's peace. Agriculture in England was an honorable calling, in which the highest and lowest were equally interested. A different estimate of the occupation, due to the fact that the nobility disdained a life of husbandry, led to the degradation of the peasant in France and Germany, and to that war of classes which has never, except temporarily and for definite but transient causes, broken out in England. The fact that England was almost the only country in Western Europe in which sheep could be kept, is evidence of how rare marauders were in this, and how common they were in other countries. When an English farmer tells one that the quality of land and the success of cultivation are measured by the number of sheep maintained to the acreage of the farm, his calculation is a survival of the time when the English sheep-master supplied through the looms of the Low Countries most of the woollen clothing of Western and Southern Europe. Everybody had land, and everybody cultivated land. The English towns were not built like Continental cities, but generally had large gardens attached to the houses. Even the strongest of these cities, mediæval London, was full of gardens. The long vacation of the law courts and the universities was set in the summer, in order to free as many people as possible for the general occupation of husbandry and the harvest.

The agricultural laborer, then, who is the weekly tenant at

will of the tenant farmer, was unknown in the early social history of England, though there always appears to have been a tolerably numerous class of free laborers whose tenements were insufficient to supply a maintenance for themselves and their families. As is always the case with a community where land is very much divided, the wages of agricultural labor were relatively high. The wages of artisans are always higher than those of agricultural laborers. But the reason of this is obvious. Everybody knew the routine work of an agriculturist. The artisan knew this and something else.

This condition of opulence and content, sufficiently illustrated by the magnificence of churches and conventual architecture in the country between 1250 and 1350, was suddenly changed by the occurrence of the great plague in 1348–9. No event in the social history of England has had such permanent effects on English life as this event has had. The calamity was as great in other countries; in England it was a social revolution on the largest scale. It is a totally new departure in English history, incomparably more important in its permanent effects than the conquest of William, the civil war of the fifteenth century, the civil war and the revolution of the seventeenth. It has left abiding marks on the present condition of England. To it we owe the peculiar position of the English aristocracy and the equally peculiar position of the English peasant. It created the poor-law and the trades-union. It was the origin of Lollardism, which was itself the precursor of the Reformation. Fortunately it occurred after representative institutions had become a necessary part of English political life, or it would have destroyed them.

Physical calamities do not destroy wealth, and only temporarily interfere with the processes by which wealth is produced. The economical progress of a community is arrested or retarded, and the prosperity of a country is destroyed, by the vices or follies of governments and the unpunished crimes of men or of classes of men. Hence the economical interpretation of municipal law is the greatest service which an economist can render his fellow-countrymen, and it is a function in which he should be never weary of well-doing. The wise and well-

informed economist who interprets the present condition of industry, its forces, and the hindrances to which its forces are subjected, is the apostle of secular life, and as far as morality is concerned, urges the claims of justice and duty as energetically, though for different reasons, as the teacher of religion does. But his reasonings need to be supplemented by the coercive powers of government. Modern societies run more danger from fraud and the dishonesty which wrecks credit than ancient societies did from violence. The enemy of our day is the man who breeds distrust, who weakens confidence, and is an unpunished knave. When a government is so demoralized that it acts in collusion with such internal enemies, civilization is speedily wrecked. This is the condition of Turkey. Now the most precious gift which the history of the past bestows on us is the power which it gives to those who use the materials rightly of interpreting the future. The decay of ancient empires, the annihilation of ancient civilization, the process which has turned the gardens of the earth into howling deserts, and fair cities into ruins, are all the acts of men. It is easy to restore the waste of Nature, and to remedy the injuries which she inflicts. The only serious risks which mankind runs are from man's hand.

But a great natural calamity, as famine or pestilence, is speedily followed by a recovery. The first of these seldom inflicts a long loss, for naturally it attacks the most feeble, acting rapidly in what is called the struggle for existence. The second is more disastrous, for it finds its principal victims when its ravages commence among the vigorous and healthy. But these destructive forces do not destroy wealth, unless, indeed, the waste of life is so great that the process of production is arrested or limited. They interfere with the distribution of wealth, however, and when the mischief is widespread they may induce a complete revolution in the distribution of wealth, or even permanently modify the conditions of society. This was what the Black Death did. It destroyed a third or a fourth of the population, especially of the laboring classes. The wages of the survivors were instantly doubled. The profits of such agriculturists as cultivated their estates by

hand labor fell to zero. From this fact we can trace the most important consequences on the social life of England, both as regards the landowners on the one hand and the wage-earning class on the other. To deal briefly with the former first.

Many of the greater landowners instantly, or after a very short struggle, abandoned agriculture as a pursuit in which to invest their own capitals. Within forty years almost all landowners gave up agriculture, and began a system of leasing land and stock for short terms, at a fixed rate for the acre and a fixed sum for each head of cattle and sheep and for farm implements, the live and dead stock to be replaced at the end of the term, or an equivalent of money to be paid. On the whole, the tenants appear to have prospered, for the seasons were exceedingly propitious during the greater part of the fifteenth century. It was during this period that the English yeomanry came into existence, whose growth was witnessed to by Fortescue—yeomen who in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became the Puritan freeholders, and from whose ranks Cromwell enlisted his Ironsides. For the mass of the English people has never but once been stirred to attempt a revolution, and this attempt occurred five centuries ago. The political events of the seventeenth century never stirred any portion of English life which was socially below the landowner and the trader. As yet the English peasant has counted for nothing as a political factor in England, and the artisan does not count for much, though he has lately been enfranchised.

The effect on the upper classes of English society was that it instantly induced all the effects of primogeniture. By a custom, the origin of which has not yet been detected, the English common law, with rare and local exceptions, confers the estate of a deceased ancestor on his eldest male child. In the period before us there was no power to make a will of lands, such a power not having been given till the reign of Henry VIII., though an indirect devise had some time before that period become customary. Personal estate, however, had from time immemorial been devisable, and was not subject to the custom of primogeniture. Now up to the time in which agriculture was abandoned by the wealthy landowners, the live and dead

stock on an estate was three times the value of the land, and hence an ancestor had abundant means from which to provide for his younger children. From the time of the Black Death, therefore, the younger son comes into prominence as a social phenomenon peculiar to England. The noble ceased to have that stake in the country which was heretofore a guarantee of his good behavior and willingness to maintain the king's peace. Hence, from the deposition of Richard in 1399 to the battle of Bosworth in 1483, with the exception of the period in which England was engaged in the war with France, England was on the verge or in the turmoil of civil war. But the battles of the civil war were only a series of duels between the armies of partisan chieftains. These armies carefully abstained, as a rule, from ravaging the estates of non-combatants. Once, indeed, the northern army of the Lancastrians wasted in its march a part of Southern England. This error set Edward the Fourth on the throne. Finally the country demanded quiet, and accepted the title of Henry the Seventh. The political importance of the civil wars of the fifteenth century lies in the fact that the English nobility ceased to be a political power in England for two centuries. They became, or rather some of them became, the chief political force in the country from the Revolution of 1688 to the passage of the first Reform Bill in 1832.

But it is with the history of the laborer that we are chiefly concerned. It was not to be expected that the employers of labor should acquiesce without an effort in a rise of wages which instantly destroyed all their profits. When Parliament met, a stringent statute was at once passed, prescribing that these wages should be permanently fixed at the rates which had prevailed a few years before, and inflicting penalties on those who gave and those who received more than the statutable amount. Of course the law was inoperative, but it was re-enacted over and over again. It began that struggle between capital and labor in England, the outcome of which is the modern trade-union. It is true that the labor laws were repealed in 1824, four hundred and seventy-five years after their first enactment, and that the prohibitory statutes were never effectual in remedying the inconvenience which they were intended to deal with.

But it was intended that they should be operative, one to which attention will presently be called was operative, and at least workmen were educated into thinking that a combination of laborers with a view to force a higher rate of wages must have some efficacy, since the right of forming such a combination was denounced with such passionate and persistent eagerness.

It has been stated before that once in the history of English social life the peasantry rose in rebellion, and strove to overset the government. This was in 1381. The event is known as the Peasants' War, or the Insurrection of Tyler. But in fact Tyler's action, though more dramatic and more frequently told than the other incidents of the revolt, was only a small part of the movement. Two causes contributed to the rebellion—one an economical, the other a religious movement. It has been stated above that before the great plague the proprietors of labor rents had commuted them for money payments, which were less in amount than ordinary wages. But the money payment may well have been more valuable than the labor, for such labor would have been yielded unwillingly and inefficiently, while the money payment was certain and convenient. At any rate, the commutation was universal. But after the great rise in the wages of labor, the proprietors of these labor rents strove to readjust them to altered prices. Such an attempt was an introduction which was sure to be resisted. The crown had to be content with its ordinary and traditional dues. The valuation on which subsidies and other mediæval taxes were based was made in the days of Edward the First, and was not revised till the Restoration, when it was superseded altogether. In custom lay all the rights of Englishmen, all the means by which arbitrary power could be resisted. Long after this epoch, the alteration which Cecil made in the book of Rates in 1610 was the beginning of the struggle which led to the death of Charles, the exile of his family, and the irrevocable admission that in matters of taxation Parliament, or rather the House of Commons, was supreme and uncontrollable. The peasantry, therefore, were simply doing that which their superiors would have done had the same expedient been tried on them—an expedient which no English sovereign, however abso-

lute, ever ventured on till the Stuarts, to their cost, attempted it. In the fourteenth century, and for many a century afterwards, resistance to bad government took the form of armed intervention.

The religious movement with which Wiklif's name is connected was another impulse to which the outbreak owed not a little of its force. Wiklif himself did not encourage the discontent which burst so suddenly into civil war. He had at first become notorious for advocating in the strongest manner an opinion which had always been popular with a considerable section of the English clergy, that in secular matters the authority of secular government should be supreme, and that the Pope should not override the laws of England or the king's just prerogative. By a natural transition, he next attacked the regular clergy, whose wealth was already exciting discontent, and whose relations to the Roman See were always closer than those of the secular or national clergy. It is inevitable, however, that when a man attacks the exercise of power he should sooner or later question the authority on which the power itself is founded, and should ultimately proceed to accuse that personage of false doctrine whom he charges with malpractice. It is also almost invariably the case that a religious reformer strives to aid his cause by enlisting social discontent on his side. Wiklif, indeed, did not take this course, for he had become an aged man before he finally broke with Roman dogma, but his disciples and followers, his poor priests, as he called them, did. They invited their hearers to contemplate the natural equality of man, and the wholly artificial character of the distinctions which rank and wealth confer. The pastoral instruction of the mediæval church was confined to enforcing outward obedience to established dogmas and to the acceptance of certain ordinances to which a consummate efficacy was attributed. It did not, for the rank and file of its subjects, suggest that enthusiasm which often compensates them for the absence or denial of solid secular advantages, or makes them contentedly acquiesce in the straits of poverty. Hence it left them peculiarly open to the influence of men who might owe their power and authority to the fulness with which they accepted and formu-

lated the grievances of which the peasants complained. The priests of Wiklif's school were the teachers, the emissaries, and the instigators of the Peasants' War.

The Peasants' War destroyed villanage in England, and practically emancipated the laborer. And though the priests who led them were sought out and executed, and Wiklif's name ceased for a long time to be held in honor, the country folk in many places, especially in the eastern counties, then and for centuries afterwards the wealthiest part of England, clung secretly to Lollardism; disseminated, though at the peril of their lives, the tenets of Wiklif; and with the same peril transcribed and distributed his controversial writings, so that when the Reformation began in England it found its most sturdy advocates and resolute martyrs in those counties where the Peasants' War was fought.

It has been stated that the fifteenth century was a period of great prosperity to the peasant and the yeoman. The means of life were cheap—cheaper than in any other period of English economical history, and the wages of labor were high. The nobles gambled away their lives and their estates in the civil wars, and the agricultural population strove. But in the next century there came a lamentable change—at any rate to the classes who lived by labor and wages. The student of social history and economical forces cannot doubt that the first cause of this decline was the destruction of the monasteries, not because these establishments relieved the poor or employed labor, though almsgiving and employment were both curtailed by the sudden dispossession of the ancient owners of what was reckoned a third of the land in England. The principal inconvenience arose from the sudden acquisition of the hoarded wealth of these institutions by a sumptuous monarch, the rise in prices which followed on its being flung on the market, and the introduction of sheep-farming on a large scale by those who, having acquired the monastic lands, had not sufficient capital wherewith to bring them under the plough. But though other prices rose, wages did not, and the population began to perish. The towns decayed, the inhabitants in many of them being greatly reduced in number, a fact which

Mr. Froude admits, though he infers, without giving any evidence of his inference, that the townsfolk went to live in the country. To make matters worse, Henry, whose enormous confiscations rapidly wasted away, adopted an expedient, which, fortunately, had never been attempted before by an English sovereign, by which to relieve his necessities—the issue of base money. It is very likely that he intended to redeem it ; but those monarchs who in the earlier periods of modern history have ventured on tampering with the currency had never fulfilled such an intention. It is almost superfluous to state that when base money has a forced circulation, they who live by wages suffer far more than any other class of persons. They who deal in money make a profit by discounting the alloy or paper which is made to act as currency.

But the English laborer had to undergo a further trial, the blow falling this time on the artisans. In all the English chartered towns, as the privileges which the towns gained were valuable, it was the custom to enroll the freemen in guilds or trading companies, entrance into these guilds being obtained by inheritance or apprenticeship. The wealthier members of these guilds frequently gave or bequeathed lands or money to the guild generally, on condition that a religious service should be said once or oftener in the year on behalf of the donor's soul, the residue being applied to the maintenance of sick or aged members of the company. In course of time these gifts fulfilled for the townsfolk the objects of a benefit society or poor-law relief of destitution. But at the accession of Edward the Sixth these guild lands were confiscated, through the agency of the Protector Somerset, who had embraced the Reformation, on the plea that the rental of the lands was devoted to superstitious uses. It is plain that numbers of people were alienated from the new doctrines, and still more from those who represented them. When the abortive attempt was made to set Jane Grey on the throne, Mary fled to Norfolk, the wealthiest and the most Protestant district in England, and that district also which had suffered the most from the confiscation of the guild lands. The Eastern counties baffled the Duke of Northumberland, and set Mary on the throne.

She repaid them with fire and fagot, eastern England supplying most of the victims of the heresy laws in Mary's reign.

Meanwhile the distress and destitution became so alarming, and the severe and sanguinary preventives which the government freely applied were so insufficient, that it became necessary to supply some legal relief to this growing evil. In the time of Henry the Eighth temporary measures had been adopted, but with no solid result, and the causes of destitution, natural and artificial, were increasing in force. Edward the Sixth's ministers procured the passage of the first poor-law. By it the minister and churchwardens were to receive voluntary contributions from the parishioners for the relief of the poor, were to stir up the willing, and to rebuke the unfeeling. In Mary's reign the law was re-enacted, with the significant addition that those who declined to give of their means were to be presented to the bishop, with a hint that their meanness would be treated as *prima-facie* evidence of heresy. At last, and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the modern English poor-law was instituted, by which the occupants of certain kinds of property were rated by the overseers to the relief of the poor, and the tax was leviable by legal process.

In the fifth year of Elizabeth's reign an act was passed under which the English laborer became to all intent a serf again, though now without the possession of that land which had been his inheritance in earlier ages. The statute of apprenticeship succeeded in effecting that which the statutes of laborers had for more than two centuries been striving vainly to bring about. It made apprenticeship obligatory on all persons who practised any other calling than that of agricultural labor. Hence it gave some advantage to the artisan, by limiting the number of those who were engaged in handicrafts, and lowered the condition of the peasant by making his calling and labor residual. But this by itself was little compared with the clauses which empowered the magistrates in quarter sessions to fix the rate of wages to be paid to the peasant laborer and the artisan. No doubt the artisan of the towns was but little affected by the law, the county wright or smith being the only mechanics who could be reached by the justices, but the country folk were

fully under the control of this machinery. The employers of labor, by the aid of law, fixed the wages of those whom they could force to serve them, and they kept them at such rates as left the peasant nothing beyond a bare subsistence. In the middle of the seventeenth century, when food was very dear, the justices fixed the wages at rates very little in excess of those at which they were placed by the same authority early in the reign of Elizabeth.

Between the beginning and end of the seventeenth century the population of England was doubled. It was certainly not more than two and a half millions at the accession of James; it was over five millions at the accession of Anne. In the eighteenth century it was again doubled, being over ten millions at the first census of 1801. The explanation of this increase is to be found in the fact that early in the seventeenth century the cultivation of winter roots became general, early in the eighteenth the cultivation of artificial grasses. In both cases the improvement came from Holland. Of course the limit of population is given in the quantity of necessary food which can be produced or procured by a community on an average of years. Roughly stated, the population of England may be measured by the quarters of wheat which it grows or imports. But the improvements in agriculture which have been referred to above rendered it possible to keep stock in quantity through the winter, and to keep it in condition; to enable the agriculturist to adopt a rotation of crops, to gradually abandon the practice of fallowing, and, lastly, to apply an increased amount of dressing to the exhausted soil. During the seventeenth century the peasantry were generally ill off. During the first two thirds of the eighteenth they were generally well off. There are faint traces which suggest that the seasons in the eighteenth century corresponded with the series of years in the fifteenth, and that the two epochs form a cycle.

But the peasantry, though they enjoyed cheap food, on the whole, from the beginning of the eighteenth century till the accession of George III. (1701–1760), were already precluded by law from any solid and lasting benefit from the bounty of Nature. The poor-law of Elizabeth would, had it been strictly

carried out, have divided England into two classes—a pauper population, which would steadily increase, and finally absorb the other class of those whose labor, producing more than enough to maintain itself, was taxed to support the destitute and improvident. This risk was aggravated by the unequal division of land, by the existence of parishes every acre of which belonged to one owner, and which were called close, and of others in which land was largely divided, and which were called open. As each parish maintained its own poor, it became the interest of the owners of close parishes to pull down cottages and drive the laboring population into the open parishes, whenever the device was possible. Hence the English Parliament of 1661, which emancipated the landowners' estates from feudal obligations and compensated the king by levying an excise upon the consumption of the general public, strove to permanently raise the rent of land by a duty of 16*s.* 6*d.* a quarter on imported corn, and a bounty of 5*s.* a quarter on exported corn, and having starved the peasant in the landlord's interest, fixed him to the soil by enacting the law of parochial settlement. The apology for this invasion of the workman's liberty was the inequality of the poor-rate in different parishes; the effect of, probably the design of, it was to render the migration of labor all but impossible.

It is to the law of parochial settlement that the English peasant owed the loutish hopelessness which almost universally characterized him up to a few years ago. Except on the rare occasions when he drove his master's produce to the nearest market town, he never left his village. His life was the meanest routine, without variety, without prospect. He was passive under outrage and penury. He knew one thing, that, once settled, the parish was bound to feed him. Sometimes, but very rarely, he remained single, and saved enough out of his scanty pittance to create an annuity for his old age. Such a man—I remember one such in my youth—was the wonder of the gentlefolks and the scorn of his equals. The former gave him a handsome Bible and prayer-book, the latter, to stigmatize his mean eccentricity and insulting forethought, used to say that he was not fit to live, and not fit to die. Meanwhile, as all persons

were taxed to the poor-rate, it was the interest of landlord and tenant farmer to make use of the power which the law gave them, in order to fix the wages they paid at a quantity which was wholly insufficient to maintain a married man with wife and children, and to supplement those wages by an allowance, paid by other persons as well as by themselves, from the poor-rate, as head-money to the peasant's children. It may be doubted whether the field-hands in the slaveholding States of the Union were so stinted and starved as the agricultural laborer of the old English poor-law was. But, with all this, pauperism grew till it threatened the most serious consequences. I well remember, when I was a boy, that my father pointed out to me parishes where the poor-rate absorbed all the rent of the land. At last the law was changed; unions were established composed of numerous parishes, so as to get rid to some extent of the privileges possessed by sole owners; and checks were put on pauperism. But many persons denounced the change, asserting that the poor-rate was that heritage of the poor which compensated them for being ousted from the soil, for the inclosure of commons by the rich, and the other devices by which a parliament of landowners robbed the nation of its heritage.

Reform or ruin must have ensued long before this epoch had it not been for the almost simultaneous discoveries of Watt, Arkwright, and Crompton, by which steam-power was substituted for manual labor, and machines with multiplied powers in place of the ordinary hand-loom. The comparative cheapness which those instruments of industry brought about led to a great demand for labor—a demand far in excess of those hands which had been previously engaged on the simpler machines. The demand for labor restored, in some degree and in some localities, that power of migration which the law for a century had denied the laborer, and thereby made deep and almost indelible traces on his mental and moral nature. Employers could afford to neglect the law of settlement when all the new hands which they could get, men, women, and children, the latter from very tender years, were pressed into the service of this new industry. The labor was cheap, for it was

sought after eagerly. The gains of the capitalist were enormous. It is said that Arkwright offered a large annual contribution to the costs of government, during the Continental war, if his patents could be continued him. The offer was refused, but he accumulated so vast a fortune that, no such opulence having been anticipated, the greater part of it escaped the tax which was levied on smaller accumulations. The seat of British industry was displaced. Before the great inventions of the eighteenth century were made, Norfolk and the West of England were the wealthiest districts in the country, Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire the poorest. The county families of Southern England generally put their younger sons into the cloth trade. The North-west undersold them, and the traveller in Devon and Dorset will constantly find day-laborers living on a poor pittance, who bear, nevertheless, some of the oldest and proudest names in England, and belong to families which were opulent in the days of the Plantagenets.

The opulence of Lancashire and Yorkshire increased the penury of the south. The busy district was too far for migration in days when locomotion was confined to the old coaches or wagons, and the distant or unknown was as terrible as the open sea to the ancient navigator. Even if the prospect had been attractive, the peasant was too spiritless to move. Now there came on his ill-paid labor the competition of the craftsmen whom the enterprise of northern ingenuity had undersold, The districts of England in which the agricultural laborers now earn the lowest wages are those in which the hand-loom weavers used to ply their calling. How they lived it is hard to guess. They knew, to be sure, that the law saved them from absolute destitution. Perhaps the English game laws have this to be said in their favor, that by bringing wild animals within his reach they gave the peasant the occasional opportunity of furtively satisfying his appetite. "I don't know," said an aged shepherd to a clergyman who commented on the infrequency of his attendance at church, "that I have done much that is bad, except not having enough to eat." The observation is suggestive of the peasant's condition, and of his theory of good works. Unless he was trying to deceive one,

I don't think I ever knew an English peasant who believed that a poacher was a wrong-doer. Similarly, before the English Government adopted free-trade I never met a man of the middle classes who sincerely thought that a smuggler was an offender against any moral law.

The condition of the English peasant, factory hand, and artisan during the long Continental war was at its lowest. The manufacturers gained wealth, and England a brand-new aristocracy. The shipper, after the battle of Trafalgar, except during the short war with the United States, became equally opulent. The contractor of loans amassed even greater wealth than the cotton lords did ; but the workman was starved, and bore the weight of taxation, as he shed his blood for dynasties and purposes which he knew nothing about. When the peace came, all suffered, for it is certain that all the gains of that industry which war stimulates are as nothing to the losses which have to be borne when the fever is over, and unnatural languor follows an unnatural activity. The landowners strove to debase the currency and to keep up rents. They were baffled in the former purpose, but they achieved the expedient by which they hoped to gain the latter, in a still more severe act against the importation of foreign corn. By this they starved the people and ruined the farmers for thirty years, till at last the mischievous law was triumphantly repealed.

In 1824 the laws which had been in operation for nearly five centuries, under which the price of labor was regulated by a machinery which repudiated the reciprocal action of supply and demand, and all combinations of laborers with a view to raise wages were severely punished, were repealed. With this epoch begins the modern trades-union. They who doubt—and many persons honestly doubt—that trade-unions ever raise wages, must admit that while these laws were in operation employers of labor firmly believed that they could do so, and cannot deny that the workmen would naturally believe in the efficacy of an organization which his employer had so steadily striven to prohibit.

It took nearly half a century for the impulse toward trade-unionism to reach the agricultural laborer. But he was far

more oppressed by the labor laws than his brother the artisan, and even more heavily bound by the law of parochial settlement. Apart, however, from the difficulty there is of developing common action among a scattered body of laborers, the peasant was too supine to take in the notion of a labor combination, and too much governed by landlords, the parochial clergy, and the farmers to feel the action feasible or even safe. At last his turn came. A Warwickshire shepherd, whose name and work are perhaps better known among the peasants of English origin than that of any other, undertook the task of forming an agricultural laborers' union. Joseph Arch is a man of ready speech, of great sympathy, of high courage, and of undaunted purpose. The opportunity was a good one, for universal suffrage had been granted to the inhabitants of towns by a government which conceded it in reluctant desperation, while the franchise was not given to the agricultural laborer. The indignation with which the farmers met the movement, the ferocity and derision with which they met the author of the movement, materially assisted Arch. He taught the peasants that they had wrongs, encouraged them in the belief that people who were so angry and intolerant must be in the wrong, and gained them no little external sympathy. Arch, who has no little genius as a leader and organizer, knew as by instinct how to succeed, and has generally succeeded in his work. For the agricultural laborer in a country like England has an advantage which no other laborer possesses. He is the most welcome of emigrants to newly-settled countries, for he brings with him the skill needed for the most universal, enduring, and necessary of callings—the industry which produces food. In a factory the man who can do one thing best is the best workman. On a farm, the man who can do the greatest number of different things fairly well is the most useful hand. Hence Arch can always compel terms, or at least make them feasible to his followers, by depleting the labor market. Besides, the struggle of the artisan is to appropriate to himself a share of his employer's profits. The struggle of the peasant is to appropriate through his employer part of the landlord's rent. Now, to trench too far on profits would destroy the employment of the artisan's industry;

but to absorb rent need not lower the farmer's profits, if he insists on making new terms with his landlord. As yet the farmers have gone with the landlords against the laborer, and are raising the cry of agricultural distress. In course of time they will go, with or without the laborers, against the landlords, or will get into a more and more hopeless predicament.

It is impossible to do justice to the history of labor and wages in England without making some reference to emigration. In England this has been almost entirely spontaneous. For a time the Australian colonies were flooded with convicts, but the practice has been given up, for the most patient of settlers are likely to resist the importation of criminals. In the early history of the American plantation, a forced emigration of political proscripts was frequently effected. But this ceased long ago. The voluntary expatriation of malcontents has been a significant fact in the history of the English occupation of the New World. It was practised by the Puritans and the Roman Catholics, who forgot their natural animosities in a common danger and a common purpose. Undoubtedly England has been saved many a convulsion, if not a revolution, by the fact that her government has rarely been foolish enough to put an embargo on the expatriation of the discontented. While the atrocious commercial code of England was starving the nascent industries of Ireland, the Protestants emigrated, and thus forced Protestant ascendency, the dream of the Whigs, to pass through the ivory gate. When the greater atrocity of the penal code was seeking to turn the native Irish into hopeless and lawless savages, it was lucky that the New World offered an asylum for the oppressed. But it should never be forgotten that the crimes of a government always come home to roost, and England is suffering now from factions which are unintelligible to those of her own lineage who live outside her, but which descend in inevitable succession from the evil days in which she did real wrongs in order to achieve unreal strength. France, on the other hand, whom the peace of 1762 and her own government shut out from the natural expansion of colonization, nourished within herself the mischief which burst forth after 1789. So no victory, no acquisition of territory and treasure,

no force of government, will save Germany from the explosion for which Prince Bismarck and his master are laboriously piling the materials. Like the inhabitants of Herculaneum and Pompeii, they are holding garden parties in the crater of a political Vesuvius, which is even now heaving with subterranean fires. No one can predict the time when these forces will find a vent, but the interpretation of the facts is open to those who can detect, as Bacon suggests, the likeness of the causes which make like events.

The genuine agricultural laborer of middle, eastern, and southern England has only just begun to emigrate immediately from his home to distant parts of the world. As yet these movements have been exceptional, have been organized by colonial agents and agricultural trades-unions, and are no way spontaneous. The landed interest, which the present English Government powerfully represents, does not dare to stop the movement, though it looks suspiciously on it. This is proved by the fact that it has prohibited the assisted emigration of pauper children from industrial schools. It is impossible for the present system of precarious tenancy to which English farmers submit, and which is maintained for the sake of securing political influence over the farmers, to last, and rents to keep up, unless the farmer be supplied with cheap labor. Hence the reluctance with which education is accorded to the children of the peasant, and the low standard required for his intellectual training. The farmers are afraid that if peasants' faculties are too well trained he may become dissatisfied and restless. The bulk of emigrants from the United Kingdom go from the manufacturing towns and agricultural districts of the north, from Scotland, and from the Irish cottiers. But before long the exodus of agricultural laborers from the south will commence, and the farmers and landowners will learn when it is too late that the laborers which are left are the weakest, least enterprising, and least trustworthy of the peasantry, and that what is left is further deteriorated by a large percentage of hereditary pauperism, insanity, and vagabondage. When they are gone they will not be recalled. I remember, half a dozen years ago, that I saw a score of strong young English peasants,

who had resolved on emigration, won back to their home by the tears of their female relatives. Before long these entreaties will have lost their efficacy, even if those who urged them to remain do not then urge them to depart.

I have, I trust, pointed out in the foregoing pages that the present condition of labor in England, ameliorated as it is in many particulars, is the outcome of a set of historical facts peculiar to that country, and singularly lasting in their effects. I do not pretend to assert that the trade-union of the artisan would not have been developed, for the relations of employer and laborer, and the fact that both are paid out of the difference which there is between the value of the material on which they work and that of the manufactured product would have undoubtedly stimulated an inquiry into the principle on which the difference is distributed between the two factors of the product. No reasonable person can, however, I think, doubt that the dispute has been embittered by the harsh English law which prohibited combinations, as the difference between the customary wages of artisan and peasant has been stereotyped by the act of Elizabeth prescribing apprenticeship in all handicrafts. But the peculiar position of the English peasant, utterly unlike that of his own order in other parts of the world, is the result of laws enacted in the interest of employers, and rigorously executed for nearly five centuries. To appearance free, he has hitherto been bound by invisible chains to the place of his birth more firmly than the Russian serf was. In the course of things it is common for the artisan, if he be thrifty and temperate, to rise from the condition of one working for hire to that of a producer on his own account, of an employer of labor, of a great capitalist, of even a millionaire. These things happen and excite no surprise. But no one ever hears of an agricultural laborer growing into the status of an English farmer, still less of a landowner. The sale of land in England is so hindered by the machinery of primogeniture, of entails, and settlements, that the newspapers publish lists of sales as though they were an article of special interest. The charges on the sale and purchase of land are so large, owing to the art with which conveyancers have multi-

plied their refinements and loaded their instruments with verbiage, that these processes often exhaust a year's interest on the value of the estate. Land to the English peasant, as an instrument of his own industry, is utterly unattainable. The rights which he had over commons have gradually been filched away, till a society has been formed for the purpose of saving a little of what was once his inheritance, as recreation ground. A short time ago it was necessary to pass a special act in order to enable the Free Church of Scotland to procure sites in that country of great wastes for building places of worship. But no one has yet attempted to grapple with the problem, which must force itself for a solution, before those who may recognize its importance too late : "How can the peasant be attached to the soil, and how can England take advantage of her natural fertility?"

JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS.

THE AIM AND INFLUENCE OF MODERN BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

NO feature of our time has more meaning for the Christian scholar than that of the new life, which has been poured into all studies bearing on the Scriptures. Biblical science may be called, indeed, one of the ripest outgrowths of the last half century. We can never forget the great periods of the past, when masters like Bengel gave a fresh impulse to sacred letters, or a school of Hebraists like the elder Lightfoot was to be found in England. Yet if we compare our wealth to-day, in every path of biblical learning, with the scanty literature of forty years ago, we may have some idea of the gain. I need not dwell on the influence which the larger knowledge of Oriental languages and history has had on the study of the Old Testament; the rich researches into its early annals, its literature, its later growth, and, above all, the obscure time from the decline of the hierarchy of Ezra to the day of Christ. Nor has the advance been less in the knowledge of the sources of the New Testament. A flood of light has been thrown on the structure of the Gospels, and the connection of the apostolic history with the half-known period just after it. It is not only in the scholarship of the continent we find this life, but we may safely say that there has never been in England so thorough and manifold a range of learning.

Yet there is a deeper cause than the general growth of letters for this zeal in biblical study. It is owing to the change in the whole culture of the time from more abstract pursuits to the real sphere of history and scientific research. The once-absorbing influence of our theological methods has given place to criticism. I am far from the belief that this shows in any

sense the decay of sound doctrine. I hold the very opposite. Theology must always have its high rank, because its truths awaken the highest thought of men. But it must find its work in the living atmosphere of the time, not merely repeat the strifes of a past metaphysics, with which we have as little to do as with the theory of phlogiston. Our scholars have begun to learn, that in a day when Baur and Renan are dissecting apostolic history to prove that the bulk of St. Paul's epistles are of later date, it is fruitless to fight over the remains of the Calvinistic and Arminian battlefield. Christian inquiry is, therefore, leading us to the sources. This is the open secret of the change from the theological to the critical spirit. Had I space, I should be glad to recall in the history of Protestant thought the earlier cases of the same striking fact. Protestantism itself was this appeal from the scholastic systems to the Bible ; and its first years were marked by the growth of critical learning. The commentaries of Calvin were for his time a model, yet he was only one in the host of scholars. It was when in its turn the living faith of Luther had been embalmed in a formal theology, that Bengel opened anew the page of the Gospels ; and its fruit was the revival of a more spiritual belief as well as a sounder criticism. But I can only glance at this history to grasp its principle. We may thank God for the quickening power of the Reformation, which compels us, in spite of the tendency at times to drift toward a dogmatic infallibility, always to return to that study of the open Word given as our birthright.

Such I hold to be the aim of our modern learning. There are many, indeed, to whom it means only the brilliant unbelief of German schools ; who are sore afraid of all researches into the date of our earth ; who shudder at the name of comparative religion, and would think it a blessing if no officious Tischendorf had unburied the Sinaitic MSS., to help on the perilous work of a revision. But it is folly to mistake the passing errors of a time for its real growth. If I cannot set right such incurables, I may yet hope to convince some clearer minds that the gain is greater than the loss, and the result sure of a more living faith in the Christian revelation. We are to find our unity, amidst the discords of opinion, in the sources of divine truth. We go backward from the seven mouths of the historic Nile,

and trace the turbid tide through the desert or the strip of green plain it has watered, until we reach the fountain-head. This is the purpose of my essay. I shall endeavor to show the principle of a true biblical criticism, its influence on theological inquiry, on our view of church history, above all on the growth of a more real Christianity in the life of the time.

Let us ask, as the first step in this treatment of the subject, what we mean by biblical science ; for to most minds, and not seldom to the clerical mind, it is an unknown quantity. The study of the Bible means to one the ecclesiastical tradition which he calls the voice of the Church, to another the theological system which he calls the Gospel ; yet in either case it may be without any clear critical principle. We mean, then, by biblical science, simply the application to the Scriptures of the methods which govern us in all thorough interpretation. It is, indeed, our starting-point as Christian scholars, that the sacred books are our supreme and sole authority in matters of faith, and "contain all truth necessary to salvation." Nor when we speak of criticism, do we at all imply that a mere scientific or literary study can give us that deeper knowledge of the divine truth, which alone can make it the Word of God. Far from it. This Word may speak to the mind and heart of a Christian reader, although he knows nothing of the methods of exact learning ; and if the keenest criticism do not approach it with special reverence for a book, which has fed the spiritual life of men as no other has done, it will be barren indeed even for the scholar. But we are not to confound the authority of its divine truth with the authority of any human systems of interpretation. As a book written in Hebrew and in provincial Greek, given in the historic form, its meaning, so far as it touches on any points of language, history, science, literature, can only be reached by an open criticism. Any theory that forbids or evades this is not only fatal to science, but to revelation itself. The authority of the church is valid, in that it preserves our unity in the essential truth of Christ, but it can never pronounce its decree on those questions, which in the nature of the case are within the field of a growing knowledge. If it do this, it has denied the supremacy of the Word, and affirmed the Romish dogma of a human infallibility. Biblical science, then, is simply the science

of right reason and moral honesty. There is nothing arbitrary in its methods. The principle of induction which it follows is the key of all sure knowledge. It is thus that a genuine science has gained its wonderful results in the domain of nature, because it no longer reasons from preconceived theory, but begins with facts and verifies them. The science of language has thus laid its firm groundwork in our time, in tracing the structural growth of manifold forms of speech to their common roots. Modern history has achieved every triumph in the same way, since Niebuhr sifted the Roman legends. It must be so, therefore, with the study of the Scriptures, if we can claim any just principles of criticism at all. Such a task, of course, is a most varied one. It must begin with the structure of the whole, and pass to the examination of each part; it must involve the question of primeval man, of early religions, the phases of Hebrew growth, and the transition to the age of the Gospels with the formation of the Christian church. Yet the same critical canon runs through all our study. History, points of science, poetry and theology are judged by their own plain meaning, and verified by the impartial tests of science.

It must be clear, then, that such a critical study could only, as with all science, reach its sure results in a gradual growth. The divine truth of Christ abides unchanged alike in its substance, and in its real influence on the life of believers. But the exposition of the written Word is in its nature a human knowledge, which must pass through its earlier and crude methods. Any one, familiar with the history of Biblical interpretation, knows the fact of such a growth since the day of Origen; and yet few have recognized in the very steps of the process a sure law. The modern rationalist will sneer at the use of the word science in regard of Scriptural study; but our true answer, as the defenders of the faith will do well to know, is just this, that it has only kept pace with all science in its mistakes or its gains. The simplest laws of knowledge are always the latest. Alchemy must precede chemistry; astronomy must grope its way through the fancies of the astrologer; and philology, even to the day of Horne Tooke, was a system of ingenious guesswork. And I can, therefore, take no better mode of showing the results of biblical science than by a brief historic sketch.

It was, then, natural that in its growth toward a sound method of interpretation the church should pass through certain steps of development, which I may sum under the heads of the mystical and the dogmatic principles. My aim is to show how each sprang out of the character of the time, and how, in this view, we know alike the truth and the crude error. It was, first of all, by the Christian Fathers, in the time when there was a deep spiritual insight into the truth of revelation, but little critical knowledge of history or language, that the mystical principle was established. The system was an inheritance from the Jewish schools. It had developed in two directions.[1] In the schools of Palestine there was a stricter study of the letter; but the Old Testament was regarded as a book of occult wisdom, in which the Rabbis hunted for a mystery beneath each vowel-point. In the schools of Alexandria the Greek culture led to a far freer, speculative method. We can never understand the early Fathers, unless we read the works of Philo, the earlier master of symbolic wisdom. It was his aim to idealize the anthropomorphic features, that were in conflict with his Platonic ideas, and to bring out the loftier truth of revelation. Every chapter of Genesis is transformed into the most arbitrary fancies, and not a vestige of literal narrative is left.

Such was the method that passed into the literature of the church. We have in Origen, the noblest scholar of his age, a statement of the principle on which the Christian study of the Bible should rest. "Because the Scriptures are written by the Spirit of God, they have not only a manifest sense, but one hidden from many." In accordance with the received division of body, soul, and spirit, he therefore claims three senses or interpretations; the literal for the vulgar mind, the allegorical for the early, childish stage of belief, and the spiritual for the spiritual.[2] It is true that all the fathers were not such mystics in their exposition as Origen, yet all held the same idea of the Scriptures. Neander has said that the school of Antioch was of a far soberer learning, and has contrasted again the more practical teaching of the early Roman fathers with that of the Greek. Yet this criticism seems to us hardly

[1] Nicolas, "Hist. des doctrines relig. d. Juifs," pt. i., ch. 1.

[2] Origen, περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. iv., 5, 12.

to touch the real point. We trace in the Christian expositors, as in the Hebrew, the two tendencies to the more symbolic method of Philo and the more literal of Palestine; but both had the same notion of an occult wisdom to be found by a subtle interpretation. The truth of the Christ and his spiritual Gospel, which only could give the key to the Old Testament, was indeed a profound one. But instead of studying it in the clear method of history, the Bible was made a sacred anagram; the most natural facts of Jewish worship or chronicle became arbitrary figures of the new dispensation. Type and allegory were the master-key that unlocked all the dark chambers, from the early chapters of the Genesis to the poetry of David or the grand utterances of Isaiah. Wherever we turn to the fathers, to the epistles of Clement or the sober Irenæus, to Tertullian, who finds the type of baptism in the Spirit brooding on the waters and in the passage through the Red Sea; or to Augustin, who explains the six creative days as symbols of the ages of divine history, we have the numberless cases of this style of exposition. We prize the early Christian writers for their intellectual and spiritual power in the great conflict of the faith with a Pagan wisdom; nay, we can often admire with Coleridge the rich, devout fancy glowing through the homilies of Augustin; but as Biblical scholars all were simply of a time when true criticism was hardly known.

It was from this source, then, that the mystical method passed into the Latin Church of later times. Nor is it strange that it should remain there. It is indeed the best proof to-day of its incapacity of a sound Biblical learning, that Newman[1] in his essay on development claims, as one of the notes of the Catholic faith, the canon of mystical exegesis. The Bible becomes by the "fourfold method" of its doctors, the tropical, allegorical, analogical, and anagogical, a kaleidoscope, in which the disjointed bits of Scripture can be shaken into any shape of doctrine. That method has never indeed been so reduced to system by earlier or later Protestant expositors. Luther laughed at the fourfold division. It is to the honor of the English Church that her best translator of the New Testament, Tyndale, has stated the true principle most clearly: "Understand that Scripture hath but one sense, and that the literal sense. That

[1] "Development of Christ. Doct.," chap. vi., 5, 1.

is the root and ground of all, whereunto, if thou cleave, thou canst never err ; and if thou leave the literal sense, thou canst not but go out of the way."[1] Few will to-day adopt the canon of Cocceius, that the more senses which can be drawn out of Scripture the better. Few, who turn to the Kabbala of Henry More, will not wonder at the allegorizing a learned Hebraist could once indulge in. Yet it is the defect of far too much of our exposition. It has turned plain history into prophecy. It mars the real learning of a scholar like Hengstenberg. We have it in one shape in our Anglican divines, who quote any ingenious conceit of the fathers, and can turn the scarlet cord of Rahab, or the ephod of the high-priest into a type of the Christian priesthood. We have it again in the evangelical school of men like Simeon, who declaim against ritualism, but follow the same symbolism in the interpretation of the Old Testament. Let us state the true principle, that none may mistake our meaning. All Christian scholars will admit typical features in the Hebrew worship, and prophetic passages which clearly point to the Christ of the New Covenant. But all such figurative portions are intelligible as such. If our typology be made to turn any natural fact or incident into a mystic meaning, it robs the Scripture of its whole historic truth. Nothing has done greater wrong to the Word of God than the exegesis, which has built a fanciful Christology out of any plain psalm of David, or any rite of the temple worship. It has not only been the source of every fancy, but it has led to much of that dishonest spirit, which "palters with us in a double sense." We recognize at once its unsoundness in the fantastic system of Swedenborg, who found in Scripture, as Origen did, a threefold meaning—literal, spiritual, and celestial ; yet it is hard to know why three senses are not as reasonable as two. We may excuse the early methods of the Fathers ; but it is astounding to-day, when a Christian scholar forces on the word of God that style of exposition. Criticism can admit no such mystical canon. It bows in reverence before the spiritual mysteries of revelation ; but it will not distort its plain truth by the guesswork of a human fancy.

We can now pass to the second marked feature in the history of Biblical interpretation, which I have called the dog-

[1] Tyndale, "Obedience of a Christian Man," p. 304, Parker ed.

matic principle. It was undoubtedly a step forward when the mystic and fanciful spirit gave place to the unity of system, as it had developed in the Latin Church. The law which reigned in the exegesis of its schools was the *analogia fidei*. Now there is assuredly a unity of truth in the Scriptures, a doctrinal basis, by which we may study the meaning of its several parts. But the abuse of the principle lies, first, in forgetting that the Bible is given in no scientific form, but in history, poetry, gospel, and epistle. If theology change its natural expression into logical proof-texts, it destroys the whole character of revelation as a living history. But it is yet worse when it substitutes for the true analogy of faith the later dogmatic system of one age, and so interprets the ideas of St. Paul, or the truth of Christ's own Gospel, by the controversial dialect of the schools. It was precisely this style of exegesis, which became the fixed method of the Latin doctors. All the living pages of the New Testament were used to sustain the definitions of the scholastic metaphysics, that had grown since Augustin. Every dogma, like that of the supremacy of Peter, or the transubstantiation of the elements, could have its scriptural texts, torn from their real connection. There could be no criticism in such a method. It was against this scholastic abuse that Protestantism declared the supremacy of Scripture. Luther touched the very point when he rejected the "analogia fidei," and claimed the "analogia Scripturæ sacræ." This pretended rule of faith was in his quaint phrase "a rover and a chamois-hunter."

And it is this false dogmatic tendency in the interpretation of the Bible, which a true criticism must correct in Protestant as well as Roman scholasticism. We need not gather the examples of it to convince any clear-sighted scholar. The habit of citing disjointed texts of Scripture as proofs of doctrine has often led to the worst sophistry. Poetry has been hardened into logical proposition, and the language of a familiar letter been wrested from its simple meaning. Many a discourse on reprobation has been wrung out of the Hebrew phrase, "The Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart;" the natural outburst of the Psalmist, "Behold, I was shapen in wickedness," has been tortured into a theological statement of total depravity; and the most unscriptural dogmas have been defended as holy mysteries by the verse, "Thou art a God that hidest thyself." But these are

only scattered instances. We may well say that almost all the great controversies are simply colossal proofs of the same vice. If we read the Epistle to the Romans by the light of real criticism, it has nothing to do with our metaphysics of divine decrees, but it speaks the grand catholic fact of the calling of all as redeemed in Christ, instead of a small pedigree of circumcised Jews ; yet its sense has been lost by the two equally mistaken schools of Calvin and Arminius. If we take the whole question of baptismal regeneration, the simple word of Christ to Nicodemus, declaring a kingdom of more spiritual gifts than John taught in baptism by water, has been looked at through the sacramental theory of the scholastic. Stanley has lately shown that the classic text for absolution in the Gospels is no more than the mistaken phrase of the Rabbis, who meant by "binding and loosing" the action of their courts of law. It is so with the treatment of the Scripture on every side. Its real unity and harmony must be found by an honest criticism of its own pages, not an artificial system. Nor need we wonder, when it has been so often distorted by dogmatic methods, that a keen thinker, like Mr. Matthew Arnold, should try to exclude all its doctrine, and treat it as a literature which has in it only a moral element. If we will meet his brilliant paradox, we must accept its partial truth, and show that we do not confound its teaching of the personal, living God, its real history and real poetry, with either his barren ethics or our former modes of interpretation.

Our view of biblical science can now be clearly understood. It has been a growth out of these crude but natural stages to a riper method. What, then, is the change which a later criticism has introduced? Simply the correction of such arbitrary rules, and the study of the Scriptures in their own direct meaning. Nothing of their truth has been lost in the process. The spiritual, the mysterious in the revelation of God is as fully recognized, although the mystical principle is not forced on its plain history. The doctrinal truth is not forgotten, because Scripture is not studied as if it were a treatise of systematic divinity. In a word, modern biblical science is nothing else than the method, which by degrees has grown out of the more thorough analysis of its language, structure, and design. In that view I will sum the results of this critical study, as it con-

cerns the character of the Bible itself, before I proceed to its influence on theology and Church polity. It would be interesting, in a fuller sketch, to speak of the rich evidence, which our researches into the history and archæology of the East have given to many of the facts of Scripture. We have far more reason to trust than to fear the results of science. But my task is not so much with the literature of the subject as with the principles of criticism. The first result of such study, then, in teaching us to examine its real structure, is to give us the true idea of the unity and design of Revelation. The Bible is not to a Christian scholar, as it has been too often regarded, a book of arbitrary teachings on all problems of doctrine, or natural science or morals. It is given for the revelation to man of the one grand fact of a personal, living God in human history; and we study his word, not as we do a systematic treatise, but in its living form.

If in such a light we turn to the Old Testament, we have the record of a nation, the development of the national life from its patriarchal beginnings to its Mosaic legislation, its kingdom, and its later sacerdotal state. Its chronicle has on it the stamp of all early writing, from a period of crude ideas of nature and man, from a childlike style of history to a later and clearer knowledge. Its social morality has the natural growth from polygamy, slavery, and heroic barbarism to the milder type of civilization. Yet there is no less the evidence of a divine character throughout the whole record. It is this very criticism which enables us to see this wonderful and unique feature. The knowledge of one God, Creator and Lawgiver; the pure ethical teaching of the Mosaic code; the social and religious fabric built on it, and abiding through all the epochs of the national growth in sharpest contrast with the idolatry and vice of the people; the Providential history amidst the changes of the outer world, all these stamp on the record the indelible proof of a supernatural design. Even the keenest criticism confesses this fact. The admission of Arnold of the moral supremacy of this religion is the best answer to his absurd denial of a personal God in Jewish history. And it is precisely this result of our criticism, which gives us the ground of agreement with the just demands of science or historic study. We deny by the most scientific proofs the *à priori* theory of all

who reject the divine origin of such a revelation. But we need not, with this knowledge of its essential truth, have any perplexity as to the questions geology may ask of the Mosaic cosmogony, or historic criticism as to the structure of the Pentateuch. If there be any who hold that all these details can be squared with science, we leave them to the test of honest criticism. All we demand is, that the defence of revelation shall not be endangered by resting it on any questionable ground. And still more, in regard of the morality of the Old Testament, we are no longer perplexed by the barbarity of a Jael, or the slaughter of the Canaanites, or the sins of David. We do not look in the earlier time for that pure social spirit, which only the teaching of the Gospel could give. It is a far higher reverence we pay, when we thus learn its divine truth, yet recognize in it a faithful record of the growth of Israel, as fully in its mental and moral stages as in its childlike ritual. We know its meaning as the education of a race for a perfect Christianity. Such is the method which our best scholarship has carried into the treatment of the Old Testament ; and whatever may be the differences between the brilliant, often over-ingenious researches of Ewald, and more sober scholars like Bleek, the method has wrought the most real results. Its history is history ; its poetry is poetry. Its prophecy is interpreted by the great historic law of connection between a preparatory religion and that of Him who is the "fulness of times," as we see the fruit in the seed. The Old Testament is a far more living book, since it has become no longer a volume of allegories, but is studied in its real structure.

If we turn now to the book of the New Covenant, we have the like method. As we open the Gospels and learn their formation, it is the person and life of Jesus Christ, the kingdom he established, which we see in the record of living history. Each of these four biographies reveals to us the character of that Jewish time, the ideas of a Messiah and Messianic reign ; and we trace in their differences the varied points of view, in which the same wonderful person appeared to those who saw and heard him. Yet it is here we find the real unity of the books. It is not that of a mechanical work of art, or of a dogmatic treatise on the creed and polity of the kingdom of Christ ; but we see it as it speaks in the incarnate wisdom of the Son

of God, and as his truth shapes itself into the common faith of believers. All these portraits agree in the great features of his character ; all unite in the substantial facts of his teaching and mission. It is the invaluable fruit of such criticism, that it has taught us to find more than a formal repertory of proof-texts in the Gospels. The divinity of Christ, his redeeming sacrifice, his gift of the Comforter are no longer theories, but realities, which we know more truly in their historic meaning. We have no difficulty in regard to the lesser discrepancies of the narrative. His life is greater than all books. And it is here we have the best answer to all modern errors. I cannot more clearly illustrate my meaning than by a reference to a weighty question of our day. It is the effort of the school, of which Renan is the expositor, to undermine the authority of the fourth Gospel ; and the strength of his objection lies in its difference from the whole tone of the Synoptics, which marks it in his eyes as the work of a later, more speculative time, instead of the simpler Jewish teaching of a Matthew. Yet the very study of the Gospels in connection with the mind of their time reveals the fact, that the lofty truth of the word of God is to be found not merely in Platonic or Alexandrian sources, but in the doctrinal faith of Palestine.[1] The Logos of the fourth Gospel is no more a later conception than the Messiah and Prophet, whom the Synoptics portray. We recognize in the more spiritual insight of St. John, or the more simple page of St. Matthew the same divine man ; yet in the last of the Gospels we see the transition from the Jewish faith to the more perfect truth of the Word made flesh. If we thus read the harmony of the book, we need fear no verbal criticism.

But, again, the same method has opened the unity of the apostolic history. Any who recalls the "Planting and Training of the Church," by Neander, one of the first essays in this line, will not forget the clue it gave to the tangled web of exposition. It has been the task of the best scholars since to study in those epistles, so varied in tone of thought, their living connection with the growth of the early body. Criticism has modified the old notion of a *Harmonia Evangelica*, such as Bishop Bull wrote. We can no longer quote that age as if it were one of full-grown theology and church polity. But as we

[1] Nicolas, "Hist. d. doctr. d. Juifs," p. ii., ch. 2.

read there the long strife of Jewish and Gentile opinion ; as, above all, we trace in St. Paul the constructive idea of the time, that question of law and grace, of a narrow tradition and a Christian faith, which must be settled for the unity of the growing church, we gain a real knowledge. It has taught us to find in these epistles all the steps of that first formative age through these mental and moral struggles toward an organic life. This is our positive fruit. And if such a criticism has shaken the validity of a few minor epistles, if we do not now quote the Apocalypse as a literal prediction against the Papacy, we have learned more surely the substantial wholeness of the canon. It is this very study, which in showing us the formation of the early Church, answers the latest rationalism. Its whole fabric rests on the assumption that the differences of the epistles, the Gnostic allusions, the sharp strifes of Jewish and Gentile ideas, prove a later origin. Such an array might well stagger our traditional interpreters. But if we have read truly the character of that age, we have found in it the germs of all the after-errors, and have learned that out of the battle came the unity of the body.

But I cannot dwell longer on the detail of the method. It is enough if I have shown what such criticism means. Nor will it be necessary for me to touch at length on any of the theoretical questions so often mingled with this subject. I have not considered the doctrine of inspiration. If this whole line of reasoning be clear, it will place that question on its real ground ; for it will show that a genuine criticism gives us a conviction of the divine worth of the Bible, far stronger than all others. All theories of mechanical dictation or verbal infallibility were the natural product of the mystical and dogmatic methods. If we have learned the method of a true criticism, we know the inspired, essential truth of the Word ; and if we have not so learned it, no theory will help us against the attacks of a false learning. But it would be a better evidence of what I have said, and a better answer to those who look doubtfully on the growth of biblical science, if I had space to add a sketch of its results. I can only sum it in a few words, and I shall take my example from that country, where the strife of neology and evangelical belief has had its fullest career. In the church of Luther we can see all the steps

in the history of criticism, which I have described. The neology of Germany began as a revolt against the dogmatic methods of the time ; it ripened from the day of Paulus into the rationalism which followed the critical system of Kant, and narrowed Christianity to a code of ethics. It passed again with the more brilliant Pantheism of Strauss into the philosophic theory, that found in the life of Christ a beautiful myth of the past. Yet step by step there grew within the church the deeper and devout criticism of the Scripture. It was against the facts of Christian history that the mythical theory was broken in pieces. We have to-day the successors of Strauss in the scholars of Tübingen, who claim that they have found the method of historic criticism. Yet it is seldom understood by those who look with fear on their subtle learning, that so far from a step forward, their method was a confession of the failure of the mythical view. They have been forced to admit the historic basis of Christianity. They take now the last ground of assault in an attempt, by a keen analysis of the New Testament books, to overturn their apostolic origin. We need not underrate their skill, but this we can justly say, that a fearless inquiry has only led to a sounder faith. Each step has been nearer to the end. It has been no fruitless struggle, but from first to last the gain of a Christian scholarship. All the rich contributions to biblical knowledge, all the noblest names on the side of German evangelical belief, all that has passed into the thought of our time, is the fruit of the long conflict. And that I may not be supposed to write in this my unsustained opinion, I beg to add the words of Dorner, which sum the whole question. After a full statement of the systems of Strauss and Baur, he concludes that "the negative criticism, beginning with the Wolfenbüttel fragments, hastens irresistibly to round its circle. The mythical hypothesis, even in its more modern form, the moment it sets foot on the ground of the actual history of Christ's words and deeds, begins to destroy its own foundations. Its latest phase must be its last." "Evangelical faith may fearlessly allow its full rights to criticism, and to an exegesis now no longer under tutelage." [1] Such is the position of this great evangelical leader. It may well assure us of the simple truth, which the Christian Church should

[1] Dorner, Gesch. d. Prot. Theol. B. 3, Th. 1.

have learned long ago, that biblical study has everything to hope and nothing to dread from the progress of criticism.

With this idea of a biblical science, we are now ready to understand its further influence in the growths of Christian learning in our own time. It is, first of all, in the sphere of theology that I wish to study it, as the weightiest of questions for the scholar. To know the whole result of modern studies, we must look a moment at the intrinsic connection of theology with the sources of revelation. It is the necessary work of the church to set forth in the form of creeds and articles the truths given in Scripture, not only because they are bulwarks against error, but because there is a unity and harmony in these truths themselves. Theology has thus its orderly growth from the earliest time, as each period has studied more deeply the sacred word, and has brought out in some new relation to the mental and spiritual want the central doctrines of the Gospel. There is no shallower mistake than that of the sceptic, who looks back on the gathered systems of the Christian past as an empty word-battle. All the most earnest conflicts between the decaying pagan thought and the truths of God in relation to man, are embodied in the Nicene symbol. All the struggles of the mind and heart of Europe are written in the confessions of the Reformed churches. But while this is true, it is to be remembered, that the great danger of theology is always to mistake the empiric doctrinal system of one age or sect for the Catholic truth. We have seen already the root of this error in the historic sketch of biblical science ; but it may be read at large in the history of the church. The doctrine of the Incarnation became at last a metaphysical formula, and the rich theology of Augustin was frozen into the definitions of the schools. The later dogmatism of the Reformed communions, when the original life of the Gospel had been fettered by its schoolmen, led the way to the reaction of neology. And hence the need of the church is always to keep alive the study of the word of God, the divine truth that shall guard it against these idols of the theological cave. If our religion become for the body of teachers or believers a system of doctrinal propositions, it has lost its power. Theology must be a healthy growth, not a fungous deposit that kills the tree.

It is the clear recognition of this principle, which more espe-

cially in our time is working out the truest and largest results. One of its marked signs is the study of doctrinal history, which we may justly call the fruit of the last half century. Our best thinkers perceive, that we have reached the point where the systems of the past must be studied in their historic law of growth, to know the real harmony. Augustin and Anselm, Calvin and Luther, Twesten and Rothe must be measured by the conditions of their Christian time. Yet this is only the herald of a deeper want. It is a biblical theology in its true meaning, toward which both our critical and doctrinal learning aim. I do not mean that mechanical summary of the doctrines of Scripture, which consists in arranging its texts under certain heads. I mean that study of its whole structure, of the essential character of the Gospels, of the growth of apostolic thought in its first formative time, which shall take us back to the unity of Christian faith before the aftergrowths of the church. Such a study will plant us on the foundations. It will not make us prize the less any dogmatic formations of the past, but rather to the Christian scholar the history of theology will be that of a living mind, expounding the divine, inexhaustible mind of Christ. All the articles of our theology will be seen to be the manifold expression of the one truth of Revelation, God in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. This biblical science alone can bring unity into our discordant confessions. We do not want a new formula of concord, which seeks compromise in some more subtle definings. As our divines have learned to study St. Paul's view of justification by its own light more than through the spectacles of Calvin or Arminius, to measure the system of Augustin from the true centre of the New Testament, not force his theory of decrees or sacramental regeneration on the Gospel, they have learned our substantial agreement. We have to-day a renewed discussion of the Atonement. It does not show that this central truth is in danger, but we are only learning not to define by the theology of Anselm alone that mystery of a divine love, which speaks in the sacrifice of the Son of God. And as the theology of the past will thus find its impartial test in such a study of the word, so the true aim of a Christian theology to-day will be clear. Critical learning will not destroy any true doctrinal teaching of former times. But the problems, that now call out the deepest thought of the

church are of more moment than any before, because they come from the special relation of revealed truth to the whole field of science in this age. They touch the life of Christianity. It is for the personality of God, the agreement of a supernatural revelation with law, the need of religion as the ground of moral sanctions, the origin and destiny of the race, the hope of a future existence, that we are called to battle with a Pyrrhonism, which shelters itself under the mask of scientific truth. We must surely know, that if we are to meet the Agnosticism of this day, it can only be by a thorough mastery of the method as well as the true results of science. It should be enough to warn us of our most fatal mistake, when we find Herbert Spencer citing Mansel as an oracle, and building his whole system of denial on the theological ground, which that ingenious champion of the faith thought the stronghold of revelation. If Christian theology will have again its mastery, as in former times, over the minds of men, it will not be by claiming that the "limits of religious thought" forbid us to apply to Scripture even the moral laws, which the author of revelation has written on the conscience. It will not be by defending past modes of scholastic thought with crude exegesis. But it will be by accepting all that a sound criticism has given us, and recognizing the fact that the abiding truths of Christianity have more power than ever, if they speak in the language that convinces the intelligence, the conscience, and the life. This is our want. If we can teach men to read in their Bibles no sealed deposit of our theology, but the plain fact of a personal Creator, a God in history, a revelation of divine love and duty in His Son, we need not fear the atheism of to-day. And this is my earnest conviction, that all our noblest aims are guiding us toward this end. This study of the essential character of revelation shall give the new life to theology, and make it again, as it has been in the past, able to restore the age from doubt to belief.

Yet it is not only in the direct sphere of theological learning that I recognize this influence of biblical criticism. I must pass briefly to its relations with other subjects, of as deep interest to the Christian thought of our time. The history of the church, in its bearing on all the questions of its nature and polity, is one of the weightiest of these. It is indeed among the best fruits of this Christian age, hardly older than the immortal work

of Neander, that we have begun to read in the history of our religion more than the Latin idea of an ecclesiastical state, or the too common one among Protestant writers of a series of dark ages, followed by an anarchy of sect. We see in it now the historic law of a Divine order, a religion linked in every step of its life, through its Nicene period, its mediæval feudalism, its awakening to knowledge and freedom in the Reformation, with all the growths of Christian civilization. But it is only in the more critical study of the New Testament itself we can only find the groundwork of church history. Just as this study leads us back from the manifold, partial systems of doctrine to the living truth of the Gospel, it leads us from the fragmentary polities to the original fellowship of Christ. We learn from it that the church of the New Testament was indeed an organic body, not a mere movement of Jewish religious life, yet, on the other hand, no copy of the theocracy of Ezra, with its priestly caste or temple service, but a divine germ meant to grow, like all institutions, in the soil of the world, and take shape according to the conditions of all social growth. The critical method of our time, as I have proved, has shown us the gradual way in which each visible feature of the apostolic body, its ministry, its creed, its worship, passed into fixed shape from the freer life of the first household. Such a study, then, corrects by the most impartial tests the common error of all sectarian theorists. Romanism is built on the *à priori* notion of a visible *ecclesia*, and can construct the whole supremacy of Peter out of one misread verse in the Gospels. Anglicanism follows the same method. It reasons from its assumption of the need of a succession to the facts, and so can readily turn the brief letter of Paul to Timothy into a treatise on the divine origin and perpetuity of the episcopate. But as no chain is stronger than its weakest link, so the weakest link in this case is where it should be strongest, in the degree of the New Testament evidence. Nor is the error less with the Presbyterian who will find a divine law in parity, the Independent who thinks the kingdom of God a democracy, or the Baptist who insists on immersion or adult baptism, because they were the usage of the infant church. All such theories vanish before the criticism which teaches us to rest no system on a few slender hints, but to apply the laws of history. Yet let none be alarmed at the result, for such

criticism gives more than it takes away. It is argument enough for the episcopate, when we can trace in it the normal growth of the early diocesan church. It is enough that infant baptism was the natural form of a household religion, whether before or after the apostolic age. We can recognize the unity in essential faith and order of the first believers, while we know the plastic character of the time. Our New Testament study is more and more bringing us into the fellowship of the Christian body, as we thus measure the real worth of primitive facts.

And thus we may pass to the last thought, which encloses all in itself. The influence of such a biblical science will be toward the growth of that real Christian life, which is the end of all Christian knowledge. As our studies bring us nearer to that divine yet human Person in whom the Gospels centre, we shall learn more and more that the kingdom of God is larger than any symbolic books or any ecclesiastical order, and can only be fulfilled as the life of the incarnate Lord is embodied in the life of redeemed humanity. Theology is queen of the sciences, but the unity of the spirit is the substance of the symbol. The church is the school-master, but its purpose is to upbuild the "perfect man." And this is the view of Christianity which shall meet the most earnest inquiries of our time. It wants this kingdom of God, which was meant by its Author to be the fellowship of men redeemed in Christ, and which alone can solve the present riddles, more real than all disputes of creed or ecclesiastical polity, the education of the social conscience, the unity of severed classes, the reconcilement of our culture with a reverent faith, the aims of peace and wise benevolence. If we have learned this need of our time, we have learned the noblest work given to the scholar or the Christian man. And as we study our subject in this light, we shall perceive it to be the deepest principle of the Gospel, that this ethical and living result should be the latest. It may seem at first a strange law, but the more we examine it, it will be found to have its correspondence with all history. Revelation has obeyed the order of intellectual and moral growth. It has cost the world its nineteen ages to ripen the germ planted by the divine sower in the soil. There was needed first the period of theological training in Greek and Latin Christianity, until it reached the unity of doctrine and of law. There was needed

next the critical period of a Protestant thought, by which it reached the utmost point of Christian knowledge. There is needed now the outcome from the strifes of system to the positive unity of truth. It is the life of Christ, the living application of the Gospel that He revealed, the real kingdom of a divine humanity, which is now to show to the world the fruit hidden in the seed, but asking all these processes for its growth. The study of the original sources of Christianity is one of the great signs of the time, that we are on the very threshold of this best period.

If, then, my view of the aim and influence of our biblical science be true, if we can see its relations with the most real aims of our modern scholarship, we may surely accept the present state of learning, in spite of all its drawbacks, with faith in the result. I have not hidden its dangers or its defects. It would, of course, be useless to expect that any, who look on all inquiry in criticism or theology as beyond the sphere of science, will agree with such views. But enough if I can aid those who, in a time of much confusion, are seeking the true harmony between the abiding ground of revelation and the changing growths of doctrinal interpretation. Nor can I more fitly close this essay than by a last citation from the scholar, who has written so nobly the history of Protestant theology. "It may be said that modern theology and literature in this country show a riper stage of exegesis than in any former time. Not only have the laws of interpretation been examined and a science of hermeneutics formed; not only are the auxiliary studies of criticism, history, geography in advance, and the text more clearly settled, but the exposition of the New Testament has within these forty years had a wonderful progress. The masters of modern exegesis are thus working together toward a biblical theology, which, though a historical science, by no means displacing dogmatics or ethics, will hold up to these the real and in many regards more complete model, wherein they have their standard." It is enough for me that my line of argument is confirmed by so unquestioned a master; and I can only hope that the growth he has seen in his own land may encourage all Christian scholars, who are working for the same true end.

EDWARD A. WASHBURN.

NEMESIS IN THE COURT-ROOM.

SEVERAL States of the American Union have recently adopted statutes permitting defendants in criminal cases to be sworn and examined in their own behalf. In some States the change is acknowledged to be only tentative. In other States, as is the case in Pennsylvania, the statute does not reach defendants charged with the higher felonies. In another group of States, and in England, a defendant, though admissible in his own behalf in a civil suit, is still excluded in a criminal prosecution. And even where the change has been made, its policy is an open question, while in England the preponderance of opinion is still against its adoption. The issue being one not merely technical, its discussion may not be unsuitable in these pages.

We should remember, at the outset, that the burden is on those who would exclude from the witness-box any person acquainted with the facts in issue. We do not exclude such persons in social or historical investigations. Our first inquiry, when we desire to make up our mind as to an act towards which such investigations are pointed, is, What do the parties themselves say? We would consider, for instance, if there was a quarrel between two of our acquaintances, and we were required to decide as to the merits of this quarrel, that it would be monstrously unfair for us to hear the story of one side and not that of the other. In historical issues, also, what judgment would be of value which did not take into account the statements of both sides? Who would pretend to impute the authorship of the casket letters to Mary Queen of Scots without hearing and weighing her explanations of these letters?

Who would pretend to decide upon the controversy between Charles I. and the Parliament, without a careful examination of the documents emanating from each? Who would condemn the Federalists for disloyalty in the war of 1812, without studying the papers issued by them when defending themselves on this very charge?

The burden is then on those who would exclude parties as witnesses, and the way this burden is disposed of by them is as follows: They allege, in the first place, that to permit a defendant to testify on his own behalf on a criminal issue, is inquisitorial; that it virtually forces him to testify to his own guilt if he be guilty; and that it therefore militates against the fundamental maxim that no one shall be compelled to accuse himself. And as if to illustrate the odiousness of such examinations, we are turned to foreign trials, in which the defendant is kept for months under oath, and in close confinement, until, after a series of adjourned investigations, a confession is wrung from him; and we are asked whether this is not both cruel and unjust.

Undoubtedly it is, but not more so than the rule of the English common law (a rule that is as fairly to be charged against us as is the old inquisitorial system to be charged against the modern French and German jurisprudence that has repudiated it), that a defendant charged with felony is not to have the assistance of counsel in presenting and arguing his case, and that not only, therefore, is he precluded from testifying in his own behalf, while the witness-box is open to his prosecutors, but he is shut off from professional assistance in preparing a defence to which professional assistance is requisite.

But in point of fact the statutes permitting defendants to be witnesses in their own behalf unite in making such appearance optional with the defendant, and they also provide that in no case is the court to permit the non-appearance to be used as a presumption against the party who declines to appear. And this protection has been rigidly applied in a long series of adjudications in our American courts. Counsel for the prosecution, who have even covertly alluded in their arguments to such non-appearance, have not only been checked, but rebuked in a way to produce a feeling rather in favor of than against the person

assailed. If the suggestion has been actually uttered, and the jury been told that the defendant could have testified, but would not, and that this is an argument against him, a new trial is granted as a matter of course in cases of conviction.

It might be said that all jurymen know the law in this respect, and will presume against a non-testifying defendant without hint from counsel. But is this so? Are not jurors just as likely to feel the wrongfulness of permitting such a presumption to operate as would legislators? So, at least, we have much reason to conclude. One of the most closely contested homicide cases that I can recollect was that of Alley, tried in Boston, in 1874. It was a case in which, had the trial been before the rehabilitating statutes, we would have said that nothing but the rule that guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt could have saved the defendant. The defendant was not called as a witness, though there were several points resting on his own personal knowledge on which his explanations seemed peculiarly called for. Yet he was acquitted, on the ground that his guilt was not shown beyond reasonable doubt; though if the presumption against him for not testifying had been allowed to operate, it would, so delicately did the balance hang, have turned the scale. There are, it is true, cases in which jurors might act less discreetly, and in which convictions, in nicely-balanced cases, might result from an application, as turning the equilibrium, of the presumption arising from silence. But if this contingency is an argument against the admission of the defendant, it is an argument against the admission of any other witness. There is no witness, connected in any way with the parties, the non-calling of whom may not be made use of as an argument against such party. Yet we would scout the idea that because of this contingency all witnesses in any way connected with a party should be excluded from the testifying in his behalf.

The temptation to perjury, however, is advanced as an objection; and there is no question that the temptation to perjury, to a person under trial, is strong. Even an innocent man may be tempted to swear falsely in order to escape an unjust accusation; and few guilty men, so it is argued, would hesitate to add the guilt of perjury to the guilt of other crimes whose

penalties they are endeavoring at the time to escape. The sight of the gallows, also, so it may be urged, will make any perjury appear venial when it is a means by which life can be saved. But are we to exclude testimony because there is a probability that such testimony may be false? Is a witness incompetent whenever there are influences about him which constitute a strong temptation to perjury? If we were so to hold, we would have to exclude from the witness-box not only parties, but the relatives, the friends, the partisans, the creditors of parties. Where could the line, indeed, be drawn, which would divide between temptation to perjury, which we would overlook, and temptation to perjury which we would treat as exclusionary? Partisanship in an election contest might be regarded as presenting a temptation comparatively slight; yet where do we find such masses of perjured testimony as in election contests? In adultery suits, has it not become a maxim that it is as much the part of a man of gallantry to deny, under oath, an intrigue, as it is to engage in it? Have we not, by common consent, abolished the test of pecuniary interest in civil suits, and yet are there not many men who would rather lose their liberty for a few months than their money? Has not the law always permitted children to be called against or in behalf of parents, and parents against or in behalf of children? Unless we reverse our rules admitting witnesses in these several classes of cases, great as may be the probability of perjury in either of them, we cannot exclude defendants because it is probable that they, when examined, may perjure themselves. And as to a defendant on trial, we must recollect that there is an important counter-check. Great as may be his temptation to perjury, he cannot forget that perjury in his case, from the conspicuousness of his position, is of comparatively easy exposure, and that if exposed it would damage his cause more seriously than would the perjury of a mere witness. It is a familiar rule of law (a presumption, indeed, of fact only, but none the less effective) that the fabrication of false testimony in a case affords a strong inference that the party fabricating such testimony is guilty of the charge which this testimony was fabricated to meet. The perjury of a witness cannot be imputed arbitrarily to the party calling him, since this perjury may have

sprung from the witness's own zeal, or from the folly or desperation of those having the party's case in hand. But it is otherwise with the perjury of a defendant. It is imputable only to himself.

We may, therefore, dismiss the current objections to the admissibility of defendants as witnesses for themselves in criminal issues, and view some of its advantages. To illustrate these in the concrete, it may be sufficient to turn to some of our more conspicuous recent trials.

An alleged accomplice, for instance, is called as the principal witness for the government in a prosecution for murder. In Hunter's case, tried in Camden, New Jersey, in June, 1878, if we should strike out the testimony of Graham, called by the prosecution as accomplice, there would not have been sufficient evidence in the prosecution's case to sustain a conviction. The murder was one of peculiar atrocity. Armstrong, its victim, was a musician and printer of music in Philadelphia, quiet, simple, and inoffensive. He had been, down to a few months before his death, in partnership with Hunter, and he was indebted to Hunter to the amount of six thousand dollars, for which he gave notes. Hunter conceived the plan of insuring Armstrong's life in a sum largely beyond the indebtedness, and then causing Armstrong's death. Insurances were effected to the amount of twenty-six thousand dollars, in several companies, Armstrong, who evidently was accustomed to lean on the superior business capacity of Hunter, uniting in the application in the belief that the excess was a mere matter of form. The insurance being effected, the next step was to get rid of Armstrong; and for this purpose a plan was laid so skilfully that, had it not been for the disclosures of Graham, the accomplice, whom Hunter found it necessary to employ, the crime might have been unpunished. Both Hunter and Armstrong lived in Philadelphia. To attempt a murder in Philadelphia, where the parties were surrounded by observers, and where they had many acquaintances, would have been hazardous. For Hunter to have alone undertaken the work might have been also hazardous. A pistol might have done it; but he was unwilling to attempt firearms, because, as was afterwards deposed by Graham, such wounds might be imputed to suicide, and suicide would vacate the policies. Arm-

strong must, therefore, be waylaid and beaten to death; but for this purpose a place of comparative seclusion was requisite, and a confederate, for Armstrong was a well-built man, stronger than Hunter, and his resistance to an attack by Hunter alone might have been sufficient, if not to repel the assailant, at least to attract attention to the assault. As the scene of the attack, a secluded street in Camden was chosen, to which Armstrong was enticed by Hunter, on the pretence of seeing a person, living in that neighborhood, who was indebted to Armstrong. Graham, who had been hired by Hunter to begin the attack, was to follow Hunter and Armstrong from Philadelphia to Camden, crossing in the same boat, and dogging them until they reached a spot where Hunter was to turn up an alley, which was to be the sign for Graham to strike. As weapons, he was provided with a hatchet, and a hammer on which were marked the initials "F. W. D.," the object being to throw suspicion on another party. Graham struck the blow with the hammer, as was arranged; but then, either frightened or overcome with remorse, fled for a short distance, leaving Hunter, as he alleged, to finish the work. When he returned, a few minutes after, he saw Armstrong prostrate and helpless, and was told by Hunter that the deed was done. Hunter and Graham succeeded in making their escape without notice, nor was there any evidence produced on the trial of persons who saw either of them at Camden that night.

Hunter was tried; rightfully convicted; and rightfully executed; but it will be seen, from what has just been stated, that there would not have been proof sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, unless either he should have confessed the act himself or Graham should have become a witness for the State. Confess he was very far from doing, and on the testimony of Graham, therefore, the prosecution was forced to rely. On the one hand, it appeared from Graham's own admissions that he was a drunkard and a vagabond; turned away from place after place for idleness and worthlessness, and considering twenty or thirty "drinks" a day as by no means an extraordinary allowance. On the other hand, in a multitude of points, so many and various as to leave no doubt of the truthfulness of the outline of his story, Graham was corroborated.

So far as concerns the law, therefore, Graham's testimony would have been sufficient to have sustained a conviction. A conviction it did sustain, and abundantly, though Hunter was examined as a witness, and flatly denied the material parts of Graham's story. A conviction it would, of course, have sustained under the old law.

But the conviction, under the old law, would not have been as satisfactory, nor would the retribution have been as just and complete, either in appearance or reality, had not Hunter been allowed to place himself on the witness stand. When confederate in crime is arrayed against confederate, and when it is a race as to whom will be assigned the gallows, and to whom the distinction of becoming "State's evidence"—when it depends sometimes on caprice of the prosecution, sometimes on the superior baseness of the accused, who of the two is to array himself as the dupe and penitent victim of the other's plot—it is proper that both should be heard, and that they should both be called as witnesses, with equal rights. And eminently does this appear just and proper when we contemplate the possibilty that the informer may have been the sole perpetrator of the crime, and that he may have instigated the prosecution as a means of screening his own guilt.

What has just been said, so far as it concerns the justice of admitting a defendant to testify in cases where the prosecution depends upon the testimony of an alleged accomplice, is further illustrated by the late trial of Mrs. Cobb, in Norwich, for her husband's murder. Bishop, the chief witness for the prosecution, without whom there could have been no conviction, made it part of his case that under the influence of an illicit passion for Mrs. Cobb, he had contrived with her a plan for poisoning her husband, and had supplied the poison; and when asked as to whether he had not caused his own wife's death, he protected himself from replying on the ground that an answer would criminate him. More malignant and desperate villany is hardly to be conceived of than is displayed in the deliberate poisoning of two unoffending persons, one the wife of the offender, in order to pursue without molestation another criminal act; yet even this villany is intensified by the voluntary betrayal (for he could have refused to answer as to Cobb's death as he did as

to his wife's death) of the woman for whom was professed the guilty passion set up as the stimulus to these atrocious crimes, and by his delivery of testimony the object of which was to bring her to the gallows and to screen himself. Undoubtedly Bishop's testimony was corroborated in so many material points as to justify Mrs. Cobb's conviction, though as to the whole *corpus delicti*, her statements, when she was examined as a witness, were express to her own innocence. But had she not been examined there would have been a sense of unfairness and of one-sidedness which would have materially interfered with the due discharge of the duties both of jury and of court.

In another class of cases, of growing importance, the value of the defendant's testimony is equally manifest. Crimes may be divided into two great classes—those in which a guilty intention is not requisite to the constitution of the offence—*e.g.*, cases of negligence—and those in which it is requisite. In the latter class of cases, by far the most numerous, there can be no conviction without proof of guilty intent. Guilty intent, therefore, becomes, in such cases, an essential element, and who is so competent to speak to this as the defendant himself? He may set up actual non-participation in the guilty act; but in most cases his defence is that he acted in passion or under sudden provocation. If so, who is so well-informed as he as to the issue? It seems a mockery to say, "The question to be determined is what was the condition of the defendant's mind at the time," and yet shut the mouth of the only one who can testify as to such condition. We may not, when we hear him, believe what he says. We may reject his statements as we reject the statements of other witnesses to material facts. But that he knows more than any one else as to the issue as to which we are inquiring there can be no question; and justice cannot be fully done until we hear what he has to say.

There is another and important aspect of the question before us which remains to be considered. We have just argued that justice is most subserved by the admission of the testimony of the defendant. We have now to add that the moral effect of criminal procedure is much impaired by the exclusion of such testimony. Criminal trials are among the most effective instruments for the moral instruction of the community; yet it cannot

be denied that by criminal trials, under the old system, this instruction was imparted in a way calculated often to create a sympathy for the defendant, or, at all events, a sentiment that he had not been fairly dealt with. There is a novel of Dumas' in which, when there is a secret to be divulged which would solve all difficulties, a paralytic old man, who is the sole possessor of the secret, but whose voice and whose hand are alike incapacitated, sits in his chair gazing with agonizing yet speechless interest on the parties whose distress he could relieve by a word, but who look to him in vain for the word by which they could be thus relieved. If, instead of a man silenced by disease, but otherwise competent to tell facts valuable to others, we were to suppose a man silenced by law, but competent to tell things vital to himself, we have a fair illustration of what takes place in most trials under our old practice. A man is charged with crime on the evidence of persons interested in procuring his conviction. The crime is one which draws public attention, and the public eye is fixed on the trial. But what is there gathered in the way of moral instruction? A person on trial, it may be, for his life, with all the power of the government against him, is capable of supplying, by his evidence, a gap in the case, or of offering a solution which would be at least probable. He stands, however, at bay, silenced by the law, and there grows up that sympathy with him which is felt for the weak when arbitrarily oppressed by the strong.

We may explain in this way the failure of trials, under our own system, to act healthfully on public feeling. There can be no better illustration of this than a case which created peculiar public interest in England in 1824. Henry Fauntleroy was an eminent banker, in whose hands large deposits of securities had been placed. The firm of which he was a member became embarrassed, and it was alleged that he forged powers of attorney in the names of the owners of some of these securities, and thus realized their proceeds. The forgeries were adroitly executed, and in such a way as not necessarily to implicate Fauntleroy. The forger, so far as the *res-gestæ* indicated, might have been one of the other partners, or a clerk in the institution; and it was not inconsistent with the facts immediately connected with the utterings of the forged notes that

Fauntleroy, at the time of these utterings, might have been ignorant of the forgery. This question, however, was apparently settled by the discovery of a paper, carefully docketed and filed in Fauntleroy's private box, which was as follows :

" Delaplace, £11,140 consols ; E. W. Young, £5000 do.; General Young, £6000 do.; Frances Young, £5000 do.; Jedediah Kelly, £6000 do. ; Lady Nelson, £11,595 do. ; Mrs. Pelham, £20,000 four per cents ; Earl of Ossory, £7000 do. ; I. Bower, £9500 do.; M. C. Parkins, £4000 consols ; Lord Aboyne, £61,000 four per cents ; Elizabeth Fauntleroy, £3550 five per cents ; W. Reeder and H. Fauntleroy, £7000 do.; Peter Marsh and John Marsh, £21,000 three per cents."

The entire schedule contained a memorandum of securities exceeding £170,000, and underneath was the following, apparently in Fauntleroy's writing :

" In order to keep up the credit of our house, I have forged powers of attorney, and have thereupon sold out all these sums *without the knowledge of any of my partners.* I have respectively placed the dividends as they became due to account, but I never posted them. HENRY FAUNTLEROY."

This paper purported to have been executed in 1816, nearly eight years before the forgeries were discovered ; and if it were genuine, must have remained among Mr. Fauntleroy's papers, subject to the inspection of his confidential clerks, who were not suspected by the prosecution of complicity. Was this extraordinary confession itself a forgery ? Had it been slipped, as the explosion approached, among his papers by the real criminal ? Against Fauntleroy were arrayed, on the trial, not only the crown officers, but the vast moneyed power of the Bank of England. He who for years had been himself one of the most powerful and respected of English bankers, found himself in the dock without friends, and stripped of the means even of employing counsel. Was the confession his ? If so, what were the motives that impelled him, not merely to sacrifice his estate, but his life, for the benefit of his partners ? It came out in the trial that he was under no obligation to them, and that to their capricious course in withdrawing large sums from the bank, he being the sole working partner, were attributable its embar-

rassments. He had been, so it might well have been argued, their devoted, efficient, and self-sacrificing servant for many years, all the labor and anxiety of the enormous business falling on him, and they reaping for a long time great dividends through his successful management. Is it likely that he would have forged to save them from ruin, and then confessed the forgery by a methodical and dry statement such as that produced, when it was impossible, had he really made it, but that he must have known that by so doing he was putting the halter round his own neck? What was the nature of the relationship which could have produced such unparalleled self-sacrifice on his part? Fauntleroy was convicted, and on the evidence, as it stood, rightfully. He was hung, and wrongfully; for though he was concerned in forging the powers, yet there were mysteries about the act which the evidence produced on the trial did not dissipate. It would be absurd to say that the spectacle of his execution was edifying. He had made, on the trial, it is true, an address in which he took all the blame of the forgeries on himself; yet even this address failed to explain why he should have ruined himself for the benefit of others. But even this address was not evidence, nor was it treated as such by the court, nor was it permitted to go to the jury as proving any facts. There was a feeling throughout the community that only part of the case had been heard. It would have been otherwise if, when offering to testify, he had been examined and cross-examined as to the facts pertinent to the issue.

We have a similar feeling of dissatisfaction with convictions in those cases in which the condition of the defendant's mind, and the degree of provocation he was under, at the time of the event, are at issue, and yet in which he is shut out from the witness-box. A homicide takes place, unseen by third persons. Was it premeditated? Did the defendant strike under the stimulus of a sudden and unprovoked insult? Did he act in self-defence? Can any verdict, when such defences are set up, be satisfactory where the defendant was not permitted to say, under oath, what defence he had, and the jury were not permitted to give to his statement credence?

In all other spheres, let it be observed, we are accustomed to resent *ex-parte* condemnations. If even a stranger be at-

tacked, we decline to pronounce on his case until he is heard from ; and if we find others prejudging him on this one-sided case, we are apt to take part with him. Often in this way we may account for the strong sympathy aroused by political or religious extravagances which were arbitrarily punished on an *ex-parte* case. Lord Jeffrey's brutality, in refusing to prisoners even the shadow of the privilege of self-explanation, not only largely contributed to the subsequent revolution, but roused up numerous new advocates, not so much of the proscribed opinions, as of the rights of those by whom these opinions were pronounced. Wilkes was personally detested by Lord Chatham, to whose haughty temper and pure moral tone Wilkes's vulgarity and licentiousness were execrable. Yet when the rights of the people in general were invaded by Wilkes's one-sided condemnation, and by his expulsion from the House of Commons, Chatham bore down upon the field with all his thunders as the vindicator, not indeed of Wilkes's opinions, but of Wilkes's rights. The sentimental yet demoralizing humanitarianism of the "friends of the people," who attempted, during the administrations of Washington and John Adams, to drag the United States into the rapids of the French revolution, was as disagreeable to Jefferson as it could have been even to the most rigid of federalists ; yet when the alien and sedition laws were passed, and when prosecutions for libel were instituted, in which from the nature of the then law the defence could not be heard, Jefferson unhesitatingly entered the ranks to shelter the defendants, though he felt that this might identify him with opinions he disapproved. And now what threatens to break down the moral force of the German Empire is its resort to what appears to be gag law. Communism by itself will always be repudiated by the great body of the people. But if liberty will be imperilled unless communists are protected, so precious is liberty that protection will be given to communists so that liberty may be saved.

We touch, therefore, high ethical issues when by *ex-parte* prosecutions crime is made the object of sympathy. It is important, to enable popular feeling to be properly directed, that the whole procedure of a trial should be so regulated as to produce a sense in the public mind that there is fair play.

There was not this sense under the old system, and this the old system itself confessed. The defendant's mouth was not only closed, but he was, until very recently, subjected to capital punishment in all cases of conviction of felony. The judges felt the unfairness of this, and they undertook to meet one injustice by another. They put in the way of conviction a series of impediments which enabled criminals, when adroitly defended, to escape in cases when on the merits they had no defence. "Better," said Blackstone, in view of the horrors of the old system, "for ten guilty men to escape, than for one innocent man to be punished." To enable the ten men to escape several ingenious contrivances were devised. If there was a variance between a single word of a writing set forth in an indictment and the writing itself; if it appeared that the offence was a felony instead of a misdemeanor as charged; if any one of several barbarous epithets (such as "feloniously") was omitted; if the evidence showed that the offender was an accessary who prepared and arranged a crime instead of actually perpetrating it as averred; if the name of any one of the owners of stolen property was incorrectly spelt so as to make a difference in sound; if the terms of a statue describing an offence were not accurately transcribed; if one of the grand jury finding the bill turned out to be incompetent; in each of these cases there was to be an acquittal, no matter how glaringly convincing the evidence for the prosecution might be. In one scandalous case a woman—guilty of torturing an apprentice to death—was acquitted on her first trial because there was doubt whether the instrument of torture was, as averred, a cudgel, and on her second trial was acquitted because there was doubt whether it was, as then averred, a sword. In another case, equally scandalous, there was an acquittal of abduction because the indictment did not aver the crowning act of guilt to have been committed in the right county. None but the rich or capable were likely to reap the benefit of these technicalities, because none but the rich or capable could employ counsel adroit enough to detect and take advantage of the slips which would work acquittals. For the friendless and ignorant prisoner there was little hope, so far as relief through technicalities was concerned. On the other hand, so far as the merits were concerned, only one side was heard. The

prosecution's case was proved by the prosecution's witnesses, though in most cases involving fraud they were deeply interested in procuring conviction; though in most cases of violence they were animated by passionate family, social, or partisan prejudices against the accused; and though in some cases they might be the real perpetrators of the crime, whose punishment they thus sought to devolve on another. These witnesses were all placed on the witness stand to speak under the sanction given by the administration of an oath. They were "sworn" witnesses; they were appealed to as such; the shield of religion and of the holy book on which they were qualified was thrown over them, and the jury was told that their evidence, if uncontradicted, was to be believed. But the defendant's statements, even if he were permitted to make them, were not to be believed. His vehement protestations, his agonizing attestation of facts which would sustain an hypothesis of all others the most plausible, could it be verified—these the jury was told to disregard as if they were mere wind. If there was adequate inculpatory evidence, there was to be a conviction, no matter though statements of the defendant, averring a probable state of facts which, if sworn to, would have acquitted him, were actually screamed by him in his agony into the jury's ears. This was not fair play. Crime was not exhibited to the community as from its own nature bringing on itself retribution. So far from this the most infamous criminals escaped through technicalities though their guilt glared on the jury at the very time the acquittal was directed, while others were convicted, because through a technicality still more pernicious, their own statements of the case, no matter how convincing these statements might be, were not "evidence." The consequence is that the moral effect of English common law criminal jurisprudence has been positively bad. Instead of this jurisprudence teaching morality, it has taught immorality. It has left on the popular mind the impression that crime, when adroit, ceases to be punishable; and that innocence, which, from its incautiousness, does not protect itself at every step by witnesses, is to be surrendered silent and helpless to the imputation of guilt.

Yet it is a great moral truth that if there be fair play, and if both sides are fully heard, crime will be brought to light and

innocence vindicated. Hence we are justified in saying that if there be a removal of technical exclusionary rules of evidence, only logical exclusionary rules (*e.g.*, those excluding irrelevancy and hearsay) being retained; and if there be such liberty of amendment allowed as will, without taking an unfair advantage of the defendant, square the *allegandа* with the *probanda;* if the absurd technical distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors and between principals and accessaries be swept away, as is proposed in recent projects of codes—then, so far as the machinery of justice is concerned, there will be no impediment to the operation of the law by which crime, from its own nature, leaves tracks by which it can be discovered, and by which innocence is able to offer solutions to relieve it from the pressure of inculpatory facts.

Innocence, indeed, can supply the key by which the cipher can be translated, because at each new point of application will be discovered coincidences between the statements of the innocent inculpated party and the facts already established in the case. On the other hand, guilt, if examined fully and circumstantially, will be led on excursions where there will be no such coincidences, and where discrepancies will be found which will result in exposure. "*Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,*" says Aristotle, "*τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές.*" In other words, the true solution will fit the facts with which the false solution will conflict. We have a striking solution of this in the Tichborne case. In England, as the law stood at the time of the Tichborne trial, and as it still stands, parties in civil suits may be examined on their own behalf, but not defendants in criminal suits. In the Tichborne ejectment suit the claimant was examined and cross-examined as a witness for himself. In the subsequent prosecution in which he was tried for perjury he was excluded as a witness; but the whole relevant part of his evidence in the ejectment suit was at the disposal of the prosecution, and all such other portions as were explanatory were admissible when offered by himself. The exhaustiveness of his examination and cross-examination on the ejectment trial was such that, the issues being very much the same, he could be treated as if actually examined and cross-examined in the criminal suit. That he was a man of singular adroitness, sagacity,

and presence of mind, there can be no question ; and there can also be no question that he was posted, as far as diligent search and a retentive memory would enable him to be, with the Tichborne surroundings. He had also the advantage of many points of resemblance with the lost baronet whom he personated. How, then, was the case affected by his admission as a witness?

Had it not been for the claimant's own testimony he might have recovered in the ejectment suit. He had been recognized as her lost child by Lady Tichborne. The family solicitor who conversed with him from time to time as to matters of family history, such as the lost son would be familiar with, united in the same recognition. A number of officers and soldiers in the army, with whom the young baronet had been on familiar terms, and several of the family servants, swore positively to the same effect. The time and place of the disappearance of the baronet, and those of the emergence of the claimant matched sufficiently to enable the one to be regarded as a prolongation of the continuity of the other. Had the claimant been at liberty to be silent, his case was one which it might have been difficult to defeat. But he did not choose to be silent. Confiding in his own matchless readiness and shrewdness, as well as on his acquaintance with the history and peculiarities of the baronet whom he personated, he tranquilly offered himself to the cross-examination of Mr. Hawkins. An iron ship, built with a series of water-tight compartments, may have the hull of one of those compartments pierced, and yet continue to float ; and by a like immunity, parts of a defence, which are not vital, may be exploded, and yet the defence may, in the main, hold good. It is otherwise, however, as to vital points, and the parts which make up the *res-gestæ* of a case are vital when they cannot be torn from it without destroying it. Here it was, in particularizing the points that constituted his identity, that the claimant broke down. He had not the faintest reminiscences of the French language, though in France he had lived till early manhood, and he had been educated in French schools. He could not remember the names of his teachers when such teachers had been cloistered in such a way as to shut them off from subsequent inquiries. He could not remember family secrets which, though of a character likely to leave an indelible impression on

a young man's mind, were not known out of the family range. He was deplorably ignorant of transactions which had occurred when he was a young officer in Ireland. And when he came to fill in details, these details were demonstrably false. He attempted to explain the relations of the lost baronet to his cousin, a lady to whom he had been conditionally engaged, by a scandalous fabrication that to the claimant's coarse mind seemed probable enough, but which was felt at once to be villanously false by court and jury, and which was promptly and indignantly stamped as an infamous lie by those whom he mixed up in his charge. He had to narrate details, but when he got out of a certain range with which he had familiarized himself, he could not step out without being trapped. Descriptions that he gave of places were promptly negatived by diagrams, pictures, photographs, and the testimony of experts. Sorties that he made into the region of collateral family history were in like manner promptly repelled. He was caught in his own trap. The key he offered to unlock the mystery of the lost heir not only did not fit, but turned out to be a burglar's skeleton. And he was afterwards convicted of perjury because he had set up a perjured claim.

That to make manifest either guilt or innocence it is only necessary that the truth should be fully brought out, is a conviction which has exhibited itself in every department of literature. The great masters of the drama seem to have viewed it as constructed for the special purpose of illustrating this conviction. It is remarkable with what care Shakespeare has sought to discharge this high moral office, and to show us at the same time the extent to which the materials for the induction may be found. He does this in connection with almost every phase of crime. In the trial scene in the *Merchant of Venice*, for instance, we have Shylock condemned for what we would call an attempt to kill :

> "For it appears by manifest proceeding
> That indirectly, and directly too,
> Thou hast contrived against the very life
> Of the defendant."

But this is not reached by proving merely that Shylock stood ready to plunge his whetted knife direct into Antonio's heart.

Whatever in Shylock's history is likely to throw light on his purpose is brought out. Undoubtedly he loved his ducats. But above all, he craved, in the secret chambers of his heart, for revenge. He had been not only underbidden in the market by Antonio, but Antonio had insulted his race and had reviled him personally. Shylock is heard as a witness in his own defence, and he is not condemned until the provocation he received is fully displayed in the lurid coloring given to it by his strong, narrow and vehement nature, intensified by a consciousness of personal as well as of race oppression. Shylock's murderous revenge, subordinating to itself even his avarice, is revealed to us; but we have also revealed to us a temper on his part, which, while not making him less dangerous, causes us to regard him as one to whom grievous wrong has been done; who has been embittered and hardened by this wrong; and who has been impelled by this fierce though trained passion, not to assassinate privately, as he, or hired desperadoes whom he might employ, might readily have done, but to use what he conceived to be a legal means of destroying his foe. We feel that justice is here done by exhibition of the truth on both sides; and that in this way not only will the offence, as it really is, be exhibited, but a punishment commensurate to the offence can be imposed. The same care is exhibited by the great poet in bringing before us what might be called the defences of others who are arrayed before us charged with crime. We have in no case unmitigated villains displayed to us. On the contrary, while the judgment always falls on the criminal, we hear just what the criminal has to say for himself, and, putting aside the objective side of crime, we have exhibited to us various phases of penal amenability;—Macbeth, in defiance of the common-law theory of the wife being under coercion of the husband, submitted tremulously to his wife's coercion over himself—Lady Macbeth stopping at no crime which would help her ambition, and yet, with sensibilities so highly strung that their reaction, like the rebound of the overcharged gun, shatters the casement in which they are enclosed—Hamlet's responsibility modified by chronic melancholy self-engendered—Othello, by temporary madness produced by a violent external shock. We have in these, and others of Shakespeare's great creations, not

merely illustrated the rule that we cannot get at the truth in any case of imputed wrong without hearing from the actors on both sides all the pertinent conditions, but we have foreshadowed one of the great themes of modern reformed jurisprudence, that of modified responsibility, *vermindert Zurechnungsfähigkeit*. Punishments, we are thus reminded, are not to be few and incomplex, as they are by the English common law, which makes all felonies capital, and sends all minor offenders to the common jail. So far from this, punishments must be various, assigning death to only very exceptional cases, and in all others apportioning corporal discipline to the peculiar phase of guilt.

Yet the drama, brilliantly as it has been used for this purpose, does not give us the platform on which the rule before us, that if the facts on both sides are fairly brought out the truth will be exposed, is best illustrated. Few dramatists have genius enough to create the vast collection of motley and apparently disconnected facts from which we infer or reject guilty agency in even the simplest of our judicial investigations. Even were this not so, we feel when we study the works of even the greatest master of fiction that the scene before us is fiction after all. We may avoid its moral teaching by saying that it is poetic justice to cause the villain to be disclosed at the right time, or innocence to be at the decisive moment vindicated, but that this is not the justice of every-day life.

Nor can the social arena be the platform on which we can effectively illustrate the great law of our nature, by which facts, when fully explained, become the revealers of truth. We cannot compel reluctant witnesses to tell their story before any self-constituted investigating committee, no matter how high its social authority; nor could such a committee be found sufficiently disciplined in the logic of examination, sufficiently patient and sufficiently impartial, to conduct such an investigation. Our ecclesiastical trials exhibit to us how impotent even the most upright and scholarly men may be for such purposes. The witnesses who have come before such courts have been only witnesses who came voluntarily; and few men, unless impelled by a zeal which makes their perceptive, if not their communicative, faculties unreliable, are willing, without the protection of a legal

summons, to expose themselves to the detentions, the misconceptions, it may be the personal responsibilities, attending the publication of inculpatory public statements as to others. It may be that to a consciousness of this infirmity in the testimony adduced before them, we are to attribute another peculiarity of ecclesiatical courts—that the judges vote, in all cases in which there is a vigorous contest, that the accused party did very much as they would suppose, on *à priori* grounds, his peculiar theological idiosyncrasies would have impelled him to do. To no tribunal which is unarmed by the full powers of investigation which the law affords, and which is not divested of personal or partisan prejudices as to the particular parties, can we look for a full disclosure of facts pertinent to a contested case.

The court-room, however, is the theatre where Nemesis, exercising this supreme function of the investigation and disclosure of truth, as well as that of the adjustment of responsibility, has her distinctive throne. From this throne she can compel the production before her of all the proof necessary to the determination of a contested issue. It is necessary for this purpose that she should be hampered by no rules except those of a sound logic. Nothing should be excluded that is relevant; and that is not secondary, and therefore inferior to a higher order of proof that could have been obtained. It is essential, also, that interest in the result, or even absorption in the result, as in the case when the accused offers himself as a witness, should go to credibility and not to competency, and that it should always be kept in mind that no man can tell more about an act than the actors themselves, and that to construct a false, and at the same time largely circumstantial story, which will square with all disclosable facts, is not within the range of human powers. It is also essential that not only the judges, but the counsel engaged, should be men of capacity and conscientiousness. If this be so, the Nemesis of the Court-Room will take her place among our chief moral instructors. She will not only show, as she has already shown, that guilt, when exposed, will be punished righteously; but she will also show that when the facts are all brought out the truth is the only hypothesis that fits.

FRANCIS WHARTON.

THE CLAIMS OF REASON, CONSCIENCE, AND AUTHORITY, CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO RATIONALISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

RELIGION regards the supernatural as its proper sphere; yet in presenting itself to mankind it makes its appeal at once to our natural consciousness of right. Apart from this it has for us no *locus standi*. If it came as a mere terror announcing inexorable events, it might perforce exact obedience from our fears, and our conviction of duty and right would perhaps be overwhelmed by an instinct of self-preservation. But religion speaks to us as rational, and rationality genuinely aims at right. If ever we are at all subjected to arbitrary demands from without, we cannot help feeling that we are wronged, or at least are unworthily treated.

But beyond this it may be said, that not only we may not be overawed into abandoning reason, but we may not ourselves, on any pretence, lay it aside, for nothing can abrogate its rights. So whatever comes before us as an obligation should commend itself to our intelligence. Were it otherwise, our nature would seem a hopeless enigma, and the idea of duty be impossible.

2. It is with such preliminary reflections we turn to consider the position occupied by our religion at the present time, confronted as it is by the natural sense of right and duty in mankind. On its first appearance eighteen hundred years ago, it had a large and enthusiastic reception by many, in certain central homes of civilization—Jerusalem, Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, Antioch; from them it began to pervade the world; and for some generations it increased its hold on the reason and conscience of

those to whom it appealed. Later on, it necessarily encountered the political changes of the East and West. New positions were inevitable, "side issues," as they may be called, were opened, and the onward progress of the religion was qualified. If the natural conscience were not less responsive, yet the conditions of civilization were so greatly disturbed that the clash of social elements often rendered inaudible the still small voice. Sometimes Christianity, while accepting the facts in the midst of which it had to move, was able to coincide with the world's changes; but at other times it found itself unavoidably in hostile collision with the current policies and customs all around. We cannot pause to give even an outline of these transitions from century to century. Passing through them all, and influencing them variously, Christianity has reached our own time. In the West, among the most educated nations, it has, in some sort, undisputed possession. No rival religion, at least, has appeared, since Mahometanism was driven out of Spain. Yet in all Europe, a large and increasing number of thoughtful men are doubting and denying the special teachings and claims of what once was hailed as the Gospel of our race.

3. The explanations commonly given of this unquestioned fact are far from satisfactory. Some allege that the "evidences" of our religion are not sufficiently known; a kind of defence which, after so many ages, sounds rather like an accusation; for a true religion concerns multitudes to whom evidences, either historical or philosophical, must be inaccessible. Its literary and archæological examination are full of interest; but the world at large has to do with the substance of the religion; and that ought to speak for itself.

It is quite an inadmissible assumption of some defenders of the faith, that Christianity is a set of doctrines arbitrarily demanding assent on external grounds. Not a few supposed believers, dismayed at the present state of facts, and fearing that the intellect of the world may be against them, even refuse the appeal to "evidences," as implying a right on man's part to "verify" Divine truth; and they blame what they call the "pride of reason;" forgetting that the pride of reason is not reason, but is a moral perversity. No doubt our relations to our Moral Ruler, and a future life, could not all be discovered

by reason ; but they must commend themselves, when properly ascertained, to all who have responsibility respecting them.

There is a class of believers whose complacency, quite undisturbed by growing infidelity, almost makes it an "evidence" for the truth of a supposed prediction about our religion, that decay of faith was to be a sign of the spiritual decrepitude of the "latter days." The unethical character of such a rejoinder is evident from the fact that Christianity still goes on appealing to men's natural conscience, which it could hardly do if unbelief were to be thus reckoned on and acquiesced in. Such systematic decriers of fallen humanity would, at least, scarcely confess that their own form of Christianity is irrational, or that their conscience revolts at it. Other men, then, have an equal right to satisfaction, without being told that they are a kind of predestinated misbelievers. The facts must be faced, far more thoroughly and fairly than by such alarmed subterfuges as we thus refer to.

4. All who surely know that their religion is Divine, and that it cannot be in real opposition to "the light that lighteth every man," must feel bound to deal very differently with the resistance to Christianity presented at this time in educated countries. They must insist on distinguishing what they believe from all mere opinion ; for until this is done, there will always be the danger of the multitudes mistaking theories connected with Christianity for Christianity itself. There can be no doubt that much which passes as Christian truth is but imperfectly defined opinion ; and this fact is commonly dealt with by an appeal to "authority" as to what Christianity is and demands ; which means, perhaps, an entire appeal from natural reason and conscience to some *dictum* which demands submission, whether it really satisfies reason or not. With a majority of Christendom, at this time, it is the Bishop of Rome, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, who is the "authority" to which reason and conscience is said ultimately to defer. With others it is the authority of Scripture, which, they think, is absolutely to be bowed to, even when it seems opposed to what men feel to be right in principle and true in fact. This idea of "authority" is essentially the same with both sides, and is based on the

supposition that Divine truth must come to us in a form of external infallible certainty, even in detail.

Here it is obvious to remark, that both these standards of "authority" have existed among us for some centuries side by side, and that they have not succeeded in persuading men that any such standards take the place of reason or conscience among responsible beings. To what position they have brought Christianity in our times, we may learn from the acknowledgments of failure which meet us on every hand; to which we must now more fully point, distressing though they are. We may afterwards see what "authority" has to say for itself.

5. The organ, *e.g.* of Cardinal Manning and the staunchest Roman Catholics, seeing that all which distinguishes Christianity from natural religion is being gradually eliminated from public opinion, surveys the state of the Continent, once outwardly of the same faith, and exclaims:

"At this moment we may truly say, there is no Christendom." (*Dublin Rev.*, April, 1875, p. 488.) "No one will say that there is now any nation which retains as a nation, or approaches to retaining, that pervasive endemic faith, penetrating to the very core the people's whole moral convictions, which characterized the Europe of the Middle Ages."

The testimony of another witness, the Archbishop of Canterbury, is equally explicit. Being in the chair of the "Christian Evidence Society," and surrounded by prelates and men of distinction in Church and State, his grace lately sanctioned the official avowal, "that it is impossible to disguise the fact that throughout Europe, as well as in this country, there is a rising wave of scepticism. Unbelief pervades the ranks of the educated and uneducated; and the doubts suggested by the highest intellectual culture filter through the social strata." (*Report*, May, 1878.) Two months after this, the Archbishop of York, preaching before the "Lambeth Conference of one hundred bishops of England, Scotland, Ireland, America, and the colonies," describes the present Christian position as emphatically a "conflict of opinions."

Of course the public journals comment on this state of things. The *Morning Post*, wont to take the side of orthodoxy, strikingly connects the European Christianity with the prospects

of European politics, and urges that the prolonged disputes of statesmen and churches, Catholic and Protestant, are issuing in Germany in a growing abandonment of religion. We then are told that a band of more than a quarter of a million of adults there is united for the entire "overthrow of religion, government, morality, and property;" also that the coming war of unbelief is to be no mild "conflict of opinion," or "wave of scepticism," rising only to subside, as some may hopefully imagine. Its uncompromising intensity may further be tolerably estimated by Strauss's [1] recent call "on all men of science, or who affect philosophy, to throw off with frankness the name of Christian, too long maintained, since every one knows that none of them believe even the Apostles' Creed."

Is France better than England or Germany? We saw last year (1878) that in the land of De Maïstre and Montalembert, the country of Chateaubriand and Dupanloup, as well as the Coquerelles, the centenary of Voltaire was with difficulty restrained from becoming a national literary repudiation of our faith. It was just limited to the public assurance of the atheistic *literati*, "that Christianity no longer commends itself to the intellectual culture of the age." At the same time in Rome, the Freemasons also were leading the Voltairean festival.

6. What is it, let us ask, that these denials all mean? Is it that our age is rejecting the claims to "the supernatural," put forth by our religion? No, men go further than that. Such writers as the painstaking author of "Supernatural Religion" do not stop there. The historical truth no less than the Divine character of our faith is disputed. They could not be separated long. Not that the supernatural depends on any history of it, nor that any history, written by the most gifted of the sons of men, is the guarantee of the supernatural, or is guaranteed by it: but that they go together; so that to adopt either is soon to admit both.

Can any one seriously persuade himself that the remedy for an unbelief which thus insists on having a basis historically true,

[1] For fuller extracts reference may be made to a recent work of the present writer, "The Church of all Ages." London.

and also appeals to the human conscience, is to be found in pure submission to any external "authority"? It would simply mean, so far as yet appears, the suppression of thinking, the persecution of investigation, and the silence of some of the best emotions of the heart of man. Such an attempt to arrest conscience has, thus far, but increased and angered the free thought which it meant to crush, leading it frequently to retaliate unjustly on the spirit of reverence, which unnatural forms of rationalism abhor. It is quite unreal, in looking back, for instance, as some do, to the sixteenth century, to regard the Reforming movement as essentially evil and irreligious; or, on the other hand, to profess that the Catholics were then just defending an irrational and tyrannical superstition. Perhaps we should confess that neither saints nor reasoners had their way at that time. The postulates of the controversialists on both sides were very imperfectly examined. The previous conditions of moral and religious action were little considered; and so long as this is the case anywhere, truth, reason, and conscience have but prejudiced treatment.

Nor let us deceive ourselves into imagining that, even now, things are philosophically much better. A large proportion of nominal Christians would gladly keep things quiet, and secure peace at the price of truth, not perceiving that the growth of civilization has made this impossible. We may be, and probably are, in the mere infancy of social and political philosophy; but the Divine right of the human mind to struggle for all attainable truth will never now be abandoned, or even suspended. We know, indeed, that we have to learn from all quarters. Our "rationalism," no doubt, has to learn modesty, and our "traditionalism" has equally to acquire sincerity. But there can really be no truce.

Our nature is being educated towards an ideal. The past has brought us to the present, and (though much has to be left behind) we have brought something with us thus far. In all this, an *à priori* is implied, and the relation between it and man is to be more and more cleared as he advances. For mere empiricism is but a "hand-to-mouth" kind of thinking, haphazard and unprincipled. The thorough desire to be right, the steady aim to be right, must accompany every step of our real

progress. The great controversy between human thought and unreasoning dictation has gone on in all ages under different forms. In Europe (with which we are now concerned), from the middle ages down to our own, the fires have alternately blazed and smouldered. But the former, at least, attempted a philosophy of the subject; the present age is but slowly perceiving that it ought to do so. Meanwhile, the course of the higher education among us tends towards the sciences of facts, rather than thought.

7. We are bound, now, to endeavor to mark more precisely the present condition of the religious problem in our own day. There is an ominous philosophical agreement both among Catholics and Rationalists—alike abandoning the *à priori*—that Christianity cannot be "proved," as the phrase is; and that if admitted at all, it must be so, right or wrong (as we have said), on the authority of the Pope or the authority of the Bible; and that, too, without asking what the Bible is, except a venerable Book, or what the Pope is, "when distinctly speaking as Pope." This controversy had long been inevitable, and now has forced itself on attention, by the "Syllabus," in which Pius the Ninth so lately challenged the social, political, and religious position of the modern rationalism, "all along the line;" and by the acceptance of the challenge by both statesmen and men of literature throughout Europe.

No more noticeable exponent of the Papal view of the different parts of the whole problem could be found among us than Dr. Newman of the Oratory, and none so likely to be listened to. In a letter addressed by him to the Duke of Norfolk, a nobleman who of right stands at the head of the Roman Catholic laity of England, Dr. Newman replies to an "Expostulation against Vaticanism," by Mr. Gladstone, our late Prime Minister, who had regarded the Roman Syllabus chiefly from a political point of view. The discussion of such a subject, between such men, could not be wholly political; though it was natural for the statesman so to approach it. Dr. Newman (p. 39) could not but turn aside "just to say one word on the principle of obedience itself—that is, by way of inquiry whether it" (obedience) "is or is not now a religious duty." This is really the point (as Mr. W. H. Mallock endeavors to put it once more,

in a recent number (December, 1878) of the *Nineteenth Century*).

Mr. Gladstone had said in his "Expostulation,"

"that the Pope claims infallible authority, demanding all obedience in faith and morals; that there are no departments and functions of human life which do not and cannot fall within the domain of morals;" that "he claims also the domain of all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church, and, moreover, the power of determining the limits of those claims, and that he does not sever them by any acknowledged or intelligible line from the domains of civil duty and allegiance." Dr. Newman does not refuse this statement of the case, but thinks it sufficient to urge first in reply, that this is no more than we all affirm 'of the supremacy of law among ourselves, and may (p. 42) in some respects seem less.'"

8. It is here overlooked that, if this were really so, the Papal supremacy needed no such formal announcement as has now been given it after the hesitation of ages. It is not conceivable, for instance, that an act of Parliament, or Congress, or a Royal Proclamation, should now come forth newly informing us that the "Law is supreme" (nor could we be persuaded that "its domain extends to every department of faith and morals"). That many overwrought minds may have accepted, as Dr. Newman for a moment may have done, such a view of the Papal theory for quieting all doubt, may be true; but it could not bear reflection. Considering the subject-matter of all grave religious doubt, such acquiescence could not ultimately be thought, even in the least, to be ethical. Nor, merely as a "practical" proposition, could it be long maintained that there is any parallel to be drawn between a law which declares itself, as that of Rome does, infallible and perfect, and the "Law of England," which is always open to correction. No one could fail to see, on any very serious consideration, that to lower the Pope's infallibility to the *de facto* supremacy of human law would be to unhinge the whole theory.

But Dr. Newman is evidently sincere; and he attempts to follow what he has said into its consequences. He says plainly, that so far from Papal infallibility having so wide a sweep as commonly supposed by us, its definitions are of rare occurrence. He regards "Father O'Reilly as one of the first theologians of the day," and thinks he is right in holding that "Papal in-

fallibility is comparatively seldom brought into action," and he asks, "What is the use of dragging in the Papal infallibility in connection with Papal acts with which it has nothing to do . . . acts in which the pontiff is not commonly mistaken, but in which he could be mistaken, and still remain infallible in the only sense in which he has been declared to be so?" (p. 124). Is it then, we ask, after all, for the enjoyment of the benefit of such a dim theory that converts are invited to leave "Protestant" variations and uncertainties, and join the "Roman obedience"?

Dr. Newman, after this, goes on to quote with approval from the Pastoral of the Swiss Bishops:

"It in no way depends upon the caprice of the Pope, or upon his good pleasure, to make such and such a doctrine the object of a dogmatic definition; and the Pope is tied up, and limited, among other things, by the fact that alongside the ecclesiastical hierarchy there is the power of temporal magistrates, invested in their own domain with a full sovereignty, and to whom we owe obedience in conscience, and respect in all things morally admitted, and belonging to the domain of civil society" (p. 126).

We take these sentences, as we are intended to do, in their ostensible sense, not pausing to point out phrases of equivocal meaning. But the summing-up sentences of Dr. Newman himself are more distinct and telling, of course, than those which he quotes.

"The Pope's infallibility, indeed, and his supreme authority have in the Vatican *capita* been declared matters of faith; but his prerogative of infallibility lies in matters speculative, and his prerogative of authority is no infallibility in laws, commands, or measures."

Certainly the claims thus "minimized" are not those which alarmed Europe when the Syllabus was issued. Whether they are those which suffice for the satisfaction of thoughtful converts, they may even yet have occasion to consider.

But to compare the claims of authority even so "minimized" with the duties of the individual conscience, Dr. Newman with his usual and at times paradoxical thoroughness proceeds as follows:

"On the duty of obeying conscience at all hazards, Cardinal Gousset quotes from the Fourth Lateran Council, that he who acts against his con-

science loses his soul. This *dictum* is brought out with singular fulness and force in the moral treatises of theologians. The celebrated school of the Carmelites of Salamanca lays down the broad proposition that conscience is ever to be obeyed, whether it tells truly or erroneously, and that whether the error is the fault of the person thus erring or not. Aquinas, Bonaventura, Cajetan, Vasquez, Durandus, Navarrus, Corduba, Layman, Escobar, and fourteen others, are quoted as holding this to be certain; and two of them as *de fide*. The French Dominican, Natalis Alexander, is approved as saying, 'If in the judgment of conscience, though a mistaken conscience, a man is persuaded that what his superior commands is displeasing to God, he is bound not to obey.' To this Dr. Newman adds, 'The word "superior" certainly includes the Pope.' And he concludes what he has to say on conscience with these words: 'Certainly if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing), I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still to conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards" (pp. 64–66).

Could we here accept Dr. Newman as the acknowledged spokesman on the Roman side, it might almost be supposed that some practical advancement towards an understanding was to be looked for. He has, to his own mind, bridged over the chasm between authority and conscience. But, unhappily, we are forbidden to take his exposition as true. Mr. Gladstone had by no means supposed that there need be hopeless hostility between conscience and authority, as, indeed, he soon had occasion to show; but he takes pains to assure us that the *Voce della Verità* of the ensuing 21st of January complains very seriously of Dr. Newman (p. 102, "Vaticanism"). Mr. Gladstone then points out that, while Dr. Newman makes such large exceptions to the rule of "obedience to authority," the Vatican Council (as we shall see) has absolutely made none. "The Church by the Council imposes 'aye;' the private conscience reserves to itself the right to say 'no.'"

9. This gentle kind of criticism, however, is far from satisfying the Roman Catholic body. *The Dublin Review* (April, 1875), edited at that time by Dr. Newman's friend and honorable admirer, Dr. Ward, disclaims all sympathy with these views of Dr. Newman: "On no other question of the day do we find ourselves so irreconcilably at issue with Dr. Newman as in his view of the Döllingerites. But it would be ungracious if we made this our opportunity of speaking our full mind (p. 456)

on the subject." Differing entirely from the "wise and gentle minimizing" which Dr. Newman advocates, the writer adds, "Increased reflection has but increased the doubt, which we ventured to express in our last number, whether Dr. Newman's 'conscience' is precisely the same with the *conscientia* of theologians; and we demur to his decision, that in cases similar to those mentioned by him (p. 65) disobedience to a Pope's official and deliberate command could be defensible on grounds of conscience." We fear that the editor of *The Dublin Review* is right as a Roman Catholic. The meaning of the word "conscience" in the Roman theology is more subtle and complicated than Dr. Newman recognizes in the argument he is conducting. The "*sinderesis*" of the schools (συντήρησις) nearly corresponds to that self-watching "instinct" which is part of our nature as moral beings, and does not correspond to the συνείδησις of St. Paul, though often simply called "conscience." (See *Aquinas*, Dist. 24, who refers to *St. Jerome* in the Gloss., *Ezek.* ch. 1.)

The editor of *The Dublin Review* could have said and ought to have said more. This equivocal term deceives and multiplies disunions in the Church of Rome. Thus, such a sentence (see *ante*) as "he who sins against conscience" (as part of his nature) "loses his soul," is wholly equivocal, if read in the scholastic sense. But we must not linger; we only ask, are questions so grave as these to be thus smothered in phrases? It cannot be; and if attempted, rather if now persisted in, we shall find that while the rationality and conscientiousness of Roman Christianity are undefended, Christendom is ceasing to believe. If there be any vindication forthcoming at this crisis of religion as in itself true to conscience, it now should appear even among competent Roman theologians themselves, men, for example, like Moehler, could they be found.

10. But we must not imply that such defence of pure submission to authority in religion devolves only on Rome. "The religious duty of obedience" (as Dr. Newman touchingly, and perhaps despondingly, puts it) is almost the "question of the day" for all. But "obedience to *what?*" is of course the first point to settle. The great majority of Protestants believe in the "necessity to salvation" of what, on "authority" of some kind, they regard as "fundamentals of the Gospel." These

may be stated differently in the various "Confessions," but with confidence some authority that as to certain essential and inscrutable doctrines there must be really "submissive faith;" in other words, that reason must not resist even what seems unreasonable. The previous question as to the possibility, *à priori*, of serving or pleasing the Supreme and All-Perfect against our reason has been as little considered among the asserters of "private judgment" as among its deniers. If the one side says, "You must bring your reason and conscience to our conclusion," and the other insists, "You must take our conclusion as infallible, whether you can bring your reason and conscience to like it or not," the philosophical difference between them is but little.

It may be supposed by some, that the weight imposed on conscience by the Church of Rome is so much greater than among other Christians that the demand is altogether different. But surely, if true, this is an impossible plea. There can be no compromise as to the *amount* of "belief on authority" against conscience. The Catechism of Trent and the Westminster Confession admit the same principle of a formal authority commanding a dead acquiescence on certain points as "revealed," whether we can think them true or not. The Pope may be more moderate and "constitutional" than even a Bossuet could own; or the turning point of adherence to a sect may be but one brief Bible dogma; but if we are called, in consequence of either, to surrender our responsible sense of right and wrong, in faith or practice, the principle is the same: the demand is unethical, and fatal.

11. The appeals often made to the Divine Scriptures as the practical authority to which reason must surrender, after a certain amount of examination and criticism, are *eo modo* as difficult to reconcile to the rights of conscience as any put forth by Rome. The diverse Scripture-conclusions arrived at by careful and thoughtful men among us are claimed for freedom of conscience, and are attributed, at times, to different "schools of thought" —a somewhat profane phrase, denying the really definite character of the "Revealing," or "Revelation," and reducing it to a half-formed human philosophy, or else likening it to a Rabbinical tradition running in various grooves with little or no

thought at all. True these many expositions claim one formal origin, the inspired Old and New Testaments, criticised or uncriticised; but we who complain of Papal infallibility, that it clashes with reason and conscience, cannot wonder if we are called to give a rational account of our own views of Bible authenticity and inspiration, on which quite as much is made to depend as on the Syllabus itself (though that extends to very practical matters). The truth is that dogmatism in us is self-contradictory also when it is uncatholic; and is unethical when, in any direction, it is unreasonable. But here we pause awhile, for another range of both non-dogmatic and non-catholic opinion glances before us for our notice.

For were we at this point to sum up the case of conscience *v.* authority, we might seem to discredit the just claims of authority in certain of its own departments, and permit a notion of the intellectual and moral sufficiency of every man, at variance with all the facts of life. But no man, after all, is eager to claim intellectual freedom so far as to dispense with *all* authority. Responsible agents have not merely private and free spheres of their own, but they develop *together;* and such is their diversity that their mutual relations in society must be determined, externally, by some practical "authority" held to be binding on all. It is indispensable that the State should see that men's responsibility to society and their responsibility to their own moral and religious convictions do not publicly clash; and statesmen are rightly anxious to understand the grounds on which public opinion can permanently repose, for it becomes, rightly or wrongly, an "authority" to many in most things. Reserving awhile, then, what we have to say further in comparing religious allegiance, as claimed specifically by some of the alleged authorities, with the inalienable rights of conscience asserted by ethical philosophy, it is proper, at this part of our subject, that we should refer to what is so very important as what may be called the statesman's view. It will be found, in the civilization of the future, that a social Syllabus cannot be omitted: and this may be the place to notice it.

12. A treatise put forth by one of the most thoughtful of modern statesmen, Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, entitled, "*On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion,*" was published some

years ago. Attention has lately been recalled to it by Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Fitz-James Stephens, and others. We may take it as a *résumé* of the political view of our subject, so far as it has been thought out in our times ; and it further may serve, at the same time, to show the incompleteness and danger of all unethical treatment of it.

The writer begins by even declining to examine the moral grounds of human responsibility, and takes the rough facts of life as he finds them. Admitting, of course, that all men are not competent to form opinions, yet that we know they will and must form them on many subjects, as well as they can, and rightly lean on some "authority," Cornewall Lewis feels that men ought to have what we may call manageable opinions. Men are held responsible to conscience by one another, as well as by themselves, all along. Both these facts have to be dealt with in society ; and the statesman's suggestion naturally perhaps is, as we here find, a *consensus omnium* in morals, for the generality, while reserving for a minority "a faith in experts." There is something that looks ethical, at first, in the *consensus omnium*. It assumes that nature does not go wrong on so large a scale as the denial of so general a fact as *consensus* would imply. But there is nothing ethical in the alternative idea of leaving moral facts to the judgment, ultimately, of "experts." Mr. Gladstone pointed out that we might go further, if we admit the *consensus* principle at all, and might introduce Christianity on authority, by something like the "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*," of Vincentius. Sir James Fitz-James Stephens' reply, "that that is not the precise meaning of Cornewall Lewis's argument," is not to the point, if it is fairly included in the principle ; and it forgets, too, that in most subjects, and not least in religion, *consensus* actually is the authority most relied on by the many : though the question may still remain as to the origin of *consensus*.

Cornewall Lewis's opening statement is, "Whenever in this essay I speak of the principle of authority, I shall understand the principle of adopting the belief of others on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which that belief rests" (p. 7) ; that is, irrespective of its being recognized, either as divinely authorized, or supernaturally accred-

ited, or even as felt to be in itself really right. Here we must ask every one to consider whether this is not often beyond our competence in very grave matters of responsibility?

13. In reference to the distinction asserted at this point by Cornewall Lewis, as to the more elaborate opinions formable by a minority, we also detect, as we have said, the serious lack of the ethical element. He bases such opinions on the testimony "of experts," without facing the fact that this "testimony" of experts must also depend in them, though scarcely in us, on something *beyond;* unless we are to surrender to a final scepticism as to the truth, or eliminate all that depends on the "experts" from moral responsibility. Internal consciousness of right must in every department of life and action predominate in a true moral agent. Our phenomena, experiences, or conditions may often be to us of the nature of authorities, but still such authorities as imply the *à priori*. The authority of experts only would seem often to stand apart from this. The authority of generally-approved habits, or of certain witnesses, or of some judges, may have a moral element, and command us rightly at times; especially when modesty and truth oblige us to confess our own incompetency, or when we are not bound to judge and act immediately on our own responsibility. But "experts" take us, after all, into a region where we are supposed to be blind, and have to be led. It is a shelving of responsibility, in whole or in part, to lean thus on "experts."

We must evade nothing in this part of our subject. Of course, being all of us in a state of advancing education, moral and intellectual, there is such a thing as partial responsibility, in which such authorities as have been glanced at come to our aid. In the case of all children, for instance, and variously immature persons, time must be allowed for growth; yet the conviction of right must even in their case be encouraged to feel its way.

Conceding that intellectual and well-reasoned convictions cannot be universally expected, we must not disguise from ourselves the fact that just in proportion as we limit the decisions of intelligence, we enfeeble and dilute responsibility itself. Truths certainly commanding and eventually receiving universal acceptance (as we believe those we are considering cer-

tainly do) are never mere opinions, but have constant internal coherence. The details of interpretation will no doubt be various if finite rationality has to apply such truths ; and it may not be always easy to draw the line between what is vital to conscience and what lies beyond ; but principle and opinion cannot really be confounded. Even in religion, as well as in simpler ethics, there are certainties which express themselves in a tone of peremptoriness, and if we refuse them we cannot avoid the consequences. Men are able, as they are free, to defy any truths ; but the realities remain. The rough rejection of a principle by an impatient empiricism may throw into disorder the philosophy of an age ; and of this, the generations from Locke to J. Stuart Mill may furnish illustrations. But, as Cudworth finely says, " Truth is the most unbending and uncompliable, the most necessary, firm, immutable, and adamantine thing in the world."

14. There is one further reflection, however, to be here added, in reference to the practical apprehension of truth and right by the non-intellectual classes, the omission of which would be unreal and unjust. There are hazy estimates of things in the generality of men, as society advances, which they cannot themselves reduce to logical form and proportion, and which yet are not commonly unreasonable. They enter very largely into the almost unconscious action of most men, and help the formation of habits. Similar in some respects to the instincts of the animal, they are still of a moral nature, variable in their working, and sometimes special to classes and even to individuals. They form a kind of " unconscious reason" on which conviction may be strongly grafted. It is no disparagement of this to say that it may be abnormally perverted in very weak persons ; this would be a diseased rather than a natural state of things. It is thus when feeble persons turn sceptics in morals, or at times in religion ; or when any suffer from alienation of reason. Their instincts or wishes may have put them first astray. But indefinite ethics may still, in multitudes, be full of the conviction of right, and it would be dangerous to true philosophy to overlook this. The true statement of the facts thus referred to seems to be that a common-sense estimate of the probabilities around us is as much a part of our conscious-

ness as intuition is of our personal reason in its cognizance of facts.

Considering the very wide scope of human responsibility insisted on by all, the vaguest power of appraising probabilities is far more ethical than any following of experts can often be. If, indeed, we took authority for any belief as nothing more than "the evidence of experts" (which Sir James Fitz-James Stephens says is the position of Cornewall Lewis), we should leave no reasonable place for any *consensus*. (See *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1877, p. 287.) And if we admit the evidence of experts in matters beyond our reach in any case, there seems no reason why we may not admit the evidence of the theologian in matters theological, as well as of the chemist in chemistry, the astronomer in astronomy, and so on. Whether this resting on experts would always lead to further scientific advancement may be much open to question. At any rate it would need much guarding; and if it should make some men to appear for a time intellectual, scientific, and theological, by proxy, it would not be an ethical achievement. Experts probably could not have been suggested, but for the absence in Cornewall Lewis of the poetry of *à priori* thought, to a degree quite surprising. His perceived need of sound general opinion among citizens seems to have obliged him, as a statesman, having nothing else, to rest it finally on this "faith in experts."

But it cannot rest there even intellectually. He confuses the ideas of "acceptance" and "faith" in his whole statement as to the reliance on experts. He says (Essay, p. 25),

> "The distinction between testimony, argument, and authority may be briefly summed up thus:
>
> "In questions of testimony, I believe a matter of fact, because the witness believes it.
>
> "In questions of argument, I believe the conclusion to be true, because it is proved by reasons satisfactory to my understanding.
>
> "In questions of authority, I believe a matter of opinion, because it is believed by a person whom I consider a competent judge of the question."

These three propositions ought all to begin, "I believe it is *true*" (implying an *à priori*), otherwise they simply mean, "I believe that I believe;" for believing implies an object. But,

even then it would be difficult to surpass the looseness and inaccuracy of these sentences. The word "belief" is used in different senses in each paragraph; and not in its real sense (as a perception of the substantially true) in any of the three. For, as to the first, no man believes a matter of fact, simply because "his informant believes it." He may *accept* it, because his informant affirms it; but he can be sure of nothing beyond that. Again, it is not true that the "conclusion of an argument" is simply believed on the ground of "reason satisfactory to the understanding;" though they may make the argument credible. Belief, as an act of the "Ego," is far more complex, and is made up of conditions antecedent, and accompanying, and of the character of the believer himself. And thirdly, it is not true that a man "believes an opinion" because a competent judge believes it (Kepler's laws were for some time believed by him, and, competent as he had shown himself, not believed by others). Sanguine hopes, or abstinence from denials, are not "belief." The complicated grounds of real faith, and the sense of prior obligation to right faith, are unnoticed by Cornewall Lewis. As a statesman, again, he rightly feels that there is a mixed social-moral responsibility which needs to be ascertained; but he does not ascertain it. And every philosophic statesman knows that until it is ascertained, the world cannot be quite reasonably governed. The facts of moral responsibility will not consent permanently and altogether to lie outside the sphere of human government.

We return, then, from the statesman's view of the relations of reason and conscience to truth and right and human responsibility in society. Statesmen have not yet thought out the problem; and it remains, at present, in the hands of parties, and their really reactionary or anarchical leaders; but only for the present. The quasi-rational attempts to establish an "authority" by massing or by averaging conclusions, or by urging the untaught majority to submit to the minority, or by asserting an arbitrary tribunal to be treated as above reason, equally fail to provide a solution of the difficulty of our times. In the presence of all absolutism, secular or spiritual, the moral agent knows that he is not free and not satisfied.

15. We must go back to the beginning if we would now ap-

preciate our position ; think, that is, of the beginning of conscience and responsibility, and the beginning of the idea of a revelation. Without this, we shall be open to the suspicion that supernatural revelation may yet be an intrusion in the sphere of human duty. The need man is seen to have of revelation, as the supplement of his natural aspirations after the truth and the right, is one ground, at least, if we "go back to the beginning," on which the claim of Christianity must first rest. "The championship of conscience is," says Dr. Newman, "the *raison d'être* of religion." He shows in a passage of extreme beauty and refinement (equalled by another quoted by the present writer from another work[1]) that the insufficiency of natural light is the justification of revelation.

The passage is this :

"The sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its flights, that in the struggle for existence, amid various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous. . . . Natural religion, certain as are its grounds and its doctrines as addressed to thoughtful serious minds, needs, in order that it may speak to mankind with effect, and subdue the world, to be sustained and completed by revelation."

Such an estimate of our sense of ethical right, as well as of natural religion, will scarcely be questioned. But then it obliges us to own that we are held responsible for right-doing, by some direct, though dim, discernment that we possess, and not in consequence of elaborate definitions. Something anterior to itself is owned by every conscience. Our knowledge of it is confessedly imperfect, and must be enlarged ; but it is not peculiar to any individual, for we expect others to recognize it. We only here would call it the "absolute," because it depends not on our own special conditions. We cannot ethically own even an "authority" which does not aim to harmonize with this "absolute." There may indeed be a pause in growth of conscience when, in its own inscrutable way, it is verifying what

[1] See "The Apologiâ pro Ecclesiâ Anglicanâ."

newly comes to it as probable authority, and temporarily submits. Were this, however, to last long, it would threaten responsibility altogether, and surrender that special function, in relation to the *à priori*, which distinguishes the man from the beast.

16. Such would be the position of conscience at all times when fresh approached by what claimed to be the authority of a revelation as to right and wrong. As an arbitrary imposition, conscience can never accept it. It is a false and incredible notion, and one pregnant with all unrighteousness and unbelief in goodness, that man, having a nature whose prime duty it is to aim at what it feels to be right, is afterwards required to aim at a technical end, which he does *not* feel to be right; and this to test his obedience! The test of a real man both as to thought and action is, that he does the "felt-right," and avoids the "felt-wrong." If we think, we must inquire whether we think rightly, not merely whether we think obediently. If we act, we desire to be right, and not merely obedient to command; and that to the full extent of our responsibility. Even during a tentative obedience, when we are growing to newly-known duties, the sense of right must be so enlarging itself as to make obedience wholly moral. Why watch our experiences, as we do, with reference to their being right, if we suppose no absolute?

If we have no communion with the right, as right *per se*, we have no large sympathy with manhood itself. Without the absolute more or less discerned, there would appear no reason why we should be reasonable. Our moral discernment must indeed be reverent and modest, yet it must not be too deferential to be honest, or too blindly reverent to be true; but it must be free from the demoralizations both of selfishness and of authority. If we admit, then, on the one hand, that we have need of help for the clearer discernment of truth, and right, and reason, we must own, on the other, that religion must not confuse our responsibility by putting before us anything which our conscience condemns. We retain enough of our moral nature, however great be our need of help, to be responsible still. The *prohibitions* still uttered by conscience are more imperative, too, than its actual directions. There is

more of discomfort in disregarding the presentiments and warnings of our moral nature than of peace in taking its guidance.

But in speaking of the prohibitions of conscience, it must be remembered that they sometimes are spurious. Objections, for example, to revelation, which take the form of "conscientious" resistance, cannot properly proceed from those who deny in their theories the very existence of absolute right and truth. Neither have they any validity if they are directed against a caricature of our religion, and not the religion itself. That misrepresentations of Christianity are very widely spread, and are popularly identified with it, no thoughtful believer is unaware; nor can he doubt that they are one cause of the increasing alienation of Christendom. Examples alone will show how deep this alienation from this cause alone is become. Men of "education," but uneducated in philosophical thought, and with no knowledge of revelation as the enlargement of our perception of the *à priori*, not unwillingly accept the most illiterate revivalism as Christianity, and all the more readily as it falls in with their own too careless doubts of absolute morality and personal responsibility.

17. So considerable a scientist as Professor Clifford, writing in the *Fortnightly Review* (No. 202, New Series, p. 780), thus describes, and it is right we should know it, "the popular and received 'theology'" (*sic*) "of Christian communities," as he understands it:

"The condition of men departed this life depends ultimately on the will of a being who, a long while ago, cursed all mankind, because one woman disobeyed Him. The curse was no mere symbol of displeasure, but a fixed resolve to keep his victims alive forever, writhing in horrible torments in a place which His Divine foreknowledge had prepared beforehand. In consideration, however, of the death of His son, effected by unknowing agents, He consented to feed with the sweets of His favor such poor wretches as should betray their brethren, and speak sufficiently soft words to the destroyer of their kindred. For the rest, the old curse survives in its power, condemning them for the manifestation of His glory. To the dead, then, if this be the future life, there is left only the choice between shame and suffering. How well and nobly soever a man shall have worked for his fellows, he must end by being the eternal sycophant of a celestial despot, or the eternal victim of a celestial executioner."

This, though expressed with a savage venom for which there is no excuse, is the popular Calvinism, working no doubt in the uneducated masses as a religion imposed by imagined biblical and (with some purgatorial modifications) traditional "authority." But for a scholar and a thinker to call this "Christianity" is disgraceful. If persons of the lower order of faculties will "interpret" the Divine but difficult and imperfectly translated writings of former ages (extracting a cosmogony, a theodicy, and eschatology, adding heathenish traditions, of "expiation" here, and of a physical state hereafter), and call the outcome their "religion," we may not be able to help it; but a man with any nobleness of nature should surely occupy himself with remedying this mingled ignorance, malignity, and selfishness, and not attempt to fasten its ignominy upon "that name which is," at least, "above every name" in the moral history of mankind. The core of this fanaticism lies, however, in its mechanical predestination, which is equivalent to universal materialism, and is easily admitted by the imperfectly-ethical multitude, educated or not. Unhappily, it is found in the systems of many, who veil its coarseness as "mystery."

A more widely known name than Professor Clifford's (and from the same class), we mean Professor Huxley's, will furnish another example of the revolt of conscience against the prevalent Calvinism of the uneducated. Writing in the *Nineteenth Century* (May, 1877, p. 538), he says: "Who shall exaggerate the deadly influence on personal morality of those theologies which have represented the Deity as vainglorious, irritable, and revengeful, as a sort of pedantic drill-sergeant of mankind, to whom no valor, no long-tried loyalty, could atone for the displacement of a button of the uniform, or the misunderstanding of a paragraph of the regulations and instructions?" The "uniform" is here apparently meant for the Creed, and the "regulations and instructions" for the Scriptures, if we rightly interpret the metaphors which Professor Huxley prefers to reasoning. We would remind him that things that look sometimes very small—*e.g.* Davy's safety-lamp in a mine—may be important, and the non-observance of some "paragraph in the regulations and instructions" may be so serious that no "valor or loyalty" could atone for it. As we are content to be reasoners

on this subject, and not rhetoricians, we may not have caught the whole meaning of the passage. We are not at all anxious to deprive Professor Huxley of the rewards of heroism which he thinks his "drill-master" might deny him (though scoffing is a questionable "heroism" as yet, in a world that listens longer to reason); nor would we refuse to Professor Clifford any praise he may rightly crave for "well and nobly working for his fellows." We agree with them, that such "theologies" as they condemn in these places are abominable. But we know they are not Christian; and any one who supposes they are shows that he has given no time or attention to exact theology. Professor Huxley's "plain rule of not pretending to believe what men have no reason to believe," is good. It is what we have long labored to enforce. (See "The Bible and its Interpreters," etc.) We have also another rule, which we recommend to his notice, and it is this: "When calm reasoning and clear speaking are possible, men need not resort to hinting and mocking."

18. One more illustration. It shall be taken from the writings of one who has come probably into closer relation with the "theologies" complained of by these scientific professors than they ever have, and whose testimony courageously bears in the same direction. The well-known and intelligent Rev. R. W. Dale, a Congregational minister at Birmingham, gives us, in the *Nineteenth Century* (August, 1877, p. 54), an interesting examination of the character of the late Mr. George Dawson; and we have thus a double testimony, all the more valuable for the evident restraint of Mr. Dale, as to the uneducated substitute for Christianity, which is so fatally spread among the populace. Mr. Dawson had been distressed by the unreality of some religious teachers, who shrank from the popular language, and yet half-clung to the ideas, and could not find other words in which to express them. Mr. Dale represents George Dawson as saying to them, "Since the language in which you express your creed does not represent your real thought, the poison of unreality will consume your very life." George Dawson then continues, "The position of many evangelicals has been in some respects ludicrous, in some respects censurable, in some respects pathetic. It was 'ludicrous,' for many of them felt that the language in which they were expressing their deepest convictions

was indefensible ; and yet they had no other language in which the convictions could be expressed." "The phrases represented a theory which they were discovering to be intellectually untenable. Their position was 'censurable.' The right course would have been to say frankly, we have given up the theory which suggested the language about 'total depravity' . . . and 'imputed righteousness,' . . . though we believe still that man cannot live for God except as he receives life from God" (a truism which no one could dispute). But "the position" (he adds) "of the evangelicals was also 'pathetic.' The language they had been wont to use had been created by human speculations ; and to part with the old way of speaking was as if their theological system was fast breaking up."

This is a very unmistakable hint that it really must "break up." It owns that the public form of so-called gospel is not translatable into the language of human reason. Mr. Dale himself is far, however, from explicit : "Frankness," he says, "is unpopular." No alternative to the "phraseology" is suggested, because the hope is in some that the thought may be retained ; though it is that very thought, express it as you may, which is helping to flood educated Europe with infidelity.

The position with which we began (Sec. 4) is now made plain, that the popular substitute for our religion is what cultivated conscience rejects. But we must, in closing this estimate of the "religion" which does not hold its ground in the conscience and reason of Europe, revert also to the Vatican Decree, which would enforce simple obedience to any proclaimed dogma as the remedy for all the resistances of conscience. Its results (like those of rationalism) have been, and most surely must be, a more thorough loss of conscience to the cause of Christ than come of any of the crude specialties referred to, which might at length be unlearned. It expresses itself finally in these unswerving words—words of intended terror and challenge :

"We teach and define the divinely revealed dogma to be that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*, that is, in the exercise of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, does of his supreme apostolic authority define by the Divine assistance promised him, in the person of the blessed Peter, the doctrine of faith and morals to be held by the whole Church, to have force by that Infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer designed His

Church to be armed in defining faith and morals. And therefore definitions of that kind by the Roman Pontiff, and *not* by the Church's consent, but of themselves alone, are irreformable. If any one presume to contradict this our definition, which God forbid, let him be accursed."

What such solemn words can practically mean, when Dr. Newman and Tessler are allowed to say "the Pope is not infallible as a man, or a theologian, or a priest, or a bishop, or a judge, or a legislator," will puzzle most people. We take them to mean that the Papal Infallibility extends only to objective declarations of Catholic truth: but even so, there is something bewildering in the exclusion of the "consent of the Church," as if formally annulling its conscience. Explain, however, as they may, this unprecedented effort of Rome to assert the principle of "belief on authority," in its baldest form (as the only preservative of public Christianity), the fact remains, on their own fullest confession (Sec. 4), that it has not succeeded.

19. If we were to pause here, the unbelief of this age might possibly persuade itself, with little difficulty, that its triumph was assured, and timid Christians be ready to ask whether the Church had not, after all, been prevailed against by "the gates of Hades." But the fact that the unbelief which advances on us has nothing to offer to conscience, reminds us that we need not despond; and, indeed, any despondency could only arise from our totally misstating to ourselves the problem before us. We have been inquiring into the historical reception of our religion by the conscience of the world as to the external system of civilization, and as to the inner life of rational responsibility. But the supernatural claims of the Gospel of Christ, its Divine vitality in itself, and its essential relation to conscience, remain to the Christian just what they ever are. It is even conceivable that the whole historical condition of Christianity might have been quite other than it has been. In the East it has, indeed, been very different, *ab initio*, from what it is in the West; and it has touched the civilization of the West, in the various kingdoms, in very various ways. There has been a sameness in the supernatural life, not in the historical, which is ever changing, intellectually and socially. Our fullest and most regretful admissions as to the de-Christianizing of European civilization, at present touch not that Divine "revelation" which ever takes

its own lofty current, and mingles with the reason and conscience of the higher souls. That enlarged knowledge of the *à priori* which the Gospel gives is the same wherever it has reached. It is as universal as the ethical sphere into which it moves ; and it is felt and known far beyond the limits of intellectual definition. While we affirm that the outward presentations of formally-expressed Christian truths *should* be in harmony with the reason and conscience of the world, the vast multitudes (who yet are affected in the best way by our religion) may long remain incapable of high rational development. And if we are told that their reception of the Christian *à priori* must needs, as we put it, be very indistinct, we reply that that is the case also in respect of even the simplest ethical beginnings, but such intellectual indistinctness does not at all supersede the real responsibility which all men recognize in one another. False and unintellectual statements as to Christian doctrine no doubt are to be deplored, and are widely mischievous, but they have natural limits. They may hinder the present advancement of the kingdom of truth among men—hence our grave responsibility in respect to them. But that which is true holds its place in the absolute, and in the conscience that has risen and is rising more and more to discern it. The intellectual proof of any truth at first is but for the few : but the consentaneousness to human nature itself is a fact, and so it is the proof for the many ; since the facts of nature open to us gradually the science, both morally and physically.

In examining the intellectual and moral aspect of religious difficulties, it is obvious that we have no right to regard as peculiar to Christianity those which pertain to the entire idea of responsibility. These must be eliminated, or at least can only be mentioned as unremoved by the "revelation" thus far. But this would only mean that our education is gradual as to the *à priori*, as it is in the *à posteriori*. Questions, again, of ontology are common to Christianity with all philosophy, and must be so regarded. And so, too, as to the historical demands sometimes made on us as believers in Christ : they are not to be exaggerated, as if we based Divine revelation on human history, as such. Such a supposition not only would require a very close continuity of the history, but needs that it should be always

accessible to all who are interested in the religion—that is, all the world.

20. With such limitations, which reason at once suggests, the intelligent believer in Christ is bound to make no doctrinal assertions in His name which affront the conscience of men. He should be prepared to state his doctrinal belief reasonably and morally, or else be silent, and live in that unseen region in which the fountains of moral life are ever found. Since the first problem of Christianity, "What think ye of Christ?" (which involved the whole conception of HIM whom we adore) was adequately settled in the fourth century, reason and conscience have acquiesced. Later on, the speculative thought of Christianity, in all its special crises, has been mainly in the direction of morals and human responsibility. Only thus is the world now deeply stirred. The questions of the sixteenth century were eminently questions of human responsibility. So Luther succeeded against indulgences, because they were immorally sold. All the disputes about grace were disputes about "right and wrong." At the present time no greater service could be rendered to Christianity, externally, than by showing that, in its main doctrines, it is in harmony with those same human perceptions of right and wrong.

The great advancing power of Christianity lay at first in baptism, which demanded moral preparation, and in the sacrament of Christ's body and blood binding men together for "eternal life." The intellectual distinction, or "belief," of the Christian community came from these two rites; which again issued in the "Creeds," and the same faith was educated by the Peschito Scriptures in the East, and by the Itala in the West; supplemented by the care of Origen and Jerome. Having these—the Divine sacraments, creeds, and Scriptures—a threefold supernatural growth, the Church, of course, asserted herself outwardly the "pillar and ground of the truth." But there was also the work of the interior life, which went on in individual moral agents, and constituted everywhere the indestructible essence of Christianity in man. Ages moved on, but with no definition of the canon, or of its inspiration, or of the atonement of Christ, or of the work of God's grace in man's moral nature, or of other and more numerous points, the correct

confession of which men often consider "necessary to salvation." But ordinary inheritors of the old Christianity really do not require theories or definitions as to all these, nor yet minute information. What St. Paul called "Christ in you, the hope of glory," is better known by them (and by the whole line of the saints, we may add) than the Christ of history. And this is no mystic dream; for a celebrated Jewish opponent of our faith, Mr. E. Benamosegh, expresses himself with amazement at what he calls the success of the greatest and boldest of "fictions," the inner "Christ of which St. Paul has persuaded the Christian world for so many ages;" and with which, we are glad to remember, the pious M. Landriot, Bishop of Rochelle, has lately almost startled the Jesuits, in his "Le Christ de la Tradition."

It is not to be denied, however, that the world is now asking for an intellectual and moral hold of the doctrines publicly professed as Christianity, and the explanations or excuses given are too often like "stones to those who ask for bread." It is not every one's work, we grant, but it is some one's, to give the intellectual defence, in the name of reason and conscience, to every doctrine of which we demand belief or even rational tolerance. Of course such defence of the substance of our religion will be conducted at a disadvantage, until thinking is more the fashion. The discouragement even of all attempts at a true ontology, and the prolonged incapacity which dreads "metaphysics," must still be expected, in an age passionately interested only in experiment and discovery, and glowing with a really grand enthusiasm to know the facts of phenomenal being. But intellect and conscience exist, even though their education be neglected. To force men to consider the relation of Christianity to reason and conscience will oblige, at last, a deeper thinking as to conscience and the absolute. But begin where and as we may, this must be done. Men who are stumbling at the doctrines of probation, pardon, expiation, mediation, retribution, must be made to see that they stand well with reason and conscience, as read in the nature of man. Without this, the darkest crisis of human civilization is before us now.

21. There is danger, indeed, of previously descending in

civilization, through sheer vacancy of thought, to a pagan level, unlike the past indeed—for history never repeats itself—but destructive. The Renaissance of the fifteenth century was not less creative than our own, but it was pagan in its character, and found its climax in the French Revolution. A new point of departure is now taken ; but the eighteenth century, or its predecessors, will not be repeated. Conservatism, when it reaches its goal, may see something more akin to the attempt of the old Alexandrian Eleatics—a revision of human relations, in a social system without public Christianity.

At the Christian era, many were the fundamental questions of society which were reopened, and afterwards very gradual settlements were arrived at. There has, since then, been no reverting to the past, with any success. To break now with what we may call, in some sense, the Christian settlement, will cost the world another reopening, whatever that may imply. Some there may be among us who, with the obtuseness of too many reformers, will hope that after some modifications things may go on ordinarily as before. They do not see how much men change when they change a principle.

It must be ours, as Christians, to be ever on the side of reason and conscience—where the saints of past ages, explicitly or implicitly, will be found. We shall show the meagre rationalist that the grounds of Christianity, as of conscious reason, lie in the absolute and eternal ; and we so must meet the syllabus of error and absolutism with a syllabus of moral freedom, reason, and truth.

The conviction that the great truths of our revelation are in conformity with reason and conscience has pervaded the best minds of the whole Church, from Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen, to Jerome and Athanasius, and from them to Damascenus ; and, among our own countrymen not the least, from John Scot Erigena at Oxford, it is said, in the days of our Alfred, to St. Anselm with his Proslogium after the Conquest, and Robert Pulleyn, in the "Concord of Reason and Religion," for which he pleaded, as afterwards did the best of the schools, Albertists, Thomists, or Scotists. We are taking no new position. But in challenging, as we unreservedly do, all men of intelligence to a comparison of our doctrines, as Christians, with Reason and

the Natural Conscience, it would be useless to proceed without asking, not only *what kind of Christianity* is true? but what we mean by "responsible" action, and what "truth" it is we aim at?

Whether responsibility implies a freedom of action in a conscious agent? This must be the first inquiry before us; let it not be superficially undertaken. It is here that parties must divide. If there be no alternative action, this is but a kind of mechanical universe after all; and man is morally responsible for nothing. Our challenge is, and can be, for those only who believe in conscience, and are willing to examine what that implies, as well as what revelation is. It is mere hollowness, when men affect to reason without defining the issue that is raised.

WILLIAM J. IRONS.

POSTSCRIPT.—The general applause with which Dr. Newman's elevation to the cardinalate has been greeted is a fact of much significance in the controversy as to receiving "on authority" that which conscience rejects. The Cardinal, on the occasion of acknowledging the Pope's formal communication to him, made a special address to a distinguished party of English friends, "Protestant and Catholic," in which he repeated that all who abstain from submission of conscience to the Pope are without religious "truth," and have nothing but "opinion" to rely on. This "address" also has been described in the public press as admirable. The chorus of approval seems unhappily to seal Cardinal Newman's view (nor will he avoid seeing it), that *truth is here left out of consideration* by his various critics and admirers; for they must mean by it either that they do not care for truth, or that they intend to do as the Cardinal has done, viz., give up the personal struggle for truth and submit formally to the decisions of the papal authority, of which, however, as yet we see no signs.

It seems hard to think that this is Cardinal Newman's "last

word" to us whom he thus finally leaves. Yet there is a plaintive tone in his phrase about "waiting the end" (as he had himself wished to do, it seems, more silently, instead of so very prominently), which almost sounds like a last doubtful adieu. But it is right that he should know how we—some of us at least—feel, on our side, the alternate of "truth or opinion," which he places before us. To us it seems to change the whole basis of human probation to say, that we must not struggle for ourselves to *know* the truth, but simply submit to "an authority" which says it knows it. To us it is equivalent to affirming, that *submission to the Papacy* is the practical outcome of the Incarnation; so that *for this* the Eternal Son of God took our nature on Him, and lived, and died, and rose and ascended, and sent the Spirit of Promise!

While fully conceding the many sacred claims of authority, in departments of alleged truth to which our present conscience makes no demur; and, more than this, acknowledging that an instinct or perception of the true and right (rather than intelligent ascertainments of truths) is all that the great mass of men can possibly have; we yet profoundly feel that without such perception, or against our clear conviction of right, it is entirely destructive of the foundations of human responsibility to surrender to any authority, however august.

And this is what his Eminence himself has previously admitted, in his letter to the Duke of Norfolk above referred to.

W. J. I.

THE ORGAN OF MIND.

THE Brain and its functions have been claimed as their especial province both by Physiologists and Psychologists, and indications have not been wanting of the existence on either side of a sentiment of hostility to the other as intruders or poachers on their domain. A similar feeling of exclusiveness is evident also in the medical profession. Those who are called Alienists or Medical Psychologists more or less covertly assume that mental disorders, or diseases of the brain involving mental derangement, form a distinct department ; and they regard as an encroachment on their legitimate province any interference with mental disease on the part of those who deal with general medicine or ordinary bodily ailments.

It would not be very difficult, if the subject were worth pursuing, to trace the origin of this jealous exclusiveness ; but, however originating, its results have been eminently unsatisfactory as regards real advance in knowledge of the brain and its functions.

For when we consider that all the various manifestations which occupy the attention of the psychologist, alienist, and physiologist have for their substratum a single organ, it is obvious that an exclusive separation of provinces has no justification in the order of things, and that a scientific study of the brain ought to include and correlate every form of manifestation of its activity, whether healthy or morbid.

Life is so short, however, that here, as in most departments of science, specialization is more or less unavoidable. What is to be deprecated is that kind of specialization which ignores all other aspects of a subject but its own limited field.

A division of the study of cerebral functions must, however, always exist, and for the following reasons: The brain is the organ of the mind, and without the brain no mental manifestations are possible in human beings. But the brain is also necessary to the movements of the limbs, etc.; and we see as the results of diseased conditions, convulsions, paralyses, and a host of bodily disturbances which fall under the care of the ordinary physician.

There are, therefore, manifestations of the activity of the brain objectively, and to others; while there are others perceptible only to the individual, or subjectively.

But the facts of consciousness, or subjective manifestations, are as much real facts as objective facts, and the observation of these and the laws of their association ought to rank as a natural science equally with the so-called physical sciences. The two methods, the subjective or psychological, and the objective or physiological, are both necessary to exhaust the study of cerebral activity, and the facts of the one are incapable of being expressed in terms of the other. But the followers of the subjective method have too frequently fallen into the error of regarding the facts of consciousness as independent instead of correlative, and, aided by a fatal facility of language, have constructed systems of mere nominalism, which have tended to perplex and obscure rather than elucidate the phenomena of mind, such alone as we find it in man, viz., mind incorporate or incerebrate.

Though mere practical applicability is not the true criterion of the value of a subject of study, it cannot be denied that until psychology is capable of practical application in the pathology and treatment of a mind diseased, its value is extremely limited, and to be measured mainly by the degree of mental satisfaction on the part of the student.

It is remarkable how little influence psychological speculation has exerted on the interpretation and therapeutics of mental diseases. Many of the most successful medical psychologists have been innocent of school psychology; and the same is true of the great majority of physiologists and physicians. This is to some extent a set-off to the charge of ignorance of physiology which is capable of being made against so many

speculative psychologists. The remedy for this unsatisfactory state of things is for the psychologists and physiologists to join hands. While psychological and physiological analysis should be pushed to the fullest extent, the results must be ultimately combined in a physio-psychological synthesis. Hitherto psychological analysis has far outrun physiological analysis. The explanation of this is not far to seek.

The phenomena of consciousness requiring no laborious investigation beyond the individual, and easily approachable without the aid of scientific instruments of precision such as are required for investigation of the phenomena of the external world, have been as accessible to exploration from the earliest days as they are at present, and it may be questioned whether in psychological analysis the philosophers of the present day have surpassed those of ancient Greece.

How different, on the other hand, as regards physiology. Physiology as a science is not yet a century old. Founded on and altogether dependent on anatomy, physics, and chemistry, its progress has necessarily had to wait on the perfection of scientific instruments and methods; and owing to the complex nature of the phenomena of living beings, the progress of physiology has been far from commensurate with the achievements of any of the sciences on which it is based.

Hence, even though the cultivation of physiology had been pursued with the same ardor as psychology, its progress might have been greater than it is but relatively immeasurably behind a science purely speculative.

Of late years, however, there have been many signs of the abandonment of the exclusively subjective method on the part of psychologists, and a growing tendency to correlate the facts of mind with those of physiology and anatomy. It will be the chief object of this paper to indicate some of the more important results of recent physiological and pathological researches into the functions of the brain and their bearing on psychological questions. To some, however, notwithstanding their admission that the brain is the organ of the mind, inquiries of this kind are looked upon with some disfavor, as attempts to obliterate the important distinctions between mind and matter. But questions as to the intimate nature of mind and matter

are altogether irrelevant and foreign to the subject of inquiry, which is to ascertain the anatomical substrata and conditions of manifestation of the various forms of cerebral activity. We are concerned here merely with phenomena and their laws, and not with metaphysical questions as to the nature of substances.

Apart from mere speculative, or vague inferences, founded on the complicated phenomena of diseased conditions of the brain in man, the experiments of Flourens may be regarded as the first important attempt to define with precision the functions of the various encephalic centres. As regards the cerebral hemispheres in particular, Flourens concluded, from the results of injuries of greater or less extent inflicted on these ganglia, that the hemispheres are the organs exclusively of intelligence, as distinct from those of locomotion and its co-ordination. And, further, that there is no differentiation of function in the hemispheres, but that the brain as a whole, and in each of its parts, provided only a requisite quantity be left uninjured, forms an indivisible substratum of every variety of mental manifestation. The indivisibility of the brain, therefore, and the indivisibility of mind were thus, according to him, mutually established.

There is now no room for doubt that Flourens' views as to the functions of the cerebral hemispheres are utterly erroneous, but the value of the facts on which he based his conclusions remains unshaken. Flourens experimented only on the lower classes and orders of animals, such as frogs, pigeons, etc. Had he restricted his conclusions respecting the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, to the animals on which alone he experimented, it would have been more difficult to shake his position; but extending them without due qualification to the higher animals and to man, he fell into serious error. This is at once rendered apparent by a comparison of the effects of removal of the cerebral hemispheres in different classes and orders of animals. When the cerebral hemispheres are removed in the frog the consequences are not such as to indicate any very striking alteration in the powers or capabilities of the animal. For it can still maintain its normal attitude, and regain it, if turned on its back. It can adapt its movements so as to maintain its balance if the basis of support be

tilted. It will hop away if touched, and even clear obstacles placed in its path. It will swim if thrown in the water, croak if its back is gently stroked, and indeed perform a number of the most complicated and apparently most intelligent actions in response to different external stimuli. The great difference, however, between the mutilated and unmutilated frog consists in this, that while the latter varies its action under apparently the same external conditions, the former acts only in direct response to some form of sensory stimulation. If this is entirely absent, the animal remains forever still on the same spot, and dries up to a mummy. The one possesses internal springs of action, not the immediate result of external impressions; the other acts only in obedience to external stimuli, including under this term peripheral impressions generally, whether arising on the external or internal surface. To this may be added variations in the excitability of the tissues, induced by nutritive changes, conditions of the circulation, and the like.

The main point here insisted on is that removal of the cerebral hemispheres produces little or no effect on the motor powers, or on the power of adaptive reaction to sensory impressions.

What is true of the frog is, *mutatis mutandis*, applicable to fishes deprived of their cerebral hemispheres.

In the case of pigeons, also, the phenomena are essentially similar. The animal can stand, walk if pushed, fly when thrown into the air; reacts to loud sounds, bright light, pungent odors, cutaneous stimulation; but when the external stimulation ceases, it subsides into a state of profound repose or indifference, exhibits no instincts of self-preservation, and, unless artificially fed, perishes, without the slightest manifestation of suffering or effort to save itself. Here also we observe the defect of spontaneity, as in the frog, while the motor powers and capabilities of reaction to various external stimuli remain practically unimpaired. When we pass to mammals, however, we observe effects somewhat different from those seen in the classes of fishes, reptiles, and birds; and the differences become more and more pronounced as we advance from the lowly rodent up to monkeys and man.

The dangers to life from lesions or complete removal of the

cerebral hemispheres also increase as we rise in the animal scale. Hence the direct results are more difficult to arrive at, and we are obliged to vary our methods in order to obtain in mammals the equivalents of complete removal of the hemispheres, so easily carried out on the lower classes of animals.

In rabbits, the destruction of the cerebral hemispheres causes one very marked divergence from the phenomena previously described in the case of frogs, fishes, and pigeons. Whereas the motor powers in these animals did not appear appreciably affected, here they are impaired to a very marked extent, and more especially in the fore-limbs. These are so enfeebled that the animal can scarcely support itself on them, and sprawls on its abdominal surface. The hind limbs, however, are affected to a much less extent. The animal also reacts less readily in accordance with external stimuli; for though it can spring if its foot be pinched, there is a headlong impulsiveness and helplessness in its reactions, very unlike the well-balanced and apparently purposive adaptations of the brainless frog or pigeon. Some improvement may, however, occur if the animal does not speedily succumb to the secondary effects of the operation.

In cats and dogs, destruction of the cerebral hemispheres in their entirety causes such extensive shock and prostration, that it is difficult to estimate the exact influence, directly attributable to the absence of the cerebral hemispheres, on the motor powers and capabilities of reaction. But when we compare the results of comparatively restricted lesions of the hemispheres in these animals with those consequent on similar lesions of the brain in rodents, we observe that the degree of paralysis is much more marked, and affects both limbs on the opposite side—though the fore-limbs are again those in which this is most clearly manifest. A considerable improvement may however occur, in so far as the use of the limbs for mere purposes of locomotion is concerned, though this is never so complete as in the rodent.

In the monkey, again, paralysis of the limbs from lesions of the hemispheres is still more complete and permanent. Here, again, the paralysis is most marked in respect to all movements which involve the greatest independence and complexity, as contradistinguished from those concerned merely in associated

and bilateral actions, such as locomotion, equilibration, and the like.

In man, the annihilation of the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, such as we observe as the result of certain diseases, not only abolishes consciousness, and all the powers of mind, but so paralyzes all the muscular powers that only the vegetative functions remain, and the reactions to external stimuli are comprised mainly in mere simple reflex response to cutaneous stimulation.

The degree of paralysis in consequence of partial lesions of the hemispheres varies with the complexity and independence of the movement, and as in the lower animals, it is most marked in the fore-limb, or arm and hand. It is, however, much more complete, and is likewise permanent in duration if the part has been completely destroyed.

The above comparison of the effects of destruction or lesions of the cerebral hemispheres in different classes and orders of animals is sufficient to demonstrate the danger of generalizing universally as to the functions of the cerebral hemispheres from experiments or observations on one class or one order in a class. A wider comparison of instances, instead of supporting Flourens' views that the cerebral hemispheres are the organs of subjective as distinct from objective functions, serves rather to show how intimately the two are bound up together. We might indeed, having regard merely to the influence of the cerebral hemispheres on the motor powers, draw the conclusion that the intellectual capacity is proportional to the degree and duration of the paralysis resulting from lesions of the hemispheres.

Or, reading the facts in another way, we may say that the lower we descend the animal scale, the more complete and independent is the organization in the centres situated below the cerebral hemispheres, of those modes of activity variously described as reflex, automatic, instinctive, or responsive, including all the sensory and motor adjustments concerned in locomotion, equilibration, and emotional expression.

I do not propose to discuss here the mechanism of these so-called responsive reactions. It will be enough to state that they have their centres in the spinal cord, medulla oblongata, cerebellum, mesencephale, and basal ganglia.

It has been much debated whether these manifestations involve sensation or subjectivity. But the dispute mainly turns on the meaning we attach to sensation. If by sensation we mean not merely physical impressions on the organs of sense, but the consciousness of such impressions, further defining consciousness as the personal consciousness or consciousness of the individual, then we have reasons, founded mainly on the phenomena of disease in man, for asserting that sensation, as above defined, is a function of the cerebral hemispheres, and that, therefore, the responsive actions of the lower centres do not involve subjectivity. But if with Mr. Lewes we suppose that all neural manifestations connote sentience, then we must necessarily admit that these responsive actions do involve sensibility and sentience. But as the only form of subjectivity of which we can have any proof or disproof is personal consciousness, and as there is ample pathological evidence to show that this is possible only through the cerebral hemispheres, it seems to me preferable to avoid speaking of the functions of the spinal cord and lower centres in terms which are generally understood to apply only to the subjectivity of the individual. Otherwise there is no reason for restricting sentience to neural action only, for we might with equal propriety speak of the sentience and subjectivity of a white blood corpuscle or a vegetable cell. Those who prefer to do so may, but their terms should be free from ambiguity.

But to return to the cerebral hemispheres. I have already pointed out the error of generalizing from one class of animals to others, without due qualification. Another source of fallacy in researches into the functions of the brain has arisen from the neglect of due discrimination between the objective and subjective manifestations of cerebral activity. Thus it has been considered as a valid argument against the localization of cerebral functions generally, that, notwithstanding the existence of extensive lesions in one or other hemisphere, there has been no impairment of intelligence or loss of any mental faculty. This is taken as a proof that the parts not diseased have been sufficient to carry on the functions of those which have been lost, in accordance with Flourens' views of the indivisibility of the cerebral functions.

Admitting, for purposes of argument merely, that the facts are as thus stated, they only show that the mental powers may survive extensive lesions in one hemisphere. But when we consider that the same absence of mental impairment has been observed even when a *whole* hemisphere has been destroyed by disease, the conclusion is obvious that for purposes of mind one cerebral hemisphere is sufficient. In order, therefore, to disprove localization of function it is necessary to show that bilateral lesions are likewise unattended with signs of mental impairment. But of this there is not a shadow of evidence. Nor do I, from my own observation and study of the phenomena of cerebral disease, admit that even unilateral lesions are without effect on the mental powers. It is, however, very difficult to gauge the extent of damage, or to specify its exact nature; but, in popular and expressive phrase, the individual who has suffered from cerebral lesion is never again "the man he was." But whatever be the exact nature of the deficiency, it is not necessarily a loss of any particular faculty; and we may regard it as established that all the fundamental operations of mind, sensation, emotion, volition, and intellect are possible with one hemisphere only. Subject to certain qualifications, presently to be mentioned, we may assert therefore that as an organ of mind the cerebrum is double. And, indeed, if we look away from the organic or vegetative functions of the organism, and consider merely the animal structures and their functions —the organs of sense and the organs of motion —we see that they are distinctly bilateral, and more or less independent; so that each individual may be considered, in this respect, as *two*, more or less intimately joined together. Each half of the body being thus looked upon as a more or less complete and independent individual, and possessing all the organs of sensory experience and volitional action, the opposite cerebral hemisphere which is the organ of its subjectivity may likewise be regarded as equally complete in itself.

This, however, is only theoretically true, for practically the two hemispheres are very intimately associated together, and one hemisphere gets perhaps more than its own share in the work of the copartnership.

This, however, does not affect the potentiality of each

hemisphere as a complete organ of subjective life. While, therefore, mental operations in their entirety are possible through only one hemisphere, it is obvious (assuming for the time being the complete cross relations of the hemispheres) that the mind can only be affected by, or react upon, the side which it represents ; and that therefore the other must be in a state of inactivity or paralysis. Though the brain as an organ of subjectivity is thus potentially double, in its objective aspects it is composed of two halves, each acting only on the opposite side of the body. Destruction of one hemisphere therefore paralyzes the opposite side.

Hence all theories respecting the question of localization of cerebral functions require to observe this difference between the objective and subjective results of cerebral lesions.

We may now proceed to the consideration of the question whether different functions can be allotted to different parts of the cerebral hemispheres. It has already been mentioned that there are numerous cases on record of diseases and injuries of the brain, which have not been accompanied with paralysis either of sensation or motion. But, on the other hand, these cases are few in comparison with those in which paralysis has been observed. The question is whether there is any constant relation between the situation and character of the lesions which are associated with paralysis, either of sensation or motion, and those which have no such results.

It might be supposed that this question should not have remained so long undecided, considering the great frequency of cerebral diseases. But the phenomena of cerebral disease involve so many factors, that the problem is an exceedingly complicated one, and not easily solved by mere comparison of instances, apart from experimental methods. For, inasmuch as the functions of organs may be seriously deranged, without such structural changes as can be discovered by our most advanced methods of research, there was always room for the hypothesis that the effects observed were not directly due to the lesion as such, but were dependent on some indirect perturbation of the functions of the organ as a whole.

The discovery of new methods, however, leads to new discoveries, and gives shape and form to the apparent chaos of

former experiences. In our investigations as to the functions of the peripheral nerves we have been able not merely to observe the effects of section, but also the effects of excitation of the nerves whose functions we seek to determine.

A similar precision has been introduced into cerebral physiology by the discovery of the electric excitability of the cerebral hemispheres. By combining the method of functional excitation with that of destructive lesion we are enabled to define and localize the individual relations of different parts of the cerebral hemispheres as compared with those of the hemispheres as a whole. And, by so doing, we succeed in eliminating, to a large extent at least, the direct from the indirect effects of cerebral disease, which mere clinical observation was unable to cope with successfully.

It has been established that there are centres or areas in the cerebral cortex more or less distinctly circumscribed, stimulation of which by the electric current gives rise to uniform and definite movements of the limbs, head, facial and lingual muscles, mainly on the opposite side of the body. These movements are not mere muscular contractions of an irregular character, but are definite combinations, corresponding in all particulars with the purposive actions ordinarily manifested in the volitional activities of the animal, and varying accordingly in different animals. It would lead me too far into technical detail to describe the exact position of these areas or centres; but there is a remarkable topographical homology in their function in different animals. When these regions are destroyed, in whole or in part, paralysis of motion or hemiplegia ensues on the opposite side, or of that movement only of which the centre, as indicated by the electrical stimulation, is destroyed. As has already been mentioned, the degree of paralysis and its duration vary much in different animals in accordance with the extent of independent organization in the centres situated below the cortex. The paralysis is strictly limited to voluntary motion, as distinct from automatic, responsive, and reflex action. In man the paralysis of motion is so great that even automatic or instinctive movements, though possible and frequently observed, are very much restricted. But we often see a patient who has facial paralysis from cerebral disease, and

unable to move one side of his face voluntarily, under the influence of emotion move both sides of his face equally well. And an individual who cannot voluntarily move his hand may do so under the influence of emotion, or in the instinctive effort at yawning, stretching, and the like.

But, however much the automatic movements may be affected by cortical disease, we should regard paralysis of voluntary motion only, or movements involving conscious discrimination, as the real and essential feature of lesions of the hemispheres. Even the lower animals, which apparently completely recover voluntary motion, after the motor centres of the hemispheres have been destroyed, do so only in so far as the movements have become automatic or organized, such as the movements of locomotion. But though a dog's paw is not permanently paralyzed as an organ of locomotion by lesions of the hemisphere, it remains permanently paralyzed for all those purposes in which it is employed as a hand. Therefore a dog, which has been capable of making unusual, and, for a dog, unnatural movements with its paw, as the result of education, loses all this power when its cortical motor centres have been destroyed. These are not hypotheses, but facts which have been established by actual experiment (Goltz). It is again to be remarked in reference to the degree in which the various motor powers suffer, that those which are most complex and independent suffer most, like the hand ; while those which are more or less bilaterally associated suffer least. Hence the movements of the legs and the bilateral movements of the facial muscles are still possible on both sides, more or less through the agency of one hemisphere. This is more especially true of the movements of the tongue, which are almost completely bilaterally organized in each hemisphere. Hence destruction of the lingual centre in one hemisphere does not paralyze the lingual movements. To effect this requires destruction of the lingual centre in both hemispheres. These differences are accounted for by the intimate connection subsisting between the motor tracts and nuclei of the bilaterally associated movements, in the spinal cord and lower centres. Such are the main facts concerning what is termed the motor region of the hemisphere.

Behind the motor area, and, anatomically speaking, in the parieto-temporal region of the hemisphere, there are more or less circumscribed centres, stimulation of which by the electric current gives rise to certain reactions, which resemble those consequent on stimulation of the various organs of sense. Some difference of opinion still exists with reference to the exact localization of special sensory areas. But apart from the question of the exact position of these areas, which is unimportant in reference to the subject immediately before us, it has been established in the lower animals that there are distinct cortical regions specially in relation with the various organs of sense.

In the case of the sensory centres, however, it is an exceedingly important fact that they are in relation, more or less completely, with both sides of the body. Hence unilateral destruction of the sight-centre does not cause complete or permanent blindness of the opposite side, and in process of time the effects at first visible pass away. Therefore, to produce total loss of any special sense, it is necessary to destroy the sensory centres completely on both sides. In man this principle of bilateral representation would seem to prevail, if the facts of clinical medicine can be thoroughly trusted, even to a greater extent than in the lower animals ; and hence, owing to the fact that we rarely get lesions accurately corresponding on both sides in man, clinical observers, while admitting the facts of experimental physiology, reserve their judgment as to the exact position of the sensory centres in the human brain. For my own part, however, I do not entertain the slightest doubt that evidence will be forthcoming, establishing, as in the case of the motor centres, the exact homological correspondence of the sensory centres in the monkey and man. The motor and sensory regions thus defined, constitute the greater portion of the cerebral hemispheres in the lower mammalia. In the monkey and man they occupy the middle portion of the hemisphere on account of the special development in them of the frontal and occipital lobes anteriorly and posteriorly respectively. These lobes are merely rudimentary in the lower mammals. Respecting the physiological signification of the frontal and occipital lobes we are still in a state of uncertainty, inasmuch as they

neither give positive outward reactions to electrical stimulation, nor does their removal affect the faculties of motion or special sense. This is abundantly proved also by the phenomena of disease in man, and many of the cases on record of cerebral lesions without evident symptoms have been instances of disease in these regions.

Though the physiological signification of these regions is thus only negatively indicated, anatomical considerations justify us in considering the occipital lobes as specially related to the sensory tracts, and the frontal lobes as related to the motor tracts of the brain.

The hemisphere would therefore seem to be composed of a motor or anterior half and a sensory or posterior half ; and thus we have in the brain a repetition of the arrangement which prevails in the spinal cord and lower ganglia and tracts.

And indeed, apart from physiological and anatomical demonstration, it would be difficult to conceive of what the brain, even as an organ of mind, could be composed, but of sensory and motor elements and their combinations. For these exhaust all our capabilities of receptivity, action, and reaction on our surroundings.

Hence we may say that mental phenomena are the subjective aspect of the functions of sensory and motor substrata, and that in the last analysis mental phenomena, however complex, should be reducible to correlation with the activity of certain simple motor and sensory elements, their accompaniments and combinations.

It is necessary, however, in reference to the question of the influence of mind on body, and *vice versâ*, to have a clear conception of what is meant by sensory and motor centres or substrata.

Sensory and motor nerves and centres are frequently spoken of as structures essentially distinct and possessing properties peculiar to themselves. There is, however, no anatomical difference between a sensory and motor nerve or cell ; nor is there any physiological difference whereby one nerve is capable of transmitting impulses or generating energy only in one determinate direction. The properties of the nerves and the nerve-cells are the same everywhere, and we cannot with strict accuracy speak

of nerve-centres or nerves as sensory or motor, except in reference to the whole apparatus of which they form merely a part, though an integral one. A motor nerve, therefore, cannot be understood apart from the muscle which it excites, nor can a sensory nerve be understood apart from the centre which undergoes what are termed sensory modifications.

We have no reason to suppose that there exist chemical or other differences in the constitution of special sensory nerves. The specific function depends on specific collocations and arrangements of structures whose properties are identical.

As every thing which forms a part of our subjectivity must be represented in the cerebral hemispheres, and as this extends to most of our tissues and organs, we may consider the brain as the subjective projection of the organism. Cerebral states projected outwardly on the organs with which in reality it is integrally connected, as part of a complex apparatus, include our volitions, bodily expressions of thoughts and emotions, and all the various manifestations of what is termed the influence of the mind on the body. Viewed in this light, it will appear that it is not merely the brain which thinks, but the brain in connection with the whole sensory and motor apparatus of the organism, and that therefore our thoughts may thrill to the tips of our fingers. That thoughts and feelings do not always manifest themselves outwardly, does not constitute any valid objection to this mode of representing the facts. For it is not necessary that every central agitation or wave should extend to the periphery in such a way as to be obviously perceptible. But it does to a greater extent than is commonly supposed, even in ordinary circumstances, while in others, classed as more or less morbid on account of their rarity, the peripheral manifestation of the central wave or commotion is pronounced. The problem of the influence of the mind on the body, and *vice versâ*, is simplified when we consider the brain merely a part of the corporeal apparatus, and that its subjective and objective manifestations are correlated ultimate facts, susceptible of no further simplification. And we may regard the brain, whether in its objective or subjective manifestation, as subject to the same laws which regulate the functions of nerves and nerve-centres in general.

The brain being the organ of consciousness it is necessary that impressions made on the organs of sense should reach or affect the cerebral hemispheres before sensation, or a consciousness of the impression, can be experienced. This is amply demonstrated by the facts of disease in man. These are the best evidence in a question of this kind, for it is by no means always easy to discriminate in the lower animals between mere sensory reaction and true sensation. But we know from human pathology that when the sensory tracts which lead to the cortex are interrupted, sensation is abolished more or less completely on the opposite side of the body, though all the centres and tracts situated below the cortical grey matter are uninjured. And that these sensory tracts are distributed to individually differentiated areas or centres in the cortex is proved experimentally by the fact that localized lesions may abolish sensory perception as regards one class of impressions, while sensory perception as regards others remains intact. Thus, by lesions of what is termed the visual centre, we may produce blindness, while the senses of hearing, touch, taste, and smell continue unimpaired.

We conclude, therefore, that each centre is the organ of sensation or consciousness of impressions made on the peripheral organ of sense with which it is connected. Hence the organs of sensation are as numerous as the sense organs. We do not know what is the exact nature of the molecular changes in the peripheral sensory organs, nerves, and centres which constitute the physical basis of a sensation, but we have arrived at many important generalizations as to the rate of transmission and relations between the intensity of the impression and the intensity of the sensation. Though some molecular change in the cortical gray matter is an indispensable condition of sensation, it does not follow, as has been very erroneously and illogically argued from this proposition, that all modifications or molecular changes in the cortical substance are correlated with modifications of consciousness. And indeed on other grounds we have reasons for believing that very important changes may occur which do not rise into consciousness. Therefore, though all consciousness implies cerebral activity, all cerebral activity does not imply consciousness.

It is obvious, however, that the mere fact of consciousness of impressions of the moment made on the organs of sense with which these centres are connected does not exhaust the functions which they subserve. It is necessary for perception that there should be a registration of sensory experiences by which alone it is possible for present impressions to be compared as to identity or difference with former ones. Arguments will be adduced to show that this registration takes place in the cortical centres, and that in the cells of these centres modifications are produced which are the representatives or equivalents of sensory impressions. These are capable of re-excitation or revivification in consequence of which the original impression rises up again in idea. These organic modifications of the cortical cells are the physical basis of memory and ideation, and constitute the very foundation of all knowledge and thought. We do not yet know what are the physical characters of the molecular changes corresponding to the memory and revival of former sensory impressions, but there is reason to believe that a careful study of the microscopical characters of the wonderful network of cells and processes of the cortical gray matter will yet lead to valuable knowledge on this head. By careful comparison of the structure of the cortex in fœtuses when as yet the brain is a *tabula rasa*, with the cortex in healthy and morbid conditions, we may reasonably hope to arrive at much that is at present unknown or mere matter of speculation.

It is a question whether what has been at one time clear in consciousness is ever forgotten. This entirely depends on the permanency of the modifications of the cortical cells which form the basis of these facts of consciousness. That they may remain long after they have ceased to be revivable under ordinary conditions of cerebral activity, is proved by some forms of disease in which what has long ceased to form part of the ordinary working material of thought may again be brought to light.

There is a tendency, however, to effacement and probably, therefore, ultimate disappearance, unless the materials acquired are more or less constantly used in ordinary ideation. We find that those who have become blind at an early age cease after a time to be able to form visual ideas; and so with the sense

of hearing. This period corresponds pretty closely with the progress of atrophic changes in the respective sensory nerves. And in accordance with what has been stated, that the more the materials enter into ordinary ideation the longer they are likely to endure, it has been observed as a curious fact in regard to amputated limbs that the memory of the hand remains longer than that of the arm. Thus a man who has had his arm amputated at the shoulder may still continue to remember it, and apparently to feel in it. But there is a tendency for the hand to apparently approximate the shoulder, so that the individual comes to feel his hand immediately connected with the trunk. The explanation of this curious fact is, that the memory of impressions derived from the hand is much more vivid and important in ideation than those of the arm, so that they remain after the arm has been entirely forgotten, and hence the intervening distance between the hand and point of amputation is lost. From this it appears that in order to keep alive or revivable past experiences, it is necessary that there should be a more or less continuous incoming of similar ones; tending to show that the process of re-presentation of the past is directly associated with immediate presentation. On this re-presentation depends the perception of identity or difference and the relations of coexistence and sequence. Of the simple sensory elements of ideation and their relations, stored up in their respective centres and all organically connected together, there is every conceivable permutation and combination; but however complex the combination may be, it never transcends the original elements. And if these have never been stored up in the cerebral centres, as in cases of absence of the organs of sense from birth, or if the centres have been destroyed, ideation is correspondingly limited. A man blind or deaf from birth can never have ideas of sight or sound, either in the waking state or in dreams; and the same is true of those cases in which the visual or auditory centres of the cortex have been completely destroyed. In the one case special sensory experience has never been gained; in the other it has been irrevocably blotted out.

Before applying these considerations on the functions of the sensory centres to the actual facts of disease, it will be well to

turn our attention to the motor centres. As has already been stated, there are cortical motor centres for the individual and combined muscular movements employed in volitional activity.

These centres may be stimulated to action by sensations and ideas of all kinds, but their activity is always accompanied by certain sensations conditioned by the act of muscular contraction. This association is frequently spoken of as a special sense—the muscular sense. Theoretically there is no great objection to this mode of representing the facts. But it should be understood that this depends on the associated physiological activity of centres which are anatomically distinct from each other. The motor centres as such are distinct from those which perceive and register the sensations of muscular action. We may, in fact, in certain pathological conditions have the power of muscular action without its usual accompaniment of the sense of muscular contraction.

As the sensory centres are the seat of sensation and sensory memory and ideation, so the motor centres are the origin of motor stimulation and the organic basis of motor memory and motor ideation. Motor experience forms no less an important part of our mental function than sensory experience, and the motor factor enters as largely into ideation as the sensory.

There are few facts of our experience or ideation which do not contain motor as well as sensory elements, and in that which gives to man his special predominance over all other animals, viz., articulate speech and its equivalents, the motor element is the most conspicuous and important.

This point is worthy of particular attention.

It is in fact the pathology of speech which has furnished the connecting link between the physiological and psychological aspects of the cerebral functions.

Cases are almost of daily occurrence in medical practice in which the following phenomena are observed : An individual formerly in good health is suddenly deprived of the power of expressing his thoughts or desires in articulate speech. His mental faculties are otherwise unaffected, and he can see, hear, taste, touch, and smell, and comprehend intelligently what is said to him. Usually also there is greater or less degree of paralysis of the right side of the face, and, it may be, of the right side

generally. But he can move his tongue and make the movements of articulation and deglutition without difficulty. He knows and can signify by gestures what is the use of an object, but he cannot name it, even when the name is pronounced in his hearing. He, however, knows the right name from the wrong one when it is uttered among others.

Usually also he is unable to write, even though he can move his fingers. Generally it may be said, that all utterances which have not become automatic, like interjections, "yes," "no," etc., and all writing which has not also become mechanical, like a signing one's name, are impossible. Cases differ in particulars, but it is unnecessary for my present purpose to describe all the variations which are observable. The above may be taken as typical phenomena. It has now been demonstrated by an irresistible body of evidence, and accepted almost universally, that these phenomena depend on lesion of a part of the cerebral hemisphere—usually the left—which physiological experiment has proved to be the motor centre for the muscles concerned in articulation. Here, then, is the interesting problem. What is the relation between the faculty of speech and the motor centres of articulation, and why is speech lost though the power of articulation is not paralyzed? Why should aphasia be associated with lesion of the *left* hemisphere particularly?

Two of these questions have already been answered by implication. That there is no paralysis of articulation by unilateral lesion of the centres of articulation, is explained by the fact that each centre has bilateral influence, so that in the absence of one, the other is sufficient. Hence the right motor centre remaining intact, the mere articulatory movements are still capable of being effected. That loss of speech should specially result from lesion of the left hemisphere is an illustration or proof of the unsymmetrical distribution of function in the two hemispheres. Though we have two brains theoretically, yet practically we find that for certain functions we use one hemisphere more than the other. And the rule seems to be that we use that hemisphere for speech which goes with the hand most commonly employed in volitional action. And as most people are right-handed, and therefore left-brained, so it

is with regard to speech. The rule, however, is not absolute, and there are rare cases where the speech centre is in the right hemisphere. But it is a significant fact that in some at least of the recorded cases of loss of speech from lesion of the right hemisphere the patients have been left-handed. This unequal distribution of function in the two hemispheres seems to hold also, as will be shown presently, in reference to sensory perception and ideation, more particularly in connection with language.

The connection between speech and the motor centres of articulation is not difficult to understand when we consider that words are the mere articulatory symbols of ideas. The memory of words is the memory of acts of articulation, and the reproduction of words in connection with sensory impressions and ideas is merely the revival of certain motor acts of articulation. And as the acts of articulation are mainly performed by the left centre, so this is the organic basis of the memory and reproduction of the same motor acts. Hence aphasia or loss of speech when this centre is destroyed. But though the ideas connected with certain articulatory acts cannot revive these motor acts when the centre is destroyed, yet the ideas continue potentially, and can be called up, to a certain extent at least, by the sounds accompanying these acts of articulation. Hence an aphasic individual connects certain sounds with certain ideas, and thus understands the word uttered, though he cannot repeat it. But comprehension of language is very defective, and in proportion to the complication and abstract nature of the propositions. Simple words—substantives—are readily understood, but a proposition involving abstract terms is unintelligible. This is due to the fact that we by practice come to use words not so much as mere symbols of ideas, but almost independently of the ideas they connote. Hence abstract thought and trains of reasoning, necessitating the algebraical symbols of ideas, are beyond the powers of the aphasic individual.

Consecutive thought is to a large extent carried on by internal speech which tends to express itself externally by the corresponding movements of the mouth and tongue. These are actually carried out in some individuals, in whom thought amounts to whispering or even talking ; while in most there is a slight initiation of the movement with the tongue, as will be

readily perceived by any one who pays minute attention to his own thinking processes.

As speech precedes writing, and as the setting down of manual equivalents of articulatory processes, in the form of written symbols, involves a more or less continuous co-operation of the articulatory centres, the destruction of these centres impairs or completely abolishes the expression of ideas in writing, in proportion to the extent of dependence of the one on the other.

Something must, however, be ascribed to the impairment of the motor centres of the hand used in writing. For, as these are generally affected in the brain which specially causes aphasia, the motor memory and ideation of the right hand are also directly impaired. And, indeed, we can conceive cases in which speech may be entirely manual, the movements symbolic of ideas being of the hand instead of the tongue. In such cases aphasia would be the result of lesion of the manual centres instead of the articulatory. But besides aphasia or actual speechlessness from cerebral lesions, we not unfrequently meet with examples of another class of cases, in which, though speech is possible, words convey no meaning when spoken, though written language is understood ; and others again in which, though spoken language is understood, written language formerly understood is unintelligible, and visible things in general fail to call up names.

In the former the cause is lesion of the auditory centre ; and in the instances recorded the lesion has been found in the auditory centre of the left hemisphere. The essential phenomenon is the abolition of auditory ideation in connection with language. There is no real loss of hearing or deafness on one side or the other ; a fact explicable by the bilateral relation of each auditory centre already discussed. But auditory ideation in relation to speech thus seems to be specially the function of the left auditory centre, *i.e.*, on the same side as the speech centre.

Auditory ideation, however, is not entirely abolished in these cases, as the right auditory centre still remains. If this also were destroyed, there would be loss of auditory sensation as well as of ideation.

Similarly, the inability to connect written or visible sym-

bols with words is due to lesion of the visual centre. Here again the lesion has been found especially in the left hemisphere. The individual sees, but what he sees he cannot *say*. What has been said of the relations of the auditory centres is applicable—*mutatis mutandis*—to the visual centres. But though here the individual cannot associate what he sees with language, he can do so with what he hears. Similarly, in the former case, though sounds do not call up names, things seen, written symbols, are capable of being understood and connected with words. These facts are practical demonstrations of the functions we have ascribed to the sensory centres. They are not merely the substrata of their respective sensations, but registers in which they are stored up and capable again of representation in connection with their respective associations, whether these be sensory or motor, simple or complex.

The association between the auditory and visual centres and those of articulation is specially effected and organized in the left hemisphere as a rule. Hence lesions of these centres in the left hemisphere cause word-deafness or word-blindness respectively.

Whereas, when the centres of articulation are destroyed, words cannot be reproduced in connection with any form of sensory impression or ideation whatever.

The differences depend on whether the motor or sensory factor of the sensori-motor cohesion is destroyed.

These facts also show that the cerebral hemispheres are not symmetrical as regards their psychical functions, and that it is not a matter of indifference, quâ mind, which hemisphere is diseased. There does not, however, seem to be any reason beyond heredity and education for this difference between the hemispheres; and good reasons might be assigned for regarding this specialization as on the whole an advantageous one.

With the sensory and motor regions of the brain alone, sensation, ideation, and volitional action are possible. This is shown by the intelligent actions of those animals which practically have no frontal or occipital lobes, as well as by the results of experimental removal of these lobes in the monkey. But we find that intelligence increases in proportion to the development of the frontal and occipital lobes, particularly of the

former. In man the frontal lobes are developed to a relatively greater extent than the occipital lobes, when we compare the human and simian brains. The exact physiological relations of these regions are, however, not as yet clearly made out, though data are not wanting for more or less profitable speculation.

My own opinion, founded on experimental and other considerations, is that the occipital lobes are in special relation with the viscera, and as such are important substrata of our feelings and emotional states. Under ordinary circumstances we are not conscious of our viscera as such; but in morbid states we are distinctly so, and can localize the feeling more or less accurately. But though discrimination is at a minimum in the nerves and centres of the viscera, feeling is at a maximum. The state of our viscera has a very important massive influence on our psychical tone, and conversely our feelings powerfully influence our organic functions.

The particular character of the emotion, however, will depend on the quality of the sensation or idea with which it is associated. Impressions on sensory nerves do not affect consciousness merely as facts, but have certain qualities which express themselves subjectively as feelings.

But as we are yet ignorant of the nature of the molecular changes in nerves and nerve-centres which are the basis of sensation, we are of course unable to determine what particular change coincides with the pleasurable or painful quality of the sensation. We are justified, however, in believing that those forms of stimulation are most pleasurable which harmonize most with the conditions of healthy and continuous activity of nerves and their organic connections, and those most painful which are the reverse. And, in fact, we do find that the most painful forms of stimulation are those which are just short of annihilating function altogether.

Each form of sensation has therefore its own quality, and as the quality is based on the molecular changes in the sensory apparatus, the fact of sensation and its quality must be given in essentially the same parts. Hence the sensory centres must be the centres also of the feelings which accompany the activity of the special senses.

And as the properties of the cerebral tissues are the same

as those of nerves and nerve-centres in general, we may conclude that the revival of a sensation in idea must possess essentially the same quality and produce the same corporeal manifestation as would be caused by immediate or direct stimulation of the same sensory apparatus. Hence the natural outward expression of the emotion or feeling, as contradistinguished from acquired or ingrafted forms of emotional expression, will be the natural reflex expression of direct sensory stimulation. And this is borne out to a very large extent by examination of the modes of emotional expression. It is possible to induce the feeling by affecting the corresponding bodily expression, and the maintenance of this tends to exclude the opposite feeling. So much are the feelings and their corporeal expression linked together, that we may succeed in arriving at the exact seat of the feeling from a careful study of the parts involved in its outward manifestation. When, however, we consider how numerous may be the combinations of the primary elements of sensation and their qualities, we can see that feelings may become as complex as the harmonies which are capable of being constructed out of a very limited number of fundamental musical notes. To analyze the various feelings and emotions into their primary elements in correlation with their physical substrata is worthy of the most searching philosophical analysis, and will prove of incalculable advantage to a practical science of mind.

Though the regions of the brain included in the parieto-temporal and occipital lobes suffice for the manifestation of sensory and motor ideation and their accompaniments, they do not appear sufficient for the exercise of that power which consists in concentration of thought and that control of the current of ideation which forms the basis of the highest intellectual operations. We are capable not merely of ideation and of association of ideas, according to certain well-known laws, but of attentive ideation, by which consciousness is kept concentrated on certain phenomena to the exclusion of others. This power is variously developed in different individuals, but on it depends the profundity and productiveness of thought, and the discovery of relations between ideas which are not manifest on the surface. By the power of attention we intensify the consciousness of certain ideas and impressions, and

actually diminish the excitability of the brain to others, as has been proved by direct experimental research. These facts justify the assumption that, in addition to the centres of sensory and motor ideation, there are others still higher which can exercise a restraining influence on them, and modify their excitability and activity. An idea in the mind which we desire to retain and follow out in all its relations and associations is kept there by the restraining or inhibitory influence which through these higher centres we can exert upon the other centres and channels through which it may tend to diffuse itself. This seems to be the essential basis of the faculty of attention. The active exercise of attention is felt as an effort ; and viewing it as an act of inhibition, we are justified by the analogy of physiological inhibition in associating it with motor centres. We have many reasons for regarding the frontal lobes as the substrata of these controlling influences. Anatomically they are specially related to the motor tracts of the brain, though they have no objective motor functions, and may be removed without causing objective motor paralysis. But their removal in monkeys, and disease or non-development in man, as is especially seen in idiocy, coincide with a condition of mental degradation, characterized mainly by a purposeless incoherence and vacillation and total inability to pursue any definite or connected train of thought. Beyond these general indications, however, it must be confessed that much has yet to be learnt respecting the exact relations of the frontal lobes and their different parts to the other cerebral centres. It would be easy to speculate, but speculation in cerebral physiology should be the handmaid only of experimental and clinical research. In the prosecution of these we must, therefore, wait for further light.

But if the conclusions at which we have arrived respecting the elementary substrata of mental phenomena are justified by the various anatomical, physiological, and clinical facts which have been adduced, it is evident that even in the apparently most simple mental operations the whole hemisphere must be engaged, some parts perhaps more than others, but all more or less. Hence the physiological and psychological absurdity of looking upon the brain as a collection of organs each complete in its own sphere.

The sum of all our states of consciousness actual and potential in the cerebral cortex constitutes our personality or ego. As this is constantly receiving new accretions and undergoing novel combinations, it is incorrect to say that it retains its identity. There can be no identity when our personality changes every moment. The term personal continuity would be more in accordance with the actual facts. Though our surroundings and our states of consciousness are ever varying, we are conscious through all of a direct continuity from the first recollection to the last presentation. This is possible only through the continuous registration of our conscious experience in the cerebral cortex, and the revival of the past in connection with present states of consciousness. We can never be conscious of the whole of our personality at any one moment, but only of a continuous succession reaching back to the earliest period in our memory.

Should the orderly succession and continuity be interrupted by morbid states of the brain, so that present states do not appear in proper relations with the past, delusions as to identity will be the result; one of the most common manifestations of disordered cerebral action, as well as of dreaming.

As it is through the brain that we live subjectively both in the past and present, and live more or less in the past when we live in the present, and as our subjective life past and present is indissolubly associated with states of our corporeal organs, it follows that the pleasurable or painful quality of an act or state of consciousness will depend not merely on its harmony or the reverse with present physical or psychical conditions alone, but also with our whole personality or cerebral representation of the individual. The satisfaction of our ideal wants or desires is as much a necessity of healthy subjectivity as the satisfaction of our corporeal wants, and indeed the same physical conditions underlie both.

The want of food will produce bodily distress, and the non-satisfaction of a mental desire, or mental hunger, will produce mental distress, and in proportion to the intensity of the desire will the non-gratification be mentally painful.

And just as certain external conditions are incompatible with physiological harmony and healthy nutrition, so certain

actions and states of consciousness disturb the psychical harmony. In the one case there is physical distress and in the other psychical pain, manifested according to the nature of the act or idea and its relations, as grief, sorrow, remorse, etc.

But these feelings vary with the individual. For as the system may gradually accommodate itself to influences which in the first instance caused great irritation and disturbance, so the personality may gradually accommodate itself to actions and ideas which were at first accompanied with intense mental pain. But in all cases, whether the cause of pain be psychical or physical, its corporeal manifestations are essentially the same. *Mens sana* and *corpus sanum* are indeed, if looked at in all their relations, essentially correlative terms.

It is a remarkable fact that those diseases of the brain which produce manifest objective effects, as paralysis, are as a rule less injurious to mental health, or, in other words, are less frequently associated with insanity or mental derangement, than those forms of degeneration of the cerebral tissues and blood-vessels which do not altogether annihilate functional activity. It is in most instances better that a certain portion of the brain should be altogether destroyed, than that it should, partially diseased, remain in gear with the rest of the cerebral machinery, and like an impure source pollute the whole current of ideation and feeling.

Given such an active source of disturbance, the subjective manifestations which it induces are, to the individual, more real than all other phenomena, and the delusion will resist the most convincing logic. It may be silenced for the time, or expelled by an argument, as with a fork, *tamen usque recurret.*

How desirable, from a practical point of view, it would be for us physicians to be able to lay our finger on the primary source of mental disturbances, scarcely requires to be insisted on ; but this would be only insignificant in comparison with the other important issues which depend on an accurate knowledge of the brain and its functions.

DAVID FERRIER.

MUSIC AND WORSHIP.

THE first and noblest use of music was said of old to be the offering of praise to the Immortals; the next the purifying, regulating, and harmonizing of the soul. Worthy of Plutarch, to whom it has been attributed, this utterance is surpassed by that in the Book of Job, upon the creation: "The morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy;" for thus is seen not only the natural and pleasing but also the divinely ordered union of music and worship.

Spiritual song and angelic and divine life are revealed close to our mundane being, so that notwithstanding our material environments, God is not very far from each one of us. Around this dim and disordered world, music is sounding from the stars, and the accompanying voices are those of the sons of God.

Not matter merely moved by soulless laws and forces, but circumambient soul-life is disclosed, realm on realm of spiritual being, all centering in God. Not a spiritually void and lifeless universe is this; not a reign of mere law with motion in fixed orbits, and exact, remorseless forces; not a series of mathematically inevitable processes alone, but a world with attendant spiritual life, a universe replete with expressive music, rousing God's sentient sons to responsive songs of praise. "The heavens declare the glory of God" in that "their sound is gone out into all lands and their speech to the ends of the world."

First heard at the laying of the corner stone of the creation, the song has sounded on, until, at Christ's advent, clouds open and mortal ears are quickened to hear a multitude of the heav-

enly host, with the announcing angel, now celebrating the laying of the Everlasting Corner-stone, the birthday of the re-creation. It is a sublime thought, a universe vocal with the praise of God, from planets and stars and systems well as as from the answering voices of the sons of God.

This assertion of the connection of music and worship in the on-going of the universe is apparently much older than the most ancient literature. Sages among Chaldeans, Babylonians, and Egyptians, whose systems of music, worship, and astronomy were the result of traditions and of long contemplation, re-affirm the ancient idea that the motions of all heavenly bodies are regulated by musical intervals, and that thus they make everlasting harmony. The music of the "ever-during" spheres is no poetic figment. Originally Asiatic, it passed later with many principles of knowledge and civilization by way of Phœnicia and Egypt into Greece, and became part of the ancient thought and worship of Europe.

The doctrine of the music of the spheres was accepted, according to Plutarch, by all the philosophers; "for the universe," say they, "was framed and constitued by its author on the principle of music." Why then does not the ear perceive the resounding song of the morning stars? Because, was the reply of classic philosophers, of the vastness of the concussion of the air, or because of the distance of the stars or the delicacy of their music, for receiving which the ears of mortals are not adapted. As in many instances, ancient philosophers, ignorant of the Baconian method and of our latest experimental processes, here reach conclusions resembling those of Helmholtz and Tyndall and the inductions of modern science. According to the Greek Archytas, our ears are like narrow-necked phials into which, if your pour too rapidly, nothing will come. The relation betwen slow vibrations or movements and a low note or between rapid movement and high pitch was anciently understood. Nicomachus, treating of the scale, gives the lowest note to Saturn, because of his apparently slow movement and greater distance from the sun, while the highest note (as with the shortest string of the lyre) was ascribed to the moon as nearest to the earth and apparently fleet of movement. The telescope annihilates distance; the microscope reveals marvels

of beauty and utility all about us. If there is a medium, however ethereal, sufficient for waves of light, must not motion through it produce sound waves or vibrations of sound? As there is a medium for the transmission of light from distant stars, is it not probable, nay, in the light of modern discovery certain, that there is a sufficient medium for the transmission of sound? The fact that the ear is dull of hearing is no proof that by inventions already suggested, or by the nobler powers of the spiritual body, the soul may not become consicous of glorious sound which as yet mortal ear hath not heard nor mortal heart conceived. The Egyptians ascribed twenty-eight notes to the universe, that being the number of notes in the scale ; while in ancient treatises, mathematics and astronomy are so mingled with statements as to music that he must study them who would possess all the treasures of thought and speech concerning melody and harmony and symphony. Perhaps it was the lack of such research that led De Quincey to wonder that upon a subject so sublime as music there had been so few worthy utterances. Without such research, how marvellously has Shakespeare caught and reproduced this ancient thought in the familiar but exquisite lines :

> "Look, how the floor of Heaven
> Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold ;
> There's not the smallest orb which thou beholdest
> But in his motion like an angel sings,
> Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims.
> Such harmony is in immortal souls ;
> But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
> Doth grossly close us in, we cannot hear it."

Pythagoras held that the glorious sounds were audible only to the gods ; and Milton but re-echoes a sentiment seemingly as old as human thought, when he exclaims of—

> "Yonder starry spheres
> Most regular when most irregular they seem ;
> That in their motions, harmony divine
> So smooths her charming tones, that God's own ear
> Listens delighted."

Music and worship then were divinely married in the temple of the universe. From the first Scripture utterances concerning music, to the last, the lesson is the same. In the Apocalypse,

worship by means of adoring music is the attitude of the saintly soul delivered from the burden of the flesh ; not feeling solely ; for although as music is the idealized language of the emotions, some of its votaries have asserted that feeling is that into which all else fades in the future life ; yet there is clearly narrated the continuance and enlargement of thought as well. "Thou art worthy!" is the acclaim of the redeemed, "for thou hast ransomed us out of every kingdom and people." History is revived while emotion and adoring song accompany the most elevated use of knowledge, and express the loftiest achievements of thought. Thus as earth's history opens with celestial music when morning stars together hymn its advent and sons of God responsive shout their joy, it is also revealed that it will close with a doxology : "And I saw as it were a sea of glass mingled with fire, and them that had gotten the victory ; and they sang the song of Moses and of the Lamb. After these things, I heard a great voice of much people in heaven saying, Alleluia ! And a voice came out of the throne saying, Praise our God !"

From the earliest times, instrumental and vocal music have advanced hand in hand. If to the hymn of creation, planetary systems sounded their accompaniment, a union not less significant is seen in the whole musical history of our race between instrumental and vocal music. If the voice and vocal music were among the earliest means of expressing emotion and passion, so at the dawn of the arts, where Tubal Cain was an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron, there stands his brother Jubal as "the father of all such as handle the harp and organ." Stringed and wind instruments are thus designated ; for while the word organ is used from earliest times in the Bible, the instrument intended (as where the Psalmist exclaims, "Praise him on the strings and pipes" !) is a tube of wood or metal, and later several pipes extending to an octave or two joined together to be held in the hands and played by fingers and lips.

Although the Egyptians had a limited but suggestive form of keyboard, and although their hydraulic organ, admired by the Greeks, was quite like a Yankee notion in its clever construction and use of water in regulating the pressure of air from

the bellows, yet it was of very small capacity. The primitive organ is seen in representations of the heathen god Pan ; and Raphael has portrayed St. Cecilia, "inventress of the vocal frame," holding the pandean pipes as the Christian patroness of music.

As the earliest musical progress was in the Orient and in Egypt, the Jews may have brought instruments and a knowledge of their use from Egyptian bondage to be consecrated to the worship of Jehovah. The Te Deum, which celebrated their triumphant passage of the Red Sea, was "sung by Moses and the children of Israel ;" and while the last notes of lofty praise were yet sounding, Miriam the Prophetess took a timbrel in her hand, and all the women went out after her with timbrels and with dances, and Miriam answered them, "Sing ye to the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously !" Resounding from camp and tabernacle during their wanderings, songs of praise were to find their highest form, when, after the promised land was gained, the temple was reared, to be the ever memorable abode of worship and music. As the simple organ of Jubal may be called the father of the modern magnificent church organ, so some lineal descendant of his harp soothed the madness of Saul and was a vehicle of the inspiration of David, while the ideal which its primitive form dimly foreshadowed is found now in that most popular instrument of our time which with reverberating strings and brilliant keyboard adorns almost every American home.

For the temple's service, the inspired psalms and their instrumental accompaniments were, it would seem, alike composed under divine guidance. Members of the tribe of Levi were selected by the Psalmist to praise Jehovah upon instruments, and a great musical college was thus founded. It consisted of four thousand musicians, of whom nearly three hundred were "cunning" performers, capable of educating the remainder. They were divided into bands of from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and seventy performers, each band being under the leadership of a competent conductor. Asaph and other leaders, it appears from the statements in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of First Chronicles, marked the time by sounding the cymbals ; the singers going before, we are else-

where told, and these performers upon instruments, following, in the midst, were damsels playing upon the timbrels. So from the sixty-eighth Psalm and other passages, we infer that both sexes participated and that voices of singing-men and singing-women, accompanied with many hundreds of instruments, made up the mighty chorus of the temple service. Stored in its treasury, it is said, were various trumpets to the number of two hundred thousand, with some fifty thousand harps, psalteries, and other like instruments. So musical were the people that joyous songs were heard at weddings and festivals ; and wailing dirges sobbed in responsive sorrow over the loved remains of the departed.

The art had its highest culture and use in connection with worship. David, welcomed with jubilant songs after his early and memorable victory, became the inspired master of sacred compositions so cherished that the chants which he composed and dedicated to his singers and minstrels, sung in the temple and on the field of battle, resounded from age to age even down to the foundation of the second temple, and again at the signal victory of the Maccabean Army, and not improbably when "Great David's greater Son" fulfilled all righteousness by frequenting the temple's courts. Perhaps its traces linger yet in synagogues and in Christian chants and ancient hymns.

To the attempts to prove that a musical service of worship is divinely ordered because of the divine ordering of the temple service, it is often replied that the temple and its service have passed away.

Synagogues exist now as of old, and although a musical service with chant and hymn and anthem seems inseparably associated with Hebrew worship, yet it is agreed that the service of the synagogue was not of divine appointment.

But music and worship need for their union no such formal argument or literal sanction ; that union exists in the nature of things, has its recognition throughout the Scriptures, is the burden of prophecies of the Apocalypse, is felt in the depths of the soul and proclaimed in the highest efforts of art, and is to be realized in heaven.

It is not necessary to discuss here the character of the musical instruments known to the ancients and especially to

the Hebrews. But with a body of four thousand trained musicians, with a collection at the temple of tens of thousands of instruments, with singing-men and singing-women and "cunning" leaders and inspired composers, teachers, and directors, and a song-loving people, let who can believe that their music was enriched by no *harmony*, and consisted only of melody or notes in unison.

Of Egypt, whence they came out a musical people, Plato tells us in his Laws that the same sacred hymns were sung for thousands of years. Egyptian harps had several octaves of strings. Drop such an instrument accidentally, and inevitably the sounds would suggest concords.

God gives human voices in different parts, treble, alto, tenor, bass, calling for harmony. The wind sighing in an æolian harp or sweeping through a forest tells of more than melody. On every hand in nature from the first, elements of harmony proclaim their presence to the sensitive musical ear. And if the ear and brain be now more highly developed, the difference is one of degree, not of kind. While the ancients had, it is safe to assert, no such melody as the aria, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," and no such harmony as that of the Oratorio of the Messiah, they had, we may believe, the rudiments of both. I have always found it difficult to credit the statements reiterated by so many musical authorities, that the ancients possessed melody but not harmony. As Ritter traces clearly modern harmony to its source, so Chappell, to whom I am herein also indebted, is convincing as to the existence of ancient harmony. From Egypt, where ancient instruments and musicians are so marvellously portrayed, he gives many interesting instances and illustrations. Harps and pipes with many notes, and so held and played, it is said, as of necessity to make harmony; the hydraulic organ with keyboard; the evident cultivation of music for worship and social life; the representation of fourteen performers making up the vocal and instrumental establishment of an Egyptian gentleman of the older times; the curious caricatures in which Rameses the king, as a noble lion, leads with the lyre, while one courtier figures as a clumsy crocodile playing a sort of guitar, another as a seemingly deceitful and slinking animal playing the double-

pipes, and the fourth member of the quartette, awkward and lumbering, as a donkey with enormous ears, performs subserviently bass to the king's treble—from this and much more, Chappell reaches his conclusion. In answer to the question, Did the ancients practise harmony? he says, "Undoubtedly they did, even at the time of the building of the pyramids; it is not a matter of doubt, but a mathematical certainty."

Recalling passages in the Greek and Latin classics, there is much to strengthen the conclusion. The declaration of Aristotle in his thirty-ninth Book of Problems is explicit: "All consonances are more pleasing than simple sounds; the sweetest is the octave." Such figures of speech as the following suggest an acquaintance with the intricacies of harmony as well as with the clear movement of melody. In the second book of his Republic, Cicero writes: "For as in strings or pipes, so in vocal music, a certain consonance is to be maintained out of different sounds, which, if changed or made discrepant, educated ears cannot endure; and as this consonance, arising from the control of different voices, is yet proved to be concordant and agreeing, so, out of the highest, the lowest, the middle, and the intermediate orders of men, as in sounds, the state becomes of accord through the controlled relation and by the agreement of dissimilar ranks; and that which in music is by musicians called harmony, the same is concord in a state." Seneca thus alludes to the mental influence of music in portions of his eighty-fourth and eighty-eighth Epistle: "When the array of singers has filled up every passage between the seats in the amphitheatre, when the audience part is girt round by trumpeters, and all kinds of pipes and other instruments have sounded in concert from the stage, out of these differing sounds is harmony produced. Thus would I have it with our minds." "You teach how voices high and low make harmony together, how concord may arise from strings of varying sounds; teach rather how my mind may be in concord with itself and my thoughts be far from discord."

Music and worship of old were associated not only with the melody and harmony of voices and of instruments, but also with the movement of human forms and with the light of sacrificial fires and feasts with pyrotechnical display; so that, should

we have the color symphonies and motion symphonies, which art prophets promise, it would still be true that there is nothing new under the sun.

The definitions of musical terms among the Greeks, like their musical scales and their use of music, differ widely from ours. The orator, as we all know, took his note, "tibiis dextris et sinistris," from the musician, and intoned rather than spoke his oration. You may hear something of the same sort among preachers in Wales, or in the preaching tone into which, despite his disapprobation of music, a good Friend preacher often falls. Symphony was the expression for concords, while harmony included both theory and practice, both poetry and its musical accompaniment. Melody with the Greeks indicated inflections or undulations of the voice, whether in speech or rhythm; music included the science of numbers, mathematics, astronomy, and so much of education as to be called the cyclopedia of knowledge. The young Greek was taught music that he might learn also obedience, since in melody, harmony or symphony, all is disordered and displeasing unless the laws ordained of God are faithfully followed. Plato held that the influence of music in the education of youths was as a gale bearing from all sides health from blessed regions and wafting them on imperceptibly from boyhood into a likeness and love and sympathy with all fair and right reason; since more than all things does it penetrate into the innermost recesses of the soul, bearing along with it the love and perception of beauty and order and rhythm in whatever forms presented. Some years since, one of our greatest American scholars, in commenting upon Plato's conceptions, spoke of the importance of the early cultivation of music, since it is not only the most perfect of the arts but the most spiritual of the sciences, belonging to the three grand departments of knowledge, pervading alike the physical, the metaphysical, and the mathematical, and being in close alliance with the believing spirit; so that the neglect of music as an art and as a science is, he exclaimed, "one of the most serious defects in our modern system of early education; and we do verily believe that if the time occupied with puerile Peter Parley treatises on natural theology was devoted to Haydn and Mozart, it would furnish to our children a far more effect-

ual security against infidelity ; for whatever aids in the cultivation of a believing heart precludes those objections from ever obtaining an effectual lodgment in the soul." Among the ancients, music found alike its earliest and its noblest use, as we have intimated in connection with worship. The severe chant, the more melodious hymns or prayers, and the dirges and choral songs, all were sacred to religion. According to Plutarch, the art at first subserved only religious purposes. "Theatres were unknown, and music consisted of those sacred strains which were employed in the temple as a means of paying adoration to the Supreme Being." Anacharsis, the younger, in his "Travels in Greece," in the fourth century before the Christian era, states of the sacred hymns sung by choruses of youths, "that they are so harmonious, and so well seconded by the art of the poet, as frequently to draw tears from the greater part of the audience."

But the music of the past is one of the lost arts.

The downfall of the Roman Empire, the deluge of barbaric invasion, would have whelmed it utterly but for the Christian Church. From ancient shrines and synagogues, from the temple, and, as we love to think, supremely from the "hallel" or paschal hymn sung by the Redeemer with his disciples at the last supper, primitive Christianity caught up and perpetuated the faint and fading sounds of sacred melody. Pliny in his well-known letters speaks of the hymns which Christians sang to Christ as God. Eusebius writes that "there was one common consent in chanting forth the praises of God. The performance of the music was exact, the rites of the church were decent and majestic, and there was a place appointed for those who sang psalms, for youths and virgins, old men and young."

At Milan, toward the close of the fourth century, rose the school of Ambrose. He collated or composed hymns and tunes, and fixed, it is supposed, the four diatonic scales called the Ambrosian ecclesiastical keys. His friend Augustine, after hearing the music in his church, exclaimed, "The voices flowed in at my ears ; truth was distilled into my heart, and the emotions of piety overflowed in sweet tears of joy." The close of the sixth century was made musically memorable from

the more extended and enduring efforts of Gregory the Great, who added four more scales and his Gregorian chant, laboring ardently for musical education and progress. Schools in which music was taught were rapidly established in all parts of western Christendom. The biographer of Gregory declares that of all unpromising pupils, the Gauls and Germans were the worst; "their rough voices roaring like thunder are not capable of soft modulations; for their throats, hardened by drink, cannot execute with flexibility what a tender melody requires; their tones are like the rumbling of a baggage wagon jolting down a mountain; instead of touching the hearts of the hearers, they only revolt them."

Charlemagne, as the eighth century was closing, rose to become the great patron of music; but still the singing was in unison, and simple melody was the substance of the music cultivated. True, Isidore of Seville, the friend of Gregory the Great, had written of harmony as the unison of simultaneous sounds, and gives rules for the use of harmony. Lines for musical notation were gradually introduced, instruments were improved, and at the opening of the tenth century harmony was brought into use by the good Flemish monk Hucbald.

But we may not follow further in this paper the growth, from its sacred cradle upward, of modern music, which is peculiarly the child of the Church. There was an early protest against it from a non-Protestant source. Pope John XXII., at Avignon, in the year 1332, writes as deeply displeased with those who "are captivated with the new notes and new measures of the disciples of the new school, and would rather have their ears tickled with semibreves and minims and such frivolous inventions than hear the ancient ecclesiastical chant." The Great Reformer later on was of a different mind, declaring that by the Gospel, art should not be banished as some zealots desired, for all arts and principally music should be seen in the service of Him who gave and created them; since, as His greatest gift, music sets the soul at rest and places it in a most happy mood, thus proving that "the demon who creates such sad sorrows and ceaseless torments retires as fast before music as before divinity." "It is beneficial," continues Luther, "to keep youth in the continual practice of this art. A school-

master must know how to sing, otherwise I do not respect him." With a musical education and a musical ear, he felt that not only church doctrine, discipline, and morals, but that church music also needed a reformation. His opinion of the old church music as rendered by drowsy monks and choristers found vent in the characteristic explosion, that it was "a dismal ass's bray." He was untiringly devoted to translating and collating suitable hymns and tunes. Words and music of his own composition have come down to us, such as the noble hymn, "Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott." He demanded that the words "be worthily expressed, not babbled or drawled, and that the masses join in the singing and pay devout attention." What a sententious summary for congregational singing! Luther was also right in attaching great importance to the words and thoughts of hymns, and also to the popular character of the music. For the Reformation as a popular movement demanded that its hymns and tunes, like its translation of the Bible, should be so rendered as to be "understanded of the people."

The chorale was a combination both of the old Gregorian and Ambrosian tone and also secular melody and harmony. By degrees the sacred song of the Protestant churches takes on its distinctive and popular character; simple secular tunes as well as old hymns tunes being often adopted or adapted. A great step forward was made by assigning to the people the treble, as the more distinct and leading part, while other voices, until the organ came into general use, sang the chords or harmony.

Luther had a hand in the preparation and wrote the preface of the first Protestant hymnal, put forth in 1524 by John Walter. Lucas Osiander rendered great service in 1586 by his book of "fifty spiritual songs and psalms set in counterpoint for four voices in such wise that a Christian congregation may join in the singing throughout." "I know well that composers are in the habit of assigning the chorale to the tenor, but if this be done, the chorale or tune cannot be distinguished from among the other parts, the common people cannot tell what psalm it is nor join in the singing. For this reason I have placed the chorale in the treble, so that it shall be recognized distinctly, and every lay member can sing too." In England and Scotland, in the reign of Edward the Sixth, metrical

psalms and hymns are found in general use. Brought in with the Reformation wave from Germany, they bore with them German chorales and other grand old tunes, vastly superior to much of our modern sentimental or machine-made ecclesiastical music. This power of music over the hearts of the people has made it, in all great popular religious movements, the prevailing element in both public and social or family worship. At the Reformation, the singing of psalms, begun in one church in London, "did quickly spread itself not only through the city, but sometimes at Paul's Cross there will be six thousand people singing together." Genius, whether that of a great composer or of common sense—which Guizot has called the genius of humanity—catching and making vocal the aspirations of the popular heart, gives us "volk" song; and the best chorales, in clear and simple tones of regular cadence and movement but of tender and melting or of rousing and inspiring power, may well be called Christian "folk" song. The word *chorale*, a modification of the word *chorus*, suggests in its Greek derivation a vast volume of simple measured melody grandly accompanied. Should the science of music become so advanced that musical phrases, like the root forms of words, will disclose history, ties of lineage perhaps may then be traced between the Greek chorus and the German chorale, or between the song of bondsmen in Egypt and the weird hymns of bondsmen in America. Who has heard the resounding plantation chorus, "Tell ole Pharaoh, let my people go!" without a mysterious feeling that the refrain was much older than our late "patriarchal institution?" Many such tunes, if rude in form, have the rare merit of naturalness, and are full of power and pathos. The defect which strikes the ear is often that of unskilled rendering. The vociferous plantation bawler who, when checked, uttered the answer, "The good book says, *Hollard* be Thy name," but expressed the apparent sense of duty of many estimable and misguided persons as to congregational singing.

The lack of a musical ear, like color-blindness, is a great deprivation. Early musical education will, however, in great measure supply the defect, and instruction in singing in many parts of the Union has been the invariable associate of the day-school and the church. In the earliest days of colonial history,

it is said that the "sounding isles of the dim woods rang with songs of lofty cheer," in which the Pilgrim fathers found utterance for faith and hope, undaunted by difficulties. The first publication of the New England free press was a psalm book; and upon the solid basis of Sternhold Hopkins how many an enduring musical edifice has been reared, until the Oratorio Society has taken the place of the winter singing-school, and the great organ of Boston's Music Hall that of the old-time tuning-fork, by which the hymns in the meeting-house were "pitched" in more senses than one. The popularity from Maine to India of music such as that of the Moody and Sankey hymns is, I believe, susceptible, did space here permit, of an explanation which, without sacrificing principles of art, yet justifies the use of whatever will bring the Gospel in music home to those to whom better music is as yet unintelligible. Is not simple congregational singing one of the greatest of the undeveloped powers of Christendom? Sir Henry Cole not long since made a valuable suggestion to his vicar, somewhat as follows: "Doctor, the people are very fond of music, and I think if you were to invite them to come to the church once a week and allow them to take part, giving them as much simple music as they can well sing and understand, you will find they will come. Let all the seats be free; let there be a sermon, but not to exceed ten minutes; let them have five or six hymns or psalms to good old tunes; and if the hymns be accompanied by instruments properly administered, I am sure it will produce a good effect." "So," says Sir Henry, "we had silver trumpets, two trombones, and two kettledrums, and, I declare, if they were the last words I had to speak, I never heard anything more solemn. My friend, the doctor, was the one who disturbed the regulations by preaching seventeen minutes instead of ten. The church was crowded, they sang their hymns, and each week the crowd increased. I met a member of Parliament at the church, and he said to me, "I have been shedding tears all the service; I never heard anything more affecting." The offertory paid the expenses. If you wish to take the people away from public houses and perhaps fatally uncomfortable homes, you might do it by a very simple process in your church, if you tried it."

Imagine such frequent services of song in Washington with members of Congress in tears! Surely to a much more general extent than at present, those responsible in great measure for the prosperity and righteousness of the nation need to humble themselves before God in his house, that they may receive divine illumination.

Why is not the Christendom of to-day guiding the art of the world, crowding canvas with noble productions, producing works of sculpture surpassing the master-pieces of heathen art, erecting cloud-piercing spires and long-drawn aisles and vast cathedrals, gathering into noble monumental and useful structures the scattered wealth of our needlessly multiplied churches and of our feeble or questionable church architecture? Because, without Christian unity, the heart of Christendom languishes, being "divided against itself."

Piled up in the principal cemeteries of our cities, you may find monuments of marble and carved stone and metal unartistically designed and wasting a wealth of material which, were we Christians united, would have built cathedrals all over the land and endowed colleges and memorial hospitals and schools, dwarfing the architectural achievements of the past. For we have added resources of engineering and construction and material, just as the multitude of modern musical instruments opens up a new world, as it were, for the progress of music; while the inspiration of the artist would not be lacking, were Christendom united. For this, time is not ripe, and we, like our forefathers, are not worthy to see that day; we might be tempted to do as they did who used the strength of unity for purposes of religious oppression and persecution. Better perish Christian unity and united effort and all triumph of sacred art, than that liberty should again be lost! The world must wait until music, teaching us harmony despite diversity, and liberty as consistent with law, can pave the way for the restoration of Christian unity. Then, united patronage and wealth and the true Christian "time-spirit" will make the Church, mistress of all the arts as she has been already the nursing mother of music, which is supremely the art of the nineteenth century and of the future. Music and worship cannot be divorced nor left to live but coldly together, without injury alike to art and to religion.

Winterfeld dates the decline of sacred art from the time when it "contracted that fatal taint" which degrades it to the service of sensual pleasure.

If music and its sister arts owe much to the fostering and ennobling influence of the Christian Church, it is equally true that, in view of popular religious movements, and of exalted services of worship, the Church also owes a debt to music which it should endeavor to repay by every means in its power. Let the Church then seek to advance musical culture and to encourage the production and execution of the greatest musical works. Since as a nation we are neither Anglo-Saxon nor Oriental nor Occidental exclusively, since all peoples gather here to become one under one government, the church music of the future cannot be exclusively of any one of the old schools, but must combine their excellences, and grow from its own soil as they did from theirs. Even now, but in the infancy of its Christian civilization, for this nation in this broad land and in the illimitable future, what triumphs may not sacred art achieve!

To pursue the subject of music and worship further would lead us far beyond our limits into the great tone-world of modern life and thought. The marvellous progress of modern music presents one of the most brilliant and fascinating chapters of art history. The achievements in the range and compass and multiplication of instruments and in the knowledge and application of the laws of sound form a grand and startling chapter in the revelations of science. While treating the relations of the fine arts, and especially of music as an art, to Christianity, we have yet another topic worthy of a separate paper. Of Christianity it has been well said that while no art is more fit emblem of her work, none can more efficiently aid that work in the present day than music. What, then, ought to be done, and done at once, for music in its relations to worship? As conducive to true progress in this matter, a principle should be enforced which is not new but which has been greatly neglected—that church music should express the worthiest worship which we can render to God, and should tend to the highest edification of the worshipper. In proposing practical measures, the suggestion most commonly made is, to

abolish the quartette choir. Not the number of performers but the spirit of display often seen in quartette and similarly constituted choirs, and the unseemly music generally chosen, are the objectionable things. But the quartette choir has been often deserving of the highest praise for the painstaking and devout fidelity of its members. At worst, it is but one of the steps from a defective past to a better future. That which we deprecate is the tendency to exhibit individual talent rather than to exalt worship. The effort and the outlay seem oftenest directed, not to the edification of the hearer, but simply to the performance of elaborate music, generally unskilfully composed and defectively rendered. I have heard at the close of a sermon on the last judgment the beautiful hymn, "Nearer, my God, to Thee," in which the whole congregation could have joined and thus have deepened the impression of the sermon, rendered as a solo to a flippant secular melody.

By the adoption of a good hymnal giving both words and music; by frequently using a few of the noblest hymns till they become beloved and familiar as household words; by leading the melody clearly and distinctly either by a trumpet or by the human voice; by making the Sunday-school in some measure and in the best sense of the term a Christian singing-school, congregational singing can be developed. Psalm or hymn singing is a mode of worship in which Christians of every name can unite. We lament the lack of Christian unity. There is ample room for an effort towards its restoration on this broad basis of co-operation. Choir unions or great gatherings for culture in the art of spiritual song are almost everywhere practicable. And Christian unity would thus secure incidental influences of no slight value; for while in melody we have the succession of single sounds in obedience to law even as individuals and churches follow some particular rule or use, so in harmony we have the blending of all in one as in the universal ever-living Church of Christ, in which, without the surrender of individuality, all may harmonize in love to one another and in filial obedience to the perfect will of God. Thus music in worship conduces to Christian unity.

Yet other Christian uses of music as connected with worship, together with practical suggestions as to musical training and

the development of correct musical taste, are too numerous and varied to be mentioned even with a passing word. I am convinced that much more rapid and satisfactory progress would be secured if, taking a lesson from what has been well done by others at home and abroad, we should give systematic attention to church music, not only in our schools and colleges, but especially in our theological seminaries, so that the clergyman should enter upon his professional work furnished not only with the authority but with the educated ability to criticise with judgment and to improve by his own intelligent influence the music of his cure. With God's blessing here as elsewhere, true progress depends upon man's effort, for man is the crown of things, and at his best estate he is the embodiment of harmony, as Dryden so eloquently sang :

"From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began.
When nature underneath a heap
Of jarring atoms lay,
And could not heave her head,
The tuneful voice was heard from high,
Arise ! ye more than dead.
Then cold and hot and moist and dry
In order to their stations leap
And Music's power obey.
From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began :
From harmony to harmony
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in Man."

E. N. POTTER.

CHRIST AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.

THE question we intend to investigate is this, What relation does the Christian religion bear to our belief in a future state? It may seem a very late stage of the day to propose such a subject of inquiry. The Christian pulpit has long since relegated the doctrine of immortality to the outer court of the tabernacle. It has long since been regarded as one of those first principles which evangelical experience should leave behind, as a truth whose foundations are laid in the law of nature, which every Christian should assume, but which no Christian should waste time in contemplating. To those who think thus, the field of inquiry which stretches before us must indeed appear a profitless and a meaningless journey. If in Christian experience we have already stood on the transfiguration mount, why should we go back to climb the mountain slope? If in the full participation of the new life we have entered the holy of holies, why should we return to pace the vestibule of the temple? If in the height of spiritual development we have comprehended a mystery which passes natural knowledge, why should we revert to a puzzle of our spiritual infancy and to those mean and beggarly elements which are fitted to nourish only the opening mind?

And yet, if we are not greatly mistaken, all this reasoning is founded upon a vast delusion. Is this doctrine of immortality indeed the rightful property of the incipient mind? does it in truth belong to the outer court of the tabernacle? If we open the Pauline epistles we shall be arrested by a very different view of the question. If there ever was a man who allowed full scope to the laws of nature, that man was Paul; so intense is

his respect for natural theology that he considers the God of nature to be to the heathen an anticipation of the God of revelation. But when Paul comes to the doctrine of immortality his language is slightly changed; it is no longer the invisible revealed by the visible, but something which the unseen and eternal alone can declare. The same man who is willing to admit an analogy between Christianity and Hellenism claims for the Christian faith two points of absolute origination: the one is the doctrine of the cross, the other the light of immortality. It is still more remarkable, and it is still less to be denied that in the mind of the Gentile apostle these two are one. "Our Saviour Jesus Christ, who has abolished death and brought *life* and immortality to light." To him immortality is revealed just in proportion as life is revealed. Life, sacrificial life, the life of the cross, of abnegation, of unselfish devotion, is the organ by which he sees it, the organ by which he would have every man see it. To be rooted and grounded in love is to comprehend with all saints; to have the charity that beareth all things is to see face to face; to be endued with the Christian spirit is to be possessed of a higher sense, penetrating where eye hath not seen, where ear hath not heard, where imagination hath not conceived. If this be Paul's doctrine, and it seems to us unanswerable, there must follow a conclusion more important still. This belief in immortality, which we place at the threshold of religious experience, can no longer be suffered to occupy a position so humble. So far from being the entrance to the outer court, it is itself, in the Pauline view, the very holy of holies, the innermost sanctuary of the temple of sacred truth. Immortality is here not the first but the last object to be fully recognized, an object which can only be perfectly seen when all other lights have been combined to behold it. It must appear henceforth not as the foundation, but as the pinnacle; not as the root, but as the flower; not as the morning-star, but as the meridian day. If the vision be the product of the Christian life, it will shine more clearly in proportion as that life is unfolded and will be felt more widely in proportion as that life is diffused. A man's belief in immortality will be commensurate with the value of his soul, his disbelief in immortality with the smallness of his spiritual experience. His vision

of the future will be the measure of his hold on the present, and the larger be the grasp of his spiritual instincts and mental possessions, the clearer will be his conviction of the imperishable nature of the soul.

There have been two extreme phases of opinion regarding the relation of Christianity to the doctrine of a future state. The eighteenth century was emphatically a century of nature-worship. Its watchword was the glory of humanity; it was built upon the pillars of despotism and culminated in the crown of kings. The English deists contended with the English apologists, but they both occupied glass houses, and the line of demarcation between them was very thinly marked. To Collins, Tindal, Chubb, Morgan, and Bolingbroke the light of nature was sufficient; to Warburton, Cumberland, Conybeare, Sherlock, and Paley the light of nature was nearly sufficient. The deists, where they denied a future state, denied it on the testimony of the soul; the apologists, where they defended a future state defended it on the testimony of the soul. The orthodox churchman claimed nearly as little for Christianity as his heretical opponent; he was everywhere victorious, but he made moderate demands and exacted slight tribute. He, like his vanquished foe, believed in the majesty of human reason; Christianity was only a supplement to that light of nature which was already almost complete. Man wanted little to perfect his hope in the future; the problem was more than half solved by the unaided instincts of the mind, and one historical manifestation would confirm the verdict of humanity. Let a man rise from the dead, and the evidence would be complete. Let an actual message be borne from the silent land, and aspiration would become reality. Let the eye gaze but for a moment upon one visible proof of vanquished death, and in that instant the human soul would know how true had been its reasonings and how just had been its aspirings; the resurrection of Christ was but the seal and attestation to the unerring dictates of the natural mind.

That century passed away, and from the flames of the French Revolution a new world arose, a world in every sense the antithesis and antagonist of the old. The eighteenth century had worshipped the light of nature; the nineteenth century

strove to leave nature behind it. In every department of thought the spirit of transcendentalism arose—in the speculations of Hegel, in the poetry of Goethe, in the dreams of Coleridge, in the utopian visions of a thousand political seers. Over the atmosphere of the religious world there came a corresponding change. The evangelical wave which began to break over the shores of England and America had some tones harmonious with the transcendental wave. It was pre-eminently a movement of life and freshness, but its course was sweeping and reactionary. The immortality of the eighteenth century had been a popular immortality—a visible house with many material mansions, whose existence was prefigured in nature, whose reality was confirmed in Christ. But to the reviving life of the nineteenth century such a future was degrading. Would men be content with idealizing the mere product of nature? Had Christianity nothing new to communicate on the subject of man's future destiny? Was this continued life of the eye and of the ear, of the heart and of the brain, the acme of human dreams? Ought not this immortality of nature to be superseded, or if it remained should it not remain only as the hell of the wicked? For the pure soul, for the regenerated spirit, was there not reserved a higher, a nobler goal? Was it not to be translated into a new heaven and a new earth, into a mystical life undescribed and undescribable, into a world independent of beautiful sights and natural sounds and mundane affections? Was it not in ascending to drop its earthly mantle, to bid farewell to material pleasures, and to be absorbed into communion with that still, calm life of God where the winds never blow, where the waves never beat, where the passions never play.

Here then are two extreme phases of opinion—one making Christianity a mere supplement to the popular instincts of the soul, the other practically regarding it as a correction of those instincts. What is our own position in relation to these opposite views? To say that it is contrary to both would not express our meaning ; it is essentially and radically different, it stands on another plane. For we would call attention to the fact that these two opinions, opposite and irreconcilable as they are, are yet based upon one vast and one common assumption: they both take for granted that the popular notion of immortality

prevalent throughout Christendom is derived from the light of nature. We hold, on the other hand, that this popular notion is itself the direct product of the Christian consciousness, that instead of being supplemented by Christianity it is created by Christianity, that it is nowhere to be met with outside the limits of the cross, and only to be found where Christian culture has preceded it. Let us just ask at the outset what is this popular notion of immortality which men claim for the unaided light of nature? That question resolves itself into another—what is the popular notion of death? If we were asked to frame a definition which would at once be brief and exhaustive, we should say that death in the popular sense of the religious world is the immediate transition of the soul into heightened conditions. Let it be observed that in this definition, brief as it is, there are involved four distinct particulars which are nowhere found united in any pre-Christian system. First, it asserts that the principle of life does not perish at death, but simply makes a transition from one state into another. Secondly, it declares that the new state into which the soul passes is not impersonal but *conditioned*—that is to say, environed by an outward form and embodiment, or, as Paul puts it, "Not unclothed, but clothed upon." Thirdly, it maintains that the new conditions are higher than the old—that is to say, that the embodiment affords greater scope for the expression of the soul's character, and this is equally true of all states, whether beatific, penal, or purgatorial. Finally, it affirms that this transition is an immediate process—not the result of a long sleep or temporary cessation of being, but the direct accompaniment of the very act of death We have said that these four particulars will not be found united in any system of antiquity; their union, in truth, begins with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. It is in the resurrection of Christ that for the first time in history we are brought face to face with the assertion of an eternal harmony between matter and spirit, the body and the soul. We do not speak merely of an isolated historical fact; the doctrine of Christ's resurrection is in its deepest sense the doctrine of Christ's life. The historical act which forms its climax is but the consummation and the illustration of that perpetual harmony between the body and the soul which constitutes the music of

his whole earthly history—a harmony which justifies the statement of the fourth evangelist, that even while on earth the Son of man was in heaven. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection professes to be more than a fact; it claims to be a gospel, a life, a continuous experience, and the very fact that it is not exhausted in one historical manifestation has enabled it to permeate the world with an atmosphere wholly new. It is through the breath of that atmosphere that we have inhaled our modern thoughts of immortality, and it is by the fresh life it has imparted to our human nature that the light of nature itself has been able to aspire so high.

The resurrection of Christ was to the heathen world the first historical vision of a complete personality; the earliest harmony of a body and a soul. It is not too much to say that throughout the life of heathendom these two were constantly disjoined. If we cast our eye down the long vista of pre-Christian speculations we shall be struck with the fact that these speculations seem to move on two separate lines of thought, opposite yet almost contemporaneous; in the one the body sacrifices the soul, in the other the soul sacrifices the body. If we look more closely we shall be struck with a fact more remarkable still. We shall perceive that these lines, opposite as they are, are yet not parallel; they are ever converging nearer to each other, the body is struggling towards the spirit, the spirit is struggling towards the body. We see materialism starting from its grossest form and enshrining itself within the earthly and the sensuous, yet ever increasingly, though almost unconsciously, becoming discontented with its own shrine and striving to renew its youth by simulating the life of the spirit. We see spiritualism starting from an intense, an overweening estimate of the absolute majesty of mind, and striving to exclude from its dominion all objects and all conceptions which bear not the stamp of abstract thought, yet ever and anon growing weary of its tenantless empire and struggling to break the solitude by the admission of material forms. We see these opposing lines of thought ever more and more losing their opposition, looking towards one another, struggling towards one another, and yet withal unable to reach one another. At last, in the fulness of time, we behold the solution of the problem; heaven and earth meet

together, matter and spirit embrace each other. The long antagonism between the body and the soul is reconciled in a life which exalts spirit without depressing matter, and which exalts matter without debasing spirit. Those claims of the sense and of the reason, which Brahm had pronounced irreconcilable, and which Plato had failed to solve, are adjusted in one grand historic deed, which harmonizes the reason with the sense and lifts the sense to the very door of reason. In the Christian doctrine of the resurrection all things at last consist; the opposing lines stand side by side, the divergent philosophies melt into unity, and the reconciling power of a re-established harmony gathers into one the fragments of the past.

Such we conceive to be the scientific place in history of the doctrine of Christ's resurrection. Within the limits of a periodical review we can only sketch the outlines of a vast subject, and must be content to point out the path without describing the way. We begin with the material line, and we begin with it in its grossest, most materialistic form. It rises in that Dead Sea of the human intellect the empire of China. The modern inhabitants of that empire have recognized a future state by worshipping the souls of their ancestors, but the Christian atmosphere has penetrated further than the Christian consciousness. The creed of ancient China, in both its early forms, was the worship of a material principle, underlying the images of all things—a principle whose one attribute was its changelessness, and whose one glory was its perpetuity. This indeed was alone perpetual. All else vanished into the inevitable abyss—men and the lives of men, things and the forms of things, times and the fashions of times; they perished, but this remained; they all waxed old, as a garment, but this was the same. The loves and the hatreds, the hopes and the fears, the joys and the sorrows of humanity faded before it; it was when they were not, it would be when they were no more. Such a creed stood at the furthest remove from any doctrine of immortality, personal or impersonal; its one gleam of comfort was the motive which prompted it. Whence this reverence for the changeless; was it not that the immutable was the symbol of the immortal? Whence this veneration for a stolid material principle; was it not that its very stolidity held out the hope that it would be changeless?

Thought must develop, feeling must consolidate, passion must exhaust itself, life itself must fade, but inert matter grew old and gave no sign, its impassiveness protected it from corruption, and its lifelessness exempted it from death.

And now for many centuries and through many lands we lose sight of the material line. It is submerged in the waves of a new civilization, and when next it appears it is in the heart of Ionic Greece. The old world has passed away and another world has dawned—the world of Thales, Anaximenes, of Heraclitus. Materialism, too, has put on a new aspect. It is no longer the worship of dead, inert, stolid matter, it is the worship of matter in its most living and life-like forms—the water, the air, and the fire. It is difficult within the same line of thought to conceive a more complete transition. Ancient China had worshipped matter for its changelessness, Ionic Greece sought it for its flexibility, and sought it only in its most flexible aspects. Water is the symbol of vital freshness; the water of life, the living water, the laughing water have become almost proverbial expressions. Air is the symbol of vital freedom; the very word spirit means breath. Fire is the symbol of vital energy; we speak colloquially of the spark of life. When the Ionic school of Greece deified the water, the air, and the fire, it uttered its protest against a dead materialism. It made one step nearer the conception of a living nature, an animated frame of the universe. Its object of worship was still matter, but it was matter transfigured on the mount, adorned in the likeness of the soul, and glittering in the vesture of human intelligence. The eye of its adoration soared not beyond the natural, but it was the natural in that aspect which simulated most the spiritual, not the movelessness of apathy, but the activity which suggested conscious power. And yet can we fail to perceive that while the instincts of humanity have advanced, humanity itself has approached no nearer even to the rudest conception of a personal immortality. The most which the individual man could gather was that he formed an infinitesimal part of an all-pervading and an all-enduring element, that he was the drop of an ocean, or the breath of an atmosphere, or the spark of a mighty fire. But death would dissolve the difference between the element and its components; the drop would go back into the

ocean and be a drop no more; the breath would be exhaled into the atmosphere and be a breath no more; the spark would mingle with the fire and be a spark no more. The individual life was contemplated as an accident of being, and the fulness of universal life was to be the death of individual existence. Man had not yet dared to hope for a personal future, yet he had made one step towards that hope by realizing more clearly his value in the present.

We pass over two centuries more, and we are brought face to face with a still more advanced development. During these two centuries the masses of the Greek population seem to have caught something of the Ionic fire, and the common mind had been gradually permeated by a very rich and a very beautiful mythology. There was in this instance a close harmony between the early Greek religion and the early Greek philosophy; both worshipped materialism in its aspects of freedom and activity. Never indeed in the history of mankind had men so powerful an excuse for the reverence of matter; for never did the idea of matter present itself in so beautiful a form. It was one of the loveliest lands on which the human eye has ever gazed; nature had lavished there not perhaps her vastest, but certainly her most attractive treasures. It was not nature in her Asiatic magnificence, which appalled even while it ravished —the magnificence of trackless deserts and tenantless plains and gigantic mountains, before which the individual life sank into insignificance. It was nature in that careless freedom, in that laughing beauty, which at once dominated the soul and left it untouched by the sense of its bondage. The Greek was not afraid of her; in the very act of deifying he sported with her, he played while he worshipped, and he worshipped while he played. He looked upon the objects of nature as the child looks upon them—as a separate assemblage of vital forces, each following its own pleasure, each doing its own will. Sun, moon, and star, mountain, valley, and meadow, stream, river, and ocean, were all animated by independent lives, and each was a god over its own sphere. The religion of the Greek had become identical with his poetry, and his poetry had become identical with his prose. What to us is a beautiful metaphor, a fine simile, a happy trope or figure, was to him a fact as sober as the

sunshine or the rain. The beauty of the universe lay to him in its appearance, and to him, therefore, its appearance was its reality, for it was the sense of the beautiful which constituted his existence, and it was the vision of the beautiful that revealed to him the divine.

And now it was that philosophy asked the question, was there not some truth in this mythology? Beneath its manifest absurdities was there not after all a scientific basis? The common mind of Greece had invested material objects with the possession of vital forces; had not the vulgar here stolen a march on the philosophers? Would it not be possible to lift the whole Grecian mythology into the sphere of physical science, and to kindle the dry bones of intellectual speculation by uniting romance to reality, the poetical to the prosaic? That we believe was what Epicurus asked, that we believe was the motive which dictated his remarkable answer. That answer was the reduction of materialism to the smallest limits within which it had yet been restricted. He reduced the physical universe to a series of atoms, and within each atom he placed a self-acting force. He brought science very near to the realm of poetry, matter very near to the realm of spirit. It was no longer dead matter as in China, it was no longer life-like matter as in the school of Thales, it was matter actually living, animated, vitalized. One step alone remained to complete the development of materialism; it was to say that these forces of nature were themselves intelligent. That step was taken by Stoicism. The philosophy of the Stoics carried to the furthest verge of refinement the possibilities of the material line, to a height which almost blazed into spirituality in the thoughts of an Epictetus and the speculations of a Seneca. While we must remember that before that time came, the world had caught the glow of a brighter and a holier day-spring; while we can hardly refrain from the conclusion that Stoicism, like every other heathen system, must to some extent have participated in the fulness of the Christian light, we are by no means disposed to deny that considering the narrow limits from which it started, the philosophy of Stoicism deserves all praise. It made the best of poor circumstances, it built a tolerable structure upon a very mean foundation. Stoicism did for the materialism of ancient Greece what the latest

development of Darwinism has done for the materialism of modern England—it invested it with a soul. Let any student of modern philosophy compare the physical origin of life as exhibited by Alfred Wallace, with the physical origin of life as exhibited by Priestley and Lamarck, and he will be forced to admit that he is standing on a higher platform. The England of the nineteenth century is still in one sense materialistic, but its materialism is almost as distinct from that of the preceding age as the soul is distinct from the body. Matter is here no longer a thing, but almost a thought; no longer a dead mechanism, but a living force; no longer a passive effect, but an active if not an intelligent cause. The position of modern England, so far from being the product of the latest civilization, is the survival of an older culture, and the return to a former day. It finds its parallel in that history of ancient materialism which, beginning with the rudest and the most ungainly forms of physical origin, culminated in investing the physical world with the attributes of reason and the instincts of intelligent power.

What, all this time, had been the position of the doctrine of immortality? The Epicurean and the Stoic had striven to spiritualize the physical basis of life, had they thereby succeeded in inspiring man with the hope of an endless future? On the contrary, it is an undeniable fact that even in the ripest development of Stoicism the doctrine of immortality was repudiated. There were some high-strung and sensitive spirits who ventured to hope for a hereafter, not even the most sanguine aspired to an endless hereafter. If the physical basis of life were itself a vital force, there might be some reason to believe that the force might survive for a time the decay of its bodily environments, might linger in some region of the universe after its earthly tabernacle had crumbled into dust. But in the mind of the Stoic all individual forces were only parts of one great primal force or fire; from this they came, and to this they must return. They might linger for a few years, they might remain active even for a few millenniums, but the time was coming when they must yield up their individual being. The great fire would try each man's work and find it wanting, the tiny individual spark would lose itself in the ocean of primal heat, and the original element of the universe would devour all minor forces. Nor was the

popular expectation of the vulgar in this case more sanguine than that of the gravest philosopher. There is a prevalent belief that the worshippers of the Greek mythology recognized an endless future; that they certainly did not. In the popular religious world of Greece immortality was not for man; the gods alone were the immortals, and those whom the gods made divine. There was a hereafter for the human spirit, but it was not to last forever, and while it did last it was little more than a half existence. Neither Hades nor Tartarus were contemplated as eternal states, and it is only by a straining of speech that they can be contemplated as states of consciousness at all. Hades and Tartarus were the dreams of the disembodied life-force; Hades was a vague troubled dream, Tartarus was a wild nightmare dream. Hades was the home of those spirits not more than ordinarily notorious for the outward crimes of humanity; Tartarus was the home of those spirits whose deeds of evil had been imperishably graven on history. Hades had a less amount of pain, but Tartarus had a fuller amount of existence; the vital force was more actively conscious in proportion to the depth of its wickedness. Yet neither the realms of Hades, which held the mass of commonplace sinners, nor the realms of Tartarus, which contained the few specimens of moral monstrosity, ever elevated their inhabitants into the dignity of waking beings. So far from heightening, they lowered the condition of the soul, imprisoned the spirit of man within narrower limits than earth had ever afforded, and confined the range of his vision to heights compared with which the visions of earth were infinite.

We have now exhausted the possibilities of the material line of thought. We have followed it out to the utmost verge of its powers, we have seen it ever drawing nearer to the attainment of a spiritual stand-point, but even at its furthest verge of development we have found it unable to reach that stand-point. Baffled in this direction in discovering an immortality of pure nature, we come next to consider the course of the opposite and far more important line. At the same time when China was rearing a philosophy upon the basis of absolute materialism, India was establishing a religion on the foundation of an exclusive spirituality. China had started from the assumption that

there was nothing in the universe but matter; India awoke with the conviction that there was nothing in the universe but mind. In China the climax of intelligence was the manifestation of physical power; in India the manifestation of physical power was the limitation of intelligence. Brahminism, the first philosophic creed of India, was spiritualism run mad; carried to such an extent that, in accordance with the law of extremes, it became equal to its opposite. In considering the nature of this spirituality, the eye naturally fastens upon that which is at once its characteristic and its blemish—the institution of caste. Amongst the few survivals of Asiatic culture which remain in modern Europe, the institution of caste stands out pre-eminent. That some occupations are in themselves, and apart from their respective aggravations, more heinous in the sight of men than others, is one of the first doctrines in the social catechism of England. That it is a survival of Asiatic culture is, we think, undoubted; but the misfortune is that the gods of one age become the demons of the next. No modern Englishman will now defend caste on any other ground than that of worldly expediency; to the ancient Brahmin the essential ground of its defence was its purely unworldly character. To the modern Englishman caste is dear as a badge of aristocracy; to the ancient Brahmin, if we are not greatly mistaken, caste was originally revered for precisely the opposite reason. That it became in process of time an aristocratic agency, that it ultimately helped to sever man from man, that its social consequence was the immoral one of breaking down the bond of human brotherhood, all this is undoubtedly, undeniably true. Yet we hold that while its social consequence was immoral, the moral instinct which prompted it was right and noble. Let us just ask, for a moment, what was that principle on which the ancient Brahmin felt himself constrained to divide society? We know that he separated mankind into four distinct sections, each rising in gradation above the other, and each expressing its gradation by the nature of its earthly work. At the foot of the ladder was the slave, at a higher stage was the man of commerce, higher still the soldier, and at the summit the priest. We do not say that such a classification would be exhaustive of any society, ancient or modern; we do not say that even were it exhaustive

it would express a true gradation. But we do say that even at this remote lapse of time we can discover a principle on which such a gradation might be made, and that unless we have misconceived the Brahminical spirit that principle was the reverse of aristocratic. Is it not clear that the social ranks of ancient India were regulated by their power of ministration? Their relative height was determined by the amount of their vicarious sacrifice, and the more voluntary was the sacrifice, the higher was the social position. The slave lived for his master, but he did so by compulsion; the commercial man lived for the community, but he did so for expediency; the soldier lived for his country, but he did so for duty; the priest lived for humanity, and he did so for love. The priest thus reached the climax, both in the extent of his range and in the intensity of his motive; he was the vicarious representative of the sins and sorrows of all mankind; and in sacrificing for those sins and sorrows, he was in his highest ideal actuated by no lower motive than the enthusiasm for humanity itself.

It was unfortunate, however, that the spirit of sacrifice which appeared in caste as a whole was unable to be carried out in its different parts. These four classes, springing as they did from a common principle, were yet on earth forever divided. The slave might have the spirit of a soldier, but in this world he could not become a soldier; the soldier might have the spirit of a priest, but in the present order of things he could not become a priest. The bond of social union lay on the other side of death, in that singularly suggestive and ultimately wide-spread doctrine—the transmigration of souls. That doctrine was at once the adumbration and the travesty of the Christian belief, that as the tree falleth so it must lie. What Brahminism said to her votaries was this: "You are making your own hereafter; whatever your present is, your future shall be." "Are you now a soldier with a craven spirit? you shall start upon your future in the position of a slave." "Are you now a slave with the spirit of a soldier? you shall begin your hereafter in the rank of military life." "Are your earthly deeds in advance of your earthly position? there awaits you in the world beyond death an advance of that position." "Are your earthly deeds unworthy of the rank you hold? there awaits you behind the

veil a retrogression in the march of being." "Have you reached the climax of self-sacrifice, have you arrived at that stage in which your own joys and sorrows have been lost in the joys and sorrows of struggling human nature? then for you there can be only one immortality—the immortality of a life which is lost in God." "What other future would you have, what other future would be conformable to your own self-sacrificing spirit?" "If your joy be to lose yourself, your fulness of joy must be to be absolutely lost; to close this individual life of selfish cares and personal interests; to bid farewell to that which separates you from the stream of universal being." "Your life of sacrificial priesthood shall be perfected in that perfect sacrifice in which you shall surrender all which has made you an individual man, and be absorbed in that great fountain from which has sprung your earthly day."

Such was the immortality of Brahminism; the excess of spirituality had led to the same goal as the excess of materialism—personal annihilation. In process of time there came a movement which was to ancient India what Protestantism is to modern Rome—a moral revolution; that movement was the creed of Buddhism. Yet the difference between Buddhism and Brahminism lay rather in their method than in their doctrine. Both equally believed in personal annihilation, both equally desired that the personal annihilation would come. But Buddhism wanted to hurry it on more rapidly. Might not caste be abolished in the present world? Why should men be dependent for so great a boon on a transmigration of souls beyond the grave? Would it not be possible that even here the gulfs of society might be bridged over, and that the soul at the hour of death would be ready to enter into its annihilation—rest? That was what the Buddhist sought to do. He proclaimed a universal priesthood, he proclaimed the abolition of caste, he proclaimed the potential equality of all men, and he did so in order that to every man the hour of death might be the hour of nothingness. Western civilization stands aghast at such a spectacle. There are millions of human souls—thoughtful, earnest, devoted souls, living a life of exceptional morality, yet living for the very purpose of dying. Here is a multitude of men making death their goal, struggling more piteously to sink

themselves in the waves than ever drowning mariner struggled to be released from them; calling on the rocks to fall on them, and on the mountains to cover them. The Greek had loathed the thought of death, but he was unable to escape from it; the Indian could always have escaped from it, but he loved it too well. Is there any thing in the realms of fiction, is there any thing in the fairy tales of childhood half so unlike reality as this Eastern paradox? To say that the Christian spirit did not create it is to say nothing; at the lapse of three thousand years the Christian consciousness is unable to conceive it. Nay, if we are not greatly mistaken, it proceeded directly from the absence of the resurrection element. A soul without a body could be no more a person than a body without a soul; yet how could a body be eternally united to a soul? Was not a body a material thing, and was not every material thing sinful and selfish? Was not matter the clog of spirit, the source of its imperfection, the secret of its unrest? Was it not that which united man to the beast of the field, which implanted an animal nature within him, which prevented him from recognizing his fellowship with the divine, and as such, was it not something to be rooted out with an iron hand, to be torn from its place in the heart and buried in the depths of that spiritual ocean which it circumscribed? We know how Platonism carried out that problem. Platonism was the true child of Brahminism, though it went into a far country and wasted its first substance in riotous speculation. It talked grandly of the immortality of the soul, but the soul was to it not a person, but an intellectual essence whose life was dwarfed by personality. It called upon that intellectual essence to set itself free from those miserable limitations which made it an individual man, to break the bars of the material prison-house, and to go back into the bosom of absolute, unconditioned thought. It was reserved for Christianity to rend the veil, to show that limitations might be real advancements, that the body might become the soul's chariot, that physical sufferings themselves might be the heavenly shadows in the Platonic cave, that frailty, weakness, imperfection, all that constitutes a cross, might enlarge the boundaries of being and set the spirit free.

Meantime, in the very home of its nativity, spiritualism was

growing weary. The soul wanted a house to dwell in. It was tired of wandering through vacancy without a local habitation or a name. Was there nowhere to be found some subtle medium in which it might be clothed? Conceding that flesh and blood were unworthy to form the tabernacle of a human spirit, was that spirit therefore bound to go without a tabernacle? Were there not fairer forms of matter than those of the corrupting and the corruptible flesh, were there not more glorious appearances in nature than those revealed in the images of men, had not the universe some element of beauty which was worthy to be reserved for the resurrection mantle of the soul? The answer to that question was, we believe, the origin of Parsism—the creed of the worshippers of fire. Men looked up to the fiery tropic sun, and beheld in it an image at once of glory and of terror, and they asked, was not this worthy to form the embodiment of disembodied souls? Would it not be a destiny consistent with the majesty of mind, if, when the house of this tabernacle were dissolved, the spirit of man should be clothed upon with a garment of celestial light? Would it not redeem the spirit from wandering forever more if there were provided for its habitation a mansion so beautiful and so permanent, a mansion which, while it belonged to the world of nature, yet stood on the very boundary line of the world of thought? The Parsee would have said with religious reverence what the poet said with poetic fervor: "Hail! holy light; offspring of heaven first-born."

Now we have no hesitation in saying that spiritualism in this doctrine had approached one step nearer the Christian doctrine of a future state; it had actually succeeded in personifying the disembodied soul. The misfortune was that while it restored personality, it destroyed *human* personality. It may seem a wild paradox when we say that the immortality of Parsism was a lower condition of being than the life of earth. We speak familiarly of shining angels, and by the very expression we imply that light, in our view, would be a fitting embodiment for celestial spirits. It is quite possible it may be so; we know nothing whatever of the nature of celestial spirits. But if light were proved to be the suitable embodiment for an angel, it would by no means follow that it was the suitable em-

bodiment for a man. Embodiment in a sunbeam might be the enlargement of a seraph, it would certainly be the limitation of a human life; it would cut off the half of its humanity, and therefore the whole of its personality. We believe a human form to be necessary to man's personal existence on the same ground that we believe rhythm necessary to the existence of poetry—the removal of either would alter the conception of the term. It is worth while considering that on this subject the Parsees ultimately became their own critics. If we pass over into Egypt we shall find the very heart of Parsism struggling after a better resurrection. The souls of the good and of the evil are supposed to have received their sentence of judgment; the good pass into the embodiment of light, the evil are immured in folds of darkness, yet the good and the evil are alike unsatisfied. The souls of the blessed look down from the sunlit heights of Osiris, and in their gaze there seems to be something of a wistful longing. Their eye rests not on the luminous framework which enshrines them; their eye is on the grave where reposes their old earthly tabernacle. That body can never rise again, yet it is necessary that even in death its form should be preserved. If decay obtain mastery over it, the souls of the blessed must cease to exist. Hence it is that the Egyptians embalm their dead; it is not merely a rite of affection, it is a condition of the soul's immortality. What means this strange medley of loftiness and absurdity? Here are souls which have attained immortality, which have reached the realization of the dreams of Parsism. They are clothed in bodies of light, and Osiris has pronounced them happy, yet their happiness rests on the preservation of other bodies too corrupt to enter into the realms of sunshine. Like the riddle of the Sphinx, the medley has a meaning. Is it not that the light has been found inadequate to clothe the spirit, that human thought has at last begun to crave for its own appropriate expression, that the human heart is straining to manifest itself in the glance of the earnest eye and the sound of the living voice, and that over the grave of the form which death has conquered the longing for a resurrection has begun to rise?

When that longing came it was time for the Exodus to appear. From the heart of that Egypt which was waking from

the dreams of Parsism there issued a stream of life which was to refresh the wilderness—a stream which was to guide the world's footsteps from the rill of faintest hope to the ocean of eternal life. The history of the Jewish nation is even from its purely secular aspect the strangest in the annals of mankind. Its course was a singular blending of glory and of shame, of light and of darkness, of triumph and of tragedy. It was at once the most privileged and the most unfortunate of all peoples. Its fate collectively was the fate of its leader individually. Like Moses, it led the world through the wilderness to the very borders of the promised land, and like Moses, at the last, it did not enter in. It conducted the human mind to the first clear light of a personal immortality, yet it saw very dimly that light to which it was leading. It carried from Asia into Europe the costliest treasure which traveller ever bore, but it never thought of opening the casket to learn the nature of the gem. It went out of Egypt pursued with fire and sword, that it might attain the glory of a Messianic hope, yet pursuing Egypt in the future church of Alexandria reached the Messianic hope sooner than flying Judah. A fate so strange, a destiny so enigmatical demands a passing notice and challenges our historical interest. In an essay which aims at scientific catholicity we cannot of course assume the existence of a supernatural element. The supernaturalist says that the history of Judea was the direct product of divine interference; the mythicist says that the thoughts of the Jewish mind conjured up the divine interfer ence and imagined the facts of the history. But there is one point on which supernaturalist and mythicist are alike agreed; they both admit that the thoughts underlying the history, however they came into the Jewish mind, certainly existed there. We shall accept this common meeting-place, and for the present ask no more. We shall take our stand upon the fact that a narrative has been written, and we shall never extend our inquiries further than these two questions, What does it say? and What does it mean? As we study that narrative we are ever increasingly reminded of the fact that Judea had to work out the problem which the Brahmin and the Parsee and the Egyptian had left it as a legacy. It had to determine the momentous question, Where does God dwell? Is there a home for

the Absolute Spirit? Its whole intellectual history is the pursuance of that problem. We could bring the entire Jewish scriptures, from the Exodus to the New Testament, in attestation of the truth that the speculative life of Judea is the struggle to find the house of God—the effort to redeem spirit from its abstraction and to clothe it in a form of endearment. First we have the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night; God moves before his people in a perpetual motion, ever leading onward, never resting to commune. Then comes the tabernacle, where the shekinah rests, more stationary than the cloud-pillar and the fire-pillar, but still without a fixed or abiding habitation. Next from the consolidated empire there rises a holy and beautiful house, a permanent temple, no longer to be borne from place to place through the wilderness, but to stand forever as the symbol of the Changeless. Yet the temple is not to stand forever; that is indeed the Father's house, but it is the Father's house with only one mansion, the priest alone can enjoy communion there. But the congregation also want a voice; therefore the glory of the temple fades and the glory of the synagogue appears. At last comes the fulness of the time, and the fulness of the Godhead dwells in a human form. Pillar of cloud, pillar of fire, shekinah, tabernacle, temple, synagogue, all melt away, and the house of God becomes not only the place of his rest but the embodiment of his revelation. The incarnation proclaims his eternal personality. He is no longer the incomprehensible Jehovah, dwelling in the unbroken solitude of an abstract existence, and only able to commune with his creatures through the intermediary forms of angel and archangel. He has spoiled principalities and powers and made a show of them openly. He has revealed himself as the immediate meeting-place with the soul, has broken down the middle wall of partition between matter and spirit, and enabled the eye of man to see God in the human form.

The eternal personality of God is intimately connected with the eternal personality of man; the doctrine of the incarnation must culminate in the doctrine of the resurrection. In finding the house of God in the habitation of a human form, Judea had virtually found the permanent house of man; for if matter was worthy to be the home of the Absolute Spirit, it was still more

worthy to enshrine a finite human soul. And this brings us to a subject which has always presented peculiar difficulty to the student of Judaic thought. Do the Jewish scriptures contain the doctrine of immortality, is a question which for centuries has engrossed the theological world, a question which has been oppositely answered and is not yet definitely solved. The combatants can by no means be ranged under the wide classification of broad and narrow churchmen; many of the most evangelical believers have felt themselves constrained to take the negative side. The controversy has received attention from the most cultured minds—from the mental precision of Calvin, from the keen rationalism of the English deists, from the utilitarian sagacity of Warburton, from the philosophic subtlety of Lessing, from the logical acuteness of Whately, from the Romanizing proclivities of Hengstenberg, from the elaborate research of Alger, from the massive learning and the conspicuous fairness of Dr. Hodge of Princeton. The arguments on both sides are exceedingly good; on their extreme opposing lines the combatants would seem to have mutually exterminated each other. We cannot wonder at this as long as the one can appeal to the orthodoxy of the Pharisees, and the other can point to the national toleration extended to the Sadducees. There is one point, however, which has often struck us: while Christ condemns the Sadducees for denying a resurrection, he never commends the Pharisees for holding it; nay, the latter are uniformly to him the more repulsive of the two. We cannot help thinking that the resurrection about which these parties disputed was not the resurrection which Christ came to preach. The resurrection of the Pharisees was the rising of a military host to form the army of a physical Messiah —a host which was to subjugate with fire and sword, a Messiah who was to shed not his own blood but the blood of his enemies. The Sadducee, on the other hand, had caught the infection of the cosmopolitan heathen atmosphere; he had brought Oriental culture out of his captivity, and was not specially desirous of an exclusive Judaism; the Pharisaic resurrection was therefore to him a matter of aversion. If the view we have suggested be of any weight, we shall find no difficulty in understanding how he whose special aim was to destroy the

physical expectation might find in the negative Sadducee a more hopeful and a more fruitful soil. We intend therefore to put the Pharisees and the Sadducees both out of court, to waive altogether the political aspects of the Jewish faith, and to view it entirely in that aspect in which it was received by that multitude who heard the Messiah gladly. It seems to us that in the short space which remains at our command, our object will be best served not by a didactic discussion but by a brief tentative narration. Here again we shall make no assumption of a supernatural element, we shall confine ourselves entirely to the question, What does the narrative say? We have long since entertained a settled opinion on this subject—an opinion which in some sense is neutral between the opposing views, yet while it expresses our personal conviction we advance it only tentatively and without the slightest dogmatism. We believe the function of the Old Testament to have been not to *teach* the doctrine of immortality but to *develop* it; not to give a final statement but to pave the way for a final statement. Judaism was only John the Baptist in the wilderness, and all the steps of Judaism were but steps in the desert. We will not therefore expect to find in the Old Testament the entrance into the Promised Land, but shall be content if we can discover there the traces of an onward march, the impressions on the sand and the footprints in the snow.

We hold then that in the history narrated by the Jewish scriptures the doctrine of immortality has passed through four distinct stages. The first stage was one of unbelief. Man had awakened to the sense of sin; paradise lay behind him, and the cherubim and the flaming sword barred the way to the tree of life. He would fain have put forth his hand to touch that tree; his was a reluctant unbelief. For the first time in spiritual philosophy we meet with a human being desiring a life of the body; in other words, craving a personal immortality, for the very sense of moral unworthiness has brought with it a sense of individual importance. The Brahmin reverenced death; the man conscious of a lost Eden reverenced length of days. He had no fear of death as a physical power; he would have laughed at the difficulties of the modern sceptic as loudly as the modern skeptic laughs at his. The sting of death was

sin; it was its moral element which made it dreadful, it was its moral element which made it eternal. It was the frown gathering on the Father's brow, it was the sentence of exclusion from the paradise of God. He feared not the act but the fact of death, not the dissolution but the disgrace, not the corruption but the curse; the removal of these would at any time have enabled him to say, "O death! where is thy sting? O grave! where is thy victory?"

Suddenly there is a rent in the cloud and through the aperture a new world appears; that rent is the translation of Enoch, the first faint light of a possible immortality. We shall not here dispute with the mythicist whether the translation of Enoch was an outward fact or the embodiment of an inward thought, for it so happens that it is the thought we are here specially in search of. Nothing indeed can be more simple, more unaffected, or more beautiful than the narrative in which the statement is conveyed. There is no attempt at elaboration, there is no effort at adventitious ornament; we see not even the chariots or the horsemen or the opened heavens or the ascending form. We hear only the description of a holy and Christlike life, and even that is narrated with the most unadorned simplicity, "Enoch walked with God, and he was not, for God took him." How and where the translation was made we are not told; the translation seems to come forth as the natural consequence of the life. All we know is, that in the midst of that vast cemetery whose tombstones record the deaths and ages of the ancient world there is one monument which records a term of earthly years not rounded by a sleep; "he *was* not," he never became a thing of the past; it always can be written of him "he is." What was the significance of such a revelation to the ancient world? Was it not clearly this, that over a life of holiness death would lose its dominion; that wheresoever the pure in heart should be found, these would be selected to see God? It was undoubtedly the advent of a hope into a world of despairing apathy. Yet we would call attention to the fact that the hope lent by the translation of Enoch was at best but flickering and feeble. Be it observed that Enoch had not conquered death; he had only passed death by. He had gained no victory over the king of terrors; he had simply been per-

mitted to escape his power. He had not removed the primeval curse from the fact of death; he had only been translated so that he should not see it. The curse of death still remained, and death itself was still unconquered. The problem of immortality had not yet been solved. Enoch might continue his personal existence without dying, but the deepest longing of the soul was to continue its personal existence in spite of that death which naturally waits for all. The divine revelation of immortality had many things to tell the world, but the world could not bear them yet; it was only able to receive the faintest streak of dawn, and the fuller flood of light must be reserved for other days.

And indeed it was not long before the indications of a fuller light began to appear. Gradually and almost imperceptibly, yet with ever deepening conviction, there was springing up in the heart of primeval man a great and unquenchable expectation. Enoch had not been sufficiently holy to conquer death; he had only passed it by, but there was coming in the fulness of time a perfectly holy one who should meet death face to face and come forth triumphant. There was a seed germinating in the Jewish nation which would issue in a flower of peerless beauty—a beauty which would cancel all the years of barrenness. A moral deliverer was coming, one so pure that his life would obliterate the curse of death. The Holy One would not be suffered to see corruption, the Holy One would conquer corruption for all mankind. The Redeemer from death was coming; he would stand at the latter day upon the earth and would call into life the dust of buried years; then would the righteous shine forth as the stars in the kingdom of their Father. Such we believe to have been the moral expectation of a Messiah, and we are too apt to forget that there was a moral expectation. Every Jew was a human being, and the interests of the human being were wider than the interests of the Jew. A conquering king might satisfy the national mind; but the individual lives of men wanted a sacrificing priest, a holiness which would cover their unholiness, a fulness of life which would enable them to feel worthy of a personal immortality.

With such a hope for the future, man could no longer look

for annihilation in the present. If there was coming a Holy One who should strip death of his treasures, these treasures must in in the mean time be preserved. There was, therefore, a treasury of souls, a resting-place of departed spirits. Sixty-five times is it mentioned in the Old Testament, sometimes as the place of the body, sometimes as the home of the disembodied soul, always as the designation for the state of the dead. Of the nature of that disembodied state Scripture tells us nothing, and nowhere does it reveal its inspiration more powerfully than by such reticence; that which is emancipated from human conditions must be beyond the conception of humanity. But what Scripture does not tell we can partially gather from the inferences of reas on and from the popular imaginations of the Jewish people. She ol, even to the best men, was never a place of desire; the Psalms are full of aversion to the passage into this unknown world, and Hezekiah's prayer for life is almost abject in its importunity. The dread of Sheol was not the dread of pain; it was the fear of a diminished being. It was admitted on all hands to be a limitation of human personality. It was a land of shadows, a land of silence, a land of profound sleep, broken occasionally by the louder waves of time, and in the Gehenna of later Judaism by the retrospective dreams of souls more than usually stained. It was not, generally speaking, a state of suffering; its chief pain was its impassiveness; it was a paralysis of the passions, a benumbing of the mental energies. The sails of life hung loosely over a windless, waveless sea, and the silence of the calm was the silence of the grave.

At last the promised Enoch came, the Holy One of Israel appeared, and the doctrine of immortality entered on its fourth and final stage. That stage was nothing less than the transfiguration of death. Death itself became the medium of translation. It was no longer a sleep, it was no longer a suspension of vital energy; it was the immediate transition into an enlarged personality, an intensification of the individual nature, whatever that nature might be. This transfiguration of death was one of redemption's universal gifts; it was purchased for all men. The retributive law still rested upon the transgressor, but it was lifted from dumb circumstances. It was lifted from labor and it was lifted from death; the sweat of the brow ceased to bear a stigma,

the weakness of the parting hour ceased to carry blame. All sufferings became possible fire-chariots, and death, the greatest of sufferings, had greater possibilities than all. In every case death in the Christian sense was an enlargement of personality. The rich man in the parable had a clearer vision in Gehenna than he ever had on earth. The intermediate state of the early fathers was not intermediate in respect of personality. The intermediate state of mediæval days was essentially purgatorial; but the very definition of a purgatory implied a personal enlargement. What, then, was this embodiment of the departed soul? Personality without an embodiment is in our view impossible, and in any view inconceivable. Do the New Testament Scriptures throw any light upon the nature of the soul's transition garment? In relation to an immortality out of Christ they preserve on this subject an unbroken silence; but in relation to that life which is their ideal of a perfect immortality, they offer what in our view is more than a suggestion. We believe the pervading thought of the New Testament to be, that the resurrection body of Christ forms the germ or nucleus out of which is to spring the transition garment of the believing soul. Let the student of the gospels and the Pauline epistles approach their study with such a thought in his mind, and he will be struck with the marvellous concentration of all other points around it. He will find a new significance in that grain of mustard-seed, which, though buried, rises up into a mighty tree and branches forth into the dwellings of the homeless. He will see a fresh meaning in those elements of communion which are professedly the symbols of Christ's earthly body—the body broken in death but distributed in resurrection. He will read in another light those narratives in which the Messiah conquers death, and measure by a new standard "the power of his resurrection." He will ask, not without intelligence, if when Christ spoke of the Father's house with many mansions—the house which his own resurrection was to prepare—he meant any thing less than that human body which had been the scene of the incarnation. He will ask yet again, and with still deepening conviction, if when Paul spoke of "the building of God, the house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," he meant any thing less than that same Father's house which the evangelist had beheld in the form of

Jesus. He will inquire if Paul had any meaning when he said that Christians were "members of Christ's body," that they were "crucified together with Christ," that they were "buried with him in baptism unto his death," that they were already "risen with him," and "made to sit together with him in heavenly places," that the Christian dead "slept in him," and that he at his coming would "bring them with him;" above all, that their rising was so bound up in his resurrection, that if there were no resurrection of the dead, then Christ himself was not risen; but that if he were risen, they had already their "conversation in heaven." These are startling statements, but they are marvellously consistent with one fundamental thought; they point, in our view, unmistakably to the belief that when the soul is clothed upon with the house which is from heaven, it is clothed upon with the resurrection body of the Son of man. The effect of such a belief was to abolish death. The soul no longer needed to linger in an impersonal sleep awaiting the consummation of all things. "He that believeth on me shall never die," was the last word on the subject of immortality. Such a man hardly required translation; he was already the member of an incorruptible body. There is one scene of the New Testament in which that thought is portrayed with more than ordinary vividness; it is around the tomb of Bethany. There Judaism and Christianity meet face to face, and separate to meet no more. Martha murmurs that her brother must wait so long for the restoration of his personal existence. "I know he shall rise again at the resurrection." The answer of Christ is striking and graphic: "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live"—shall live in the hour of death, shall live in the act of death, shall live even in your Sheol, the place of death! In the light of that answer the immortality of Judaism faded away and a new immortality arose. That new conception has become so much the portion of humanity that we have forgotten its parentage and claimed it for our own. Yet let us not forget that what we call the natural light of immortality has risen not only on the ruins of Judaism, but on the ruins of our pre-Christian human nature. Where does it exist outside of Christianity? We have asked, in the course of this inquiry, what

form of ancient philosophy represents on this subject the light of modern reason? We have passed the systems of antiquity under a rapid review, yet not too rapid to embrace a doctrine which holds amongst them so insignificant a place. We have interrogated Confucius, Brahma, Buddha, Zoroaster, Thales, Epicurus, Plato, Seneca; we have consulted the popular expectations of Greece; we have questioned the sacred records of Judea, and as the result of the whole we have arrived at this conclusion—that the conception of death as an enlargement of man's personality is a conception which emanates from Christianity alone. We have found the East generally too spiritual; we have seen the West invariably too physical; the Christian doctrine of the resurrection repudiated both. Yet here, as ever, Christianity has reached its goal, not by destruction, but by incorporation; not by eliminating the antagonistic elements, but by removing the source of their antagonism. It purified matter from the taint of corruption, and made it worthy to be the home of spirit, and it showed that the intensest phase of spirit might infinitely dwell in the form of matter. The modern doctrine of immortality may have proceeded from human nature, but it is from human nature in its reconstructed form. A middle wall of partition had divided the personality of man; the flesh lusted against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; the incarnation restored their union, and the resurrection made their union eternal. Man has recognized a new future because he has recognized a new present. He has aspired to a personal immortality because he has reached a personal elevation. He has dared to project into eternity the shadows of the earthly hour because the earth has itself become to him a scene of spiritual possibilities, and the hour has itself revealed the shadows of a changeless day.

GEORGE MATHESON.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT—AT HOME AND ABROAD.

THE true position of our own local government may be seen more clearly by comparing it with the systems of other nations. Brodrick[1] informs us that the origin of local government in England must be sought in the primitive communities of our Saxon forefathers. The German nations, as described by Cæsar and Tacitus, were nothing but associations of self-governed villages, or larger districts, occupied by separate families or clans, among whom there was not even the shadow of a common national allegiance, except for purposes of war. Such was the organization of the Saxons when they first settled in England, and continued for centuries to be the essential organization of the English people. In Scotland the most ancient form of local jurisdiction of which any trace remains was the baronial; and the power of the barons grew till it alarmed the crown which had created it. There sprung up, in the course of time, communities which engaged in manufactures and merchandise, and the crown sought in these some counterpoise to the great barons. It gave charters to these communities of the lands in their neighborhood, and made them perpetual corporations, with power to choose councils and magistrates, and with special privileges of trade. These, after a long term of abuse, grew into veritable republics, with magistrates chosen by the people, practically independent, in their office, of the crown, and their acts subject only to revision for error or illegality in the courts of law. These baronial courts continued in full vigor till the great rebellion of 1745, when their jurisdiction was so limited by Parliament that it

[1] "Local Government in England." By Hon. George C. Brodrick.

gradually decayed, and has now nearly died out. Local government in Ireland has but little distinct history from that of England ; and the local authorities may be divided into five classes—those connected with Poor Law Unions, counties, towns, and harbors, respectively, with a class of minor authorities. The county authorities include baronial presentment sessions, grand juries, governors of lunatic asylums, trustees of inland navigation, and arterial drainage authorities.

In France there are no traditions to be considered as in England and Scotland. The old system of local government was entirely altered at the end of the last century. In France the department is divided into arrondissements—the arrondissements into cantons, and the cantons into communes. The canton is only a judicial division ; but the department has its Parliament, the Conseil General, presided over by the Préfet ; the arrondissement has its Conseil d'Arrondissement, presided over by the Sous Préfet ; and the commune its Conseil Municipal, presided over by the Mayor. The number of the departments is 86 ; each of them including from two to six arrondissements, from 17 to 62 cantons, and from 72 to 904 communes. The number of inhabitants, according to the census of 1871, varies from 118,898 to 2,220,060. There are 362 arrondissements, 2865 cantons, and 35,989 communes. The commune is the administrative unit in France, and corresponds to our township. France suffers by so much being done through these municipal councils, in very much the same way as we suffer ; for there, as in the United States, the city councils are not infrequently composed of an inferiór class of men. But there is no clashing of areas of taxation, as in England. Each forms part of a harmonious whole. The departmental council fixes the departmental taxes, which are divided between the arrondissements, and by them subdivided among the communes. The arrondissement settles any district taxation, and partitions it between the communes. The commune votes its own taxes for municipal objects, and collects them with the communal share of the departmental and arrondissement taxation. Complete reports of the expenditures of the communes of France are rarely published, and are only accessible for the years 1836, 1862, 1868, and 1871 :

	1836. Francs.	1862. Francs.	1868. Francs.	1871. Francs.
RECEIPTS:				
Ordinary.....	100,848,990	291,899,431	309,488,605	313,169,350
Extraordinary.....	24,461,073	149,517,559	130,178,005	226,416,910
EXPENDITURES:				
Ordinary.....	83,830,926	256,954,948	276,343,915	276,187,190
Extraordinary.....	33,962,204	193,283,419	167,518,655	244,314,970

It will be seen that the expenditures for the year 1871 aggregated 520,502,160 francs.[1] Deducting from these numbers the sums expended in consequence of the war, and the total expenditure for the year was 401,378,075 francs. The latest available statistics show that the local taxation of France is now, in round numbers, a sum exceeding 800,000,000 of francs for the whole country, including the Département de la Seine. The proportion between the various sources of income may be nearly estimated at 500,000,000 from direct taxation, 200,000,000 from indirect taxation, and 100,000,000 from tolls, duties, and miscellaneous revenues.

De Laveleye[2] has traced in the institutions which govern the provinces and communes of Belgium and Holland the double impress of the German and the Latin spirit. Whatever of autonomy they possess he thinks is owing to the free customs of the Germanic tribes who peopled the provinces of the Low Countries. Whatever of centralization they possess is due to the French conquerors of 1792, who, both under the Republic and under the Empire, took as their ideal of government a complete uniformity imposed upon every locality by the central power. Their institutions preserve to this day much of their ancient character, and on the borders of the Lake of Lucerne can be found all the features of the primitive democracy transmitted without interruption from times the most ancient.[3] But as riches accumulated in the hands of the few,

[1] This does not include the commune of the Département de la Seine. The budget of the Ville de Paris is about 200,000,000 francs a year.

[2] "The Provincial and Communal Institutions of Belgium and Holland." By M. Emile De Laveleye.

[3] This idea has been recently developed in De Laveleye's "Property, and its Primitive Forms."

democratic institutions disappeared little by little. The inhabitants having nothing in the way of common property to manage, had less reason for assembling together. They got tired of administering justice. They neglected to attend the public assemblies. In brief, communal liberties died, feudalism was established. Precisely the same evolution took place in England, where the manor absorbed the commune so that the very name has disappeared, and there remains nothing but the vestry. De Laveleye thinks nothing is more dramatic or more instructive than the picture of the progress of democracy in the great communes of the Low Countries, and nowhere can it be better studied than in the history of Liege. The conquest of popular liberties was there made in a more regular manner than elsewhere, because the sovereign authority exercised by an elective bishop was less powerful than when exercised by hereditary dynasties. The local government in Belgium and Holland has its foundation in the commune, though the communes no longer enjoy, as in the Middle Ages, the attributes of sovereignty; but they are ruled by elective bodies which in matters of administration and police have very considerable powers.

By no means the least important reform accomplished by the present Emperor of Russia has been the entire change which was effected in local government in 1864. Mr. Ashton W. Dilke, who has resided much in Russia, and has acquired no slight personal knowledge of its people, institutions, and language, informs us that before the ukase of 1864 there existed in Russia only three popular elected assemblies with deliberative powers. Of these, one, the lowest, and at the same time the most widely spread and important of all, was the village assembly (*mir*, *mirkskaya skhodka*), which, though not materially altered, received extensive powers in 1864. The village commune (*mir*) is the unit of Russian local government. A Russian peasant lives for his commune and not for himself; to him life as a unit is almost unintelligible. The patriarchal system, a remnant probably of the time when the Slavonic race was still a pastoral one, has been handed down untouched—nay, strengthened even by some local circumstances. The town meeting is very frequently called as the people are leav-

ing church, and always takes place in the open air in the middle of the village street. After the meeting, the crowd generally adjourn to the village tavern, once more to discuss the business which has been settled. Formalities there are none ; the credentials of voters are not looked into too closely. Nominally every head of a household is entitled to a vote. It is said that the assembly seldom comes to an actual vote on a subject. Russian peasants hardly ever decide by majorities ; but if two parties disagree in a matter, it is talked over and over again, and the meeting is adjourned. At the next meeting a compromise is generally arrived at.

The only real and living piece of self-government in Prussia is the municipal government, which had its origin in Stein's great law in 1808. Morier says of it :

> It has, after nearly 70 years of a fruitful existence, driven its roots deep into the soil and satisfactorily solved the great problem of local government, viz., the combining the administration of affairs which are partly private, partly public, in the same hands ; it has established itself as the type which all future attempts at creating self-governing institutions must follow.

This comparison, brief and imperfect as it is, shows that in England alone the Anglo-Saxon idea of freedom took permanent root. Professor Gneist, one of the most profound political writers, in his various works [1] has sketched with great skill the relations borne by the local institutions to the general institutions of the country in Germany and England. He exposes the continental error of the eighteenth century, which supposed that the secret of England's political liberty lay in her parliamentary institutions. Morier, another good authority, observed this when he said the great continental recipe for political liberty became the creation of parliamentary institutions. Fix upon a census ; divide the country into electoral districts ; elect representatives ; find some big town-hall for them to sit in, and the thing is done ; all the rest will come of itself. The Parliament will beget self-government ; self-government will beget liberty. It is this erroneous idea that Professor Gneist so effectually refuted and showed the reverse to be the case. He held that it was because the English were free in the old

[1] "Self-Government in England ;" "Communal Institutions of England ;" "The Administration of the Constitution of England."

Teutonic, positive, and concrete sense of the word *freedom*, and not in the abstract negative sense, of the word *liberté*, that England was self-governed, and that it was because they were self-governed in their local affairs that Parliament grew up, in which they were able to govern themselves in regard to imperial affairs ; in a word, that in the received continental doctrinaire view, cause and effect had been reversed.

Let us now glance briefly at the history of local government in England, from which our own system of local government had its origin, and in which as far back as the Conquest lay the hidden germ of our present political liberty. It may be traced by the light of charters and other documents still extant. London, as is well known, was chartered, though not incorporated, by the Conqueror himself. Henry I. granted its citizens the liberty of electing their own sheriff. The mayoralty of London is traced back to the beginning of Richard I.'s reign ; but it was from John that London first received the royal permission to choose a Lord Mayor annually. Other towns slowly gained their civic independence. After the reign of Richard I. and John, borough charters became numerous. Local freedom was encouraged by the Tudors, and propagated by means of new charters ; and the entire local government was placed in the hands of the Mayor and Common Council. There can be little doubt that in this diversity of municipal constitutions, franchises, customs, and sentiments, consisted one of the most potent securities for liberty. Had London been one symmetrical whole instead of being overspread with a net-work of public and private jurisdictions in the days of Magna Charta, it would have been far more submissive. Close students of the Middle Ages admit that the necessity of consulting local sentiment, and governing through local agency, made itself felt in every branch of civil administration. Louis XI. succeeded in debauching the ministers of Edward IV., but he could not debauch the members sent up to Parliament from the country ; Pepys records the same facts in the evil days of Charles II. But the local institutions that had nursed our liberties through the most trying times, could not withstand the political blight of the eighteenth century, and the decline in the old-fashioned public spirit took the very soul from municipal

life of olden times, and the Reform Parliament of 1832 opened a new order of things in Great Britain.

Brodrick mentions the curious and instructive fact that while the primitive ideal of self-government had thus become obscured, both in English counties and in English boroughs, it not only survived, but acquired a fresh vitality, in the colonies of New England. The New England "towns," which we shall presently consider, he says were nothing but a reproduction of Anglo-Saxon "townships," with a larger average area, and with better defined corporate identity. Their resident inhabitants, or "freemen," like the free suitors of the old town-moot, constituted the electoral body, which admitted new members, chose all local town-officers, such as "constables," "tithing-men," and "surveyors of highways," regulated all local taxation, and sent deputies to the "General Courts," which corresponded in most respects with county courts before the Conquest. Like the townships of Old England, the New England towns were held responsible for their own roads, bridges, and police; they were also held responsible for their own poor relief and education. Old usages and even old names were carefully preserved; there were grand juries and petty juries, militia regiments and district train bands, and even whipping-posts and stocks, as there were in England under the rule of Cromwell. The system thus evolved from the results of English experience, modified, as I shall endeavor to show, by the exigencies of a vast and new country, retains its characteristic outlines to this day in every State of the American Union. It has been truthfully remarked that the study of it may serve to show how little the working of political machinery depends on its outward form, and how much on its inward spirit.

Mr. S. A. Galpin[1] has roughly classed the minor political subdivisions of the United States for local purposes under three general types or systems, viz., the "town" system, the "county" system, and the "compromise" system. It will be necessary for our present purpose to indicate briefly the general characteristics of these types. Of the three systems mentioned

[1] "The Minor Political Divisions of the United States." By S. A. Galpin, LL.B., Hartford, Conn. Statistical Atlas of U. S.

above, the two which differ most widely from each other are the "town" system of New England and the "county" system of the South. Both of these were firmly rooted in their respective sections before the Declaration of Independence, and passed through the successive transfers of sovereignty growing out of the war of the Revolution, without any material change. Of course the county exists in the "town" States, their title being simply the result of the prominence given to the "town" in their interior political organization. So strong has been the impress of English tradition throughout the United States, that, with one exception, only the political division next below the State is known as the county. The only exception is found in Louisiana, which is divided into "parishes." But the powers these "parishes" possess are substantially the same as the counties of other States. The "town" system pure and simple prevails only in the six New England States—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The area of these States is 8348 square miles; population, 3,487,924; containing one thirtieth of the area and one eleventh of the population of the United States. In these States the "town" is the important political division of the State. It is a body corporate and politic, deriving its charter from the Legislature of the State, and generally entitled to an independent representation in the lower branch of the Legislature. It has power to elect its own officers, to manage in its own way its own roads, schools, local police, and other domestic concerns, and collects through its own officers not only its self-imposed taxes for local purposes, but also those levied by the Legislature for the support of the State, or for the support of county officers and to cover their limited expenditures. Where so much power is vested in the town, any larger subdivision of the State must necessarily have but a limited function. The county in the States above mentioned thus becomes a judicial, not a political, subdivision of the State.

The "county" system is now found in seventeen States, viz., Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. These "county" States have an area of 1,243,295

square miles, with a population of 11,955,731—about two thirds of the area and more than one third of the population of all the States. Under the "county" system the conditions of the "town" system are reversed—the outward form remains the same, but the inward spirit is greatly changed. The names of the greater and lesser subdivisions of the State remain unchanged, but the powers and position of these subdivisions are in no case or degree the same. The town or township is but the skeleton of the New England town, while the county is clothed with all the political power. It derives its charter from the Legislature, and is responsible to the State authorities for its share of the taxation. A comparison of the States of Rhode Island and South Carolina will show the reader at once the radical difference between these two systems. The area of Rhode Island, as given by the General Land Office, is 1306 square miles, less than double the average area of the political unit under the county system, yet it has within its limits 36 towns and cities, each being an independent political organization, while South Carolina, with an area of 34,000 square miles, has only 31 organized counties, which are in no respect the superiors of the Rhode Island towns in political power. On the other hand, the population of the Rhode Island town averages 6038, or, excluding cities, 4000 inhabitants, the area being about 36 square miles; that of the South Carolina county 22,731 inhabitants, distributed over an average area of nearly 1100 square miles. Under these conditions of settlement, differing so widely, it is easy to understand how different are the methods of administration.

Lastly comes the system called the "compromise system," which, having its home in States lying between those already named, is itself the result of a fusion of the systems prevailing on either side of it. This third general type has been adopted in the organization of the States of the North-west, and now prevails in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. These fourteen States contain 672,824 square miles, and 22,671,986 inhabitants, their area being about one third of that of the States of the Union, their population nearly two thirds. In this system the political power, which in New England is lodged with the

town, and at the South with the *county*, is divided between the two organizations. The county is the creation of the Legislature, and is the political unit. It is, however, subdivided into towns or townships, which possess considerable political rights, and thus becomes a miniature of a State as subdivided for local purposes into its counties. The townships are laid out by the county officers,[1] and have power to elect their own officers, to lay and repair their highways, to determine in township meeting the amount of taxes to be raised for school and other local purposes, and submit an estimate of the same to the county authorities for approval, and, in general, to act upon all local matters in much the same way as the New England town, subject, however, to the *supervisory* of the county. The tabulated statement below is compiled from official sources, and shows at a glance the various systems of local government in the United States.

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER AND AVERAGE AREA OF THE TOWNS, TOWNSHIPS, OR OTHER POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF THE COUNTIES OF THE UNITED STATES, SO FAR AS THE SAME CAN BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE RETURNS OF THE NINTH CENSUS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR AVERAGE POPULATION.

THE "TOWN" SYSTEM.	Total Number.	Average Area.	Average Population.
Connecticut..	164	29	3,277
Maine (1) (2)..	412	36	1,552
Massachus'tts	338	23	4,318
New Hampshire (2)....	231	39	1,378
Rhode Island.	36	36	6,038
Vermont (2)..	243	42	1,360
The system.	1,424	34	2,450
THE "COUNTY" SYSTEM.			
Arkansas....	659	79	735
Delaware....	31	68	3,139
Georgia (3)...	1,122	52	1,055
Kentucky....	845	45	1,563
Louisiana (4).	444	93	1,637
Maryland....	193	52	4,046
Mississippi...	325	145	2,547
Missouri (5)..	940	70	1,831
South Carolina (6).....	415	82	1,700

THE "COUNTY" SYSTEM.	Total Number.	Average Area.	Average Population.
Tennessee....	1,282	36	982
Texas.....	705	226	1,161
The system.	6,961	79	1,301
THE "COMPROMISE" SYSTEM.			
Illinois (7)....	1,545	36	1,644
Indiana.....	993	34	1,693
Iowa (8).....	1,187	45	1,006
Kansas (9)....	353	104	1,032
Min'sota (10).	662	79	664
New Jersey..	228	37	3,974
New York...	942	50	4,653
N. Carolina..	809	63	1,324
Ohio	1,357	29	1,964
Pennsylvania.	1,452	32	2,426
Virginia (8)...	435	88	2,817
West Virginia.	313	73	1,412
Wisconsin....	780	69	1,352
The system.	11,915	59	1,923

[1] We note one exception, New Jersey, the Legislature reserving this right in that State.

RECAPITULATION.

	Total Number.	Average Area.	Average Population.
The "Town" System.....	1,424	34	2,450
The "County" System.....	6,961	79	1,301
The "Compromise" System.....	11,915	59	1,923
	20,300	69	1,695

(1) The average area is estimated. (2) Only *organized* towns included in computations. (3) Militia districts of twenty counties estimated. (4) Wards of four parishes estimated. (5) Townships of one county estimated. (6) Townships of three counties estimated. Since 1870 all townships in this State have been abolished. (7) Townships of the twenty-six unorganized counties estimated from the returns of precincts or land survey townships of those counties. (8) Townships of two counties estimated. (9) Townships of twelve counties estimated. (10) Townships of nineteen counties estimated.

In attempting to examine the badly-kept accounts of upwards of 20,000 minor political divisions of a vast country, one is met with many and serious difficulties. We cannot expect to find the uniform order and method which prevails in France, alike in all the municipal budgets, from the largest town to the humblest commune. The Americans, as De Tocqueville has shown, can be very justly reproached for the sort of confusion which exists in the accounts of the expenditure in the townships and cities. Another writer of talent, in the comparison which he has drawn between the finances of France and those of the United States, says, "When I see the communes of France, with their excellent system of accounts, plunged in the grossest ignorance of their true interests, and abandoned to so incorrigible an apathy that they seem to vegetate rather than to live; when, on the other hand, I observe the activity, the information, and the spirit of enterprise which keeps society in perpetual labor in those American townships whose budgets are drawn up with small method and with still less uniformity, I am struck by the spectacle; for to my mind the end of a good government is to ensure the welfare of a people, and not to establish order and regularity in the midst of its misery and its distress." It will be well to bear in mind these words in this attempt to unravel some of the evidences of local misgovernment in the United States. It is my present purpose, now that the reader has been made acquainted with some

of the difficulties attending such an investigation, to first call attention to the debts of the cities and counties of the United States—those mortgages of property that weigh so heavily upon taxpayers. It may be useful to consider their rise and progress in the cities where they exist, and their pressure upon the populations ; to compare their relative amounts ; and to add up, when correct figures can be obtained, their vast totals ; so that we may form some idea of the aggregate burden as well as of their separate effect on the cities that are bowed down under the double yoke of debt and taxation. The census reports afford very little assistance in ascertaining the real local indebtedness of the United States. In 1870 the total indebtedness of the United States is given as follows : State debts, $352,866,698 ; county debts, $187,555,540 ; town and city debts, $328,244,520 ; total, $868,676,758. Leaving out the State debts, there remains $515,810,060, which is put down in 1870 as the total county, town, and city debt of the country. Feeling satisfied, in 1876, that local indebtedness and taxation had augmented out of all proportion to the other two elements—value of property and population—with regard to which it should maintain a certain relation, I instituted an inquiry, with a view of finding out the facts. Letters were sent to the comptrollers of one hundred and fifty of the principal cities of the United States, selected not only for their size and importance, but to geographically represent the entire country. The facts sought after were the amount of the debt, the assessed valuation, annual taxation, and population in 1866 and 1876. One hundred and thirty responded, and from these answers a tabulated statement was compiled, which, as far as it went, formed at that time the most recent statistics of the kind attainable. The aggregate footings of the four elements of debt, valuation, taxation, and population, in the hundred and thirty cities which reported, are as follows :

	1876.	1866.
Municipal debt of 130 cities	$644,378,663	$221,312,009
Assessed value of property of same	$6,175,082,158	$3,451,619,381
Annual taxation of same	$112,711,275	$64,060,093
Population of same	8,576,249	5,919,914

The aggregate municipal indebtedness of these cities, as will be seen, was in 1876 over ten per cent of the assessed value of property, whereas in 1866 it was only six per cent, showing an increase of indebtedness of four per cent of the valuation of property. It will also be seen that debt increased upward of $420,000,000 in the decennial period ending 1876, a yearly increase of $42,000,000. The percentage of increase is about as follows: Debt, 200 per cent; taxation, 83 per cent; valuation, 75 per cent; and population only 33 per cent. Population and valuation of property have by no means kept pace with debt. Another fact brought out by this investigation was that if the census report of 1870, giving $515,810,060 as the total local debt of the United States, was correct, then the increase from that year to the close of 1876 must have been enormous, for incontrovertible figures showed that the municipal debt of one hundred and thirty cities, representing a population of only 8,576,249, exceeded by $128,568,603 the county, town, and city indebtedness of the entire country in 1870; or, still more appalling, that in six years the indebtedness of these cities had exceeded by $316,134,143 the bonded and floating indebtedness of all the towns and cities in the United States. I pondered over these figures some time before I ventured to make them public. There could be no mistake about the calculation, as the debt of 1876 came direct from the financial department of the respective cities, and the long column of figures were added up and fully verified. In 1875 and 1876 there was a very general halt in the reckless extravagance in municipal affairs. The New York commission appointed by Governor Tilden to devise a plan for the government of cities published their report; and though but little heed was taken of it, the mere publication of the startling facts was not without its effect. Pennsylvania followed, and though the commission appointed by this State did not even take the trouble to collate statistics of its local indebtedness, the report served to call public attention to the threatening danger. Among the good results of this very general discussion of the subject of the growth of local indebtedness was the passage, by several States, of bills compelling the county, township, or city officers to make out annually, and forward to the State Auditor, a

report of the outstanding indebtedness. One or two States had deemed it of sufficient importance to collect these statistics before the general agitation of municipal reform which followed the overthrow of Tweed in New York, but in all other States no complete record had ever been kept. The advantages of these new laws are now beginning to be understood, and from the different auditors' reports of 1879 I have succeeded in obtaining a complete report of the existing local indebtedness (with one exception), at the close of the year 1878, of eleven States of the Union :

TABLE SHOWING THE AGGREGATE LOCAL DEBT OF ELEVEN STATES IN 1870 AND IN 1878.

STATE.	Total Local Debt, 1878.	Total Local Debt, 1870.[1]
New York (1)	$244,079,859	$127,399,090
Massachusetts (2)	89,601,156	40,940,657
Illinois (3)	51,811,691	37,300,932
Ohio (4)	41,205,840	12,509,910
Wisconsin (5)	9,931,158	3,651,475
Minnesota (6)	5,272,230	2,436,795
Kansas (7)	13,473,197	4,848,976
Missouri (8)	35,343,155	29,043,865
Connecticut (9)	17,151,327	9,813,006
Georgia (10)	26,130,351	15,209,212
Rhode Island (11)	12,289,564	3,025,142
Total	$546,289,528	$286,179,060

Debt, then, in these eleven States has almost doubled, but the following table shows that the value of property has increased at no such ratio :

[1] The figures in this column have been obtained by adding together the reports of the county, town, and city debts, as given in the census of 1870. It includes floating and bonded debt. (1) New York makes no return of local indebtedness, so the figures were taken from the census report of 1875, and are undoubtedly correct. (2) Tax Commissioners' Report, January, 1879, p. 161. (3) Auditor's Report for 1878, p. 223. (4) Auditor's Report, 1878, p. 12. (5) Secretary State's Report for 1878, p. 146. (6) Auditor's Report, 1878, p. 137. (7) Auditor's Report for 1878, p. 253. (8) The returns of county, township, and city indebtedness of Missouri may be found in the Missouri State Almanac for 1878, p. 73. The figures as given were not even footed up, a work I performed myself. (9) Comptroller's Report for 1878, p. 25. (10) Comptroller's Report for 1878, p. 22. (11) Rhode Island Manual for 1878, p. 191.

State.	Total Assessed Valuation of Property, 1878.[1]	Total Assessed Value of Property, 1870.[2]
New York	$2,755,740,318	$1,967,001,185
Massachusetts	1,568,988,210	1,591,983,112
Illinois	1,201,123,110	482,899,515
Ohio	1,574,645,765	1,167,731,697
Wisconsin	423,596,290	333,209,838
Minnesota	220,930,629	84,135,332
Kansas	137,826,643	92,125,861
Missouri	614,726,225	556,129,969
Connecticut	344,406,977	425,433,237
Georgia	235,659,530	227,219,519
Rhode Island	256,052,818	244,278,854
Total	$9,333,696,515	$7,172,148,179

The above statement indicates a better condition of affairs than did the investigation into the financial condition of the hundred and thirty cities. One advantage in the latter investigation is that reliance can be placed in the figures—especially those for 1878. Debt has increased almost a hundred per cent in the eight years, while the assessed valuation of property has only risen from seven to nine billions. In some States the assessed valuation has actually decreased—as, for instance, Massachusetts and Connecticut. In the former the local debt has doubled, in the latter it has gone from nine to seventeen millions. A comparison of the aggregate debts of the hundred and thirty cities exclusively with the returns of the total local indebtedness of the eleven States brings fully to view the fact that the danger lies exclusively in the city and not in the county and township debts. The debts of the hundred and thirty cities jumped from $221,312,009, in 1866, to $644,378,663, in 1876. On the other hand, by adding in county and township debts the increase is from $286,179,060 to $548,789,528—the one at a rate of 200 per cent, the other at less than 100 per cent. In short, the bulk of the debts are municipal. The debt of twenty cities in Pennsylvania, a State that gives no complete returns, aggregates $87,329,180; nine cities in New Jersey, $36,502,722; two cities in Maryland, $34,000,000; five cities in Louisiana, $20,000,000, and five cities in Kentucky,

[1] The assessed valuation of these States for 1878 has been taken from the last report of the State Auditors of the respective States.

[2] From United States census of 1870.

$12,000,000. But when to these great debts are added the township and the county debts, the average per capita to the population is brought down, and the grand aggregate, though serious enough, loses some of its startling characteristics. I have made a careful estimate of the total local indebtedness of the United States, based on the returns received by the State Auditors, and such returns as I have been able to obtain, myself, from States where no regular reports are made. According to this calculation the total local debt of the country at the close of the year 1878 was $1,051,106,112, exclusive of the debts of Territories. If this calculation be approximately correct it will be seen that the eleven States given in the table on page 14, representing a population of about 16,500,000, owe the largest proportion of the local debt. In eight years the debt has increased about half a billion dollars, while, as has been shown, in some States the assessed valuation of property has decreased. The imperfect and variable revenue laws may have much to do with the latter result, but the same may be said of the reports of 1870, so it is fair to make the comparison. Added to this it has been given out at Washington, in a semi-official manner, by those presumably well informed in such matters, that the next Federal census will reveal a condition of things not flattering to our national vanity. Statements based upon the most recent returns of the assessed valuation of the different States have been printed in the leading newspapers of the country, showing an actual decrease in the aggregate wealth of the United States during the last decade. Of course these are but estimates, and the figures showing the total assessed value of property of eleven States, on page 15, do not warrant such statements, still it is more than probable that the total increase in the real value of property will be small when compared with that of 1860–70. The wiping out of millions of worthless bonds, the decline in stocks, and the enormous shrinkage in real property will have a decided tendency to lower the value of property in 1880.

Of the separate effect of these debts so much has been said and written that it seems hardly necessary to more than allude in passing to one of the most recent and painful illustrations of the evils arising from the rapid growth of municipal debt. The

shocking condition of affairs in some of the cities of New Jersey formed the chief topic in the last annual message of the Governor of that State. The following tabulated statements obtained from official sources, and which may be regarded as authentic, will show at a glance that repudiation or bankruptcy alone can save the property of the tax-payers of those unfortunate cities from confiscation :

	Total Debt.	Population, Census, 1875.	Debt per Capita.	Expense per Capita.
Paterson	$1,374,000	38,814	$35 39	$8 36
Newark	8,824,455	123,310	71 56	8 64
Jersey City	14,217,435	109,227	130 16	16 78
Hoboken	1,110,065	24,766	44 82	5 77
Rahway	1,690 000	6,947	243 27	23 36
Elizabeth	5,808,500	25,923	224 06	14 89
Trenton	879,567	25,031	35 13	5 99
Camden	1,130,200	33,852	33 38	6 24
New Brunswick	1,468,500	16,660	88 14	10 17
	$36,502,722	404,530		

The annual amount of interest paid by these nine cities on their debt amounts to $2,138,856, while the total annual expenses for carrying on the local government only amounts to $2,307,368, or $166,512 more than the interest on the debt. The tremendous burden under which the tax-payers of these nine cities are bowed down can more fully be understood by a glance at the following table, which I have compiled from the abstract of ratables reported in 1878, and which shows the assessed value of the property side by side with the debt :

	Total Tax Rate.	Amount Property Taxable.	Debt.
Newark	$19 80	$84,704,000	$8,824,455
Paterson	22 50	19,150,861	1,374,000
Jersey City	23 60	60,404,281	14,217,435
Hoboken	18 57	15,278,573	1,110,065
Rahway	29 61	3,093,275	1,690,000
Elizabeth	35 60	13,579,650	5,808,500
Trenton	15 00	14,503,252	879,567
Camden	23 00	11,773,815	1,130,200
New Brunswick	29 00	5,658,000	1,468,500
		$228,145,707	$36,502,722

The town of Rahway, a town of 6500 population, and with property assessed at $3,093,275, has a debt of $1,690,000, or of $243.27 per capita of its inhabitants, and which exceeds, by thousands of dollars, half the assessed value of all the property within the city. The value of the property in Elizabeth is $13,579,650, and its debt almost $6,000,000, or very nearly half the value of its property. There are many other cities in this country struggling under burdens almost as heavy for the tax-payers to sustain as those given above. It is not the intention of this article to continue further the examination of the separate effect of these debts, but rather to ascertain, if possible, what has been done and what can yet be done to lighten the taxation which with the present imperfect revenue systems often falls heaviest in the poorest localities and lightest in the richest.

Before venturing to suggest a remedy for this condition of affairs, it may be well to pass in brief review the propositions made by the distinguished commissions of New York and Pennsylvania, whose elaborate investigations in this direction were mentioned at the beginning of the article. The New York commission says the only remedy is that every city should have a responsible executive head elected by the people—heads of the department answerable to him, and removable for cause. Debt must be regulated by those who have to pay the taxes. A board of finance, elected by tax-payers and rent-payers, to have full control, jointly with the Mayor, of the financial affairs of the city. Property holders to have something to say about improvements chargeable to their estates. The Legislature of any State to be deprived of the power to impose burdens upon the tax-payers of cities for purely local affairs, and above all that local affairs be separated as far as possible from State and national politics. In these changes, and in nothing short of them, could Mr. Evarts and his eminent associates see anything like a rational and business-like management of the affairs of our large cities.[1]

But the equally eminent gentlemen who composed the Penn-

[1] Report of the Commission to Devise a Plan for the Government of Cities in the State of New York, 1877.

sylvania commission[1] differed with the New York commission in regard to the property qualification for electors. The Pennsylvania commission say this proposition attracted their careful attention; and while they were prepared to admit the force of many of the arguments in its favor, and that, perhaps, in a city like New York it might prove effective, yet they were forced to the conclusion that in Pennsylvania no important results could be expected from requiring such a qualification. The proposition of the New York commission has been fully discussed by the press of the country, and has a great many advocates; on the other hand, the limited number printed of the Pennsylvania report has almost entirely cut off the discussion that such an elaborate investigation deserved. The commission show that the city of Philadelphia contained in August, 1876, 143,936 dwellings. It is estimated that 5000 have been built since that time, so that, in round numbers, Philadelphia now contains 150,000 dwellings. The number of votes cast at the last municipal election was 127,520, and it is not claimed that the city contains more than 135,000 voters. It will thus be seen that the great bulk of voters are either owners of houses or tenants paying rent. Hundreds of blocks of comfortable houses, renting from $12.50 to $20 per month, are scattered throughout the city. These are mainly occupied by the intelligent class of mechanics and operatives in manufacturing and other establishments. The provision recommended by the New York commission, requiring the payment of an annual rental of $250 as a qualification for voting, would, if adopted in Pennsylvania, exclude this large and reputable class of citizens, while it would not exclude the tenants of low grog-shops and other disreputable establishments, who, in most cases, pay a higher rent. This is not the only point on which the Pennsylvania commission disagrees with that of New York. From a careful investigation they are led to believe that the undue accumulation of debt in most of the cities of the State of Pennsylvania has been the result of a desire for speculation on the part of owners of property themselves. Large tracts of land outside

[1] Report of the Commission to Devise a Plan for the Government of Cities in the State of Pennsylvania, 1878.

the built-up portions of the cities have been purchased, combinations made by men of wealth, an councils besieged until they have been driven into making appropriations to open and improve streets and avenues, largely in advance of the real necessities of the city. In many of these cases, the commission truthfully remarks, owners of property need more protection against themselves than against the non-property-holding class. It is due the municipal authorities that in some cases the largest debts have been contracted, not by their authority, but under the provisions of special acts of Assembly, appointing commissioners to open streets, park commissions, building commissions, and so on. It is plain, therefore, that an adequate protection against municipal debt cannot be found in a property or rental qualification. In the opinion of the Pennsylvania commission nothing short of absolutely forbidding cities to borrow money can effect any permanent good in this direction. They also proposed an elaborate scheme for divorcing the city councils from all executive functions, believing the great vice of the present system is the practical consolidation of legislative and executive powers in committees of city councils.

While New York and Pennsylvania have been adding to the literature on the evils of municipal debts, Massachusetts has set about their payment in a manner that will show a material reduction in the aggregate burden another year. From a comparison of the tables in the Tax Commissioner's report for 1879 it appears that 203 towns have diminished their net debt during the year 1878, and only sixty-five towns have increased it, and twenty have neither increased nor diminished. Sixty-three towns have no debt this year, against fifty-four which were in a like situation last year.

The idea is constantly gaining ground that at least a partial remedy for the evil of local indebtedness may be sought for and obtained in constitutional limitations. In view of this nearly all the recent State constitutions have inserted clauses looking to the limitation of local debts. New York, by the amendment of 1874, prohibits the loan of the credit of the State absolutely The power to contract debt is limited : (*a*) to meeting casual deficiencies in the revenue, not to exceed at one time $1,000,000 ; (*b*) to meeting the contingencies of war ; (*c*) "to some

single work or object" authorized by law and distinctly specified, in which case the proper tax shall be levied to pay the debt within eighteen years, provided that such law, on its final passage, be voted upon by the popular vote, when no other proposition of law or of the constitution is pending popular action. Subdivisions of the State are forbidden to appropriate money, incur indebtedness, or lend their credit in favor of any individual, association, or corporation, except to provide for the poor according to the general law. Pennsylvania, in like manner, limits the State debt for casual purposes to $1,000,000, and does not admit other purposes for which debt can be contracted at all, except those of war and to pay existing debt. The State or municipal credit cannot be loaned for any purpose ; the debt of municipal subdivisions shall never exceed seven per cent of the valuation ; new debt of the amount of two per cent shall not be incurred without a popular vote. The State shall not assume municipal debts, but their payments shall be provided for by municipal taxation. Ohio, West Virginia, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Nevada, Alabama, Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas all strictly limit the borrowing power of the State, without even a recourse to the popular sanction for an increase ; the same States prohibit the loan of municipal credit. In Mississippi and Nebraska the power of the municipality to contract debt is based upon the popular vote. In New Hampshire the power of the municipality is restricted. Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, and North Carolina all limit the State debt and have strict prohibitions upon municipalities. California makes it the duty of the Legislature to limit municipal indebtedness.

Reading over the annual messages of thirty-eight governors produces a curious effect on the mind. Though alike in form and arrangement, the views are as varied as the colors of the covers. Though as a whole monotonous, here and there may be found a scrap of wisdom, and now and then a fact of deep interest. One prominent feature in all these messages is the apparent lack of intercourse between the executives of the different States. Some governors recommend laws and measures that have been tried and proved utter failures in sister States. Many of the messages contain paragraphs, and in some pages

are devoted to the subject of local reform, but there cannot be found in one a decided proposition looking toward a remedy of the evil so bitterly complained of. It is pleasing, however, to observe that several governors recommend that measures be immediately taken to ascertain the amount of the local debt of their respective States. Some governors take a gloomy view of the future of American local government. For example, the Governor of Pennsylvania says: "It is apparent to all that, under the present system, the bankruptcy of our larger cities is only a question of time." In this gloomy pre-eminence Pennsylvania is not alone. One day later Governor Robinson, of New York, said: "The people of this State have played with debt, and courted taxation, as if for pastime. Many towns almost buried themselves with bonds, issued for railroads which have never been built, and covered their farms with mortgages for which they have received no consideration. Now that the illusion is gone, they are deploring the misfortunes in which it has involved them. Some of them are even hinting at the dishonor of repudiation." Governor McClellan, of New Jersey, in speaking of the municipal problem in that State, says: "In some of our cities the problem is very serious and difficult of solution, and demands the utmost wisdom, so heavy is the burden of debt, so grievous the taxation." After calling attention to the local debt of Illinois, Governor Cullom says that about 30 per cent of the $51,000,000 of local debt of that State represents the railroad aid debt of the municipalities of the State. The constitution of the State now forbids all counties, cities, or other municipalities from making subscriptions to capital stocks or donations in aid of any railroad or private corporation, and further forbids the incurring of any indebtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per cent on the value of the taxable property therein. "These," the Governor says, "are wise and fortunate provisions, and under them the municipal debt of the State is now decreasing, and will for some years continue to decrease." Governors Croswell, of Michigan, and Williams, of Indiana, show the absolute need of at once taking steps to ascertain the local indebtedness of those States. Governor Gear, of Iowa, says that it is "a cause of general complaint by the tax-payers of our

cities that their municipal affairs are so loosely conducted, without due regard to their interest." He also suggests that a commission be appointed to report to the next General Assembly "the propriety of placing the cities and towns of the State under some more simple, uniform, and economical system of municipal government than we now have."

Year by year the question of reform in local government is augmented in importance. Already the demand for laborers in this field has met with a response from earnest and able men, in all parts of the country. How they differ from each other in their methods has been shown. Secretary Evarts, in New York, proposing to stop the flood-gates of corruption by a property qualification; the Pennsylvania commission by divorcing the legislative and executive powers of the cities; Governor Cullom, in Illinois, by constitutional amendments; Francis Parkman pointing out the failure of universal suffrage, and W. R. Martin showing the importance of cities as units in our polity, are all laborers toiling in the same vineyard. Each has his especial medicine for the malady, but the trouble is no *one* prescription will effect a cure. It needs time. It needs patience; and, above all, the working out of natural laws. New experiments and tinkering only aggravate the disease. Instead of looking for new schemes in the future, the proper way is to look back into the past—back, if need be, to where we started, into the primitive communities of our Saxon forefathers; back to the time of Tacitus and Cæsar; back to the time when communal liberty died and feudalism was established in Holland; back to the days of Anglo-Saxon liberty in England, before the dull thud of the "poor law" sounded the death knell of pure local government. It is by looking back into the past that a remedy can be found. The Anglo-Saxon idea of freedom, after preserving our liberties through centuries of darkness and despotism, acquired fresh vitality in the colonies of New England. To these little republics, Jefferson says, we owe the vigor given to our Revolution. It is this pure *self-government* we want now. The self-government of to-day hates trouble and loves self-indulgence—hence the deplorable condition of our cities. Self-government, it has been well observed, is a hard task-master. It expects every man to do his duty, not

optionally but as a public obligation. Have those who complain bitterly of high taxes and mismanagement done their duty? They have paid their taxes. Yes! What else? Folded their arms and done nothing. Without disparaging the efforts of the distinguished gentlemen who have expended so much thought on this question of reform in local government, it is my belief that it can never be thorough until our citizens return to their former simplicity. Let general orders be given out for *reform* in every one of the twenty thousand townships in the land, as to the sergeant of an army, and soon the whole nation will be thrown into energetic action in the same direction. Then, and not till then, the force becomes absolutely irresistible, and we are on the right road to true and lasting Reform.

ROBERT P. PORTER.

PHILOSOPHY AND APOLOGETICS.

DR. PATTON is a polemic both by taste and by profession. His recent review of "The Final Philosophy" in this journal illustrates the best traits of that character. It has all the learning, acuteness, and adroit logic which have distinguished him as a leading theological critic of the age, and at the same time is marked by a dashing candor and fairness but seldom shown within the lists of controversy. It is withal so courteous in tone and mingles so much praise with the blame, that it might seem almost churlish to reply to it, and better to let the book explain itself. But many will read the criticism who will never see the book, and some of the objections raised are really too serious to be passed by. Moreover, the discussion has lifted into public view several questions which are of more general interest than the opinions of either author or critic, and, therefore, not unworthy of a place in these pages.

It is important to bear in mind the just distinction between philosophy and apologetics, with which Dr. Patton opens his review of the work. By depreciating its apologetic value, he has thrown into strong relief that philosophical point of view from which alone it claims to be judged. Indeed, if he had gone further and argued that it has no apologetic value at all he might have reasoned more to the point. As its very title shows, it does not profess to be a treatise on apologetical theology, nor even a contribution to the evidences of Christianity as afforded by the growing harmony of science and religion. A volume of that kind might have been useful and timely, and may possibly have been anticipated as a natural product of the chair which the author holds. But it is not what he has

attempted in this treatise. In fact, it is precisely what he has disclaimed attempting. Carefully excluding all apologetic motive whatever, he has simply aimed to write an introductory essay, partly historical and partly critical, on that complete, conclusive system of knowledge which reason and revelation are combining to produce—"the Final Philosophy as issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion."

It is true the most philosophical work need not be incompatible with apologetic interests. The author does not admit that this work puts in peril any such interest. He might rather argue, if this were the place, that the final philosophy, whensoever attained, will involve among its practical issues a confirmation of religion as well as the perfection of science. And he could also grant, if need be, that the work of the apologist is of much more direct and obvious utility than that of the philosopher. But all this would be aside from the point that he is now urging. He simply suggests that a book, purporting to be wholly philosophical, from its title-page to its index, ought not to have been judged as if it were an apologetical treatise, and held answerable for religious difficulties which it neither created nor was specifically designed to remedy. It was a mistake to assume that the author of such a work had written as an apologist rather than as a philosopher, or even had "undertaken to fill both offices at once." Happily, however, the mistake may be turned to general advantage. Though the distinguished critic has not found in the book what he looked for, yet he has come upon a collateral question outside of it, deserving the most careful study, viz., the relation of apologetics to philosophy. A little elucidation of this question may serve to scatter some of the mists which have settled upon it.

In general, it may be said that apologetics can enter into the construction of the final philosophy only as any other branch of applied logic can enter into it—in a purely philosophical spirit, without any dogmatic or partisan aim. The apologist must come into the wide realm of philosophy, if he come there at all, not as an apologist, defending his own religious faith, whatever that may be, but as a philosopher, seeking the whole truth, wherever it is to be found, in nature as well as Scripture, and by all available means, by revelation no less than reason. And

that it is possible thus to exchange the advocate for the judge, in the very same field of inquiry, has been abundantly shown by so illustrious examples as Locke, Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, and Butler, who were philosophers as well as apologists, and have treated even apologetic questions in a philosophical spirit.

But more specifically it may be said, that the labors of the apologist, besides their primary religious value, have also a secondary philosophic value and admit of a philosophic use, which he never intended, which he may even repudiate, but which nevertheless is not to be despised. They may serve to ascertain one of the legitimate factors of knowledge, and so aid in completing the system of truth. If philosophy be defined as the science of knowledge, it is plain that to determine whether there be a divine revelation, making known the otherwise unknowable, is a strictly philosophical question. It is as much a philosophical question as that of determining the validity, functions, and limits of human reason as a source of knowledge. And in the present speculative crisis it is the most pertinent philosophical question which could engage the attention of the thinking world. We are just now menaced by a subtle agnosticism which seeks to extinguish one of the very eyes of philosophy and paralyze an entire half of the body of knowledge. It claims to have demonstrated that the Absolute is unknowable, and a revelation therefore metaphysically impossible. But the apologist is at hand with an immense mass of empirical proofs of the fact of such a revelation, which have been accumulating for eighteen centuries and which are as scientific in their nature as the Principia of Newton or the Copernican theory of the solar system. And now it is for the philosopher from his point of view, seeking all possible means of knowledge, to sift this evidence and decide whether it is scientifically probable. If he accept it, it will then be in order for him to admit the light of the duly-attested revelation upon all questions to which it refers, as they pass before him in the great debate between religion and science. And this he may do without any apologetic intent, as philosophically as if he were examining an essay on the human understanding instead of a treatise on the Christian evidences, and had found himself handling purely sci-

entific rather than also partly religious problems. In a word, the philosopher may derive valuable aid from the apologist in framing a theory and system of perfect knowledge.

In the light of these definitions and precautions we shall now be better able to estimate the criticism before us. The pith of it is thus expressed: "It is an error to suppose that the reconciliation of science and religion is the true function of philosophy. The effect of it is in the first place to magnify the opposition of science and religion and so enlarge the area of apologetics; and in the second place, to put unphilosophical elements into the very foundations of the philosophic structure." But if the foregoing reasoning be sound, there is a sense in which the area of apologetics is circumscribed and defined by philosophy; while the philosophic use of apologetics is but part of the demonstration and construction of philosophy itself. This will appear more plainly as we descend from the abstract discussion to some of the particular objections urged against the book in question. They are partly apologetical and partly philosophical.

From the former point of view it is repeatedly charged that it has "exaggerated the opposition between science and the Bible." How much of truth is in this statement may appear if we recur to some distinctions which the critic himself has made with great clearness and force, and which the author also, in his own way, has emphasized on every page. Although, assuredly, there can be no conflict between science and religion, none between science and Christianity, and none between science and the Bible, yet there may be and is a wide-spread conflict between the crude, unproved hypotheses put forth in the name of science, and the human, fallible dogmas claiming to express the sense of the Bible. And it would be difficult to exaggerate the proportions of this conflict. If it be true that "one's opinion respecting the area which it covers will depend, in a measure, upon the importance which he chooses to attach to certain so-called scientific hypotheses," yet it is also true that it will largely depend upon the importance which he chooses to attach to certain so-called religious dogmas, some of which are as trivial or pernicious as any scientific vagaries, and all of which,

from the lowest heterodoxy up to the highest orthodoxy, are avowedly drawn from the Word of God :

> "This is the Book where each his dogma seeks,
> And this the Book where each his dogma finds."

It is the crowning aggravation of the strife, that dogmatists are no more agreed in their interpretations of Scripture than are scientists in their interpretations of nature. And yet, amid all the warfare of the sects and the schools, there is still such a thing as true religion and true science ever in harmony with each other. There are common truths and facts in which nearly all can agree. To distinguish in this manner the imaginary from the actual, the problematical from the ascertained, and even to magnify the former in contrast with the latter, must contract rather than enlarge the real grounds of controversy, and can only tend to put the apologist in his right place, not as a polemic contestant for some questionable dogma on the open field of scientific research, but as an intrenched defender of essential Christianity against oppositions of science falsely so called.

It is further charged, however, from the same point of view, that by giving weight to every scientific speculation and by strong statements regarding the unsettled problems of religion the impression is made that every article of faith is involved in the conflict, and "the whole Bible becomes a sealed book, which no one is worthy to open who has not been instructed in the Final Philosophy." The objection is a grave one, and it is trenchantly put. It is to be met more than half way. In the first place, it disregards the distinction already made between the substantial truths of Scripture and their dogmatic definitions. There is much more certainty and general agreement as to the former than as to the latter. While the former are in a good degree settled, the latter are in a sense still unsettled, and may long remain so, unless we are prepared to put human dogma in place of divine revelation, the Church in place of the Bible, and a theocracy in place of the Church. And, in the second place, the objection ignores the difference between matter of faith and matter of knowledge, between the aim of theology and that of philosophy. There are many dogmas concern-

ing which we may confidently say We believe, but cannot yet affirm We know. They have not acquired that scientific certitude which leaves no room for doubt and converts faith into knowledge. They may or they may not yet explain all the facts, both of Scripture and of nature, to which they refer, and are therefore, in the view of a sound philosophy, as problematical as a scientific hypothesis that is not yet fully verified. And there are also some dogmas which relate to pure mysteries of faith as well as paradoxes of reason, and which, even though the final philosophy should never arrive, would still figure in the most subtle theology as mere fruitless attempts to unseal a book which neither man nor angel is worthy to open. All dogmas are indeed valuable as exponents and tests of faith, and the more one studies their history the more important and durable do certain great orthodox tenets appear; but after all that may be said for them, they are neither infallible in religion nor axiomatic in science; and if the final philosophy could put every one of them in conflict, it would do no more than the Reformation did when it appealed from the traditions of the church to the pure Word of God, and opened the Bible which they had sealed.

But the crowning charge brought from the same apologetic point of view is that of scepticism or agnosticism as the logical conclusion to which a student of the Bible would be driven. It is thus illustrated:

"Suppose that the doctrine in question is that of creation as opposed to the hypothesis of evolution. A Christian says, 'I am an Extremist; I shall oppose the hypothesis.' But our author says this will not do. 'I will be an Indifferentist, then, holding the dogma, but ignoring the hypothesis.' Again the writer says this is not philosophical. 'Then I will combine the hypothesis and the dogma, and this will place me among the Eclectics.' But our author would say that efforts of this sort are premature. Finally the Christian says, 'I will give up the doctrine, for I see no way of reconciling it with the hypothesis.' But this proposition is open to objection with all the rest. What, then, should he do? He must not attack the hypothesis; he must no hold the dogma; he must not combine the hypothesis and the dogma; he must not give up the dogma. Is it possible to conceive of a condition of more unqualified scepticism than that in which this unfortunate inquirer would be left? And when it is remembered that the rival hypotheses and dogmas cover the whole field of revealed religion and embrace even the question whether a revealed religion is possible, it is safe to say that Dr. Shields has made the

strongest plea for an agnostic theology which has been presented to the English-speaking world in the present generation."

Now, so far as this is a real difficulty, it would be enough to reply that the author has not made it, and is not responsible for it. It inheres in a state of facts which he has simply described and which no one denies. The critic himself admits the existence of the various hypotheses and dogmas and of the different classes described. But he has chosen to imagine "an unfortunate inquirer" perplexing himself with these conflicting opinions and parties which Christendom presents. It is simply the modern religious sceptic that he has evoked, and it would be only fair that he should now be left to lay the spectre as best he can. He has driven it out of the four classes, and will not admit it into the final philosophy: what limbo remains?

But the difficulty, as he has imported it into the present argument, is imaginary as well as irrelevant. He seems to have forgotten that the essential truths of the Bible might remain to its supposed student, in spite of all mere hypotheses, and though every dogma in existence were modified, even the various dogmas as to inspiration itself. And he has strangely overlooked the pivotal fact that the four classes are not presented as religious, but as philosophical or rather unphilosophical parties, embracing scientific as well as religious factions, infidels as well as apologists, sciolists as well as dogmatists; and that both are alike condemned, but condemned only for philosophical errors, for having unphilosophically attempted to oppose, separate, mingle, or mar two related portions of truth and vitally-connected bodies of knowledge; in a word, for obstructing in various ways the proper work of philosophy. And then for such philosophic vices a remedy is proffered, which, whatever else it may be, is not agnosticism. Through two entire chapters the theory of nescience is directly combated, the very notion of an agnostic theology is repudiated, the claims of the revealed theology upheld, and its complemental relations with the rational theology explained. In the next chapter, the opposite theory of a perfectible science is based upon the harmonious interaction of reason and revelation, and the whole series of sciences reviewed in order to show that their rational and revealed portions are fast coming into logical agreement. And in the closing chap-

ter a scheme of architectonic rules is projected for organizing these growing masses of knowledge into a complete system. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that hitherto the heaviest charge preferred against the teaching of the book has been that of a supposed gnosticism or illicit mixture of revealed and rational knowledge. And this is the work which is now pronounced "the strongest plea for an agnostic theology which has been presented to the English-speaking world in the present generation"!

In bringing this grave charge Dr. Patton is kind enough to discriminate between the avowed faith of the author and the supposed mischief of his argument, and to allow that the former may be held in spite of the latter. There could be no higher compliment than that of having one's piety praised at the expense of his logic. To be illogical and yet pious, is to be pious under peculiar difficulties. But in this case the compliment is not deserved. The author cannot avail himself of such a plea. Leaving the piety out of the question, he expects to hold to the logic of the book, at least until it encounters "some Herbert Spencer with wit enough to capture it and turn it against the citadel of Christianity." Meanwhile, his advice to the "unfortunate inquirer" might be, "Stick to your Bible and to your creed, and let philosophy alone. You can be a good Christian and even a sound divine without being a philosopher. Not every one is born to be a philosopher; nor is a philosopher by any means the happiest of mortals. In much wisdom is much sorrow."

In other words, the worst that could happen to the supposed student of the Bible would be, that he should remain contented in some one of the four unphilosophical classes indicated: as an apologist, defending true religion against false science; or as a dogmatist, constructing revealed truths without regard to scientific facts; or as a religious eclectic, adjusting dogmas and hypotheses together; or as a religious despondent, holding both as contradictory; or even as an earnest Christian, not caring too much for either. There would be nothing unsafe or ignoble in any of these positions, and he would find himself in much good company. But if at any time he should be seized with the philosophic impulse, the passion for wisdom, the intellectual

craving for unity of truth and completeness of knowledge, he would then need to inquire into the terms of a philosophic settlement of the problems that had so perplexed him. This brings us to the second part of the criticism—the philosophical objections.

The first one relates to the function of philosophy in harmonizing science and religion. It is suggested that "by dividing the work of reconciliation among the Extremists, Indifferentists, Eclectics, and Despondents, it can be accomplished satisfactorily and without much delay." But, according to the critic, these are the very parties that have perplexed and baffled the "unfortunate inquirer," and the author has argued through several hundred pages that they are wholly inapt to the task of combining human with divine knowledge; the two former classes, as their name implies, being actually averse to it, and the two latter having attempted it unphilosophically and failed. It is true that even the infidel without meaning it, and the sciolist without knowing it, may contribute occasional labor and materials which the philosopher can use; but for him to adopt their crude notions and partial conjectures as presented without modification, would be what the critic well terms "putting unphilosophical elements into the very foundations of the philosophic structure." It is true also that great service may be rendered to the cause of truth by such writers as Guyot and Dawson; and the author has "carefully premised that in the class of religious eclectics will be included many who may have the true cognitive theory latent in their minds without elaborating it, and whose work therefore will endure and appear in the final system of knowledge." These admissions do not affect the principle in question. It is one thing to attempt to harmonize science and religion as an apologist, solely in the interest of the latter and for the defence of a dogmatic faith, but another thing to attempt this as a philosopher, wholly in the interest of both and with the view of establishing and completing the system of knowledge. As there are still many scientists who oppose, ignore, or modify important revealed truths, so there are still many religionists who oppose, ignore, or modify important discovered facts; and to not a few in each class the two opposite structures of knowledge which they are separately rear-

ing may now seem like hostile ramparts, with a dark and impassable chasm between. But in the long future the day may come when in the view of both classes they shall prove to have been but the rising piers of the completed arch of the final philosophy, having one base in Bacon's Organum and the other in Butler's Analogy, with a perfected Christian science as the triumphal key-stone.

The next objection concerns the order of the unsolved problems between science and religion falling within the purview of philosophy. It is alleged that "the philosopher is supposed to approach the subject with the foregone conclusion that the Bible is true, in which case the arbitration proceeds by begging the gravest question now before the world." The author may be allowed to recall his exact words: "The whole field of natural theology and the Christian evidences logically [not chronologically] precedes all questions between the Bible and Science." This is not begging the question: it is simply stating it by distributing its details for a methodical treatment. If we mean to wait until all logically connected questions are settled chronologically, we shall have to wait a long time. The question of a supernatural revelation is indeed prior in the order of reasoning to the other questions dependent upon it; but like them it is also in process of settlement. A vast number of philosophers think it already settled; and these at least need not suspend judgment until everybody else is convinced. Many of them may even think the whole series of questions sufficiently settled for an intelligent faith, though not yet matter of certain knowledge. If any of them, in these times of wide-spread unbelief, like defaulters in a financial panic, have "managed to go into theological bankruptcy with a snug fortune hid away in the doctrine of inspiration," it is charitable to hope they are but few. It should be remembered, too, that there are sceptics in science as well as religion, who decry all our cognitive faculties, together with the whole scientific procedure of reason, and to whom it must be conceded that we are still far from having a complete organon of any of the sciences, some of the most successful scientists having known little or nothing of the inductive logic which they used. Yet this does not deter the true philosopher from accepting the immense body of physical

knowledge which rests upon that logic. Nor does the fact that the logic of Christian evidence is still incomplete oblige him to discard the whole mass of religious truth which it upholds. He need not prejudge the contents of revelation because its credentials have not all arrived. He may even find the internal evidence strengthening the external as well as the external enforcing the internal; science corroborating revelation and revelation completing science, as the two ever mount together towards the fulness of absolute truth. Moreover, he cannot hope to settle all questions at once, and build the temple of knowledge in a day. The simple fact is that in so vast and complicated a work as the construction of the final philosophy many laborers must be successively as well as simultaneously employed, in different ages and countries, each with his own task; some toiling in the quarry; some laying the foundations; some chiselling blocks for the architrave; and all building better than they knew. So that in the finished structure will doubtless be wrought here and there a corner-stone which the apologist has rejected as well as some chance boulder that the infidel has hurled from his catapult.

A remaining objection of the critic has reference to the philosophical system issuing from the harmony of science and religion. It is argued that "as the final philosophy has not yet made its appearance, it would follow that the questions with which it is to deal are open questions, and may so remain for many a day." They are open questions only in the sense in which all questions are open, which do not admit of demonstrative as distinguished from probable evidence, the most scientific as well as the religious; and if in any other sense they are kept open, it will not be by the philosophy which seeks to close and settle them, but by the polemic scientists and divines that refuse its mild and just umpirage. In fact, as we have seen, that philosophy is already proceeding with their settlement, and so fulfilling its own high mission. It would not be difficult to show, and that from the present condition of scientific research, that the *Philosophia Ultima* for which earnest thinkers have long aspired is at least in full view if not within our reach. In the first place, we have the fit opportunity for a complete theory of the sciences, which by correlating revelation

with reason as a legitimate factor of knowledge shall supply what neither the positivist theory of nescience nor the absolutist theory of omniscience can afford. In the second place we have the prepared means for a complete organon or logic of the sciences, by which the metaphysical sciences shall be based upon the Christian evidences and brought into due complemental relations with the physical sciences. And in the third place we have the accumulated materials for a complete system or organization of the sciences, in which their chief authorities shall appear as harbingers and witnesses of their essential harmony with religion; in which their ascertained portions of truth, both rational and revealed, shall be exhibited as in proved agreement, the physical sciences with natural religion and the psychical sciences with revealed religion; in which their problematical portions, the hypotheses and the dogmas, shall be provisionally adjusted as in process of settlement; and in which even their paradoxical portions, the old miracles of religion and the new marvels of science, shall be made to balance and explain each other.

But these are themes that have been elsewhere propounded by the author as parts of an unfinished scheme, which the shortness of life and other weaknesses may frustrate, and of which it might be neither wise nor modest here to speak.

CHARLES W. SHIELDS.

PROGRESS OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

"Westward the course of Empire takes its way;
The first four Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;
Time's noblest offspring is the last."

THESE lines of the philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, inspired by his noble missionary and educational zeal for the British Colonies in the western hemisphere, are often quoted as a prophecy of the future greatness of America, and express a general law of historical progress. Civilization and religion follow the course of the sun from east to west, encircling the globe, until they shall reach again the lands of their birth. Asia is the cradle of the human race. Europe is an advance upon Asia; America ought to be, and will be, in due time, an advance upon Europe, unless the world should come to a sudden end.

But it may be said with equal propriety, especially at this time:

Eastward the course of empire takes its way."

The West acts back upon the East. As Alexander the Great carried Greece to Syria, and as Napoleon carried France to Egypt, so Russia and England are now transplanting their sceptre and institutions, the one to Siberia, the other to India. America, too, by her politics, commerce, letters, useful arts, and religion, exerts a growing influence upon older nations.

The whole civilized world, by the wonderful inventions of

the press, the power of steam, and electricity, is becoming more and more one international and intercontinental community. Time and space are annihilated. An American gentleman reads at his breakfast what was said and done the evening before in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and Calcutta.

EUROPE AND AMERICA.

Europe is in the prime of manhood, America in her fresh youth. Manhood has moderation, wisdom, and experience; youth has its levity, vanity, and conceit, but also its buoyancy, elasticity, and hopefulness; and while it has much to learn and to unlearn, it may with its peculiar gifts teach a good lesson even to old age, as Elihu did in the poem of Job.

Dean Stanley, of Westminster, who has in his keeping the venerable mausoleum of English history and literature, was struck with the remark he often heard during his recent visit from American lips in a tone of plaintive apology: "We are a young people," and "We have no antiquities;" but he adds (reversing Lord Bacon's "Antiquitas sæculi juventus mundi"): "The youth of a nation is also its antiquity."

America has, it is true, no pyramids like Egypt; no colosseum like Rome; no venerable cathedrals like Westminster and Cologne; no libraries like the Vatican and the British Museum; no Universities like Oxford and Berlin; no art collections like Paris and Florence; no poets like Shakespeare and Milton, or Goethe and Schiller; no philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, or Leibnitz and Kant; no historians like Gibbon and Macaulay, or Neander and Gieseler; no theologians like Augustine and Calvin. She lives on the immortal works of genius which older countries and former generations have produced. She was discovered by an Italian sailing under the Spanish flag, and named after another Italian; she derived her language, laws, customs, and religion from England; her idea of a republican confederation from Switzerland and Holland; her population, books, and works of art from all parts of the globe. Without the preceding history of Europe she would be still an unknown wilderness inhabited by savages.

But America—by which, of course, I mean here the United States—has learned a great deal in a short time, and claims a joint inheritance in the potent traditions and historic memories of all Christian nations, from whom she gathered her own population. Her few historic spots, such as Jamestown, Plymouth Rock, Independence Hall, Mount Vernon, touch English history in some of its most important epochs, and are as inseparably connected with it as the stem is with the root. The achievements and fame of Christopher Columbus, Sir Walter Raleigh, Captain John Smith, the Pilgrim Fathers, Roger Williams, William Penn, General Oglethorpe, Bishop Berkeley, John Wesley, George Whitefield, Count Zinzendorf, General Lafayette, Dr. Priestley, Louis Agassiz, James McCosh, and other distinguished men of modern times are divided between their native Europe and their temporary or permanent home in America.

In one respect America is only a new edition of Europe. Human nature and divine grace are the same in all ages and countries, and the great antagonist of God is as busy in the new world as in the old. There is nothing new under the sun. And yet there is nothing old under the sun. History never repeats itself. Every age and every nation has a peculiar mission to fulfil, and adds to the capital of wisdom and experience. America is not a feeble echo of Europe, but is honoring her ancestry by making a profitable investment of her rich inheritance and will transmit it doubled in value to posterity.

CENTENNIAL PROGRESS.

The progress of the United States within the first century of their independent existence is one of the marvels in modern history. It is due not to superior merit, but chiefly to the immense extent of country and a foreign immigration which has assumed the proportions of a peaceful migration of nations. We would not forget that God sometimes selects the smallest countries—as Palestine, Greece, Switzerland, the British Isles—for the greatest service. But vast empires are also included in his plan, and the unprecedented growth of the youngest of nations foreshadows a great future, as it involves corresponding danger and responsibility.

The United States of America is the daughter of Great Britain. It passed from the colonial into the national state by the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776; was recognized after a seven years' war by Great Britain, February 10, 1783, and adopted a constitution, September 17, 1787, which was enlarged from time to time by fifteen amendments, the last amendment being passed, February 26th, 1869. It has had nineteen Presidents, some having served two terms of four years. In 1876 the nation celebrated its first Centennial by an international exhibition in Philadelphia, the city of its birth, and by innumerable local commemorations. No nation on earth has celebrated such a centenary; none had such cause of gratitude for the past and hope for the future; none received such a rich legacy; none such a vast responsibility.

During that century the United States has had four wars; two with Great Britain, one with Mexico, and, worst of all, a fierce civil war which brought it to the brink of dismemberment. The first was the war for independence, the last for the preservation of the Union, the sovereignty of the national government over State rights, and the emancipation of four millions of negro slaves. The civil war cost probably more blood and treasure and stimulated more speculation and corruption than any war of the same duration; but the destruction of slavery—that relic of barbarism and heathenism which turned the Declaration of Independence into a lie and attracted the finger of scorn from the civilized world upon this land of boasted freedom and equality—was worth the cost. And, what is not less remarkable, immediately upon the defeat of the rebellion the immense army melted away like snow before the vernal sun, and the soldiers returned to the occupations of peace. Fortunately this country needs no standing army except for the protection of the frontier against Mexicans and wild Indians.

The progress within a century may be summed up in the following facts: The population—in round figures—has grown from less than three millions to more than forty millions, the number of States from thirteen to thirty-eight (besides ten Territories which in the course of time will take their rank among the States), the extent of territory by purchase and war from 420,892 to 3,026,494 square miles, with every variety of

soil and climate, and inexhaustible agricultural and mineral wealth.

The growth of churches, schools, colleges, libraries, newspapers, benevolent institutions, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, public roads, railroads, steamboats, and every branch of industry and art has been in proportion to the increase of population.

The American idea of a republic, as "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people," has been consistently developed and ceased to be a mere experiment.

At the same time we have learned that republican institutions are just as liable to be corrupted and perverted as monarchical and imperial institutions, and that liberty without moral self-government and respect for law is a delusion and a snare. Universal suffrage, which after the civil war was extended to the negroes without any qualification, has worked well in the country as a whole and in national elections, but in the large cities it has thrown the ruling power into the hands of an ignorant multitude of voters under the control of selfish demagogues; and even our national elections are not free from disgraceful frauds. But universal suffrage once given to the people can never be recalled, except by a revolution, and its evils can only be counteracted by universal education. The evils of older countries are fast accumulating among us. Wealth is breeding extravagance and luxury, and is sweeping away the noble simplicity of republican habits. Materialism and Mammonism are undermining the foundations of virtue and spreading a degrading form of idolatry. Vice, crime, and pauperism are on the increase. Capital and labor are coming into conflict. We had street riots, in Philadelphia (1844), New York (1863), and elsewhere, and even a fearful outbreak of communistic violence (in 1877), which stopped railroads, destroyed millions of property, and threatened whole cities with destruction. Bribery and corruption have disgraced many a legislature, and even the judiciary is not always administering impartial justice. We are forced to witness the humiliating and shameful spectacle of whole States repudiating their honest debts, after Mississippi long ago had set the bad example, and there is no power in the general government to vindicate the national honor. If with a

comparatively small population in an immense country waiting for occupants we have already so much trouble, how much greater will our dangers and troubles be when the land shall be as thickly settled as Europe?

Some look upon universal education as the remedy for all evils, forgetting the inborn depravity of human nature. But intellectual education is worth little without virtue, and virtue must be supported and fed by piety, which binds men to God, inspires them with love to their fellow-men, and urges them on to noble thoughts and noble deeds. Our safety and ultimate success depends upon the maintenance and spread of the Christian religion. This was the conviction of our greatest statesmen from Washington to Daniel Webster and Abraham Lincoln. The religious tie of authority and loyalty must be strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed. A self-governing democracy which does not obey the voice of conscience, and own God as its Ruler, must degenerate into mobocracy and anarchy. "Despotism," says De Tocqueville, that profound student of American institutions, "may govern without faith, but liberty cannot." God's Church, God's Book, and God's Day are the three pillars of American society. Without them it must go the way of all flesh, and God will raise up some other nation or continent to carry on his designs; but with them it will continue to prosper notwithstanding all hindrances from without and within.

A distinguished English divine, when visiting Niagara Falls, as he looked at midnight from the bridge which spans the river and unites the British and American dominions, into the seething chaos below and listened to the ceaseless roar of that avalanche of water, thought it a fit emblem of the restless and bewildering whirlpool of American life; but when he raised his eyes to the moonlight sky, "there arose a cloud of spray twice as high as the Falls themselves, silent, majestic, immovable: that silver column glittering in the moonbeams seemed an image of American history—of the upward heaven-aspiring destiny which should emerge from the distractions of the present."

It is the motto of an American citizen never to despair of the commonwealth, and it is the motto of every believing

Christian never to despair of the progress and ultimate triumph of Christianity.

ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS.

Figures are facts. The following statistics will give you the best idea of the outward growth and the present numerical status of Christianity in the United States.

1. STATISTICS OF 1870.

We present first the results of the last decennial census of the United States, which was taken in 1870. They were published in three large quarto volumes, and condensed in "A Compendium" of 942 closely printed pages of figures, edited by Francis A. Walker (Superintendent of Census), Washington, 1872. From this document we make the following extracts:

Total population in the United States and Territories in 1870	38,558,371
White do	33,589,377
Colored	4,880,009
Foreign-born white population (included in total)	5,567,229
Born in Great Britain and Ireland	2,626,241
Born in Germany	1,690,533

The ecclesiastical statistics of the census report (which are not given as a separate head, but strangely ranked under "Schools, Libraries, Newspapers, and Churches," and which do not agree in all cases with the statistics of denominational year-books and almanacs) are given on p. 514, in alphabetical order as follows:

	Denominations.	Ecclesiastical Statistics of 1870.			
		Organizations. (Congregations.)	Edifices.	Sittings.	Property.
	All denominations	72,459	63,082	21,665,062	$354,483,581
1	Baptist (regular or Calvinistic)	14,474	12,857	3,997,116	$39,229,221
2	Baptist (other, Free-Will, Mennonites, Tunkers, etc.)	1,355	1,105	363,019	2,378,977
3	Christian (and "Disciples of Christ")	3,578	2,822	865,602	6,425,137
4	Congregational	2,887	2,715	1,117,212	25,069,698
5	Episcopal (Protestant)	2,835	2,601	991,051	36,514,549
6	Evangelical Association	815	641	193,796	2,301,650
7	Friends (Quakers)	692	662	224,664	3,939,560
8	Jews	189	152	73,265	5,155,234
9	Lutheran	3,032	2,776	977,332	14,917,747
10	Methodist	25,278	21,337	6,528,209	69,854,121
11	Miscellaneous	27	17	6,935	135,650
12	Moravian (Unitas Fratrum)	72	67	25,700	709,100
13	Mormon	189	171	87,838	656,750
14	New Jerusalem (Swedenborgian)	90	61	18,755	869,700
15	Presbyterian (regular)	6,262	5,683	2,198,900	47,828,732
16	Presbyterian (other)	1,562	1,388	499,344	5,436,524
17	Reformed Church in America (late Dutch Reformed)	471	468	227,228	10,359,255
18	Reformed Church in the United States (late German Reformed)	1,256	1,145	431,700	5,775,215
19	Roman Catholic	4,127	3,806	1,990,514	60,985,566
20	Second Adventist	225	140	34,555	306,240
21	Shaker	18	18	8,850	86,900
22	Spiritualist	95	22	6,970	100,150
23	Unitarian	331	310	155,471	6,282,675
24	United Brethren in Christ	1,445	937	265,025	1,819,810
25	Universalist	719	602	210,884	5,692,325
26	Unknown (Local Missions)	26	27	11,925	687,800
27	Unknown (Union)	409	552	153,202	965,295

The decennial growth of all the churches since 1850 may be inferred from the following table:

	Church Edifices.	Accommodation.	Property.
A.D. 1850	38,061	14,234,825	$87,328,801
A.D. 1860	54,009	19,128,751	171,397,932
A.D. 1870	63,082	21,665,062	354,483,581

2. COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF THE CENTENNIAL GROWTH OF CHURCHES FROM 1776 TO 1876.

The growth of churches during the first century of the United States can only be made out approximately. The Revolutionary war produced great confusion, and there are few reliable lists of ministers and congregations before 1790. The statistics of 1776, therefore, are mostly conjectural, but those of 1876 (as also those of 1878 in the next table) are from official records and private communications of leading men of different churches.

STATISTICS OF 1776 (OR 1780–90.)			STATISTICS OF 1876.		
DENOMINATIONS.	Ministers.	Churches.	DENOMINATIONS.	Ministers.	Churches.
Baptists of all descriptions.....	722	872[1]	Baptists.....	13,779	22,924
Congregationalists.	575	700	Congregationalists.	3,333	3,509
Episcopalians.....	150 (No bishop.)	200[2]	Episcopalians.....	3,216 (61 bishops.)	4,000
Friends (Quakers).	400	500	Friends (Quakers).	865	885
Lutherans (1786)...	25	60	Lutherans.....	2,662	4,623
Methodists of all descriptions.....	24	....	Methodists.....	20,453	40,000
Moravians.....	12(?)	8(?)	Moravians.....	75	75
Presbyterians (Gen. Assembly, 1788).	177	419	Presbyterians (Gen. Assembly).....	4,744	5,077
Reformed, Dutch..	40	100	Reformed, Dutch..	546	506
Reformed, German.	12	60	Reformed, German.	644	1,353
Roman Catholics..	26(?)	52(?)[3]	Roman Catholics..	5,141	5,046
Universalists.....	1	1	Universalists.....	689	867

[1] The Regular or Calvinistic Baptists numbered in 1790 about 200 ministers and 300 congregations.

[2] Estimated. The Protestant Episcopal Church had no regular statistical tables before 1832.

[3] The first R. C. bishop, Carroll of Maryland, was consecrated in 1790. In 1808 there were 80 Roman Catholic churches; in 1830, 230; in 1840, 454; in 1850, 1073; in 1860, 2385; in 1870, 3995.

3. ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS OF 1878.

DENOMINATIONS	Ministers.	Congregations.	Communicant Membership.	Nominal Membership.	Colleges.	Theological Seminaries.
Baptists :						
(*a*) Regular Baptists..	14,954	24,499	2,102,034	.....	31	9
(*b*) Other Baptists....	5,338	5,732	554,187	.....	....	....
(*c*) All Baptists.....	20,292[1]	30,231	2,656,221	.....	....	....
Congregationalists.....	3,496[2]	3,620	375,654	.....		7
Episcopalians.....	3,141 (63 b'ps.) [3]	4,200	314,367	about 1,250,000	14	16
Friends (Quakers).....	860	900	70,000	100,000	4	none.
Lutherans.....	2,976	5,176	808,428	about 2,000,000	18	15
Methodists :						
(*a*) Epis. Meth. North.	11,676 (12 b'ps.)	20,000	1,709,958	6,900,000	27	7
(*b*) Other Methodists..	11,886	12,000	1,718,092	7,100,000	25	5
(*c*) All Methodists....	23,562[4]	32,000	3,428,050	14,000,000	52	12
Moravians.....	82 (4 b'ps.)	82	9,407	16,236	1	1
Presbyterians :						
(*a*) Gen. Assem. North	4,901	5,269	567,855	.....	....	13
(*b*) Gen. Assem. South	1,117	1,878	114,578	.....	....	2
(*c*) All Presbyterians.	8,301[5]	10,648	897,598	.....	....	....
Reformed Episcopalians.	6 (3 b'ps.)	69	7,000	16,500	....	1
Reformed, Dutch.....	550	510	79,000	251,000	2	1
Reformed, German.....	714	1,380	124,596	151,651	6	3
Roman Catholics.....	5,750[6] (52 b'ps.)	5,589	6,375,630	6,375,630	78	23
Second Adventists.....	120	80	10,000	.....	....	....
Swedenborgians..... ..	100	115	5,000	15,000	1	2
Unitarians.....	401	358	.....	.....	....	2
Universalists.....	711	963	37,965	42,500	4	2

[1] Estimate of Rev. Prof. H. Osgood, D.D., Rochester, N. Y., compared with the American Baptist Year-Book. Philadelphia, 1879. (Bapt. Publication Society.)

[2] According to the careful statistics of the Congregational Year-Book. Boston, 1879.

[3] The statistics furnished by Bishop Perry, of Iowa, the historiographer of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, and the Rev. Dr. C. C. Tiffany, of New York.

[4] According to the estimates furnished by Rev. D. Dorchester, of Springfield, Mass., endorsed by Rev. Dr. Warren, of Boston. The Methodist Almanac, New York (Nelson & Phillips), 1879, differs somewhat, and credits the Methodist Episcopal Church only with 11,308 ministers (including 12 bishops), 16,099 congregations, and 1,688,783 members. But there are counted besides 12,749 local preachers. All the Methodist organizations together number 30 bishops and 26,642 local preachers, in addition to the regular ordained clergymen.

[5] The figures of the Northern and Southern General Assembly are from the last Minutes. The sum total of Presbyterians is estimated by Rev. Dr. E. F. Hatfield, of New York, Stated Clerk of the Northern General Assembly, and includes the United Presbyterians, the Welsh Calvinists, and the Cumberland Presbyterians, but not the Dutch and German Reformed churches.

[6] Among the 52 Roman Catholic bishops there are 11 archbishops and 1 cardinal. See Roman Catholic Almanac for 1879, New York (Sadlier & Co.). In some dioceses chapels are counted with churches, in others with mission stations. In some cases colleges and theological seminaries are combined, as at Emmitsburg, Md. The membership includes the whole R. Catholic population.

4. STATISTICS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN 1878.

We add the ecclesiastical statistics of the American metropolis, taken from the last report of the N. Y. City Mission Society, carefully prepared by its secretary, Mr. Lewis E. Jackson. It may furnish an idea of the strength of the churches in the larger cities.

Baptist churches and chapels	46
Congregational churches and chapels	9
Friends' churches and chapels	5
Greek churches and chapels	1
Jews' synagogues	23
Lutheran churches and chapels	23
Methodist Episcopal churches and chapels	58
African Methodist Episcopal churches and chapels	8
Free Methodist churches and chapels	2
Moravian churches and chapels	2
Presbyterian churches and chapels	65
United Presbyterian churches and chapels	10
Reformed Presbyterian churches and chapels	6
Protestant Episcopal churches and chapels	85
Reformed Episcopal churches and chapels	2
Reformed (Dutch and German) churches and chapels	28
Roman Catholic churches and chapels	56
Union or Undenominational churches and chapels	18
Unitarian churches and chapels	4
Universalist churches and chapels	6
Miscellaneous churches and chapels	39
Total	496

Of these 496 church organizations (including chapels and mission stations), 387 have church edifices, and these, together with the ground they occupy, are estimated to be worth $40,172,850. The total population of New York City in 1875 was 1,041,886.

The church organizations average a membership of 300, equal to a total of 80,000 communicants. The number of attendants, of course, is much larger. The Protestant churches and chapels afford accommodation probably for 275,000 persons, and the whole (nominally) Protestant population of the city is estimated at from 500,000 to 600,000.

The Roman Catholic churches are usually crowded on Sundays, and are not sufficient for the Roman Catholic population, which probably amounts to one third of the whole.

THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY.

The first distinctive feature of America is the commingling of nationalities. It is truly "e pluribus unum." The Anglo-Saxon nationality forms the solid foundation, the very best for a vigorous, enterprising, liberty-loving, independent race; but on this foundation are built stones from Scotland, Germany, Holland, Celtic Ireland, France, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Bohemia. Even African negroes, red Indians, and Asiatic Chinese are there in large numbers, but keeping apart.

With the exception of the last-mentioned races, the process of amalgamation is going on with wonderful rapidity, and out of the different nationalities of Europe there is fast rising a new and distinct nationality which more than any other seems destined to realize the unity and universality of the human family, with a continent for its home and two oceans for its outlet to the other continents. If the present English nation is superior to any of the three elements—the Celtic, the Anglo-Saxon, and the Norman-French—of which it is composed, may we not reasonably expect that the American nationality will ultimately be an advance upon any or most of the nationalities which contribute to its growth?

A similar phenomenon is presented to us in American Christianity taken as a whole. It has gathered its material from all the churches and sects of Europe. It strikes its roots in the most excited and interesting period of English history, in the first half of the seventeenth century, when all the leading English denominations—except the Methodist—assumed a separate organization. It embraces the Anglican Episcopal Church, the Congregational, the Presbyterian, the Baptist, the Methodist Churches, and the Society of Friends—all of English descent. Ireland furnishes the chief material for the Roman Catholic Church, Germany for the Lutheran, German Reformed, and Moravian, Holland for the Dutch Reformed Church. All the historical denominations are now represented in America except the old Greek Church, which numbers but one congregation in New York in connection with the Russian Embassy, and

another in Alaska Territory, which was bought from Russia under President Lincoln's administration. But these Churches are not, and probably never will be, melted into one national American Church. They exist as separate, independent organizations, on a basis of equality before the law, enjoying the protection of the government, but deriving no support from it. They are self-supporting and self-governing.

CHURCH AND STATE.

America has solved the problem of a "Free Church in a Free State." Church and state co-exist in peaceful and respectful separation, each minding its own business without interference or hindrance from the other. The state takes care of the secular, the church of the moral and spiritual interests of the people. The church enjoys the protection of the government for its property and the free exercise of public worship, but asks and receives no pecuniary support from it.

Congress is forever prevented, by the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This indeed does not apply to the several States, and some of them continued to tax their citizens for the support of the church till 1830, but the voluntary principle has gradually triumphed in the whole country, except in the abnormal territory of the Mormons. The law of Congress, it should be distinctly remembered, is protective as well as prohibitive, and owes its origin not to contempt, but to respect for religion and its free exercise. Herein the American idea of religious freedom differs *toto cœlo* from the red-republican idea, as faith differs from infidelity, and as constitutional liberty differs from antinomian license.

The experiment of unrestricted religious freedom has been tried for a hundred years, and has worked well. There is no desire anywhere to change it. Every church knows that the freedom and independence of all other churches is the best safeguard of its own freedom, and that the least attempt to aspire to political power and supremacy would arouse the jealousy and opposition of the others.

Religious freedom—which is very different from mere tole-

ration, and which necessarily includes freedom of public worship—is regarded in America as one of the fundamental and inalienable rights of man, more sacred than civil freedom or the freedom of thought and speech. It is the highest kind of freedom, and is at the same time the best protection of all other freedom. The dominion of conscience is inviolable. No power on earth has a right to interpose itself between man and his Maker. All attempts to compel religion from without are apt to beget hypocrisy or infidelity. Religion flourishes best in the atmosphere of freedom. The inevitable abuses of freedom are more than counterbalanced by its benefits. These are settled principles in America.

Experience has proved already in the first three centuries of persecution, that Christianity is abundantly able to support itself and to govern itself, and to do it much better than the secular power can do it. The voluntary principle has its inconveniences, and entails a great deal of suffering on pastors of young and poor congregations, and among immigrants who are not yet weaned of reliance on government support. The average salary of ministers is probably not more than $700 (although a few receive from $5000 to $10,000), and ought to be $1000 to enable them to live comfortably and to give their children a good education. But, on the other hand, the voluntary principle secures an able, energetic, devoted clergy, who command respect by their self-denying services. It makes the laity feel their responsibility, calls forth a vast amount of liberality, and attaches them to the church in proportion to the amount of labor and money they have invested in it. Liberality, like every other virtue, grows with its exercise, and so becomes a settled habit. The more we give the more we feel the blessedness of giving. "Make all ye can, save all ye can, give all ye can."

Upon the whole we may venture to say that America, in proportion to her age and population, is better provided with churches, Sunday-schools, and religious institutions and agencies than any country in the world, with the exception, perhaps, of England and Scotland. Church extension keeps pace with the growth of the population; and this is saying much, if we remember the enormous influx of foreign elements.

THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN NATION.

The separation of church and state is not and cannot be absolute. It does not mean a separation of the nation from religion. It means only the absence of an established or national church to which all are bound to belong and to contribute, whether they agree with its creed and polity or not; it means that citizenship is independent of church-membership; it means that every man is free to choose his own creed or no creed, and that his religious opinions and ecclesiastical connection have nothing to do with his civil and political rights.

But the American people are nevertheless in fact a Christian nation, and if religion may be judged from the number of churches and Sunday-schools, colleges and seminaries, from the extent of Bible-reading, Sabbath-keeping, church-going, liberal giving, and active charity, they need not fear a comparison with any nation in Christendom. The clergy are, upon the whole, the most respected and influential class of the community. They are invited to all public festivities, and called upon to open even political meetings with the invocation of the divine blessing. The government employs in the judiciaries and in the introduction of officers the Christian oath. It appoints from time to time days of thanksgiving, fasting, and prayer. The memorable national ordinance of 1787, for the government of Territories west of the Ohio, declares that "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and means of education shall ever be encouraged." Congress, the army and the navy, have their regular chaplains, paid by the government. Church property, like school property, is exempt from taxation. Christianity is an integral part of the common law of the land, and enjoys as much protection in courts of justice as in any country under the sun. It is deeply rooted in national habits, which are even stronger than laws, and has a mighty hold on the respect and affections of all classes of society.

I have consulted on this important subject, which is often misunderstood in Europe, one of the most learned jurists, Judge Theodore W. Dwight, President of the Columbia Law School,

New York, and he has kindly furnished me with the following confirmatory statement on the legal status of Christianity in the United States:

"It is well settled by decisions in the courts of the leading States of the Union—*e. g.*, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts—that Christianity is a part of the common law of the State. Its recognition is shown in the administration of oaths in the courts of justice, in the rules which punish those who wilfully blaspheme, in the observance of Sunday, in the prohibition of profanity, in the legal establishment of permanent charitable trusts, and in the legal principles which control a parent in the education and training of his children. One of the American courts (that of Pennsylvania) states the law in this manner: 'Christianity is and always has been a part of the common law of this State—Christianity without the spiritual artillery of European countries—not Christianity founded on any particular religious tenets—not Christianity with an established church and titles and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men.'

"The American States adopted these principles from the common law of England, rejecting such portions of the English law on this subject as were not suited to their customs and institutions. Our national development has in it the best and purest elements of historic Christianity as related to the government of States. Should we tear Christianity out of our law, we would rob our law of its fairest jewels, we would deprive it of its richest treasures, we would arrest its growth, and bereave it of its capacity to adapt itself to the progress in culture, refinement, and morality of those for whose benefit it properly exists."

There are especially three points on which church and state come in contact: marriage, Sunday, and education. They require a separate consideration.

1. MARRIAGE in America is a civil contract, and may be performed by a civil magistrate as well as by a clergyman. The Mayor of New York solemnizes more marriages—chiefly among immigrants—than any minister of the Gospel. But most Americans seek the blessing of the church for their union.

The only legitimate form of marriage is monogamy. Mormonism tried to undermine this Christian institution, and to introduce a worse than Mohammedan polygamy which destroys the dignity of woman and the happiness of home; but Congress has expressly prohibited polygamy, and the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of this law. Utah Territory will not be admitted into the confederacy of independent

States until this poisonous plant is uprooted. It is a significant fact that the increase of that abnormal sect is almost exclusively from foreign immigration, stimulated by promises of temporal prosperity, which so far has attended the Mormon settlements in Utah.

2. SUNDAY is regarded as both a civil and religious institution, and hence a proper subject for protective (not coercive) legislation. The State cannot compel people to go to church or to observe Sunday religiously, but it may lawfully prohibit the *public desecration* of it, and ought to protect the religious people in the enjoyment of the Sunday rest and the privilege of public worship as well as in the enjoyment of any other right. Hence the Sabbath is guarded in nearly all the States, and such protection is of the utmost importance to the laboring community, who otherwise would become slaves to heartless capital.

A strict regard for the civil and religious Sabbath is a national American custom, and dates from the first settlements of the country, especially in Puritan New England. Law and custom go hand in hand. All legislative and judicial proceedings, including those of the Supreme Court of the United States, are suspended on Sunday. Civil contracts are to a large extent illegal if made on that day. No political elections are held on Sunday, as is customary in France. The inauguration of the President of the United States is postponed to Monday, if the fourth of March appointed for this act falls on the Lord's Day. The Constitution of the United States, which extends over all the States and Territories, exempts Sunday from the working-days of the President for signing a bill of Congress. The whole nation celebrates the Declaration of Independence on the fifth instead of the fourth of July, if it be Sunday; thus subordinating the birthday of the nation to the day of Christ's resurrection.

So general and deep-rooted is this sentiment in the American people, that President Abraham Lincoln, even in the midst of the civil war, when every thing seemed to give way to military necessity, issued a memorable order enjoining the proper observance of the Sabbath upon the officers and men in the army and navy. The order, dated Washington, November 15th, 1862, says: "The importance for man and beast of the

prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the army and navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity."

The sanctity of the American Sabbath is threatened by infidels and foreigners from the Continent, who would like to turn it into a day of secular amusement, and to substitute the theatre and beer saloon for the church and Sunday-school. But the better class of Europeans, after some observation and experience, come to see the inestimable blessing of one day of sacred rest for body and soul, and are co-operating with the Americans for the maintenance of their time-honored national custom. The Sabbath Committee of New York has done a good work in this direction and stimulated similar efforts in other large cities.

3. EDUCATION is untrammelled, and left to individuals, to the family, the church, and the several States. Religion may be freely taught in all private and parochial schools. The General Government provides only for the education of officers of the army and navy, and does so very liberally.

But almost every State and Territory maintains now a system of public schools which are supported by general taxation, and are open to all without distinction of race or creed. Some of the new Western States have made munificent provision by devoting a part of the public lands for the support of primary and even university education. President Grant, in his Centennial Message to Congress, December 7th, 1875, advised the passage of a constitutional amendment making it "the duty of the several States to establish and forever to maintain free public schools, adequate to the education of all the children in rudimentary branches, within their respective limits, irrespective of sex, color, birth-place, or religion; forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious [sectarian], atheistic, or pagan tenets," etc. But the suggestion was not acted on, and the strange phraseology in the last clause certainly would need some rectification.

In the public schools of New England and other States, the custom prevails—and has prevailed from the beginning—of opening the daily exercises with the reading of the Scriptures, singing, and prayer. This custom works very well where the

population is Protestant and homogeneous, and, although it is not at all sufficient, it keeps up before the rising generation the importance and necessity of religion as an essential element of education. This is a great deal. The effect, of course, depends greatly on the spirit and personal conviction of the teacher who conducts the religious exercises.

But just here comes in the irrepressible conflict between church and state. This time-honored custom is violently and persistently assailed by infidels, Jews, and especially by Roman Catholics—who have become very numerous in large cities. The Roman hierarchy, in accordance with the Papal Syllabus of 1864, claims the monopoly of religious education, cares more for the Roman Catechism than the Bible, regards King James' Version as a sectarian, incorrect, and incomplete translation, and is not without good reason afraid of the free Protestant atmosphere of the mixed public schools. These scruples are conscientious, and consistent from the Roman Catholic standpoint, and have inclined many Protestants to sacrifice the Bible, if necessary, rather than the common schools.

The controversy will come up again and again in different States, and can only be settled in the course of time. I will state the various plans which have been proposed.

(1) Give up the public schools, and leave education in the hands of the family and the church where it properly belongs. This was originally the Roman Catholic plan, but it was signally defeated in public elections. It would surrender a large portion of our population to the barbarism of ignorance. A self-governing republic needs for its preservation intelligent voters and useful citizens, and hence is bound to furnish the opportunity, at least for primary education. The American people will never abandon the common-school system ; on the contrary, it is gaining strength from year to year and rising higher and higher, even beyond the reasonable limits of a thorough elementary training for intelligent and useful citizenship.

(2) Divide the public-school funds annually raised by taxation among the different denominations and sects for separate management. This is the more recent Roman Catholic proposition, but is likewise impracticable. It would break up the common-school system altogether. It would require Protes-

tants, who pay most taxes, to aid in supporting the Roman Catholic parochial schools, and would leave those who belong to no church or sect without any schools. Besides, it would intensify and perpetuate the sectarian animosities, while the present system has a tendency to check and moderate them, and to raise a homogeneous generation.

(3) United secular, and separate religious education. Confine the State schools to purely secular instruction, and leave all religious instruction to the churches and Sunday-schools. This is the spirit of General Grant's proposal mentioned above, which would exclude all religious, but also all irreligious (atheistic and pagan), teaching from the public schools. It seems to be most consistent with the separation of church and state, and many advocate it as the genuine American plan. But an immense interest like the education of a nation of cosmopolitan and pan-ecclesiastical composition cannot be regulated by a logical syllogism. Life is stronger and more elastic than logic. It is impossible to draw the precise line of separation between secular and moral, and between moral and religious education. Absolute indifference of the school to morals and religion is impossible ; it must be either moral or immoral, religious or irreligious, Christian or anti-Christian. Religion enters into the teaching of history, mental and moral philosophy, and other branches of learning which are embraced in our common-school system, and which public sentiment deems necessary. What should we think of a text-book of general history which would ignore the creation, the fall, the revelation, Abraham, Moses, and even Jesus Christ, and the Christian Church? An education which ignores religion altogether would raise a heartless and infidel generation of intellectual animals, and prove a curse rather than a blessing.

(4) Let the leaders of ecclesiastical denominations unite in some general scheme of religious instruction which shall be confined to the essentials held in common by all, such as a selection of psalms and hymns, the Sermon on the Mount, the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed. But the Roman Catholics are not likely ever to agree with the Protestants on any religious formula. And the conscience of the Jews must likewise be respected.

(5) Let religious instruction be separately given in appointed hours by special teachers chosen for the purpose by the different churches; the parents to be free to send their children to the teacher they prefer, or to excuse them from attendance. This may be called the German plan, which has not yet received sufficient consideration.

(6) The local option plan leaves the whole question with the school boards to be decided according to the composition and wants of the children. This is the present plan, and is likely to prevail, with some modifications and adaptations to the wants of different communities. Absolute uniformity seems impracticable and undesirable in a country where the States are independent, the population heterogeneous, and the public sentiment divided.

Fortunately, religious education is not confined to public schools, which would be meagre indeed, but is supplemented by the family, the Sunday-school, and pastoral or catechetical instruction. Even if the Roman Catholics should succeed in driving the Bible out of our common schools, it would only stimulate the churches to greater zeal in training the young for usefulness in this world and happiness in the world to come.

DENOMINATIONALISM.

American Christianity, as already stated, is not an organic unit, nor a confederation of churches, but is divided into an indefinite number of independent ecclesiastical organizations called *Denominations*,[1] which, while differing in doctrine, or discipline, or cultus, are equal before the law, and have perfect liberty to work and to propagate themselves, by peaceful and moral means, to the extent of their ability.

Where there is no national or state church, there can be no dissenters or nonconformists as in England, and no sects in the sense in which this word is used on the Continent in opposition to the (national) church. The sects have become churches, and among these the Methodists and Baptists, who

[1] The term *Denominations* is the American equivalent for the European (Continental) term *Confessions*, and is more appropriate, since the number of sects is much larger than the number of confessions of faith.

are scarcely known in some countries of the Continent and barely tolerated in others, are numerically the largest in the United States.

This of itself would be enough to condemn the religious condition of the United States as an anomaly in the judgment of a churchman who is brought up in the traditions of an exclusive state-churchism. To a German looking from the outside, America is a wilderness of sects, as to an American, Germany is a wilderness of theological schools. The liberty of thought, which in Germany produces more opinions than thinkers, is checked in England and America by the wholesome restraint of public opinion and orthodox sentiment; but, on the other hand, we have much greater liberty of action and organization, which produces a superfluity of sects.

American denominationalism is certainly not the ideal and final condition of Christianity, but only a transition state for a far higher and better union than has ever existed before, a union which must be spiritual, free, and comprehend every variety of Christian life. The time must come, although it may not be before the second advent of Christ as the one Head of His Church, when party names will disappear, when there will be one flock under one Shepherd, and when believers will "be made perfect in one," even as Christ is with the Father.

But American denominationialism is the necessary outcome of the church history of Europe, and is overruled by Providence for the more rapid spread of Christianity. We should consider the following facts, on which an intelligent judgment must be based:

1. There is a difference between denominationalism and sectarianism: the former is compatible with true catholicity of spirit; the latter is nothing but an extended selfishness, which crops out of human nature everywhere and in all ages and conditions of the church. The Roman Church, with all its outward uniformity, has as much carnal animosity among its monastic orders as there ever existed between Protestant sects.

2. The American denominations have sprung directly or indirectly from the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the Puritan commotion of the seventeenth century; they are found in Europe as well, though scattered and divided

by geographical and political boundaries, and hampered by many disabilities.

3. They represent historical phases and types of Christianity which must be fully developed and finish their mission before there can be a free reunion. At the same time I would not deny that there are a few petrified sects in America, which date their existence from some local or temporary quarrel in Europe, and which seem to have no right to exist except as antiquarian curiosity shops.

4. The denominations multiply the agencies for Christianizing the land, and stimulate a noble rivalry in all good works, which counterbalances the incidental evils of division. It is proper to add that proselytism is denounced by all honorable men. There is work enough for all denominations among their own members, and in the outlying semi-heathenish population, without interfering with each other.

5. They are really more united in spirit than the different theological schools and church parties of national churches under one governmental roof, and manifest this underlying unity by hearty co-operation in common enterprises, such as the distribution of the Bible, the preservation and promotion of Sunday observance, the Sunday-School Union, the Evangelical Alliance, city missions, and the management of various charitable institutions. The European delegates to the General Conference of the Alliance in New York were struck with the powerful manifestation of this unity in diversity, which they had never witnessed on such a grand scale anywhere before. And this spirit of catholic unity is steadily progressing, and all the more so because it is the spontaneous outgrowth of the spirit of Christianity, which is a spirit of love.

Among these various modes of co-operation should be mentioned the work of revising the English Bible in common use, which has been carried on since 1870 with great harmony by a large number of biblical scholars of all Protestant denominations in England and the United States. This revision, when completed and adopted for public use, will be a noble monument of the spiritual unity and exegetical consensus of English-speaking Christendom.

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

We now proceed to describe some of the general activities of evangelical Christianity in America. We begin with the preparation for the ministry.

Theological learning is fast progressing, even among those denominations who formerly neglected it, but are beginning to see that the intelligence and culture of the age peremptorily require a well-educated ministry, especially in a country where public opinion rules supreme and where the church depends upon the voluntary support and affection of the people. A few obscure sects perpetuate their ignorance and stagnation, and as they are dead to the surrounding world, the world cares no more for them than for antediluvian fossils.

Ministerial education is carried on in special seminaries, of which there are now probably more than a hundred in the land. A few first-class institutions would be better than many poor ones which spread a superficial culture at the expense of depth and solidity. But the vast extent of the country and the rivalry of sects stimulate the multiplication. There are institutions where one or two professors must teach all branches of learning, and spend the vacation in the humiliating business of collecting their own scanty salary. But a few of the older seminaries are nearly as fully equipped with professors, students, and libraries as the best theological faculties in Germany and Switzerland, and admit no students who have not taken a full college course. Two of them have more students than some renowned universities of Europe.

Instruction is free in all these seminaries, and professors receive no fees. Indigent and worthy students are aided by scholarships or by beneficiary boards, to which all congregations are expected to contribute according to their means. Others prefer to support themselves by teaching or by mission work in connection with some church or Sunday-school.

Discipline is much more strict than in German universities. The wild excesses of student life are not unknown in some of our colleges, but unheard of in theological seminaries. Only such students are admitted as are in good standing in their

church, and give reasonable evidence of choosing the ministry not merely as an honorable profession, but from love to Christ and desire to save souls. Every lecture is opened with a short prayer. Much attention is paid to the cultivation of piety as well as learning. From a long experience as a public teacher in Europe and America, I may venture the assertion that the theological students of America, as regards ability, gentlemanly bearing, and Christian character are equal to any in the world.

The theology taught in these seminaries differs, of course, according to the denomination. Each has its own creed and theological traditions. New England Congregationalism has produced the first and so far the only distinct school of American dogmatic theology, headed by the great and good Jonathan Edwards. It is a subtle form of scholastic Calvinism based on the Westminster standards, but it has during the last fifty years undergone, in one of its branches, considerable modification, even to the verge of Pelagianism. The latest monumental work of orthodox Calvinism is the "Systematic Theology" of the venerable and amiable Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton, who after celebrating the semi-centennial of a spotless and unusually successful career of public teaching (1872), entered into his rest (1878), but will long live in his books and in the grateful memory of innumerable pupils. Dr. Tholuck, the friend of his youth, had preceded him a year before.

In biblical and historical learning we are largely indebted to Germany, which has been for the last fifty years the chief intellectual and critical workshop of Protestantism, both orthodox and heterodox. Professor Stuart of Andover, and Professor Robinson of Union Seminary, New York (the well-known Palestine explorer), were the pioneers of biblical and Anglo-German learning in America. Since that time almost every important German contribution to theological science has been imported or translated, and many German scholars—Neander, Gieseler, Tholuck, Olshausen, Lange, Meyer, Delitzsch, etc.—have more readers in America than in their fatherland (if we are to judge from the success of their translated works). A considerable number of our students are annually resorting to Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, and other universities to complete their studies; and not unfrequently they extend their visit to Bible lands, where

they can read "the fifth Gospel" and study the Book in the land of its birth. The students return with the latest ideas and advances of European scholarship, and prepare the way for America's golden age of theology, which cannot be far distant.

The American ministry, while it may be behind in classical culture, is more orthodox and better trained for practical church work than that of Protestant countries of the Continent. A minister may choose among the different creeds, but is expected to be loyal to the one he has chosen. A preacher who does not believe what he preaches is regarded as a moral monstrosity, and would soon be disciplined or starved out. There are indeed a few smart and witty sensationalists who turn the sacred pulpit into a platform for the amusement of the hearers, and preach politics, æsthetics, and anything rather than the Gospel of Christ. But these are exceptions. Dull and tedious sermons are not more frequent than in some parts of Europe. The great evangelical doctrines of sin and grace are faithfully, earnestly, and effectively proclaimed in nearly all denominations.

SUNDAY-SCHOOLS.

In close connection with the church is the Sunday-school. It is the church for the young and rising generation. There is hardly a congregation which has not a Sunday-school attached to it. The pupils are divided into groups, and the groups are gratuitously taught by members of the church, male and female, under the superintendence of the pastor or a competent layman. The school is held either before or after the morning service. It is made attractive to children by lively music, pictures, anecdotes, and innocent amusements adapted to their capacity and taste. The chief and often the only text-book is the Bible, with or without a catechism. The recent system of interdenominational and international Scripture lessons has immensely stimulated and extended Bible studies, and called forth a flood of popular commentaries in periodicals and separate volumes.

The American Sunday-school instruction is of incalculable importance for the future of the country. It may often be very superficial; but that is the fault of the teachers, and not of the system, which admits of endless improvement. The Sunday-

school system supplements the scanty religious training of the public schools ; it popularizes and commends religion by bringing it down to the capacity of childhood in the spirit of unselfish love ; it develops a vast amount of lay-agency, and gives to young men and women a fine field of pleasant usefulness on the Lord's Day ; it promotes the proper observance of the Lord's Day by feeding His lambs ; it keeps alive a child-like spirit in the adults ; it attaches the parents to the church by the interest shown in their offspring ; and it is a most effective missionary agency by scattering the seed of new churches throughout the land.

The literature for children stimulated by the Sunday-school system is beyond any thing known in former ages of the world. There are illustrated child's papers with a circulation not only of tens of thousands but of hundreds of thousands of copies. That a large amount of this literature is not child-like but childish, may be expected. But the chaff is soon blown away, the wheat remains. Alongside with ephemeral productions you will find in the majority of Sunday-school libraries the best popular and devotional books and periodicals for teachers and pupils.

The American Sunday-school system has for the last ten or fifteen years found much favor on the continent of Europe, and is likely to become there a regular institution. A society in Brooklyn, consisting mostly of ladies, keeps up a regular correspondence with foreign Sunday-school workers and aids them with funds.

MISSIONS.

The churches in the United States spend more men and money for the conversion of the heathen than any other nation except the English. The two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, having the control over the seas and commercial intercourse with all parts of the world, are chiefly intrusted by Providence with the propagation of Bible Christianity to the ends of the earth. They have the means, and on them rests the responsibility. It is, however, but proper to state that some of the most devoted missionaries in the employ of the English

"Church Missionary Society" (including Bishop Gobat of Jerusalem) are Germans or Swiss trained in the Mission Institute of Basle.

Missions are carried on in America by the churches themselves as a regular church work, instead of being left to voluntary societies, as in the national churches of Europe. Each pastor and each congregation are supposed to be interested in the spread of the Gospel at home and abroad, and to contribute towards it according to their ability. Boards are appointed as the agencies of the church, with officers who devote their whole time to this cause. The missionaries are selected from the most gifted and zealous graduates of the theological seminaries, instead of being trained in separate institutions of a lower grade.

Hence American missionaries in foreign lands are admitted by disinterested observers to be men of superior character and education. Lord Shaftesbury commended the American pioneers of the mission in the Turkish empire for "a marvellous combination of common-sense and piety," and more recently (in 1878) Lord Beaconsfield called them "men of the highest principles, of even a sublime character; men who devote their lives to the benefit of their fellow-creatures, and seek no reward but the approval of their own consciences." It would be easy to collect similar testimonies from the books of travellers who have observed the labors of these missionaries in Turkey, Syria, India, China, and Japan.

The missionary activity is divided between Foreign missions, Home missions, and City missions.

1. The FOREIGN or HEATHEN missions began in the colonial period with the labors of John Eliot (the translator of an Indian Bible—the first Bible printed in America, 1663), David Brainerd, and David Zeisberger, among the red Indians, and if their zeal had been kept up the Indian problem would have been peacefully solved long ago. The first general Foreign Missionary Society was formed in 1810 under the name of the "American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions." It grew out of a society of students in the Theological Seminary at Andover. It embraced for a considerable period the Congregational, Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, and German

Reformed churches, but is now purely Congregationalist; the other churches having peacefully withdrawn to form their own missionary societies, with a view to develop more fully the liberality of their people. The Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and other denominations have likewise their own mission boards.

These various societies are now supporting schools, churches, and presses among the native Indians, in the Sandwich Islands, in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Persia, East India, Siam, China, Japan, South and West Africa, Mexico, and South America, and the papal countries of Southern Europe. Some of the most zealous propagandists regard even the lands of the Reformation as an open mission field, and provoke the opposition of those who look upon them as sectarian intruders, while others welcome them as helpers in reclaiming the destitute masses, and rejoice with St. Paul if only Christ be preached and souls saved.

The American Missionary Societies combined sustain at present about 600 Protestant missionaries and many times that number of native helpers in foreign fields, at an annual cost of about $1,704,000. Of this sum the General Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian Church contributed last year $468,147.

2. HOME Missions. The vast immigration from Europe and the constant emigration of Americans from the Eastern to the Western and Pacific States necessitates the organization of special efforts for supplying this population and the new settlements with the means of grace, with ministers, churches, and institutions of learning. All the leading denominations take part in this great work of Christianizing the continent. It is generally felt that, unless we follow the westward tide of our population with the gospel, we are threatened with a new and worse heathenism and barbarism.

As a specimen of what is done in this direction I will present a sketch of the work of the Congregational Home Missionary Society, which has been kindly furnished to me by one of its secretaries (the Rev. Dr. D. B. Coe):

"The Home Missionary work of the Congregational churches was commenced in Massachusetts about the year 1695, and was sustained by annual grants from the treasury of the colony. 'The Society for Propagating the Gospel among

the Indians, and others in North America' was founded in Boston in 1787, and was the first incorporated missionary society in the United States. In 1798 the Missionary Society of Connecticut was organized, and similar societies were formed soon afterward in the other New England States.

"The American Home Missionary Society, though planned in New England, was organized, May 12th, 1826, by individuals representing four denominations of Christians. The Associate Reformed, Reformed Dutch, and Presbyterian churches successively withdrew from this alliance, and since 1860 the society has represented Congregationalists only in the work of home missions. But its resources and its operations have rapidly increased. In its first year it expended $13,984, and sustained 169 missionaries who preached to 196 congregations in fifteen States and Territories. More than two thirds (120) of these missionaries were stationed in the State of New York, and only 33 of them in the Western States and Territories. During its last year (1878) the society expended $284,540, and sustained 996 missionaries, who preached to 2237 congregations in 32 States and Territories; and 604 of these laborers were stationed in Western States and Territories.

"In 52 years the American Home Missionary Society has collected and disbursed $8,200,000. Through its agency 33,000 years of ministerial labor have been performed at more than 7000 stations in 45 States and Territories of the United States. About 4000 churches have been planted or aided in the support of the ministry, 281,000 persons have been gathered into them, and nearly 2000 of them have been raised to the condition of self-support."

3. The CITY Mission is a part of Home mission, and aims to evangelize the destitute and ignorant masses which congregate in large cities, especially in New York, where, as in ancient Rome, to use the words of Tacitus, "cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque." It is conducted by combined effort of several denominations, or by separate denominations, or by individual congregations which establish and support mission Sunday-schools and chapels as a regular part of their work. "The New York City Mission and Tract Society," which is carried on by several denominations, but mainly

by Presbyterians, sustains forty missionaries (men and women), three organized churches, five chapels, five Sunday-schools with 2000 children, and expends annually about $40,000. Besides, almost every denomination in New York has its own missions, and there are also independent missions among the seamen, the Germans, the Irish, the Italians, the colored people.

THE RELIGIOUS PRESS.

America is the paradise of newspapers. The paradise is, of course, not free from snakes. "The satanic press," so called, is stronger in a republic than in a monarchy, and does an incalculable amount of mischief. There is no restraint whatever on the freedom of the press, which accordingly reflects all the bad as well as good passions of the people, and all the bitterness of party contests, especially in times of election. But the Americans have much more confidence in freedom than in the police, and are determined to fight out the battle on this line, being convinced that truth is mightier than error, and must prevail in the end. Newspapers are, of course, amenable to public opinion, and in the struggle for life and success they must satisfy all the reasonable demands, and respect the usages and tastes of their readers. No decent paper would dare to defy the general sentiment of morality and religion. Even the worst of them publish more religious news than any secular paper in Europe.

Every American reads newspapers. He would rather do without his breakfast than without his morning paper, which gives him a bird's-eye view of the world's life on the preceding day. The leading dailies number their subscribers by tens of thousands, some reaching a circulation of over a hundred thousand. They are brought into every household, sold on the street, in the hotels, on the steamboats, in the railroad cars, and transmitted by post to the remotest settlements. Owing to their immense circulation and advertising patronage they can afford to be very cheap. The enterprise of American newspapers shrinks from no expense. They get telegraphic news and correspondence from all parts of the world, wherever any thing of

interest is going on. The Monday issues contain even reports of popular sermons as items of news, so that millions may read what thousands have heard the day before. One editor in New York succeeded, where geographical societies and government expeditions failed, in finding Livingstone in the wilds of Africa, and revealing the mysteries of that continent from the sources of the Nile to the western coast.

This spirit of enterprise communicates itself in large measure to the religious press. Every respectable denomination has its stately quarterly review, its monthly magazine, and its weekly newspaper or newspapers. The quarterlies are intended for scholars, and for that vast and steadily-growing theological lay-public which wants to be posted in the progress of theology and general literature, and to possess itself of the results of the latest learned researches. The magazines furnish light reading for the educated classes. The weeklies are religious newspapers in the proper sense of the term. Of the last class 30 are published in New York City, 21 in Philadelphia, 15 in Chicago, 14 in Cincinnati, 11 in Boston, 9 in St. Louis, 9 in San Francisco, 4 in Richmond.

The weekly religious newspaper is a peculiar American institution, and reaches almost every family. Europe has, of course, its religious periodicals, but with the exception of a few English weeklies, they are confined to purely ecclesiastical or devotional reading, and rarely exceed a circulation of one thousand copies. An American religious weekly treats *de rebus omnibus et quibusdam aliis*, and requires at least five thousand subscribers to be self-sustaining. It furnishes a weekly panorama of the world as well as of the church, avoiding, of course, all that is demoralizing and objectionable, but omitting nothing that is thought instructive, interesting, and edifying to a Christian family. Miscellaneous advertisements, ecclesiastical, literary, and commercial, take up a good deal of space and pay the heavy expense.

The religious newspaper furnishes throughout the year a library of useful and entertaining reading for the small sum of two or three dollars. It is a welcome weekly family visitor, and easily becomes an indispensable institution, a powerful aid to the pulpit, and a promoter of every good cause.

THE TEMPERANCE REFORM.

Intemperance is one of the greatest evils in America, and the most fruitful source of crime, pauperism, and taxation. It prevails especially among the lower classes, both native and foreign. A great deal of intemperance is imported from abroad, and made worse under the stimulating effect of the American climate and by the poisonous adulteration of liquors. The Latin races are generally temperate (though less so than the Arabs and Turks under the prohibition of wine by the Koran); the immigrants from the British Isles and from Scandinavia take to the strongest drinks; the Germans, whom Dr. Luther in his day charged with being possessed by the "Saufteufel," worship lager-beer, which is consumed in amazing quantities, and, although far less injurious, yet, in the opinion of Prince Bismarck, the greatest of living Germans, "makes stupid and lazy, and breeds democracy." Its effect is much worse in America, where every thing is apt to be carried to excess.

It is estimated that between six and seven hundred millions of dollars are annually expended in the United States for intoxicating drinks. In New York City alone there are 8000 licensed and unlicensed liquor-shops and lager-beer saloons. Chief-Justice Noah Davis, of New York, states from his long judicial experience that "one half of all the crimes of America and Great Britain is caused by the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors; and that of the crimes involving personal violence certainly three fourths are chargeable to the same cause." The liquor interest is a fearful monster: it defies or evades legislation, it uses bribery and corruption for its work of destruction, it devours the hard earnings of the poor, it brings misery and ruin on families, and sends thousands of drunkards reeling with a rotten body and a cheerless soul to a hopeless grave.

To counteract this gigantic evil the best efforts of philanthropists and Christians have been called into action. The temperance movement, while it reveals one of the darkest aspects of American society, is also among the strongest evidences of

the earnest, aggressive, reforming character of American Christianity. The "National American Temperance Society" covers the land with tracts and books setting forth the baneful effects of intemperance, and acts upon legislatures in behalf of prohibitive measures. There are besides innumerable local and congregational temperance organizations of men and women. Temperance lecturers travel over the land and address crowded audiences in churches, public halls, and theatres, inducing thousands to take the pledge after the example set in a previous generation by Father Matthew in Ireland. Among these lecturers are reformed drunkards like John Gough and Francis Murphy, men of extraordinary dramatic eloquence, made doubly effective by their own sad experience. The evangelists Moody and Sankey make temperance a prominent practical topic of their revival preaching. The Methodist Church as a body is a vast temperance society.

There is a difference of views as to the best means of curing the evil, but there is abundant room for a variety of methods.

The moderate temperance reformers advocate strict license laws, the prohibition of all artificial alcoholic drinks and the poisonous adulteration of genuine wine. Regarding total prohibition as undesirable or at least as impracticable, especially in large cities, they aim at such a regulation and diminution of the liquor traffic as will make it comparatively harmless. Unfortunately, in a heterogeneous city like New York the best legislation is so often defeated or evaded by faithless magistrates, who are elected and re-elected by the very breakers of the laws, that the independent efforts of disinterested citizens are necessary to bring the police and the judges up to their duty. Two years ago a vigorous Society for the Prevention of Crime was formed under the leadership of the Chancellor of the University of New York (Dr. Howard Crosby), by the influence of which 1739 unlicensed tippling houses were shut up, which had been allowed to do their work of mischief in the very teeth of the license law now on the statute-book.

The radical temperance reformers advocate total abstinence and the entire prohibition of the liquor traffic. They put fer-

mented wines and malt liquors in the same category with distilled spirits as alike poisonous. The Maine law, so called, has been actually tried in the State of Maine and several other States, but while it may be carried out in certain country districts, it is a dead letter in large cities.

The advocates of total abstinence differ again as to the ground on which they base their practice. Not a few denounce the drinking even of pure wine and beer as a sin, and thus unintentionally cast reproach on the character and example of our blessed Lord, who changed water into wine, and instituted the holy communion in wine as the symbol of His blood shed for the remission of our sins. I say, unintentionally, and under the strange delusion that the Bible wine was not fermented and not intoxicating, *i.e.*, no wine at all. But the vast majority of teetotalers base abstinence on the tenable ground of Christian charity and expediency; they apply Paul's principle concerning meat (1 Cor. 7 : 13) to drink, and deny themselves a right in order to set a good example and to avoid giving offence to a weak brother.

It is certainly a commanding phenomenon that since the beginning of the temperance reform in America about fifty years ago, the use of wine as a beverage which formerly prevailed, as it still prevails all over Europe, has been greatly diminished in respectable society. The majority of the Protestant clergy and church-members content themselves with water, coffee, and tea. You can sit down in any decent hotel or give a social party to the most distinguished guests without a drop of wine. What is the rule in good society in Europe is the exception in America. Thus much at all events has been effected by the temperance reform. But much more is needed if the lower classes are to be saved from the deadly effects of the scourge of intemperance. The temperance movement will not stop until the sale of distilled liquors, such as rum, brandy, gin, and whiskey, as a beverage, is prohibited, and banished from the land.

THE TREATMENT OF THE FOREIGN RACES.

Our picture of American Christianity would not be complete without a glance at the treatment of the non-Caucasian

races—the Negroes, the Indians, and the Chinese, who are brought as wards under the care of our government and our churches. The negroes were imported against their will by the iniquity of the African slave-trade, but have become naturalized and feel at home among the whites; the Indians are the natives of the soil, but are still refused the privileges of citizens, and crowded out by the white men, or flee from them like the buffaloes of the prairies; the Chinese emigrate voluntarily and form a distinct community of their own, but generally return again to their native China with the gains of their industry.

The conduct of the Americans towards these races is unfortunately characterized by the overbearing pride and oppression of a superior race, but redeemed by many examples of noble Christian devotion and a growing sense of our national guilt for the past and our duty for the present and future. The negro problem is at last happily solved, and it is to be hoped that the justice done to the Africans will ultimately be granted to the Indians and Chinese.

THE NEGROES.

The history of the African race in the United States is one of the most striking instances of God's wisdom and mercy overruling the wrath of man for His own glory. The civil war which brought the government to the brink of ruin was a just retribution for the national sin of slavery, but ended, by an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure, in the salvation of the Union against the suicidal rebellion of the slaveholders, and in the destruction of slavery. It would have been far more honorable if emancipation had been peacefully and gradually accomplished by voluntary action of Congress as a measure of justice and humanity, instead of being resorted to as a necessary war-measure in self-defence, with its inevitable consequence of chaotic confusion and bitter alienation of the Southern and Northern States, which it will take a whole generation to heal. Nevertheless the great cure has been accomplished, and four millions of negroes now enjoy the rights of free citizens. American slavery

lives only in "Uncle Tom's Cabin," and in those plaintive songs with which the jubilee and Hampton singers have moved the hearts of Europe as well as America.

With emancipation came a new zeal for the moral and religious training of the freedmen. Considering all the difficulties of the case, the progress made is quite encouraging. The negro problem is unfortunately still complicated with party politics. The sooner the negro's rights and wrongs are taken out of politics the better.

The Southern churches have the negroes more immediately under their care and could do most for them, but they are fearfully impoverished by the war, and need Northern aid. The Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians have special societies and agencies for this branch of Christian philanthropy. The Roman Catholics also have made quiet and earnest efforts in that direction, but without much success. Schools, academies, colleges, and theological seminaries have been founded for the special benefit of the negroes; prominent among them are Howard University at Washington, Lincoln University, Fisk University, and the College at Hampton, near Fortress Monroe, in Virginia. It is supposed that one third or nearly one half of the colored people are now under direct Christian instruction. The negroes are very religious by nature, and infidelity is scarcely known among them; but their moral sense of honesty and chastity is weak. They have a marked preference for the Baptist and Methodist types of Christianity, which seem to be best suited to their emotional and demonstrative nature. They present a very important home-mission field to American Christians and philanthropists. Many of them no doubt will in course of time carry the Gospel to Africa, and form Christian colonies after the example of Liberia.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM.

The Indian problem is as dark as midnight. It has been called the devil's labyrinth, out of which there seems to be no escape. The romance of the earlier encounters between the

white and the red men, with which we are familiar from Cooper's novels, has long passed away. The story of the aborigines, the original lords of the soil, now reduced to beggary and apparently doomed to extinction, is a sad tragedy that must fill every American Christian with mingled indignation, humiliation, and shame. In the Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the national domain north-west of the Ohio River, the government solemnly declared that "the utmost good faith shall always be preserved towards the Indians, that their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent." And yet since the forcible removal of the Cherokees from the State of Georgia in 1830, the policy pursued towards the Indians has been one of most expensive mismanagement and injustice. There is no valid excuse, for the English Government, by strict adherence to treaty obligation, gets along well enough with the Indians in British North America.

The blame lies first upon those border ruffians who poison the Indians with the worst vices of civilization, covet their lands, push them farther and farther west from their reservations, and look upon them, not as human beings to be civilized, but simply as red-skins and incurable savages, doomed to extermination, like the hopelessly corrupt Canaanites of old; then upon unprincipled Indian agents, who cheat both the government and the Indians by selling them rotten blankets and rotten provisions; and finally upon the government itself, which has pursued no fixed and consistent policy of its own, but yields to the pressure of squatter sovereigns and political rings, and under this pressure violates the most solemn treaty obligations.

Is it a wonder that the poor Indian savages rise again and again in rebellion against such iniquities? The expense of the Indian wars is so enormous that every Indian killed in battle is said to cost the government twenty thousand dollars, besides valuable lives. It is only too true what President Bartlett recently wrote (in the New York *Independent* for February 13th, 1879):

"For at least fifty years the history of our relations to the Indian tribes has been chiefly a record of broken faith, oppressions, and exasperations on our part, followed by slaughters to put down the resistance and retaliation thus

aroused. The present and the past Administrations have shown a desire to protect the rights and interests of the tribes. But the fundamental method has been faulty; and for the most part the hand of the Government has been hard and heavy upon a race that have shown themselves, where properly approached, singularly accessible to religion and civilization. Add to this the frauds of civil agents, the violence of soldiers, the barbarity of officers, the corrupting influence of white renegades and swindlers, the devices and plottings of railway and timber speculators, the inroads of eager squatters, and the cold-blooded heartlessness that glosses over all this with the maxim that 'the weaker race is destined to fade away before the stronger,' and one is constrained to ask, Shall this go on forever? How long, O Lord! how long?"

The American Congress and people are now seriously roused on the subject, and are discussing the various modes of settling the difficult problem. Some advocate the transfer of the Indian affairs from the Interior Department of the Government to the War Department which managed it before, while others deprecate such a change from religious motives. General Sherman, however, recently assured the public that as long as he remains commander-in-chief, "every religious denomination should have a fair chance to establish schools, churches, and charitable societies among each and all the tribes," and that he will "personally and officially encourage every effort to convert the wild warrior to the obedient citizen with some Christian virtues superadded—be those Methodist, Episcopalian, Quaker, or Catholic."

It can scarcely be expected that the Indian can at once be changed from a wild hunter into a quiet farmer without passing first through the transition of nomad life. Above all things, treaties should be sacredly kept, or not made at all.

Whatever is to be done ought to be done quickly, for the race is gradually dying out. According to the last report of the Indian Commissioners, which contains some important facts, the whole number of Indians, exclusive of Alaska, is said to be only 250,864, against 251,000 in 1877 and 266,000 in 1876.

One thing seems certain from past experience and is confirmed by this report, that schools and missionary work are the shortest and surest road to Indian civilization. The government spent last year $352,125 for educational purposes, and the religious societies $66,759, making a total of $418,885—consider-

ably more than in the previous year. There are 366 schools with 12,222 children. There are 41,309 Indians who can read. The number of missionaries of different denominations at work, exclusive of teachers, is 226, and there are 219 church buildings. It is very difficult to overcome the deep-rooted dissatisfaction and prejudices of the hostile Indians against the whites, and they must be kept under military control and at the same time be dealt with in an honorable manner that will convert them to better views. But other agents make favorable reports. The Rev. H. Swift, an Episcopal missionary at Cheyenne River (Dakota) Agency, reports that during six years spent among the Sioux he has witnessed a great change. "They were a wild, painted, armed, unfriendly, filthy, idle, dissolute, and heathen people. Now they dress properly, are cleanly, industrious, and have a desire to learn. Heathenism is no longer in the ascendant; but large congregations attend church services, and the number of professed Christians is increasing."

THE CHINESE.

The emigration from China (mostly from the province of Canton) began after the annexation of California and the discovery of the gold mines in 1848. The total number of Chinese emigrants during the last thirty years is estimated at 270,000, of whom more than one half have died or returned to their native land; the rest are scattered through the United States, mostly on the coast, but keep entirely aloof from assimilation with the Caucasian race. About 109,000 are now living in California (which has a total population of 670,000), and from 20 to 25,000 in the neighboring States and Territories. At San Francisco they occupy a special quarter of the city, which presents all the occupations, amusements, and strange customs of Chinadom.

The Chinese are intelligent, industrious, frugal, and peaceful. They furnish few inmates of hospitals and prisons. They have done much to develop the foreign trade and the resources of the country, and it is doubtful whether the great Pacific Railroad could have been built without their aid. Although their highest

ambition is to return to China with the gains of their industry, they leave the result of their labor behind, which is far more valuable than their earnings. The Surveyor-General of California estimates that they have increased the value of property in that State $290,000,000 within ten years, and this property is held by white men. They have reclaimed a million acres of marsh lands, and raised their value from $3 to $100 per acre. This is a better showing than can be claimed by any equal number of "sand-lot hoodlums," as the white rabble of the Kearney stripe in San Francisco are called.

But, on the other hand, the Chinese bring with them also the vices and filth of heathenism, and are destitute of the ennobling influences of family life. Most of their imported women (who number only 7000) are said to be prostitutes of the lowest grade. Moreover, by their ability to live on rice and to do as good work for lower wages they have aroused the envy and indignation of the laboring classes in the Pacific States. Politicians irrespective of party are always hungry for votes, and many of them care more for money and power than for principle and honor. The same spirit of exclusive native Americanism which twenty years ago, under the name of Knownothingism, was turned against the Irish and German emigrants, was roused against the Mongolians, but now found its chief supporters among the Irish laborers, who suffer most from this competition. The whole Pacific coast resounded with the cry, "The heathen Chinese must go." [1]

The anti-Mongolian crusade came to a crisis in the last session of Congress, which passed by a large majority the Chinese-exclusion bill, forbidding under penalties any vessel from bringing hereafter to American shores, at one time, more than fifteen Chinamen, whether as visitors or immigrants. This bill is not only contrary to the traditional policy of the country, which hospitably opens the door to voluntary emigrants from all parts of

[1] The spirit and tendency of this new form of nativism was well expressed and reduced *ad absurdum* by the following fictitious counter-petitions, which we quote as specimens of American humor from the *N. Y. Tribune* of February 25th, 1879:

To the Honorable House of Representatives:

The undersigned, legal voters and citizens of the United States, respectfully ask

the world without distinction of race and color, but it is also an open violation of articles five and six of the "Burlingame Treaty" of 1869, wherein the United States of America and the Emperor of China, recognizing the inherent and inalienable right of voluntary expatriation, and the mutual advantage of free migration and emigration of their citizens from one country to the other, for purposes of curiosity, trade, or permanent residence, pledge to such emigrants the enjoyment of the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions in respect to travel and residence as are enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.

The President therefore very properly vetoed the bill, March 2d, 1879, and the House of Representatives wisely re-

that you prevent the immigration of any more Germans to this country, because they will drink lager, go on Sunday excursions, save their money, and are buying up all the land in the country.

ROBERT MACGREGOR,
HUGH MACDOUGAL,
SANDY MACPHERSON,
and 1000 others.

To Yer Honers the Mimbers of Congress:

We the unthersigned citizens of the United States of Amerikie respectfully petition you to tack into the "Haythen Chinee" bill the white nagers or Ratalians that are coming over here in dhroves and working ten or twilve hours a day for nothin' at all at all, and boarding thimselves at that. Now what can an honest man do to airn a dacent livin' if you don't put a stop to it?

PATRICK O'REILLY,
MICHAEL MCDERMOTT,
WM. JAMES O'SULLIVAN,
and 1000 others.

CONGRISHMAN: Vot for you no schtop dem Irishman shust de same mit Schineman? He drinks up all de viskey like nothings, votes every time all day long, and makes drubles mit us. And it is shust so easy mit de needle in de camels' eye ash to have de behind vordt mit the Irishman.

JACOB ROERHAUSEN,
HANS BUMGARTEN,
PETER VON STEINBURGER,
and many others.

To Ze Grand Congress.

SHENTLEMEN: If you vill keeps out of ze countarie, all ze Germans, all ze Irish, all ze Anglasie, wis all ze, ze—vat you calls him—Shine—mans and evra boda but ze Frenchmans, you vill have one magnifishant Republic.

LOUIS DU BOISE,
PAUL COGNAC.

fused to pass it over his veto. Thus the national honor was saved from disgrace, and the wisdom of the veto power confided in the Executive, which guards the right of individual conscience, has received a striking illustration by showing that the President with the veto may better represent the national sentiment than a Congress of politicians attempting to outbid each other for a party advantage.

A wholesale immigration of heathen Mongolians for permanent residence might indeed endanger the Christian civilization of America, and would justify a modification or abrogation of the treaty by mutual consent of the two governments. But the experience of 1877 and 1878 does not justify such an apprehension, but the probability that the emigration from Asia will decrease rather than increase.

It is gratifying that the Christian sentiment of all denominations, as far as it has been manifested during the recent agitation in petitions and religious newspapers, has been strongly against the bill of Congress and in favor of the President's veto. How could it be otherwise? The instincts of the Christian heart are always in favor of peace and good-will toward men. A law like the one proposed by Congress would have been a fatal blow to Christian missions among the Chinese now residing in America, and probably also in China itself, by provoking measures of retaliation. The only way to Christianize them is kind treatment.

The missionary efforts which have been made by various churches among the Chinese in the Pacific States are by no means discouraging, if we consider the wide-spread prejudice against them. There are flourishing Chinese mission schools in San Francisco and Oakland, numbering, it is said, over three thousand attendants. I had never more attentive listeners than when I addressed one of them a year ago. A Presbyterian pastor at Oakland told me that he had in his large church for several years fifteen Chinese converts, who during all that time had led as consistent a Christian life as any equal number of American members. It is supposed that about one thousand Chinamen have been converted. Besides, two hundred Chinese youths are educated at the expense of their government in

various American institutions, and show remarkable aptitude for learning.

The providential design in the Chinese immigration seems to be the same as in the involuntary importation of the African slaves: it looks towards the extension of Christ's kingdom and the salvation of men. The conversion of Chinese immigrants, most of whom will return, is the entering wedge for the conversion of that immense empire, which numerically represents more than one fourth of the population of the globe.

PHILIP SCHAFF.

THE LATEST PHASES OF THE PHILOSOPHIC MOVEMENT IN ITALY.

DURING the Renaissance (1400 to 1500 A.D.), Italy directed the philosophic movement in Europe. The schools of Padua, Bologna, and Florence were greatly renowned ; Aristotelianism and Platonism, those two immortal forms of philosophy, had most illustrious representatives in these schools ; but with the tortures of Campanella and the martyrdom of Giordano Bruno, the symmetrical development of thought came to an end, stifled by the Inquisition and by despotism. Italy, invaded by strangers, ceased to belong to herself, and philosophy could only soar again with the awakening of national sentiment and the efforts of patriotism to recover independence.

I.

Amid the precursors of those events which have resulted in the reconstruction of Italian nationality, there figure illustrious writers and philosophers. The names of Romagnosi, of Galluppi, of Rosmini, of Gioberti, of Mamiani, are bound up in the gratitude of Italians with those of Parini, of Foscolo, of Alfieri, of Manzoni, of Pellico, of Niccolini. The doctrines of which the former of these are the authors, form a body of thought which has been the theme of a work in two volumes ("Essay on the History of Philosophy in Italy during the Nineteenth Century," by Louis Ferri. Paris, 1869), and we must familiarize ourselves with their essential characteristics if we are to form a true idea of the actual condition of philosophy in the Italian peninsula. They not only contain the most original and influential thought of Italy in the sphere of philoso-

phy during the last century, but are at the same time the mark at which the attacks of dissentient criticism are aimed, and the point of new departures. But while I propose to set forth that which in the philosophic productions of the Italy of our age is spontaneous and characteristic, I do not propose to maintain that the spirit of the peninsula has developed itself without aid from abroad, or without reference to the past. On the contrary, foreign influence and historic traditions have stamped a deep impress upon its labors, so much so that without the philosophies of Scotland, of Germany, and of France, on the one hand, and the ideas of Christianity and scholasticism on the other, the most important works of contemporary Italian philosophers would be incomprehensible.

II.

Italy may be said to have had no other philosophy than that of Condillac and the encyclopædists before the year 1819. The *Traité des Sensations*, variously commentated for the use of schools by the Abbé Soave and the economist Gioja, feebly modified by the celebrated jurisconsult Romagnosi, and applied by them to the various branches of human knowledge, ruled, with rare exceptions, in the teachings and writings of philosophers from the north of Italy to the south.

The appearance of a work by the Calabrian, Pasquale Galluppi (*Saggio filosofico sulla critica della conoscenza*), was the signal for a revolution. Devoted to the study of philosophy, and particularly to the investigation of the fundamental problem of cognition, discontented with the sensualistic solution of this problem, the author of this work demands of history, of the discussion of systematic philosophy and of psychological analysis, a solution more in conformity with common-sense and the instincts of humanity.

The Cartesian and Scotch schools and the philosophy of Kant are the principal historic sources from which he draws, and his *Lettere filosofiche su le vicende della filosofia relativamente a' principii delle conoscenze umane da Cartesio insino a Kant*, published in 1827, and translated later into French, prove, by the clearness and exactitude which distinguishes them, how thoroughly he had comprehended their theories.

It is true that Galluppi is indebted for these results in no small degree to Cousin and his school, since their expositions and translations facilitated his access to theories which he could not comprehend in their original tongue. None the less, however, Galluppi is a truly distinguished psychologist, and the acumen of his analysis exercised a propitious influence on the philosophical studies of Italy. As a defender of spiritualism, and consequently of the distinction between mind and matter, between God and the world, he put forth all his efforts to demonstrate their existence by what he calls the reality of cognition. With what success did he meet in this enterprise? Criticism reproaches him with having pretended to base the legitimacy of our belief in the existence of the external world on the objectivity of sensation, and with having misunderstood the special function attributed by Reid to perception; in other words, with having confounded in this question the distinct offices of sensibility and intelligence. The manner in which he accounts for the existence of the soul has incurred the same reproach; for he bases it upon a sense which he confounds with consciousness, properly so called.

It is very true that Galluppi never takes into consideration the difference which exists between the different phases of experience, and especially between those which in his system are fundamental, one of which he designates as immediate or primitive experience, and the other as secondary, derived or compared experience. According to his theory, these two phases are to be distinguished in that the former contains nothing but sensible elements, while the latter is the resultant of sensible elements and of intellectual elements or ideas. It is true that between these two forms of knowledge there is exerted an activity of the soul and an intellectual operation which commences with attention and produces by analysis and synthesis those ideas which are necessary to carry over experience of the first kind to that of the second. Unfortunately, Galluppi's exposition of these ideas remained incomplete in this essential point, his very language is equivocal; and although he compelled himself to shun the shoals of idealism and of sensualism, although he sought a realism conformable to common-sense, he did not in the least succeed in dispelling the mists which surround his "Objectivity of Sensation."

The feeling (*sentiment*) of self is in Galluppi's system an integral element of every phenomenon of perception; but he distinguishes this feeling from the reality of the soul considered in its substantial unity. This unity, which he calls metaphysical, is for him the resultant of a course of reasoning based upon synthesis and the products of that function. In his mind every idea, every mental representation is a synthetic unity, which supposes the metaphysical unity of the Ego. In the same way, as he thinks, the reality of divine existence is neither given in an *a priori* intuition, as the ontologists suppose, nor left in that uncertainty to which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason condemns it. The idea of the absolute is, he believes, suggested by that of the relative, the idea of the infinite and necessary by those of the finite and contingent, and the existence of the Being to whom the attributes of infinity and necessity belong is demonstrated by a process of reasoning whose premises are furnished by the perception of finite realities and by the principle of causality.

The theory of Galluppi with reference to this all-important point is altogether too imperfect; his explication of the origin of the idea of the absolute, which he seeks in the analysis of the relative and in an operation of the intelligence, is wrecked upon insurmountable difficulties, the most manifest of which is the impossibility of positing the absolute as an element of another object, and, above all, of its exact contrary.

We will now proceed from these unsatisfactory particulars to those in which Galluppi's system stands firm. The first is the distinction between external phenomena and the energy of the soul which appears as it really is, especially in thought and intelligence, whilst the qualities of sensible things are the distinct appearances of the things which they reveal to us. Another point of doctrine which has a clearly discernible affinity with the preceding is the veracity of consciousness, *criterion* of truth, with which, according to Galluppi, all others are connected, because the very axioms which rule our demonstrations are the products of consciousness before they become universal laws, and because the particular rules of external perception and the products of sensible cognition cannot exist for us without forming, in the first place, a part of a natural whole and a concrete

synthesis, of which the consciousness of the Ego and its modes is a necessary condition.

The *rôle* which Galluppi assigns to consciousness and the keen analysis which he gives us of its attributes bring him, on the one hand, into close relationship with Reid, and separate him, on the other, by a wide gulf from Kant. With the former he attributes to consciousness an immediate certainty, which, based upon the consciousness of the Ego and aided by reason, reaches the metaphysical unity of the soul, whilst he refuses to see, with the second, in the functions of the conscious mind any thing else than the means of internal representation, without any necessary connection with reality in itself. In other words, consciousness furnishes him in the modes of the subject a part of the internal noumenon which it belongs to reason to complete.

However, in his sincere endeavor in the search for truth, united with a circumspection which separates him from the spirit of system, Galluppi does not hesitate to borrow from Kant the means of grounding his ethical systems, the notion of which he regards as an *a priori* element of practical reason (*connaissance*). Nevertheless, in spite of this transcendental side of his system, Galluppi believed himself to have founded a philosophy of experience, and defended it as such in the chair which he occupied in the University of Naples from 1831 till his death in 1846. But what we have just said will suffice to show that every thing in his system did not have an experimental origin. Italian metaphysics, also, weighed down by the difficulties raised against sensualism and empiricism, had to enter resolutely upon the course which the Calabrian philosopher had just marked out for morals. Ontologism rules in the phase whither we are about to follow it.

III.

The author of this revolution was a member of the clergy, a cadet of a noble family of the Venetian provinces. Antonio Rosmini, born at Roveredo in 1799, was never a teacher of philosophy, but he had at his disposal resources more efficacious perhaps than those of a professorial chair. He was rich, and his inclination having turned him toward the Church he con-

ceived and carried out the project of forming a religious order (Instituto della Carità) whose members should naturally become the disciples and expounders of his doctrine. In the month of May, 1829, appeared the celebrated work in which his doctrine is set forth. The "New Essay on the Origin of Ideas" (Nuovo Saggio sull'origine delle Idee) is composed of three distinct parts. In the first part all systems of importance are reviewed and divided into two classes, as they sin on the side of defect or of excess—that is to say, as they admit conditions too many or too few for the purpose of explaining the origin of ideas. In the second and third parts the Italian philosopher develops his own theory, the aim of which is to avoid whatever does not suffice or goes too far in the others. Some of the essential features of this theory are as follows : on the one hand, it grants to the school of experience that reality is based on and is an endowment of feeling (*sentiment*). On the other hand, it admits with the critical school that knowledge without an *a priori* element is impossible ; of the two elements in knowledge, matter and form, one is furnished by sensibility, the other by the intellect, and more particularly by the intellectual intuition of Being. Whilst the empirical school admits too little to explain ideas, the ontological schools in general, and the critical philosophy in particular, admit far too much, because in place of a single *a priori* idea which can suffice to account for the genesis of others they unnecessarily enlarge the formal element, whether it be by the doctrine of innate ideas or by that of the forms of the sensibility and the understanding. According to Rosmini, it suffices for the explanation of cognition to remark that at the basis of each act of cognition lies with the elements of sensible origin the intuition of Being, the idea of which serves to unite them and render them intelligible and objective, or to cause them to be thought as they are in themselves. In other words, all ideas except one are formed by perception and formulate themselves by judgments, in which they present themselves to analysis as determinations of Being ; and as the first judgment as well as the last are in the same condition, and as, besides, the Being of which we are speaking is indeterminate and universal and opposed to the concrete and particular given in experience, it follows, in Rosmini's system, that it constitutes the sole and neces-

sary *a priori* form of all knowledge; so that the law of our faculty of cognition is a primary synthesis between the ideal or possible Being manifested to the understanding and the real Being revealed by the senses, a synthesis whose condition is the unity of the soul, and which corresponds up to a certain point with that which Kant admitted in every mental representation and in every concept, with this important difference, however, that the *a priori* formal element admitted by Rosmini in his syntheses is a unity, while that of Kant is a multiplicity, and that the same element is in the one objective, in the other subjective.

IV.

Such is the basis of the most important system of philosophy which has appeared in Italy during the nineteenth century. We would not, however, have any exact comprehension of its origin if we were to limit ourselves to the consideration of its points of agreement with Kant's Critique or with the philosophy of experience. Its founder yields, to be sure, to a desire of combating scepticism and of establishing the objectivity of reason, but he also proposes to himself the reconciliation of science and revelation. This design, which he expressly avows, is followed out in the fundamental ideas of his ontology. The ideal Being, the presence of which he exerts himself to prove in the intellectual intuition of man, and which virtually contains the types and intelligible reasons of all finite realities, constitutes with the substantial principle of these realities—that is, with the infinite reality—two aspects of the absolute Being, the relation of which gives birth to the third fundamental form of Being—namely, moral Being.

It is on these three forms of Being that Rosmini bases his philosophical interpretation of the dogma of the Trinity. The Real corresponds to the Father, the Ideal to the Son, or Word, the Moral to the divine Love or Spirit.

This is a theory far enough removed, as the reader will observe, from the circumspect efforts of Galluppi's psychology. Rosmini is a theologian as well as a philosopher. To this far-reaching and mighty soul, to this persevering investigator, it was granted within a lifetime comparatively short to bring to-

gether a complete encyclopædia of philosophic science, scattered amidst a large number of works, among which those devoted to Anthropology and Psychology excite a deep interest to this day.[1] Rosmini founded a school. Although his numerous adherents belong for the most part to the clergy, yet we find among them many of the laity, eminent men, like Pellico, Manzoni, and Tommaseo.[2] An innovator in philosophy, Rosmini aspired as well to the reform of the Church, and through the Church to that of the State. His writings on the Five Plagues of the Church (1848) and on the Constitution according to Social Justice (1848), show the tendency of his reform to be partly a liberal one, partly in opposition to public sentiment.

V.

Italian philosophy, thus started upon a course in which science and religion were allied in one cause and aimed at the same practical end, could not pause half-way. Its union with theology was about to become the most intimate possible, and both were destined to be employed for some time to come as direct instruments of political revolution in the hands of another reformer. This, in point of fact, was the end which the Abbé Vincenzo Gioberti proposed to himself. The writings of this illustrious patriot and author, composed in exile and secretly introduced into the peninsula when roused by the need for liberty and independence, exercised a paramount influence upon the events of 1848 and the temporary alliance between the Pontificate and the Italian people.

The most remarkable features in his ontologism are these: In place of the *a priori* intuition of ideal existence which Rosmini had made the keystone of his ideological system, Gioberti set up another intuition which embraces both absolute and relative Being, and a relation of creation between the two. While Rosmini had reduced the transcendent object of the pure understanding to a minimum, Gioberti raised it to a

[1] Rosmini's principal works are: Nuovo Saggio sull' origine delle Idee, Psicologia, Antropologia, Logico, Teodicea, Principii di Scienza Morale, Filosofia del Diritto, Del Principio Supremo della Metodica.

[2] The famous Tommaseo was a colleague of Daniel Manin in the provisional government of Venice in 1848.

maximum. *L'Ente crea l'Existente* was, according to Gioberti, the magic formula, the application of which ought to regenerate science and society; and certainly as it was interpreted and developed in his works, and especially in the *Primato morale e civile degl' Italiani* and in the *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*,[1] it seemed plausible and fertile; but in reality its worth depended less on its own power than on the might of the spirit which made it the instrument of its designs and filled it with his ideas. We will only say that in making of the mystery of creation not only a philosophic dogma, but the incomprehensible object of the understanding, Gioberti could not without reason be accused of reducing philosophy again to the servile position which it had occupied in the middle ages. This is in substance the reproach which others uttered and which he himself felt in the latter part of his life, when the hopes with which the pontificate of Pius IX. had inspired him in its first years were shattered and he had changed his philosophy as well as his politics. The scattered outlines of this change, in which, without misunderstanding the points of agreement between reason and faith, he at the same time traced their distinct spheres in a system more rational than the former, have been preserved for us in the collection of fragments published as his posthumous works. Belied by political events, resisted by the spirit of the laity and by the progress of the historical and natural sciences, the close alliance between philosophy and theology of which Gioberti had dreamed was destroyed; but its fall did not embrace that of ontologism. Among the contemporaries of Rosmini and Gioberti, Count Mamiani had already embraced its doctrines, after having been for some time an adherent of the philosophy of experience to which he had devoted his work *Del Rinnovamento dell' antica filosofia Italiana* (1834). The cause of this change was a controversy between him and the Abbé Rosmini on the origin of ideas; but he did not pass without some reservations into the enemy's camp.

[1] The first philosophical work of Gioberti is entitled Teorica del Sovranaturale, Bruxelles, 1838. The Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia was published in 1839–40; the Primato morale e civile degl' Italiani in 1842–43. Besides these he wrote the Treatise del Bello (1841), the Errori filosofici di Antonio Rosmini (1842), and Il Gesuita Moderno (1847).

His writings bear the impress of an independent mind, and have modified in more than one vital point the ontologism prevalent in Italy. Like Rosmini and Gioberti, M. Mamiani admits an intellectual intuition, but he limits its object infinitely more than Gioberti, and extends its range far beyond the bounds fixed by Rosmini. According to him we have an ideal vision of the absolute Being, but while we attain through this higher function of the understanding directly to its existence, we can not do so but by the aid of ideas, intellectual forms, intermediate between the soul and the principle of truth, and of Being. Thus while the object of intuition is for Rosmini ideal, not real, a something which is divine without being God ; while it comprehends for Gioberti the universe in abridgment, it is limited for Mamiani to the divine reality without embracing the attributes of God. Ideas are also in Mamiani's system very different from what they are in those of Rosmini and Gioberti. While Rosmini thinks them the determinations of a universal form or sole idea playing the *rôle* of mediator between God and man, while Gioberti thinks them the determinations of infinite Being, of finite existence and the relation of these two objects, the first intuition of which particularizes and develops itself under the auspices of an *ontological reflection*, Mamiani regards them as objective forms by which the absolute reveals and represents itself to our intelligence. These three philosophers differ also in their extension of the part which experience plays in the generation of our cognition. Rosmini holds the share of the ideal in our perceptions and conceptions to be that of a sole and constant form to which the senses add an element manifold and variable. Ideas are in his system the innumerable daughters of a marriage ceaselessly renewed between the ideal and real in the womb of the human soul, if we may be allowed to express ourselves thus. Gioberti holds, if we examine only the works published during his lifetime, that our sensations and perceptions furnish only the necessary occasion for the development of the intuition and the manifestation of ideas. Finally, Mamiani, while he maintains for the ideas considered in themselves an existence objective and independent of sensible things and the sentient subject, unites them to experience in two ways. First, he lays down that no one of them is innate, that no one of

them presents itself in consciousness without a previous exercise of perception ; this, then, allows him to say that *universals* are *ante rem* and *cognitions post rem ;* lastly, distinguishing in them matter and form, he agrees that it is only in form that they differ from the corresponding subjective and objective phenomena, and that consequently they represent externally (*ad extra*) finite things in the province of experience, and internally (*ad intra*) the divine activity by which all things are created or are possible. We observe, therefore, that what is especially Mamiani's in this development of the theory of ideas is his method of representing their nature ; in his system they are neither modes of the divine thought as in those of Malebranche and St. Augustine, nor are they substantial determinations of divine existence as Plato declared, nor yet a kind of abstract and detached attribute of God like the ideal existence of Rosmini, but they are a kind of superior and transcendent phenomenality of the divine activity in relation on one side to God as their immediate cause, and on the other to the human intelligence which observes them and to the things of which they are copies. Here we have, as is easy to be seen, the form of Platonism modified by a mind justly preoccupied by the difficulties in which the systems of his predecessors had remained befogged. It is the work of an intelligence which understands the needs of an age ruled by the sentiment of the real, by the experimental method, and which, nevertheless, aspires to preserve the ontological foundations of rational theology and the objectivity of the necessary truths, an objectivity shaken by the Critique of Kant and denied by scepticism and empiricism.

VI.

Another point which we must mention, in this too rapid review of Mamiani's system, refers to external perception. The Italian philosopher wished, like Reid, to free it from the compromising mixture of representative ideas and abstract conceptions, and he believes himself to have attained this by the application of his general views regarding the conjunction of existences to the harmony between the subject perceiving and the

object perceived, and by the direct observation of internal facts as they fit into our sensible and intellectual intercourse with the external world.

The passivity which shows itself in our existence at the moment of the action of the external forces upon us and the intuitive act which perceives both the one and the other, are the facts on which he most insists and from which he draws this conclusion: that, considered in its essence, the perception of realities is altogether distinct from the intellectual intuition of ideas, and that it essentially consists in a perception of the meeting of two acts, one of which appertains to the subject, the other to the object.

Our space does not permit us to enter into further details. To form an idea of the different spheres in which the philosophic activity of Mamiani exerted itself, we must peruse the numerous books in which are set forth his views on the fundamental principles of law and on the international law of Europe (*D'un nuovo diritto Europeo*), on the connection of Religion and the State (*Teorica della Religione e dello Stato*), and especially on cosmology and the causes of progress, *Principii di Cosmologia* (in the second volume of the *Confessioni d'un Metafisico*). In all these works, whose elegant and pure style recalls that of the best Italian writers of the sixteenth century, Mamiani sometimes defends, sometimes modifies and completes the doctrines of the school whose leader he is. The distinction between theology and philosophy purposely mingled and confounded by Gioberti is re-established in his works. A love of free thought, a sincere desire for discussion, an unalterable faith in the triumph of truth, guide and animate his controversial writings, and have no other counterpoise than the love of the beautiful and patriotism. Mamiani was a poet before he was a philosopher, but for more than forty years his muse has been that of science and of eloquence.[1]

[1] Besides the Rinnovamento dell' antica filosofia Italiana, the Confessioni d'un Metafisico, the Fondamenti della filosofia dell Diritto, D'un nuovo diritto Europeo, the Teorica della Religione e dello Stato, let us note, among other works of Mamiani, the Dialoghi di scienza prima, the Meditazioni Cartesiane rinnovate, Dell' ontologia e del metodo, and his Lettere all' abbate Rosmini.

VII.

About Mamiani there have grouped themselves in these days the partisans of a rational and independent spiritualism, who, while they agree with the last representative of Italian Platonism in a certain number of vital points, such as the objective reality of cognition, the spiritual nature of the human soul, its freedom and moral destiny, and the divine government of the world, yet belong to different schools or follow different methods. The principal of these are the lamented Bertini, professor of the history of philosophy in the University of Turin, where he has left memories of a career of instruction remarkable for erudition and critical force; Bonatelli, professor of philosophy in the University of Padua, a Herbartian in theory; Burzalotti, and the other co-editors of the *Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, a Review whose direction the author of this article shares with Count Mamiani. Sincerely attached to philosophic speculation and to the noble interests which are united in it, these writers are so animated by a love of truth and of independence that they often engage among themselves in controversies on the fundamental questions of philosophy. The problems of perception, of the idea, of the relation of the spirit to the absolute, the foundations of religion and of revelation, have all in turn been examined with great freedom of discussion and criticism.

VIII.

The principles of philosophic spiritualism of which this review is the organ in Italy are naturally opposed to those which inspire the *Civilta Cattolica*, a theological organ under the direction of the Jesuits devoted to the Vatican and pontifical despotism. The *Civilta Cattolica* represents in philosophy the school which gives its adhesion and lends its support to Thomism as well as to the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope and to the anathemas hurled by the syllabus of Pius IX. against the public liberties, the rights of the state, and the idea of progress. This invariable attachment of the Jesuits to the doctrine of the Catholic commentator of Aristotle is naturally associated with a bitter aversion to ontologism and to Platonism, and the reason for it is perhaps as much practical as speculative. For

Thomism as it is generally understood by the Jesuits restrains to the furthest extent the power of human reason, while Platonism raises it above the limited horizon of the real into the sphere of the ideal and its divine archetypes. One is far more favorable than the other to obedience, and is consequently appropriated to that immobility of the Church to which the Thomist school seems to consecrate all its endeavor; and up to this time it has been crowned by success, for not only do its doctrines generally prevail among all the Catholic clergy of Italy, but, aided by powerful influence, they have contrived to remove every other doctrine from the teaching of the ecclesiastical establishments. This overshadowing and powerful school tolerates no rival. In those colleges of Rome and the provinces whose supervision belongs to the Vatican, the only text-books permitted are those of Sanseverino and of Liberatore, rigorous Thomists and devout Jesuits. With the exception of these handbooks and those which reproduce their spirit and doctrine, all else is viewed with suspicion and disapprobation. The same is true as regards the timid innovations of the Abbé Bonelli and the daring works of Rosmini and Gioberti. We shall not pause to speak of the insertion in the Index of two works of the former and the posthumous works of the latter. Rosmini's *Five Plagues of the Holy Church* and *Constitution according to Social Justice* contain too much which touches nearly existing institutions and the interests of the Society of Jesus to cause any astonishment at their condemnation, and the last ideas of Gioberti were too heterodox to escape the same fate. But what was so dangerous in the works of the Abbé Bonelli, professor of philosophy in the College of the "*Pace*" at Rome, that it should be deemed necessary to fight them to the death, and to eliminate them from the course of instruction? This, beyond doubt, that Bonelli was not a Thomist; that, although a priest and orthodox, he recognized the need of following the movements of modern thought, and that, persuaded that the philosophy of experience in its widest sense would conduce to that end without danger to faith, he had adopted and introduced into his teachings and writings the philosophy of Bacon.[1]

[1] See Præcipuorum Philosophiæ Systematum, disquisitio historica Aloysii Bonelli, presbyteri Romani. Romæ, 1829.

IX.

With regard to two questions in particular, the Jesuits have in these days repelled every kind of innovation contrary to the scholastic philosophy, with reference, namely, to the essence of the human understanding and the constitution of matter. On this latter point the learned members of the Society do not permit any divergence from the opinions of St. Thomas, even in one of their own number, without expressing the liveliest opposition. The case of Father Secchi, the illustrious physicist and astronomer, is an example. In 1864 he published a work entitled *Unité des forces physiques*. In this work, which met with great success, the learned ecclesiastic, proceeding from a purely physical standpoint, applied the principles of mechanics to the explanation and simplification of the phenomena of matter. At once there appeared a pamphlet from the pen of Father Cornold (I sistemi meccanico e dinamico), aiming at a refutation of his theories. Again, Father Tongiorgi, author of three volumes of *Institutiones Philosophicæ* (Rome, 1861), had in his Cosmology applied the chemical theory of atoms to the explanation of the nature of bodies. The defenders of philosophic orthodoxy at once rose against him in favor of the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form. Finally, the most violent opposition was called forth from Jesuit philosophers by a work of the Abbé Francisco Rignani, *Sulla essenza dei corpi* (Rome, 1876–77). This distinguished prelate, who is director of the College of the "*Pace*" at Rome, and who upholds the Baconian traditions of Bonelli in that place as far as the rigid instructions of the hierarchy make it possible, places the results and rules of the experimental method above the prejudices of the school. His metaphysical theory of matter is ingenious, and deserves to be mentioned. It is a dynamic conception based on physics and chemistry. Monsignor Rignani starts with the rational principle that the composite presupposes the simple; like modern science, he admits atoms or primitive bodies, but he distinguishes between the physical body and the chemical body. The true atom is not, as he thinks, the chemical, but is the physical body, although neither possesses absolute simplicity. On the contrary, simplicity and unity are to be found in each; a multi-

plicity of simple forces which taken by themselves and isolated could not produce any effect, and whose co-ordination produces the first elements of cosmical realities, primeval matter. These are the atoms ; they are all equal in weight, and their diverse co-ordinations produce the specific weights of chemical elements, their properties and different aptitudes ; so that a chemical body, a molecule of oxygen, for example, is a composite of physical atoms as regards matter or substance, and differs from them in the resulting effects of their multiplicity diversely co-ordinated, that is to say, in form. These ideas resemble without doubt those of Boscovich and the centres of force of Faraday, and possess the incontestable advantage over the doctrines of his adversaries of attempting a reconciliation between modern science and the Aristotelian traditions.

Such are the most salient features of the philosophical situation in the breasts of the Italian clergy and at Rome. Scholasticism supported by authority has up to this time been victorious. Thomism seems to be regarded in high places as one of the foundations of orthodoxy and to be considered as indispensable as the Bible.

X.

But the ontological idea is not the only one in the peninsula which fights for the freedom of thought and conscience, and puts forth all its effort to give an impulse to national intelligence. The Hegelian school of Naples has been laboring for the same object since 1860. We know the principles of Hegelianism, and do not need to develop them here. The idea, considered as the basis of things, developing itself throughout the spheres of logic, of nature, and of spirit, to take consciousness of itself in man and to produce social life and civilization, the dialectic idea finally ruling the whole circle of sciences, is with the Italian Hegelian as with the German the basis of a system which has justly been entitled the absolute idealism. This grand doctrine has not been modified by them, but it has not remained barren in their hands. It has been applied by Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco Fiorentino to the history of philosophic systems, and notably to the history of the systems of the Renaissance. It has given us in the writings of Francesco De Sanctis pro-

found critical studies of the leading productions of modern literature ; with Dr. De Meis it has penetrated into natural history, and finally has found in M. Vera the most faithful and learned interpreter of Hegel himself.[1]

Cherished by distinguished minds, implanted in the south of Italy, and especially in Naples, where there appears to be a natural taste for that kind of speculation which is the distinguishing characteristic of Hegelianism, this system has penetrated into the colleges as well as into the universities, where it shares in the philosophical instruction.

XI.

In spite of the wide difference which separates the absolute Idealism from the theory of ontologism, these systems have concurred in emancipating the minds of men and in elevating them above the narrow limits of empiricism ; they have fought together the battle with materialism, and still agree in repelling the recent explanations of the nature of soul made by the English school. Unfortunately the impulse given by them no longer suffices for the wants of our time. The method of the absolute Idealism has grown old ; the progress of historical studies is united with that of experimental method in the discovery of defects. Common-sense, defied by a logic which begins by laying down at the head of its axioms the identity of contradictories, has taken up the glove, and, supported by history and observation, has thrown it down once more. On the other side, ontologism, with its transcendent vision of absolute existence and its external archetypes of things, finds no longer a favorable reception in an age devoted to the study of facts, and which sets up in psychological analysis and in the critique of cognition a rigor contrary to mystic rapture and enthusiasm. Great difficulties arise in the face of this vision ; and although an irresistible instinct which is really but the ex-

[1] The principal works of Spaventa are : Principii di Filosofia, Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia, La Filosofia di Gioberti, Saggio di critica Filosofica, politica e religiosa. Those of Fiorentino are : Pietro Pomponazzi studii storici su la scuola Bolognese e Padovana del secola XVI., Barnardino Telesio, Studii storici su la idea della Natura nel risorgimento italiano. Those of M. De Meis are I tipi animali and Vita a pensieri.

pression of nature and common-sense declares that truth is external, that it must have an objective basis in Being, and that our soul was made for it, we cannot diminish the repugnance to admit that the path followed by ontologism is the most scientific and legitimate. Do the partisans of the English school of association and evolution succeed better in solving the enigmas of the human soul, in explaining cognition and its faculties? It is certainly permissible to doubt it. Under the name of the philosophy of experience, it is really a system which they teach, and this system, which owes its importance to the progress of physiology and natural history, and obtains from these sciences a certain number of objective facts which transcend the limit of the subjective observations of the old psychology, swings on one side to pantheism and on the other to materialism. For on the one side it undertakes to show that all existences arise through evolution from an eternal and infinite matter kept in perpetual ferment by a continual movement of composition and decomposition, and on the other side it either effaces entirely the distinction between physiological and psychical facts or declares a complete subordination of the latter to the former. But if they undertake to deny, with the transformist Hæckel and the boldest Darwinians, the distinction between soul and body, internal freedom, and the consequences in metaphysics and morals which proceed from it, Italian evolutionists still remain powerless to clear away from their theories the insolvable objections which meet them, of which the first is that which repels as contrary to observation, the confusion of psychical and physiological facts. The most remarkable representative of this school which voluntarily takes the name of positivist, is M. Ardigo, professor in the Lyceum of Mantua. In a book entitled *La psicologia come scienza positiva* (Mantua, 1871), he supports himself on the relativity of internal and external facts, to redivide them into two divisions of the same kind, and declares them to be all equally phenomenal. For him the distinction maintained by Tyndall, Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz, and the savants who avow the impossibility of passing from one of these orders to the other, does not exist. In harmony with Comte, with Spencer, and, in general, with the representatives of Positivism, on the necessity of abandoning to

the "dreams of metaphysic" the investigation of essences and causes, he admits at the same time an unique reality which he calls psycho-physical, which he believes himself to have established on the analysis of facts and by the inductive method. In opposition to materialism and spiritualism, which appear to him two equally exclusive systems, this writer affirms his views on cosmic unity in a more recent work, entitled *Natural Formation in the Solar System*, where, following the tracts of Herbert Spencer, he explains the genesis of worlds and the development of existences by a natural movement which causes all things to pass from an indistinct condition to a distinct condition, from homogeneity to heterogeneity.

This evolutionism applied to the psychological problems which affect morals could not fail to engender the negation of free will. M. Ardigo denies it in the name of the uninterrupted continuity of the train of facts and of the principle of causality. Falling for this end into what we conceive to be an error common to other positivists, he makes the internal freedom admitted by spiritualists a contradictory conception, representing it as a spontaneity without motives, and reduces for his purposes voluntary action to the result of a series of intellectual movements, which are in reality nothing but physiological ones. M. Ardigo was preceded in this theory by M. Herzen, demonstrator of anatomy in Florence, a disciple of M. Maurice Schiff, and author of a book published in Italian and French on the physiological analysis of the will, and has been followed by M. Enrico Ferri, who has developed his ideas in a large volume directed against the existence of free will and human responsibility.

XII.

We must acknowledge that the spiritualistic school, relying doubtless on the support of common-sense, has made no answer to these negations by extended and special treatises, but it has never ceased to demonstrate the insufficiency of the proof on which they rest. Above all, it has insisted on three points: I. We can grasp by consciousness a reality which is not phenomenal—that is to say, the appearance of another, but which is noumenal—that is, the direct manifestation of Being to itself.

II. This reality is not a collection of modes but a dynamic unity, an active subject, which in so far as it is conscious of itself is called Ego. III. Every thing in human knowledge is not relative; there are absolute principles, whatever be their origin or the manner of explicating them. The same school has combated the notion, in its belief contradictory, of an absolute which ceaselessly changes, the ever-changing Proteus of Hegelian pantheism. It has combated Hartmann's notion of the Unconscious and Spencer's theory of the Unknowable as being incapable of affording a rational basis for either science or religion. It has finally sought to arrest the madness of the evolutionists by calling attention in the writings of savants opposed to them to the proofs on which their precipitate conclusions rest. Mamiani especially has devoted himself, in the *Filosofia delle scuole Italiane*, with the greatest constancy and ardor to this work. The psychology of transformism is at this moment undergoing criticism in the same review, and, finally, a memoir, published at Rome, in the transactions of the Academy of the Lincei, goes back to the historical origin of the doctrines, sets forth their insufficiency and lacunes without misconceiving their importance. Nevertheless, we cannot refrain from observing that the spiritualistic school of Italy does not occupy itself sufficiently with psychology. Taken up with the great questions of ontology, it has roused itself to debate the questions concerning the agreement of the soul with the absolute, while schools of experimental philosophy abroad were giving a tendency to human thought and gathering facts to which it was as yet indifferent. It has, however, no want of precedents even in its own midst. Thus the Psychology of Rosmini is not only a metaphysical study of the essence of the soul, but is also an examination into the laws of its development. His Anthropology, under the heading of "Functions of the Synthetic Force of the Soul," includes the most essential of all psychological facts, those of association. Why has not this second part of Rosmini's work been more carefully examined? The leaders of spiritualism have neglected detail, fixed their gaze on the summit of the Understanding and not on the facts which form their base. There has been too much place given in their works to polemic as to the dominant formulas of the system, and they

have been wrong in occupying themselves too little with the more modest and certain disciplines of their science. Not only psychology but logic also could complain of their indifference. If we except a single important work of Rosmini's, we would search in vain for any thing remarkable accomplished in Italy for this science during the second half of the century.

While the English have studied the theories of the proposition and syllogism, and made changes in both, while they have perfected that of induction and written the history of the processes of the human mind in the sciences, while the Germans in the same department of philosophy have produced the important works of Lotze, Drobisch, Dühring, and Sigwart, not to speak of some of the principal representatives of Herbart's school, the Italians have no recent work on logic which can be cited. Æsthetics, which would seem particularly suited to their tastes, has not proved any more attractive. Happily, the philosophy of history forms an exception. In this particular department of philosophic study the thread of our traditions remains unbroken. Since the time of Vico this important science has never ceased to be cultivated, and in modern times a disciple of Romagnosi, Joseph Ferrari, has endeavored to submit it to an universal arithmetic capable of controlling the periodic course of political events and their forms, types, in all nations. Such is the spirit and the aim of his work entitled, *Il Periodo politico*, the last which this writer, more brilliant than solid, wrote upon the favorite subject of his speculations, and whose publication preceded but a short time the end of his career.

By the side of Ferrari we shall place M. Ansonio Franchi, professor in Milan. Their tendencies and ideas may be regarded as intermediate between the Italian development of the French philosophy of the eighteenth century and the party in the present movement which belongs to the French positivism of Auguste Comte and the English transformist school. We would add also that having written at a time when the spiritualistic school flourished, these two philosophers took an attitude hostile to it. Since they were both partisans of the most radical political party, they embraced in their attacks the doctrines of the representatives of that school, as well as the po-

litical principle of the moderate party, which in spirit and reality were at one.[1]

In spite of this identity of purpose, the philosophical methods of these two men were very different. Ferrari was at heart a sceptic and a knight-errant who seemed only to believe in the contradictions of history and nature for the purpose of using them to demolish existing theories and institutions. In his versatile mind there was an element of confusion and volatility. Franchi's intelligence is more solid and symmetrical. His writings on Sensation (Del Sentimente) and on the judgment (Teorica del Gindizio) belong almost as much to the critical school of Kant as to the empirical. The same characteristic is plain in his *Filosofia della scuole Italiane*, a polemic often fiery, but never without force, in which he has brought suit, if we may be allowed the expression, against ontological doctrines.[2] In this book, which was widely heralded, the author endeavored to put in evidence the contradictions of their principal representatives, but his destructive critique put nothing in place of the systems which he sought to overthrow. This inconvenience he proposed to remedy in his book on sentiment, in which he re-establishes the foundations of science, of natural religion, and of morals, by admitting primitive instincts, which reflection renders clear and develops. In short, the philosophy of Franchi is a critique of ontologism and a return to a theory of experience differing but little in its essential characteristics from that of Galluppi, but he fails to reproduce either Galluppi's analytic method or his historical erudition.

XIII.

The intuition of absolute existence was the principal object of Franchi's attack, and his polemic on this point still preserves

[1] See especially the philosophical and political review entitled *La Ragione*, edited and published by Franchi from 1850 to 1869, and the speech delivered by Ferrari before the Pilmontese chamber of deputies.

[2] La Filosofia delle scuole Italiane of Franchi is not to be confounded with the review of the same name published in Rome by Mamiani and Luigi Ferri. It was a collection of letters addressed to a professor in the University of Turin, the lamented Bertini, author of the Filosofia della vita, and an adherent of ontologism.

a certain interest. For the fundamental question which is now debated in philosophy, that whose solution must decide its fate, is without doubt that of determining whether there is an *a priori* element in human knowledge, or whether, on the contrary, every thing can be reduced to *a posteriori* elements, and, granted that the *a priori* element exists, what connection there is between it and its object. As we know, there are three principal schools at this time : the first, that of experience, admits nothing innate or superior to the product of the senses and of consciousness ; the critical school, for which the transcendental or *a priori* element is necessary to knowledge, without being a transcendent object of intuition ; and finally, the ontological school, which admits the intuition of one or several transcendent objects.

If we consider the condition of the problem in Italy at present, it seems to have reached this point : the controversies between ontologists have shown it to be necessary either to reject the intuition of a transcendent object or to admit that this object is real and determined, and that intuition or intellectual vision is true perception. The intuition or intellectual vision of an ideal absolute undetermined but objective is a contradiction. Has the intuition of an absolute existence, real and objective, been proven or can it be ? and besides, is it necessary to the establishment of science ? And is there no other means of demonstrating the objective value of the corresponding idea ? We believe that another path is possible, which can be found in the harmony of the idea of the absolute with experience. On this head we are at one with the English and American school, known as that of intuition, or at least with its most illustrious representatives, Hamilton, Mansel, and McCosh. In the PRINCETON REVIEW for November, 1878, the last of these, in criticising Kant, sustained the theory of a natural realism against the absolute distinction of phenomenon and noumenon, of the thing appearing and the thing in itself. He showed anew that our primitive perceptions certainly furnish the real and objective without the mediation of general ideas and of abstractions which are only possible in science. He has proved that if knowledge does not begin with reality it cannot end with it, and in effect we know that science operates upon the real

because scientific knowledge is preceded by the natural realism of intuitive knowledge. This solution of the problem of perception, which in its general features is that of the Scotch school, furnishes, in our belief, the position which we must assume, in order to answer the question of the existence of the absolute. This existence is not the direct object of a supersensuous intuition. It cannot be drawn from the idea of infinite existence without paralogism, as Kant has shown. The notion of its object rises in us by a law of our intelligence, which reflection compels us to conceive as the final condition of all finite reality and the lowest foundation of all thought. We do not embrace the infinite in our sensory, we do not perceive it, we do not contemplate it, in the proper sense of the word; we conceive it by a law of our reason (cf. McCosh, Intuitions of the Mind, The Infinite). Now, if this law necessarily intervenes in the organization of our ideas of the world at the same time when the perception of the existences which compose them reaches their reality, we have a means of assuring ourselves of its objectivity and of the truth of the idea which is its result—that is, of the idea of the Infinite. It suffices to ask ourselves if the scientific operation which develops our perceptions and arranges their sum is suited to this idea, if it conditions from far or near the results which experience verifies. The answer is not doubtful; the idea of the infinite necessarily conditions the operations of science in nature, and experience, gathering the objective results of these operations, bears witness to the reality of the condition. Kant, having separated the thing in itself from the phenomenon at the base of knowledge, could not reunite them at its apex; but the true theory of perception, that whose primitive form the Scotch school has discerned, reunites at the beginning what Kant falsely separated, and permits by a final synthesis the re-establishment of the union of the ideal and the real, in the idea of the infinite considered as the immanent condition of finite realities, in spite of the impossibility of contemplating them directly in a region where perception abandons us.

LUIGI FERRI.

PAINTING IN ITS HISTORIC RELATIONS.

IN a former number of this Review (September, 1878,) I ventured upon the statement concerning art, in all its varieties, that it was an interpreter of history ; but in the restricted limits of a single paper I could do no more than to give a few illustrations of the position taken from the study of architecture and the plastic arts. I propose to resume the consideration of the subject in this article by a brief inquiry as to the historic teachings of the sister art of painting. Here we enter upon a more extended field, of which I can only present a partial outline to the reader, which the student of history and art must fill up for himself.

Fortunately, although there is an *embarras de richesses*, since the great works of pictorial art largely outnumber those of architecture and statuary, I can illustrate my subject by referring to national characteristics and representative artists and pictures. The period, too, is much more limited ; for while architecture and sculpture are pre-eminently classic arts, finding their best development in ancient times, painting, as we know and enjoy it, is a modern art, and is the more interesting as the interpreter of modern history.

It seems hardly necessary to say that in speaking of painting in its relation to national history, I do not refer to imported art, except indeed so far as it vindicates or accuses the popular taste. The establishment of great museums and galleries is indeed a sign of culture, and tends to attract and mould native talent ; but my postulate is this : when art is indigenous in a country, or comes into it, under historic circumstances, it is moulded by the light, the scenery, the characteristics of the people of that country, and very soon begins to tell the nation's

history. The artist, like the author, is the man of his time and people; he depicts what he sees and feels, and unconsciously presents from age to age a chronicle of national life. In the words of Isaac d'Israeli, as applied to the literati, artists "are the creators or creatures of opinion; the great form the epoch; the many reflect the age."[1]

The painter, in this great school of history, occupies a more prominent and magisterial station than the architect or sculptor; the work of the two latter must be largely interpreted by the intellect and the imagination; that of the former clearly narrates the circumstance, or depicts the person, so that it requires little effort of the fancy to aid the illusion. Perhaps no one has so delicately determined the place and relations of painting among the arts, and its historic power, as Cousin, in his eloquent eulogium of poetry. According to his view it stands between sculpture and music; almost as precise as the one; almost as touching as the other, expressing beauty under all its forms, and the human soul in the richness and variety of its sentiments.[2]

Notwithstanding the very few remains of ancient paintings which have come down to the modern period, we have so many and such enthusiastic references to the great painters of antiquity, in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Pliny, Cicero, and Horace, that we may form no inadequate conception of their achievements and progress, and their influence upon the periods in which they lived.

A few sentences, however, will be sufficient for our purpose in reference to them. Passing by the subject of Egyptian painters, with the observation that they seemed to content themselves with adorning flat reliefs or flat surfaces with unshaded color, with no foreshortening or perspective, we approach with more respect the claims of Grecian art; which, beginning with

[1] "Amenities of Literature.

[2] "Entre la sculpture et la musique, ces deux extrêmes opposés, est la peinture, presque aussi précise que l'une, presque aussi touchante que l'autre; . . . plus pathetique que la sculpture, plus claire que la musique, la peinture s'élève audessus de tous les deux, parce qu'elle exprime davantage la beauté sous toutes les formes, l'ame humaine dans la richesse et la variété de ses sentiments." *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien.*

drawing, soon presented substance and color—from skiagram to monochromes, and from these to the illusion of natural coloring. The Greeks had varied and permanent pigments ; they understood chiaroscuro ; they studied like modern painters from nude models ; they painted on canvas (*linteum-pictum*). Soon the art became so diffused that we find, as in later times, *schools* of painting. We are almost as familiar with the name of Apelles as with that of his patron Alexander. Painting in his period was called the Apellean art, and what we can learn of his soft, finished, and effective pictures has entitled him to the name bestowed upon him by modern scholars—" the antique Rafael."

There are no anecdotes of Sanzio and Michael Angelo better known than that of Apelles and the critical cobbler, who could set the artist right about a sandal tie, but who when he ventured beyond his trade was rebuked by the painter with the *ne sutor ultra crepidam*, which has silenced many a pretender since.

And there is a nice prout-bit of history in the story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius : the former painted a boy carrying a basket of grapes, which were so real that the birds pecked at them ; the latter a curtain which deceived his rival and won the prize. The depression of Zeuxis was not dispelled by the friendly criticism of the birds ; " for," said he, " if my picture was really good, the sight of the boy carrying the basket should have frightened the birds away."

The first great historic lesson to be found in Greek art is that art was worship. It attempted to depict the gods ; it was used as an instrument in their honor. It passed by logical degrees to heroes and the representations of a rich mythology which delighted to personify the powers of nature in human form and action. It taught theology ; and it honored valor, whether of an Apollo, a Hercules, or an Alexander. It descended to the representation of existing customs and surrounding nature. It seems to have possessed its votaries ; they threw their whole lives into their art. What a history there is of enthusiasm deaf to pity in the veritable story that Parrhasius bought an aged Olynthian slave, and tortured him on the rack that he might adequately present the agonies of Prometheus,

> " The vulture at his vitals, and the links
> Of the lame Lemnian festering in his flesh."

They could use stratagems of imagination in their representations of men. "Polygnotus," says Aristotle, "painted men more beautiful than they are; but Pauson less so, and Dionysius painted them as they are."[1]

The passage from Greece to Rome is neither far nor difficult, for almost all the decorative art in ancient Rome, of which there are a few remains, is Greek.[2] Before the Tarquins the images and delineation of the gods were Etruscan handiwork; but when we come far down in the history, to the period so lately unveiled at Pompeii and Herculaneum, we find the wall paintings at least Greek in their origin. The celebrated Medea found on a wall in Pompeii is a fair copy of an earlier Grecian painting. The Cæsars had wealth and power, and they bought or captured their paintings.[3] Thus it was that in the dearth of Roman talent, and the few inducements to native effort, Grecian painters were employed in Italy, and collections of their works were made. Thrice conquered Rome had little time and small inclination to cultivate the arts.

The burial-places and catacombs were the rude cradle of Christian art, and, when Christianity was adopted as the imperial religion, a vast field was opened to sacred art, and was divided into the territories of the natural, the supernatural, and the symbolic. Thus, alike in its great verities and its frivolous errors, Christianity is wonderfully displayed in all its periods by pictorial art. Martyrs, saints, the Virgin, angels, even the persons of the ever-blessed Trinity, were subjects for the pencil; and whether in the rude paintings of the catacombs, the flat figures before the Renaissance, or the immortal works of that new birth, we are taught what men believed, or fancied they believed, as fully as by the formularies of doctrine and the rituals of worship. Take the most prominent subject of all, the yearning of men to find out what were the human form and lineaments of Christ. If the famous letter of Lentulus, an officer of Pontius Pilate, to the Roman Senate, describing His person

[1] Poetic. ch. ii.

[2] See an article by Tyrrwhitt on "Greek Art at Rome," Cont. Rev., Sept. 1877.

[3] Lübke, "History of Art," i., 200. I have used Bunnett's translation, London, 1868.

was a forgery, it is at least ancient and suggestive ; it is in accord with the visions of a meditative fancy.[1] "He is," says Farrar, who may be supposed to have combined and compared the representations—differing in detail but of the same general type—"a man of middle size . . . on whose face the purity and charm of youth are mingled with the thoughtfulness and dignity of manhood. His hair, which legend has compared to the color of wine, is parted in the middle of the forehead, and flows down over the neck. His features are paler and of a more Hellenic type than the weather-bronzed and olive-tinted faces of the hardy fishermen who are His apostles ; but though those features have been evidently marred by sorrow, yet no man whose soul has not been eaten away by sin and selfishness, can look unmoved and unawed on the divine expression of that calm and patient face."[2] But this pleasing summary is, after all, a judgment of fancies. The type even is a fancy. Irenæus, who lived in the second century, says indeed that pictures of Christ were common in his day, and he knew men who had seen the older apostles. The first portraits were marked by sadness ; later the representations assumed a lovelier and more cheerful aspect ; but in all there was a faint tradition of likeness, before, in the rapid progress of art, the thousand ideals of the Renaissance appeared, and presented the rapt fancy of many a meditative artist as he mused upon the Godhood in human form.

I must pass with the mere mention over the Romanesque period of painting—as of architecture—from the tenth to the thirteenth century, in which little of progress in art culture is found. Of the Gothic style which succeeded, it may be remarked, that while it reorganized architecture it injured and retarded the progress of painting. It took away wall-surfaces, and offered the poor equivalent of painting on glass for the decoration of the numerous tall windows.[3] There were illuminations ; there were mosaics ; there were, during that long and unprogressive period, the flat figures of Hagiology, without foreshortening or chiaroscuro, labelled for divinities and saints with a golden circlet around the head, in comparison with

[1] See Radcliffe's "Schools and Masters of Painting," 14.

[2] "The Life of Christ," ch. xxii.

[3] Lübke, "Hist. of Art," ii., 71.

which the Madonnas of Cimabue and Giotto, now so meagre, were the perfection of art.[1]

The art of this earlier period was eminently decorative, enamelled on copper or silver, or gilded wood; and the highest attainment was reached by Fra Angelico, who was sent for from his cloister by the Pope, and whose radiant angels, looking out from gilded panels, have been copied by tens of thousands, and sent all over the world. Thus before the Renaissance "declining ancient art became the garment in which the young and world-agitating ideas of Christianity were compelled to veil themselves. The new wine had to be put in the old bottles, till it burst asunder the decaying vessels, and issued forth in a new form of art as in a vessel appropriate to itself."[2] That new form was also a new birth—the Renaissance. The principal causes of the Renaissance have been already mentioned. After the violent intermixture of Roman civilization with German vigor, and during the dark ages, there seemed a hopeless and inextricable confusion; the light of letters and of art, shut up in cloisters, no longer shone upon the masses of men; but in reality the latent elements of European character and polity were in combination, ready, when the time should come, to burst upon the world in a new and beautiful order. For pictorial art that auspicious period was the sixteenth century. "What the age of Pericles was for sculpture the sixteenth century was for painting." Even the disasters of the Eastern empire, which culminated in the fall of Constantinople, sent a stream of Greek culture into the West, and gave a new impetus to art.

But the Renaissance, if it had depended on art alone, would have been greatly retarded. Patronage was needed, and that was not withheld. The family of the Medici, in Florence, whose munificence began with Cosmo, a merchant prince, patronized art and literature, and deserves most honorable mention in the history of the new culture. This is the chief glory

[1] "We cannot understand," says Radcliffe, "their popularity, till we contemplate a Byzantine Magdalene near them, standing like a hideous wooden doll, with vermilion-daubed cheeks, a gown of reddish brown, and explanatory scroll." "Schools and Masters of Painting." App. 489.

[2] Lübke, "Hist. of Art," i., 276.

of the grandson of Cosmo, Lorenzo, well called the Magnificent, whose second son, John, became Pope in 1513, with the title of Leo X. What a history of politics, religion, and art clusters around this name—the Reformation, the Renaissance, the splendid dome of St. Peter's at Rome! Popes, kings, and emperors caught the spirit, and immortal artists came flocking at their summons "like spirits from the vasty deep"—Leonardo, Raphael, Michael Angelo, Perugino, and Titian. We owe the origin of the Uffizi gallery in Florence to the Medici, and the busts of the family seem to make the claim and the announcement as they now stand to-day in the vestibule.[1]

From that day to this, Italy has been the chosen home of pictorial art, the custodian of its greatest treasures, the *alma parens* of its greatest masters, the place to which art-pilgrims resort, not only to admire its collections, but to imbibe the spirit of its mysteries. Study in Italy is a solemn initiation. "It is the clime of art, the temple of the sacrament of the material transfigured into the spiritual. . . . An ethereal stream of ideal sentiment seems to float over the land, and refract all perceptions, feelings, and objects into beautiful outlines and lines. It is a land where all is ruin, but where ruin itself is more splendid, more permanent, and more vital than the freshest perfections of other countries."[2]

The gorgeous and diversified nature of Italy gave rise first to individual enthusiasm, and then to many distinct schools. The beauties of Florence, the picturesque banks of the Arno, and the natural grace of the *contadini* inspired the fancy of Cimabue, of Giotto, of Leonardo, and Michael Angelo. Thus nature suggests *form* as the distinctive feature of the Florentine school, while Venice was the chosen studio of color, as displayed in the gorgeous tints of Titian, Tintoretto,[3] and Paul Veronese.[4] It could not have been otherwise with the Venetian school. "With her street pavement of liquid chrysoprase,

[1] Radcliffe, "Schools and Masters," 491.

[2] H. B. Wallace, "Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe."

[3] Jacopo Robusti, called Tintoretto, from the trade of his father, Il Tintoret—the dyer.

[4] Paolo Cagliari, of Verona, "mingled a silvery clearness with the amber, purple, and crimson of former Venetian colorists." Radcliffe, 215.

with her palaces of porphyry and marble, her frescoed façades, her quays and squares aglow with the brilliant costumes of the Levant, her lagoons afloat with the galleys of all nations, her churches floored with mosaics, her silvery domes, and ceilings glittering with sculptures bathed in molten gold," Venice was enveloped in a transparent atmosphere, with the sea or the flat plain for its only horizon. Tintoretto was called "The Thunderbolt of Painting," because of the vehemence and rapidity of his execution ; but his distinctive merit was that he brought the poetry of chiaroscuro to perfection in expressing moods of passion and emotion, by the study of Venetian models of humanity, placed in dashes of light, and luminous half-shadows, merging into opaque darkness. Thus from the study of color came that power of chiaroscuro which characterizes the school of Venice, and in which even the great Raphael was wanting. It soon became evident that a school must arise which should combine form and color to the prejudice of neither.

But, again, Italy had a grand treasure-house for art in the old mythology, with its fanciful pictures, its thousand warm and striking subjects for the pencil—Jupiter, Venus and Minerva, Mars, Diana and Actæon, Olympian glories and Hesperian gardens. Here the historic teaching is manifest. In the words of Froude, "mythological history, mythological theology, mythological science"—and he might have added, mythological art—"belong to a time when men had not yet learned to analyze their convictions or distinguish between images vividly present to their own minds and an outward reality which might or might not correspond with these."[1] The painters of the early Renaissance were men still groping in that gorgeous cloud-land.

But from mythology it was an easy step and a happy one to the Christian story, and in art as well as religion Rome soon usurped the moral dominion of Europe. The studies of mythology had been purely fanciful ; in Christian art the new and powerful element of reverence was introduced. It soon began to adorn the basilicas and churches, and to come to the support of the faith. Saints and martyrs without number reappeared upon earth ; angels descended from heaven ; Christ

[1] "Scientific Methods applied to History." Short studies. 2d series.

walked once more among men, was born, performed miracles, was transfigured, was crucified, was entombed, rose from the dead, and was enthroned in glory. In that wonderful picture of Leonardo, "The Last Supper," it is fancied that the heads of the apostles are from the men of his own time, but the face of the Lord, by a perfect study of chiaroscuro, radiates the light upon the groups, and claims the principal admiration of the beholder.[1] There is a story that the artist, having finished the rest, could not paint this; he found it one morning miraculously finished.

We cannot estimate too highly the talents, genius, and industry of the great men who represent the Renaissance of Christian art in Italy. Their chief glory is that they were original and individual. Thus there were isolated names before there were schools; men who dared to paint as their hearts and fancies dictated; to lead and instruct the world; to lift men up to their standards. It has been said of Michael Angelo that, in his "Last Judgment," "he renounced all traditionary forms of Christian art,"[2] and of Raphael, that "he traversed and exhausted the whole mental range of his time, and revealed, in an almost countless number of splendid works, that highest idea of the beautiful, which, as he himself said, ever floated before him."[3]

[1] "The details we must take upon faith; painted over in oils, and badly, it has peeled off, so that the visitor is not only disappointed but shocked. His first impulse is to wonder if it ever could have been a famous work of art. If he will patiently study it in sections, it requires no great effort of the fancy to restore the form—and it never could have depended much on color. Take, for example, the group of John, Peter, and Judas, on the right hand of Christ: nothing can be more masterly." See Lübke, "Hist. of Art," ii., 216.

[2] It is a curious comment upon the theological or rather biblical scholarship of his time, that he should have been misled into giving his magnificent statue of Moses, when he came down from the mount, a pair of horns. The explanation is very simple: the Hebrew verb קָרַן means, 1, *to strike, to push*, and, 2, *to emit rays*. Hence we have קֶרֶן *a horn*, which in the dual means *rays of light*. Our version is (Ex. 34 : 29), "the skin of his face shone," which accords with the Septuagint *δεδόξασται τὸ πρόσωπον αυτοῦ*. In the Vulgate it is absurdly rendered *cornuta erat*, and hence Michael Angelo, and other painters and sculptors of his day, have represented the great law-giver with horns.

[3] It was a beautiful thought to place the "Transfiguration" at the head of Raphael's catafalque when he died.

Such men compelled a world of admirers and imitators, for they spoke through their art to the quick, impulsive, and sensuous nature of their fellow-countrymen. There were impassioned pictures for their ardent fancy, and holy pictures for their religious moods ; and while the greater artists rose above the vulgar prejudices and common tastes, those of lower station were unconsciously affected by them. As a single example,—I have tried in vain, in the midst of my admiration, to pity a repentant sinner in the "Magdalene" of Correggio : I can only find a lovely woman, luxuriously reclining on the soft turf of a cave which the sunlight must visit, and reading an interesting story ; more covered, but not otherwise more refined than the "Venus of Titian crowned by Cupid." This may be harsh judgment, but let the reader examine the picture once more.[1]

The chronicler of art soon finds that with the great and independent masters there came hosts of disciples and imitators, and that these were segregated into schools, numerous, and distinguished by locality and characteristic. Thus, among many, the Florentine was the school of nature and form ; the Venetian that of color ; the Lombard, of expression ; those of Naples and Bologna, eclectic.[2]

The progress thus far in art cannot be better epitomized than in the formulary of Ruskin. The *fourteenth* century was the age of *thought*, and is represented by such men as Dante and Giotto ; the *fifteenth* was the age of *drawing*, and produced such men as Leonardo, Michael Angelo, Ghiberti, and Raphael, who worked in the succeeding age ; the *sixteenth* was emphatically the age of painting, illustrated by the former names, and also by those of Tintoretto, Paul Veronese, and Titian.

After that came the decline of painting in Italy, in the seventeenth century ; but when the school of nature, under Caravaggio and Salvator Rosa, was at its best, and about to cul-

[1] Mrs. Jameson speaks of the paramount idea of sensual beauty attributed to the Magdalene by the schools of Venice and Bologna ; and to the "licentiousness of sentment" of the French painters, the "air de galanterie," which suggests rather her former sinful condition than her penitence.—"Sacred and Legendary Art," i., 345.

[2] It should be remembered that art made rapid material progress from the introduction of oil as a vehicle for color, by John Van Eyck, in 1410.

minate, Italian art was reaching out into other countries and planting vigorous shoots from the decaying trunk. Thus, while it was impressing itself with great power upon Western Europe, that beautiful art of Italy which had begun with nature, and pressed on with untiring footstep through the worlds of mythology and Christian story, "had returned to nature to die." It is astonishing to observe the rapidity of its decline, the suddenness of its extinction. There is no illustrious name since. The galleries are filled with clever copyists and imitators; there is an art-atmosphere in Rome which attracts students, connoisseurs, and idlers; but Rome is by no means a great repository of art. The Vatican has, it is said, eleven thousand rooms, and two hundred staircases, but besides the *stanze* of Rafael in the entrance chamber only four salons are given to painting. The causes of this must be found in detail in the religious and political history of Rome and of Italy. The Renaissance was, indeed, in a period of turmoil, but the turmoil was the tramp and hum of a marvellous *progress;* the decadence in a long period of modern turmoil was in accord with political *decline.*

Italy still remains the same in her beautiful and inspiring nature, and in the soul of her children. A new, united Italy, prosperous after all the storms of centuries, must present new incentives to talent and industry. Who shall say that another Raphael may not come from some obscure Urbino to astonish Europe with a new Renaissance—a regeneration of Italy in art, as well as in political government? The patriot who looks around and finds little to achieve in the cause of liberty, now so triumphant, may turn his thoughts upon the prostrate condition of Italian art, and find a new and interesting field for his energies and his hopes, and a vigor of emulation to equal if not to exceed the other nations of the continent, which, owing the origin of their art to his own beautiful Italy, have left her far behind in their swift career.

Among the first recipients of the great boon of Italian art was France; and, according to the principle we have laid down, we find whatever it received soon remoulded and colored by the peculiarities of the French nature and atmosphere, and thus made an exponent of French history. We need not go back to

the tinsel altar-pieces of King Réné, the accomplished but frivolous monarch of Anjou, who was a patron of art ; nor even to the parchment miniatures of Jean Foucquet, court painter of Louis XI. The first demands for veritable art were made by French monarchs upon Italian artists, because there were no painters in France worthy of the new culture. French wars and royal oppression, acting upon a very mercurial people, had thus far been adverse to art. It is to the credit of Francis I. that he sent an autograph letter to Michael Angelo, under date of February 6th, 1546, for paintings with which to adorn his chapels ; and that he appreciated the merits and honored the person of Leonardo da Vinci with an intimacy which ended only with the death of the artist.[1] We may accept the reign of Francis as the period in which Italian art came into France. Of original efforts there were few worth the mention, until, nearly a century later, we come to the works of Nicolas Poussin, and Claude Gelée, known as Claude Lorraine, who happily turned their attention to landscape, and thus won a fame which would have been impossible had they attempted high art.[2] Of the two, Claude had the higher merit for developing landscape, which had always thus far been the weak point in Italian art ; and he had a worthy successor in LeBrun, the Rosa of France.

The progress of art in France was extremely slow. The genius of the painters and the taste of the French people did not take that direction, and does not now. Active, mercurial, eager for happiness, they delight in personal adornments, gilded interiors, open-air demonstrations. They erect lofty piles, and surround them with mathematical parterres and artificial mazes, in which splendid fountains glisten with rainbow hues. And this taste is always a key to their art ; it is objective and realistic in the extreme. These things must be depicted with

[1] There is a story, which some have doubted, that Leonardo died in the king's arms. It was so excellent an art fancy that Angelica Kaufman, who painted at the close of the last century, adopted it as the subject of one of her masterpieces. Lübke, ii., 219.

[2] Poussin did attempt a few works of historical composition, which are but little esteemed ; while his "Arcadian Shepherds" is specially valued for its landscape. There can be no doubt that these landscapes mark an epoch in European art of which the French have a right to be proud.

an illusive correctness, which pleases the French but earns no permanent European reputation. The name of Claude Joseph Vernet (1714–89) would hardly be known through his own works or those of his son Charles, but he is retained in grateful memory as the grandfather of the greatest of the modern artists of France, Horace Vernet,—no less a historian than an artist.

The pompous, artificial portraitures of royalty under the Bourbons, and until the revolution, have little merit except as biographic exponents of the days of atrocious grandeur—the glorification of Louis XIV., the debaucheries of the regent, and the leprous horrors of Louis XV. and the *Parc aux cerfs*.[1] And when the great retribution came there was little time or taste for art. The greatest name during the French revolution was that of Jacques Louis David, the conventionist,[2] whose stilted and hyper-artificial style may be seen in that impossible equestrian feat of Napoleon crossing the Alps, on a rearing charger, surrounded with snow, and treading upon slippery ice on the verge of a precipice! It is the farcical exponent of French art as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, and represents one phase at least of that French glory which inspired the excitable Frenchmen during the Napoleonic wars.[3]

I remember being struck, in the French salon of 1870, by a stratagem which was very successful, and which will serve as an illustration of the artificial character of French art in the latest day. The picture was one of a female figure, in rustic costume, sitting on a low wall of earth or stone; it was exquisitely painted, and deserved its label of "*hors concours*." The atmosphere behind the figure was of so brilliant a saffron yellow as almost to dazzle the eyes. It did more, and that the artist intended; it literally extinguished all the other paintings around

[1] The principal names during this period are Le Sueur, Le Brun, Mignard, Rigaud, Watteau, and Greuze: and although they are not without merit, the cursory reader will hardly recognize them as he goes over the list of world-renowned painters. If Le Sueur has indeed been called the French Raphael—it is certainly *longo intervallo*.

[2] He voted for the death of Louis XVI., who had been his kind patron.

[3] Notwithstanding the ancient armor and the antique costumes in his *Belisarius* and his *Leonidas at Thermopylæ*, "one must smile to perceive how far the French element outshines the Roman." Radcliffe, 532.

it to the distance of fifty feet on either side; and it ought to have been not only *hors concours* but *hors du salon.*

Since the downfall of Napoleon I. art has progressed rapidly; there have arisen several schools of correct draftsmen and brilliant colorists, whose works have hosts of critical admirers. I can only mention the most renowned. Horace Vernet, bold and fiery, as well as accurate, finds vent for his genius in battle pieces and wild Arab scenes[1]—such as the "Storming of Constantina," "The Lion Hunt in Algeria," "The Selling of Joseph by his Brethren," and, later, "Scenes from the Crimean War." Splendid in conception, minute in detail, they are theatrical and spectacular, but eminently historical—and French.

Paul de la Roche, more thoughtful and ideal, has corrected the error of David, by presenting Napoleon crossing the Alps, his mule led by a peasant guide, in accordance with the truthful description given by Thiers.[2] And when he would seek another subject in that great and stormy life, he took the scene of the abdication at Fontainebleau, in the little cabinet, where, huddled helplessly in his *fautcuil*, with his head upon his breast, the great emperor acknowledged to himself that the world, which he had done such marvellous deeds to win, was lost.

I have no space to refer to the sad and dark delineations of Gerome—the "Gladiators in the Arena," the "Consummatum est" of *Le Golgotha*, or to the exquisite *tableaux de genre* of Meissonier, or to the tender treatment of human flesh by Bougereau, or to the extreme finish in form and color of many modern artists.

In epitomizing the present condition of French art as it illustrates French nature, taste, and manners, I shall let a Frenchman be the judge and censor, by presenting the following extract from the *critique* of M. Houssaye upon the salon of 1877, in Paris:[3]

[1] In speaking of Vernet as an actual French historian, I refer to pictures which illustrate the scenes in the career of Louis Philippe and his sons,—in Algeria and Mexico, and his Crimean War pictures; his "Massacre of the Mamelukes" and his "Defence of Clichy" illustrate actual history.

[2] "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire."

[3] *Revue des Deux Mondes.* The salon is always a large exhibition of the finest and newest paintings, which excites the ambition and emulation of artists, and displays actual art at its best.

"It (the collection) is the same animal profusion of *tableaux de genre*, of landscapes and of portraits: it is the same procession, poor and meagre, of naked goddesses and unclothed women; the same theory of Bible and gospel types, which display less a cultivation of style for its own sake than of aspiration for the prizes of the salon, or for the first medal; the same grand scenes of history seen through the small end of the glass, conceived and treated in anecdotic fashion. Thus, as on former occasions, one is astonished at the skill of hand, at the power of execution of this ingenious spirit, but one deplores the absence of style, the poverty of conception, the ignoring of the grand and the beautiful. Superb promises which prepare us only for deceptions!"

He speaks also of the triple brass and heroic abnegations—qualities lacking in the French nature—requisite for a painter to spend two or three years on a historical painting, which may be praised and medalled, but will not sell, while in ten sittings he can make a portrait for which he can get twenty thousand francs. And yet French painting, artificial, unideal, but beautiful, in these latter days aptly illustrates the French character and the philosophy of French history.[1] Of Paul Gustave Doré, the illustrator of Dante, Cervantes, and Tennyson, it has been well said, that he is fantastic, imaginative, and sensational, and that it is "quite uncertain what place he will occupy in the estimation of posterity."

And now let us cross the channel, and look for a moment at the history of art in England. Its introduction was very late, and its development has been very slow. This condition of things has been due to many causes. The aristocracy looked down upon art as a profession; the people were ignorant and phlegmatic; the former would buy art with a quid-pro-quo, and the latter were indifferent to it. "A generation," says Tyrwhitt, "devoted entirely to money and politics cannot care at all for art." Something indeed must be allowed for the insular situation of Britain, which kept her from receiving the boon of Italian art as early and as fully as did the continental countries; but much of this indifference to art has certainly been due to the character and social conditions of the English

[1] It is but just to say that the Salon of 1878 was a great improvement upon that of the former year; many of the paintings were afterwards placed in the Exposition, where they had literally a world of admirers.

nation. So the earliest painters in Britain were foreigners. Henry VIII., it is said, invited Raphael and Titian to come to England, but was not successful in alluring them from the art-empire over which they ruled supreme in the South. Hans Holbein, who came to England in 1527, portrayed queens and court beauties, and, as we know, painted that flattered portrait of Anne of Cleves, which induced Henry to have her brought over, and then, much to his disgust, to marry her. It was a costly picture ; it changed the political situation ; it added one to the long list of Henry's crimes, and it cost Thomas Cromwell his head. Rubens was in England in 1629, and awakened some enthusiasm for painting. Vandyke, after two visits and two disappointments, was at last invited over by Charles I., who knighted him and gave him a pension ; and he painted so many portraits there that, though a foreigner, we always think of him as an English artist. Then came Peter Lely, from the Hague, who was knighted for his pictures, who was court painter to Charles I., Cromwell, and Charles II., and who has perpetuated in the galleries of Hampton Court the brazen charms of the frail beauties who formed the seraglio of the merry monarch. Of Godfrey Kneller, who was the son of an architect of Lübeck, it is recorded that he painted nine kings and queens during the reigns of Charles II., James II., William and Mary, and George I.

So far, nearly to the close of the seventeenth century, there were no English artists ; but after that an English school of art sprang rapidly into vigorous existence, as if from nothing. Beautiful art had conquered national phlegm and prejudice. The good work began with Sir James Thornhill, the immediate predecessor of Hogarth and Reynolds. Hogarth was a satirist and reformer rather than a great painter. No doubt through his means rakes were reclaimed, prostitution checked, idle apprentices rendered industrious, and marriages not made quite so much *à la mode*. He was, too, in the true sense a *historical* painter ; he shows us the curious social customs, the abuses, the bad manners, the enormous wrongs of the period, and in these his works have a permanent value to the student of history, but a great painter he certainly is not.

And of Sir Joshua Reynolds, so accurate in likenesses, so

admirable in coloring, it must be observed that he was in the main a painter of portraits, whose well-earned fame, as the greatest English artist of his day, shows how little had been achieved in England, when compared with the masterpieces of Italian art, which were already nearly two centuries old.[1]

To my mind it is significant of the poverty of English art, until the beginning of the eighteenth century, that a humble lad, born in Chester County, Pennsylvania, in 1738, among Quakers, with little instruction, and not much genius, should have found his way to London, and risen, by great industry and judgment, to the presidency of the Royal Academy. The career of Benjamin West is a commentary on English painting. There was no high art before; he undertook to inaugurate it, and although there is some merit in his "Death of Wolfe," the English world and his patrons were certainly willing "to take the will for the deed."[2]

Gainsborough, who died in 1789, may be considered the father of English landscape painting; but still art in England was chiefly in portraits, and the taste of the beginning of the nineteenth century may be seen in the demand for the theatrical and ideal pictures of Sir Thomas Lawrence, whose subjects all seem to belong to one family, and that family proud of its blue blood and its waving hair.

But now a great progress was manifest, and the later history is one of activity, earnestness, and great success. The very qualities which retarded art in the beginning have aided it at last; a pertinacity of opposition has slowly given place to a pertinacity of support; and art critics like Ruskin and Eastlake, who make it the study of their lives, have proposed rigorous standards, and elevated their subject with its votaries. In no country is the future of art more promising than in Eng-

[1] His greatest work is "Mrs. Siddons as the Tragic Muse," and the historic lesson it will teach is the great revival of the drama. The president of the Royal Academy "could not resist the opportunity of sending his name down to posterity on the hem of her garment."

[2] When Sir Joshua Reynolds declared that "The Death of Wolfe" would occasion a revolution in art, he was misled by the simple fact that the artist had painted an epic picture, in the costume of the day and with the real circumstances, instead of in the clumsy armor and impossible grouping of the classic times, to which poor Haydon returned to his cost.

land, and easy communication with continental schools and collections gives to the English student all the advantages which the world can bestow.

Of the later English artists it is not the time to speak ; time must elapse before we can see what they have achieved towards the solution of the great problem ; they are still too much the subjects of controversy : the original fancies and gaudy colors of Turner ; the return to finished detail of the pre-Raphaelites —what Old South used to call in speaking of sermons, "the painfulness" of their painting ;[1] the rural and *genre* scenes of Wilkie ; and the figure-teeming canvas of William Frith, and many others.

Much has been said of *high art*, and this term has been confounded with *historical painting*. The mistake has led to evil consequences for art and artists. The two phrases are by no means synonymous ; it is only incidentally that they approach each other. We have seen how Haydon was ambitious to teach the English people high art, and how he committed suicide because they would not learn it. True historical art is not simply cognizant of classic subjects, or of great events in some antecedent period ; it is best represented by a faithful rendering of the men and manners of our own time, or that "touch of nature" in depicting the old, which in all periods "makes the whole world kin."[2] This is the only historical art which is of value to the student of history. "It falls or rises," says Ruskin, "in changeful eminence from Dutch trivialities to a Velazquez portrait, just as historical writing varies in emi-

[1] Not simply in their finish with the pencil ; but in their careful study of detail. Holman Hunt went to Jerusalem to find models for his Hebrews, and was somewhat thwarted because the people, who thought his pictures were to be hung up and worshipped, were unwilling to sit to him. He encamped for a fortnight at the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, at an unhealthy season, to paint the color and atmosphere of the Moab mountains for his picture of the "Scape Goat in the Wilderness." His full moon in "The Light of the World," and his "Shadow of the Cross," are happy *stratagems*.

[2] It is this natural sympathy which is enkindled by the "Virgin Martyr" of Gabriel Max, whose upturned face, even when the wild beasts are gathering around her, seeks the friendly hand which has thrown a rose at her feet. This picture is in the possession of a lady in New York, who includes among her many unobtrusive charities the patronage of art, not only in the collection of paintings, but in a provision for art-instruction.

nence from an old woman's story-telling up to Herodotus." In accordance with this principle Hogarth was far more an historical painter than Haydon ; so was Wilkie ; Chantrey was an historical artist. The great Raphael, when he represents, in his cartoon of "Christ Appearing to his Disciples on the Lake of Galilee," the followers of the Lord with curly locks and long robes with fringes, is not a historical painter at all. The fishermen were really wet, sea-stained, unkempt, half-naked ; and not a college of splendid cardinals. It is not wonderful that the early reformers were inclined to reject all art as related to religion, because "high art" was in so many cases spurious and misleading ; not at all historical in the real meaning of the term.

From this digression in speaking of English art, I return to mention one painter who has lately passed away, and who seems to me to have an individuality of power and excellence. He has been compared to Rosa Bonheur ; but while hers are perfect representations of "dumb, driven cattle," his pictures are full of sentiment and moral teaching. If the days of Æsop should ever return, "Dignity" will confer with "Impudence ;" the animals will hold a council, with the lion in the chair, and decree a golden crown to Sir Edwin Landseer. A man of original genius and tender heart, his animals think and reason, and claim our sympathy as if they were human beings ; his pictures are heroic, and never mock-heroic ; and they range in variety through the forms of lambs and mastiffs, lions of the tropics and polar bears, gibbering apes and hunted stags, whose tears almost compel our own.

The limits of this paper forbid my consideration of the historic teachings of art in Germany and the Low Countries, subjects which deserve and repay a curious and careful study, but which cannot be disposed of in a current page or two. They must be left for future consideration.

I shall close with the mention of an art school neither so pretentious nor progressive as those of Flanders, France, or Italy, but yet very curious, rich, varied, and individual—I mean the Spanish school. In comparison with the never-ceasing crowds which visit the galleries of Italy, France, and Germany, few Americans find their way to the *Museo* at Madrid, or the

galleries of Seville, where Spanish art is to be seen in its glory.[1] The former is one of the most famous galleries in the world.

As to the origin of art in Spain, we may pass by the arabesques of Granada and Seville, the paintings on parchment in the courts of the Alhambra, which represent the chivalry of the Moors and Christians, and the decline of Moslem faith.[2] The materials and the original handling in art came to Spain from Italy at the Renaissance ; but the personality—in artist and subject—was not borrowed ; it was found in Spain. The earliest paintings were imitations of the Italian ; but art was soon bound by a threefold cord to the Peninsula—*the church, royalty, and Spanish provincial life* (*cosas de España*).

The power of the church is everywhere apparent in the sacred subjects—Virgin, saints, miracles—of Murillo, Ribera (Spagnoletto), Alonzo Cano, and a host of others. The same power that controlled art instructed the hearts of the people to call for and admire such subjects. The artist was himself devout ; he had or affected to have trances and visions.[3] The Virgin appeared to one who was painting her similitude, and told him just how to arrange her dress ! This reverence engendered an extreme prudery in delineation. "No loosely-robed madonnas and unclad Magdalenes were allowed to profane the public eye."[4] To Spanish artists the Virgin had no feet ; they were always covered.[5] To their exalted fancy she was not a woman, but a goddess ; they liked to depict her with the grand accessories of the mystical woman of the Revelation :[6]

[1] In the *Museo* there are sixty-five pictures by Velazquez ; forty-six by Murillo ; fifty-eight by Ribera, and eight by Alonzo Cano, while the Murillo gallery at Seville is a great treasure-house of that master's works.

[2] The Mohammedans were forbidden to represent the forms of men and animals by the Koran ; and for a long time their zeal for the faith led to exact obedience.

[3] In some this reverence was Pharisaic : Alonzo Cano would not receive the Sacrament from a priest who habitually confessed Jews ; and when dying he would kiss only a very handsome crucifix.

[4] Radcliffe, 337.

[5] The reader will recall the story of a Queen of Spain, who in a royal progress passed through a town where there was a stocking factory ; the simple people sent her some stockings ; they were returned with the answer that the Queen of Spain had no legs.

[6] Rev. xii. 1.

"Clothed with the sun, and in her train the moon,
And on her head a coronet of stars,
And, circling round her waist with heavenly grace,
The bow of mercy bright, and in her hand
Emmanuel's cross, her sceptre and her hope."

Strange to say, with this curious ideality many Spanish artists were very realistic. Those who have travelled in Spain will remember Alonzo Cano's picture of a dead bishop, robed and mitred, but rotting away in the charnel-house. The criticism is good, whether the story be true or not, that when Murillo went to see it, and was asked his opinion of it, he simply held his nose.[1]

The greatest name in Spanish art, and that which is specially illustrative of the influence of the church, is the name of Murillo. He is a church painter, but he is always a Spaniard. His Virgins, modelled from the women around him, are dark-haired, essentially national, and representing the better class of Spanish muchachas. He is more easily studied than any other truly great artist in his three distinct styles—the *frio*, the *calido*, and the *vaporoso*. In the first, his beggars and peasants are for the most part painted; in the second, his *visions* are warmly depicted, and in the third he presents his aerial (vaporous) figures, rising, or poised in air, as if in their native element. Such are the "Immaculate Conception" of the Louvre, and the "St. John the Baptist." But in the latter his realistic tendency is displayed, in that his saint is but a sublimation of the peasant type, a glorified *muchacho* of provincial Spain.[2]

It may be said that all Spanish painters have acknowledged the influence of the church; but of those who have painted at the instance of *royalty*, and to perpetuate the kingly prerogative and prestige, Diego Velazquez is the most prominent representative. Murillo was a plebeian; Velazquez was a gentleman of blue blood; and, while more at home in the palace, he

[1] The painting is in the hospital of La Caridad, in Seville: the modern beholder instinctively imitates Murillo.

[2] We are reminded of the wise saws of honest Sancho as we look upon this picture: "Clothe me as you will," said Sancho to the Duke, "I shall still be Sancho Panza;" and again: "Clothe the boy so that he may look not like what he is, but what he may be."

had the rare merit of being extremely truthful; he would not flatter his princely subjects, and the historian must thank him for delineating them just as they were, and as they lived. He painted a few sacred subjects; but, says Ford, "he went to the earth and not to heaven for types and models; hence his Virgin has neither the womanly tenderness of Murillo, the unspotted loveliness of Raphael, or the serenity unruffled by human passions of the antique; he rather lowered heaven to earth, than raised earth to heaven." [1]

Thus we have his "Philip on Horseback;" his equestrian portrait of "Isabella de Bourbon;" his "Prince Carlos on a Chestnut Pony;" his "Count Duke of Olivares," and his famous "Surrender of Breda" (1625). He was an accurate, if unconscious, chronicler of his own period, a historical painter in the best sense of the phrase; and lest he should be wanting as a patriot, he has left us some remarkable landscapes, among which is his "Gardens of Aranjuez."

In speaking of the third potent influence over Spanish art, provincial life and customs, we must return to Murillo and the school which he originated. Here we have the peasants, the groups of ragged but contented boys seated on the ground eating fruit, and playing their simple games—persons and scenes which every traveller verifies as he wanders through the enchanted land of Southern Spain—a land which retains its primitive life while all the world is changing, a land

> "In which it always seemed afternoon,
> A land where all things always seemed the same;" [2]

the only land where the traveller really forgets his home.

In all its varieties Spanish art excites a peculiar enthusiasm, from its unlikeness to other schools, and from the great originality of its masters, "whose works bear the impress of the individual mind of those great Spaniards who borrowed nothing from the past or foreign art, nothing from Apelles or Raphael,

[1] Hand-book for Spain, ii., 690. He adds: "Look, however, at his 'Crucifixion'—a sublime representation of the death of the Son of Man; the treatment is solemn and impressive. How fine the darkness over the face of the earth, and the partial concealment of the face by dishevelled and scattered hair."

[2] Tennyson, "The Lotos-eaters."

from Greece or Italy. . . . They drew, with a local color, subjects which were in correspondence with the national eye and mind ; while the *mens divinior* of Murillo and the pith and savor of manhood of Velazquez imparted to the commonest subjects their own freshness and fire, as Pygmalion, in that beautiful myth, breathed life into a stone."[1] The women of Seville saw themselves while they worshipped the holy faith of SS. Justa and Rufina on the canvas of Murillo.[2]

If Spanish paintings have suffered from conquest, their purloining by the French gave them that public recognition which they could never have had in the cloistered peninsula. Napoleon Bonaparte had set the example of plundering captured capitals, and sending pictures and statues to enrich the Parisian galleries ; and his marshals were not slow to imitate him. Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia, is especially notorious for his rapacity in this respect. He carried off that famous "Immaculate Conception" which adorns the *salon carré* of the Louvre, and which was purchased by the French government at the sale of his effects, in 1852, for six hundred and fifteen thousand three hundred francs.[3] The "Birth of the Virgin" and the "Repose in Egypt" were concealed from his search ; but a traitor gave him information, and he sent to *beg* them from the owners ; the petition meant command. Of another Murillo a story is told which credits him with a grim humor : "The worthy marshal one day, showing Colonel Gurwood his collection at Paris, stopped opposite a Murillo, and said, 'I very much value that specimen, as it saved the lives of two very estimable persons.' An aide-de-camp whispered, 'He threatened to have both shot on the spot unless they gave up the picture.'"[4]

The contest between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, and the later supremacy of the latter house, have been unfavorable to art in Spain, and since then no Spanish artist of great name has appeared except Francisco Goya, who has been called the Spanish Hogarth. Spain lies fallow in arts, in literature, and in arms ; when will her day of awakening come ?

[1] Ford, ii., 673.

[2] "Patron Saints of Seville." Murillo has painted them as *muchachas*, Spanish girls of the lower class. Mrs. Jameson, "Sacred and Legendary Art," ii., 677.

[3] Galignani, Paris, 178.

[4] Ford, i., 180.

Of American art it is not my purpose to speak. If art is indeed the chronicler and interpreter of history, what a rich field lies before the American painter, soliciting his labors and promising the richest rewards. In its very infancy our art is abundant and enthusiastic ; its inspiration is to be found not in grand galleries containing the treasures of former periods,—for our collections are still exceedingly meagre in comparison with those of older nations,—but in the great extent and variety of our country—in climate, natural scenery, and the types of mankind. The American artist should abandon madonnas and saints, Italian brigands and Alpine passes. Let him take home themes more varied, more picturesque, and more magnificent than all Europe can offer him. Of human personality he has the New Englander of the North, the Knickerbocker of New York, the cavalier of Virginia, the Quaker of Pennsylvania, the Huguenot of South Carolina, the creole of New Orleans, the Russian of Alaska, the Spanish Indian of New Mexico, the "dialectic" heroes of Bret Harte and Mark Twain and John Hay : the manumitted negro ; last and least, the fast-vanishing aborigines, who wither in the noonday of our civilization like forest flowers before the sun. And each has his thrilling story, fresher and truer than the traditionary legends among which the early art of Europe found its subjects and its tone.

And for the landscape school what a world of beauty presents itself ! The snows of the North ; the grandiflora of the South ; the great cataract ; the Father of Rivers ; marine views on a double coast ranging almost from the frozen zone to the tropics ; the lofty precipices and the tall trees of California ; the marvellous jumble of the Yellowstone, and the gigantic spurs of the Rocky Mountains. With these let the painter portray the incidents and events in our unexampled progress, and then let a liberal government place the best of such works in *a great national gallery*, provided, filled, and maintained at the public expense ; and what a history of our country would be displayed upon the canvas, not only supplementary to the written records, but more truthful, more valuable, more intelligible than the written records themselves !

We have seen that the patronage of art at the Renaissance was necessary to its progress. It may be added that in the long

run patronage is an injury to national manliness. From that time to this, art has been an honorable, but frequently needy solicitor, and the artist is under the control of the rich and noble, who buy his talent, and appear as his benefactors! Such should never be the case in America; it is the artist who should play the part of benefactor, who should speak, as some are already doing, not of their *patrons*, but of their *clients*. Individual patronage, however necessary it may be, is not often beneficial, but the government patronage which I propose would open to talent an honorable emulation, to rank among the historiographers of America.

I cannot believe that this is a visionary project; I look with a sincere hope to see it carried out; we are still near enough to our origin to do this in the most effective manner.

In view of European art in its great museums, so easily accessible to-day to all our students of art, who can live among them quite as frugally as at home; in view of the excellence attained in material and methods, the young American who is ambitious of fame in painting may place in his standard the words of Goldsmith's "Traveller":

> "For me your tributary stores combine:
> Creation's heir, the world, the world is mine!

And as he looks at home, upon his inheritance of beauty and progress, he may exclaim, in the words of "The Pilgrim's Vision" of Holmes:

> "I see the living tide roll on;
> It crowns with flaming towers
> The icy capes of Labrador,
> The Spaniard's 'land of flowers!'
> It streams beyond the splintered ridge
> That parts the northern showers;
> From eastern rock to sunset wave
> The continent is ours!"

HENRY COPPÉE.

RELIGION AND MORALITY.

RELIGION and morality are not proper complementaries of each other. They do not lie side by side in the same plane, so as together to make up a larger, more comprehensive field of truth. They are not presented from the same point of view—are not determined by the same principle of logical division. Accordingly, in strictness of thought, religion cannot safely be viewed as supplementing morality, nor morality, on the other hand, as supplementing religion, either speculatively or practically.

Nor, again, are they correctly regarded either one as germs of the other, in the sense either that morality is but the outgrowth and fruit of religion, or religion the normal development of morality. However helpful the one to the other, however closely allied, this is not the exact relationship that subsists between them—that one is the natural source and ground and the other the proper outcome and result. A true and perfect religion cannot be based on a merely moral system, nor can a complete moral structure be built upon religion. Logically they do not stand in that relationship to each other.

Much less are religion and morality identical. As Wuttke well observes, under this treatment the one is reduced to the other, and morality is entirely merged into religion as in mysticism, or religion into morality as in the "illuminism" of the last century. The general interpretations of experience ("Christian Ethics," § 55) as expressed in language have so differenced religion from morality, that to represent the laws and

phases of the one in the terms of the other involves unavoidable contradiction and bewilderment.

These broad denials, without argument, of certain views more or less prevalent are presented as simply introductory to our endeavor to ascertain more precisely and exactly the essential character of religion on the one hand and of morality on the other, and the true relationship that subsists between them. Our method is indicated in the following propositions, which will be considered in order :

First. Religion and morality have much in common.

Secondly. They differ in important characteristics.

Thirdly. They cannot safely be divorced.

Fourthly. The conflicts that may arise between them admit of solution ; and,

Fifthly. In any comparison as to their relative authority and importance to man the precedence must be given to religion.

I. In the first place, religion and morality in several most important respects, are at one. They have thus, first, their seat and ground in a rational nature—a proper personality ; secondly, the essential characteristic of both alike is a constraining force acting out from and upon this rational nature ; thirdly, they both derive this constraining force alike solely from God ; and, fourthly, their spheres are coincident.

1. Religion and morals alike presuppose and also characterize a proper rational nature. This proposition, in this bald form of statement, would probably be questioned by none ; and yet a wide opinion and a corresponding practice contradict or ignore it. A religion and a morality of the highest type certainly cannot be supposed, except as in beings endowed with reason ; and in reason are necessarily embraced the several functions of sense, thought, and free choice, acting indeed in varying degrees of predominance in different rational acts, yet in fact never dissociated. In truth, we can have no adequate conception of an act of proper reason except as put forth in the common exertion of these three functions, and the concurrent exercise of the three satisfies our notions of reason. That is an arbitrary definition of reason which limits it to denote merely a specific, although the highest, form of the in-

telligence. Such a definition may satisfy a theory, but does not satisfy the demands of the great *norma loquendi*—general use. A rational act without sense or without freedom, however intelligent, is in the common apprehension of men as inconceivable as active lungs in human body without blood or muscle. Rationality—reason—can be conceived only of an active being that in its activity must have an object given to it, and therefore apprehended by it, in the sense and retained in the imagination, and must also intelligently and freely direct its action towards that object; that, in other words, must act aimingly, or with sympathetic, intelligent, and free design. All right notions of religion and equally of morality presuppose this unity of agent in the concurrent exercise of these several co-ordinate functions. To leave out of our notion of an act of reason or unduly to degrade or subordinate in that notion either of these constituents—receptive and retaining sense of object, intelligence of its essence and relations to the activity, and determination of activity towards it—is logically unsound and practically harmful.

Now there are notions widely prevalent in different circles which directly conflict with these representations of religion and morality as essentially rational—ever outworkings of a proper rational nature, that as one and single can act only as an entirety in the concurrent exercise of sense, thought, and freedom. There is a conception of religion, found elsewhere, but particularly put forth with a kind of authority by a certain class of thinkers, which makes it a mere matter of feeling, sentiment, emotion. Some of these men would satisfy the religious instinct, which they cannot but recognize as an endowment of the soul of man, with the conscience as its proper object—would deify nature and so make religion identical with "cosmic emotion;" while others exalt religious emotion—emotion towards God, or even a simple form of religious emotion, as for instance the sentiment of reverence, into the one essential characteristic of religion. So that to feel reverent, even although blindly or by spontaneous, unconsenting constraint, before the majesty of God, to worship before him or any specific manifestation of his greatness, is to meet all the requirements of religion. This conception, in either form, indeed, separates

religion from morals, as a sentiment is separated from action. With life and conduct such a merely emotional religion has little to do. If the whole of religion is contained in the simple feeling of reverence awakened in proper degree as objects great and high now and then address it, morality need not concern itself with it—*de minimis lex non curat.*

So, on the other hand, there is a conception of morality which excludes sympathy and wellnigh, too, a consenting will. To be moral is simply to move with cool mechanical accuracy and regularity along the track of an intelligently prescribed honesty and uprightness, swerving neither to the right hand nor to the left of an exact, evenhanded rectitude. The relief of obtrusive want, ministry to innocent distress, charity at home, focusing on self and then waning away in ever rapidly fading beams on receding kinship or neighborhood, bearing pain and letting others bear it with Stoic equanimity and indifference—this is morality, as some are prone to view it. Such morality is as far as possible removed from religion ; it regards neither God nor man as beings between whom any sympathy is to be allowed or loving affection interchanged.

These conceptions of religion and morality, making religion predominantly and characteristically a matter of feeling and morality a matter of frigid rectitude, have led to the supposition that there is a true logical opposition between the two—an opposition that, resting on a common basis of mental activity, distinguishes the one as determined by feeling from the other as characterized by intelligence—that they are proper complementaries of each other, forming complementary types or species of character. We find exemplifications of the practical influence of these defective notions, perhaps held wellnigh unconsciously, everywhere around us : religion characterized as mere feeling—it may be gratitude, trust, or other sentiment as well as reverence or even mere sympathy on the one hand ; and on the other morality that is purely judicial, repudiating alike passion and conscious freedom as necessarily perverting and defiling and comparing the direct and pure and authoritative decisions of conscience. The same man, indeed, thus opposing religion and morality to each other, assigning them separate co-ordinate spheres of manifestation, may be as a

religious man a very enthusiast in his reverential homage, his grateful thanksgivings, his confiding prayers, his proper sympathetic religious life, and be at the same time the most punctilious as well as the most discriminating and impartial observer of all the moralities of life, while yet keeping the two spheres entirely apart, excluding all morality from his religion and all religion from his morality. His life is necessarily a zigzag, driven at one time by one principle in this direction, and at another by a different motive in that; and his character is correspondingly unsymmetrical and defective.

This illogical opposition shows itself in speculation in the so-called contest between reason and faith. To oppose religion as grounded in faith and as essentially characterized by this element to morality as founded in pure reason, is at bottom to oppose a specific function of a rational nature to the comprehensive nature itself, since a feeling is nothing other than a rational exercise, and can be conceived to be irrational only as it is imperfect in degree or in direction upon object; and reason enjoins perfection in both regards. There can neither be faith without reason—that is, outside of a rational nature; nor, on the other hand, can there be reason without faith: for faith, which is but a mental act denominated from its sense-side, implies an object given from without and impressing the sensibility, and thus engaging the intelligence and the free will; and reason equally implies some object presented to it which it can receive only through the sensibility, and in this way exert upon it its functions of intelligence and free activity. The psychological error in separating the imagination or the faculty of form, by which the mind holds up the impressions made upon it, re-shaped and colored out of its own stored-up material, for its own contemplation and re-impression or for impression on other minds—in separating the active from the passive side of the same function—the proper sensibility, and the philosophical delusion of the ability of a finite reason to create out of itself, without experience determined from without, ideas and systems of thought and of conduct—to create even philosophy, a morality, a religion of pure reason—have conspired to prevent the discernment of the true relation between faith and reason, and to occasion the irrational supposi-

tion that there may be a real conflict between the two, between legitimate feeling and conviction, between morality and religion. In the light of the grand fundamental truth, as unquestionable as comprehensive, that for a finite being, as, on the one hand, there must be of necessity for every feeling an object which awakens and to its due relative degree determines it in form and intensity, and for all continued and intensified feeling a continued re-impression of the object upon the sensibility by the imagination as the one faculty of form, and as by the organic unity of the soul this feeling must be characterized more or less by intelligence and free will, and therefore can never be other than rational in nature, however imperfect in any respect of degree or direction; so, on the other hand, there is equal necessity in order to any intelligence or choice, that there be given an object on which reason is to act in thought or in purpose, and that object must be introduced to reason, to rational thought and choice, through the capacity or faculty of feeling—the proper sensibility or the imagination. Hence it follows with necessary conclusiveness that faith and reason cannot in legitimate exercise be in opposition or conflict, any more than one function in normal exercise be in conflict with another function or with the entire organic life. They are outgoings of the same rational nature, differing only in kind or degree of specific function. Faith directly regards the object presented to the sense and apprehended by it; reason indirectly implies this object thus presented and apprehended as a necessary precedent condition to its action. A rational religion without a God thus presented and apprehended, that constructs its God out of principles or ideas into which a real God has not been introduced in some way of actual experience, is a phantom, a nullity. Reason can never reach the divine except through faith—through the reception and acceptance of some manifestation of God.

It is accordingly in a very special sense only that we can represent on the one hand religion as grounded upon faith, and on the other morality as grounded upon reason, and by no means in that absolute sense which implies a radical diversity, and so a possible antagonism, between them. Were we even to suppose religion to be mere emotion or sentiment, they

could not be thus placed in fundamental antagonism, since emotion necessarily engages intelligence, while freedom and morality presuppose objects of moral action which first introduce themselves to the moral nature through the emotional. There may be variation in the degree of predominance in a given mental act of the several functions of the soul; so far there may be contrast or opposition; so far an act of feeling differs from one of thought or choice; faith from reason; religion from morality. But each alike supposes at bottom the same one organic nature—a soul that ever feels when it thinks and when it chooses, and thinks and chooses when it feels; acts ever feelingly, intelligently, and freely in every act; that believes whenever it reasons and reasons whenever it believes; is religious when it is moral and moral when it is religious. The rational soul is essentially and pervasively emotional, intelligent, and free, believing and determining, religious and moral.

The grand truth thus to be carefully recognized in theory and conduct is, that religion and morality belong alike to the rational nature—to the proper personality, in the sense that every such nature must be both religious and moral, and can never in any expression of itself lay aside either attribute, any more than the animal nature can in its actual living expression forego its breathing or its pulse. To be rational for man is to be reverent and devout, loving and trusting, as it is to be upright and courteous and respectful towards all rational beings alike in their due degree and relation—towards God and equally towards man. A rational nature, we repeat, cannot but be, ever and always, both religious and moral.

2. Religion and morality agree in asserting each for itself an absolute sovereignty and rule over the whole personal life and conduct. There is alike in every human soul a true natural instinct of piety and equally so a true instinct of duty. These instincts are universally recognized—at least, are not questioned—by any authority worthy of consideration, while human history attests their existence on every page. They are of the nature of a constraining, obliging, as well as directive and guiding force, so as to impart a proper law over the soul—an actual imperative—impelling to acts of piety and

equally to acts of duty. They are, each in its respective way and manner, supreme and absolute, in the sense that, on the one hand, the dictates of true piety and, on the other, the dictates of duty are the highest law and exert a natural and underived authority—an authority as absolute and independent as it is possible to conceive in a finite created being. This ruling force, moreover, is seated in the rational nature, in the personality, and is inseparable from it. It cannot be conceived except as pertaining to such a nature ; nor can such a nature be conceived without this constraining force. We shall hereafter see that this sovereignty both of religion and of morality is not a divided, conflicting sovereignty in principle or spirit, in source or aim, and can be so, if at all, only through imperfect interpretation or application in specific acts of life and conduct.

3. Religion and morality, once more, agree in having their ground and sanction alike originally in God. The proof of this statement is demonstrative on the assumption of the fact of the religious and moral nature in man. And of this fact there certainly can be no question. It were as preposterous to question it as to question the fact that man thinks and also breathes. Experience, consciousness, observation, history, language, law, alike attest the fact that men are both religious and moral. Religion and rights are the two greatest factors of human history. It is equally incontestable that these religious and moral attributes appertain to the instinctive nature of man. They are not imbibed, they are not acquired from without ; they are developed from within out of native germs. They are the endowments with which the soul has been furnished, or rather the very constituents out of which the soul has been fashioned ; its essential elements, which its creator has determined to it. As the soul is his handiwork, its capabilities, its tendencies, its instincts, are the expression of his will as to what it should be and what it should effect ; they are his law to its action. The law of piety and the law of duty are alike thus his law, in the sense that they are the natural outcome and result of his fashioning and designing work. They are thus grounded in his creative will, as they are conditioned in their working by his disposing providence. They have accordingly

both alike his sanction. Their authority—underived from any creature, and so above all the forces of external nature, absolute, independent, as respects them—springs as creature from the creative act, from God who has made man alike a religious and a moral being. It is derived from him as this religious and moral nature is derived from his creative power, but is supreme and absolute in the sense that man can know no higher law. Even the new and positive law which the sovereign creator may be pleased to promulgate that is undiscoverable by the unaided reason of man, and that is not possibly derivable from his original and proper nature, must be not merely in harmony with this instinctive law, but in support and guidance and development of it ; can never be subversive of it or contradictory to it. Such subversion and contradiction would prove at once that such new law was not from the same all-wise and all-perfect God. The supposition of any such revelation subverting his own law in creating man is preposterous ; it arrays perfect wisdom against perfect wisdom, and is contradictory to clearest reason.

4. The spheres of religion and morality are exactly coincident, whether subjectively or objectively determined. The moral nature and the religious nature are, as already indicated, both conterminous with the rational nature ; they must therefore be coincident. So far as man is susceptible to impression from external object ; so far as he is intelligent so as to apprehend the object in its essence and relations and his own capabilities in reference to it ; so far, moreover, as he is free to determine his own activity—he is certainly moral. And this capability of moral activity reaches to God as well as to other objects. No sound conception of morality can exclude from its sphere the highest, nearest, most engaging of all objects ; since the moral nature must necessarily go out to him as fit object equally with other objects, if indeed God, as we may here lawfully assume, have himself a moral, that is a truly rational, nature—be susceptible, intelligent, free. If God be conceived to be something else than a moral person in this sense ; be, for instance, an inconceivable thing, an incomprehensible and unthinkable absolute—a most preposterous and self-contradictory conception—or be a mere power that, while

"making for righteousness" or for blessedness or any other end, is yet destitute of all sympathy, all wisdom, all self-determination in sympathy and wisdom; or, further, be a mere stock or stone or force of nature—then, indeed, morality has nothing to do with him; the moral can interact only with the moral, and there can be no morality when there is not interaction between the moral subject and the moral object. This is a first truth in ethical science. But if there be evidence of any power or force in the sphere which men as moral beings occupy, there is equal evidence that that power or force is in communion with other objects in the same sphere so as to be impressible by them and reciprocally to impress them—is sympathetic; is also intelligent, discerning ends and means, moving in orderly ways; and moreover is autonomous, undetermined by external agency of any kind; for that power or force in nature manifests itself in these rational ways everywhere, and only in these ways. Science may in logical abstraction separate for purposes of thought or knowledge the power or force in nature from these essential attributes, these attributes of reciprocal impressibility between its manifold parts, of orderly relationship between these parts, and of absolute sovereignty; but it cannot conceive of it as a concrete reality, as an actual substance, except as thus characterized, for the simple reason that it can know the existence and working of this force only as it is manifested through and with these characteristics. Morality, therefore, if the term be meant to include the entire capability of the moral nature in relation to all great objects of its activity, must respect God as well as all created moral beings.

So, on the other hand, the religious nature must respect God in the fulness of his true character and relations. Inasmuch as a foremost attribute of the divine being is that of creator and ruler, the religion that truly and fully embraces God in its scope must embrace his works as they express his perfections and will, and must recognize him in every moral creation of his; it cannot terminate in his pure being. Indeed, as his very being is activity, religion can find him only in his action, and must adore the manifestations he makes of himself in all that he has made as in all that he does. Religion, moreover, is in exercise nothing else than God-like action; if God is

moral—loving, beneficent, upright—towards his moral creatures, every soul that is truly swayed by religion must, as it is God-like, be moral also.

Take what view we will, accordingly, we discover ever that the spheres of morality and religion, whether determined from the subject or from the object, must be exactly coincident. The religious nature must go out towards God wherever he is to be discovered, and must therefore recognize his moral creatures as the proper object of its activity—must, as true to itself, act morally throughout the entire sphere of moral beings; and the moral nature must equally go out towards God—must, as true to itself, act religiously throughout the entire sphere that God fills in common with itself. In an analogous way, looking from the object in religious and in moral activity, the divine in the creation of God commands the due regard of the religious sense—that is, enforces moral duty as truly religious; and the divine in the creator filling in common with his created work the moral universe, evokes all that is truly moral and requires that all true morality be religious. The identity of personal relation between God, the creator and moral ruler of all rational beings, and the God-fearing saint in the one case, and the conscientious moralist in the other, necessitates identity of law in all religion and all morals. Love to God as the first command and love to man as the second are prescribed by both as the complements of the one all-comprehensive law.

II. But while religion and morality have so much in common—are grounded in the same rational nature which they alike presuppose and at the same time characterize, exert a legitimate sovereignty alike in and over this nature, derive alike their sanction and authority from God, and fill the same spheres of rational activity—they yet, as common speech recognizes and abundant speculation and practice, however erroneous and imperfect, also prove, are widely to be differenced from each other in their proper logical import and application. They are not identical; and to treat them so is to mistake and to mislead. The fundamental difference is indicated at once by the fact that they are immediately given by different views of the same personal nature. Religion looks at

once at the object or end of life and conduct; morality looks at the essential nature of the subject of rational activity or of that activity itself. The former is objectively determined; the latter is subjectively determined. The term religion suggests as the first thing God, or at least the highest object of reverence, trust, service, love; it denotes the personal or rational life in its immediate relations to that which is accepted as the God of the life. A religious system, whether of faith or of practice, is characterized first and chiefly by the view it takes of God—his character and relations, his personality, his attributes of power and love and wisdom and beneficence, his relations of sovereignty and of righteous and gracious providential rule. It determines from these attributes and relations as they regard men his claims as to nature and extent, and their duties, as well as their hopes and fears. It derives from them the whole authority of conscience, and finds in them the light to guide as well as the motives to prompt and press its control, formally and expressly making conscience the simple representative of God, and only as such the rightful regulator of life and conduct. In the religious view, conscience is the voice of God, and therefore sovereign. The common moralities of life are, in its view, of divine appointment, and are obligatory only as they are ordained of God. As from the very necessities of the case religion must see God in every thing—in every being, in every act—it must see God in every object possible to the moral activity, because it is God's work, and he is in every creation of his; it places God accordingly in all specific acts of duty, and, as we have seen, makes morality essentially religious. It allows no duty which does not derive its obligation immediately or remotely from God as creator and sovereign ruler, and adjudges that man to be imperfect in the ordering of his moral nature who does not practically regard God as the source of all obligation and all morality. Religion has thus its peculiar nature and character determined from the object in the rational activity; it is throughout characterized and shaped by what it accepts as the object that is to receive its highest adoration, its largest trust, its all-engaging service.

Morality, on the other hand, is given from a purely sub-

jective view. It determines all duty, all obligation, all rectitude, from the nature of duty, or, what amounts to the same thing, from the nature of the subject of duty. It necessarily supposes an object to whom duty is to be rendered; it determines specific duties from the character and relations of this object of duty; but it sees this object only through the medium of the moral nature. Whatever object may be imagined to exist without or beyond the scope of this moral nature it ignores and wholly rejects from its notice. All claims from whatsoever object are measured and determined in the light of the moral capabilities themselves. It accepts God as object to whom duty is owed; it accepts him, if at least it be true and legitimate, as chiefest object, to whom first and highest obligations are to be discharged. A true ethical system must thus recognize God in his true character and relations to the moral subject, consequently as supreme and sovereign. It must accordingly, as we have seen, make all morality religious. But it determines and measures all duty to God immediately from the capabilities and instincts of the moral nature itself. Ethics may presuppose or imply, but does not attempt to prove, the divine origin of every moral agent, and therefore does not found itself directly in the divine authority. But it finds in the moral nature itself an instinct towards God as worthy object of duty, and so must enforce proper religious duty.

Thus while systems of morality and religion must give the same rules of practice and must fill out the same spheres of duty, these rules are ascertained and determined and correlated from entirely different points of view.

In the light of this fundamental difference between religion and morality it will be easy to see how, especially with imperfect men, widely diverse results, both in speculation and in practice, may be reached, according as the one or the other is made the principle of development. A perfect philosophy must from both attain the same specific rules of duty and from both prescribe the same specific steps of conduct; but the methods and the motives will vary, and consequently, if aught of imperfection in the thought or in the life find admission, the results will not only be diverse in order of presentation and

arrangement and in gradation, but also in essential character; the theology will be here and there in conflict with the ethics, and the piety will be at variance with the morality. In other words, a system of practical philosophy will easily, with imperfect men, limited in view and biassed in judgment, become a widely different thing when grounded and motived objectively in God from what it must be when developed and determined subjectively from the moral nature itself.

Speculatively, for illustration, theology begins with a positive revelation of God either oral and by the outward sense or in attributes and workings intentionally discerned. It inclines naturally and legitimately to the oral or sensible revelation. But there is a legitimate natural theology—a theology founded on the manifestations of God, either immediately in the soul itself—its own nature divinely constituted and its own experiences which it is necessitated in reason to ascribe to a supernatural, a divine working—or in the world without, being apprehended through the outward sense and so brought into its own experience, and in these affections of itself revealing to its intuitions just as in its own workings divine attributes. These revelations of God, whether oral or intuitional, are apprehended in proper faith, being accepted as accredited in themselves, just as the testimony of our own senses—what we see and hear—and of our own thoughts and feelings and purposes is believed and not reasoned out. Theology builds thus on faith—on the revelations of God accepted and trusted for their own sake. It erects its superstructure by proper work of reason, analyzing, selecting, correlating, adapting to a proposed end. Ethics, on the other hand, will naturally begin with the moral nature itself. It accepts this as given in proper faith, apprehending the phenomena of its own moral nature as true, credible manifestations of that nature. It founds thus necessarily on faith equally with religion, and builds up its superstructure by an analogous procedure a work of proper reason. But the relations of this moral nature to God are not, as in theology, the prominent and comprehensive relations in ethics; they are either only remotely involved, as the moral nature must involve more or less the attributes of its author, or pre-

sented only as co-ordinate parts of the diversified object of moral activity.

While theology and ethics thus alike necessarily begin in rational faith and pursue their work in rational intelligence, and between the two no proper opposition of faith to reason is necessarily involved, yet unless absolute perfection be supposed in the cases the results in doctrine will more or less necessarily vary. Theology will exalt its views of the character and relations of God, and overbear all repugnances and remonstrances from alleged facts in human nature or experience. God will tend to become to it literally "all in all," absorbing all the human into the divine—absolutely identifying it as in pantheism, merging it in a living unity as in mysticism, or engaging it as exclusive object of action as in religious asceticism. It will tend not merely to exalt the first great commandment over the second as superior in rank and in importance, but by its exclusive regard to the first to crowd out or at least unduly depress the second. It will tend to run rational faith into credulity; to accept on slight pretext divine revelations, miraculous interventions, superstitious observances. Not that a perfectly exact religious philosophy must issue thus, but such is the liability in human weakness: the divine relationships will tend to overbear all other relationships, to engross to themselves the movements of thought, and so make the philosophy of human life one-sided and partial—make men religionists instead of religious, pietists instead of pious.

In an analogous way, ethical science, proceeding from the intuitions of reason as directed upon the manifestations of the moral nature, will tend not only to drop out of view the divine source and principle of all morality as well as of all thought, but to concern itself more exclusively with the immediate and palpable objects of moral activity, to identify itself more and more with mere philanthropy. The human, especially in the social relation, will determine the sphere of the moral life and indicate all the lines of duty. This is most fully exemplified in the famous system of Confucius, in which the human nature in its capabilities and its needs, to the utter exclusion of the divine, whether as creator and original or as existing object of the moral life, is made both the single basis of right living and the

single aim of humanity. The religious instincts become debased and perverted into love and worship of ancestry; the state and the family become the all-comprehensive relations; earth becomes the sole sphere of interest for man.

Practically, the life and conduct as ordered by commanding consideration of the divine—by habitual recognition of his being and all-perfect character, of his presence and power and goodness, of his righteous and gracious rule, and by a full subordination of every interest to his control and disposal—must be a very different matter from a life determined from a mere consideration of the moral nature, its capacities, its instincts, its ends. The motives of an exclusively religiously ordered life, its aims, its enthusiasms, will be higher and more commanding; while at the same time it must be more liable to excesses, to unevennesses, to superhuman exaltations intermixed with unmanly depressions, because the invisible and spiritual cannot be held by human grasp so evenly and so steadily as the seen and tangible. The religious man will move, as a whole, in a higher plane than the mere moralist, while his course may not be so uniform or so constant.

In short, the life and conduct must be very differently shaped and colored according as it is motived by the divine as freely accepted in the consciousness or by the mere phenomena of the human nature. Its look and aspiration in the one case will be outward and upward, its scope broader, and its inspirations deeper and stronger. In the other, the look will be inward, and along a level of its own existing attainments and developments; its scope will be narrowed to its own demands and claims; it will kindle with no enthusiasms but the common and ordinary; it may be even, and ever keep along the just middle of possible endeavor; it will hardly ever be ecstatic, hardly ever beam with the radiance proper to an immortal nature. Self-humiliation before God with the inspiring assurance of future glory will characterize the one; self-complacency with satisfaction with the present will mark the other.

III. It is very apparent from this survey of the respective natures of religion and morality that they cannot in reason or with safety be divorced either in theory or in practice Theology is, for its own sake, for its own integrity and com-

pleteness, necessitated to recognize every principle of sound ethics; and piety, to be sound and perfect, must flow out into every department of the moral sphere. Just so a sound ethical system must found itself on a nature that is divine in origin; that depends absolutely on God for sustenance and for growth and expression; that goes out instinctively, by the constraints of its own being and of the conditions of its existence and working, towards God, and can never be satisfied till it reaches him; that is in its normal condition God-like, and must be in sympathy and accord with him, as well as in loving trust and obedience towards him. It must, moreover, in laying out the spheres and directions of moral activity, devote one large field to God as its object, and recognize in worthy prominence and rank its relations to him. Ethics must embrace in its orderly enumeration of duties the duty owed to God—all religious duty. Piety, too, must be coupled with a sound moral life—or, more exactly, must be embodied in it. A religious life that renounces all claims but those that immediately respect God, becomes a lean, vigorless, Simon Stylites skeleton of faith, and approximates this type of character just in proportion as it separates itself from social relations and conditions. And a moral life, on the other hand, without God, is sadly incomplete, and as sadly weak and cold.

There is, as has been shown, no ground for separation to be discovered in their nature and essence. As embraced in the same personality, they must be in organic harmony. To regard them philosophically or practically as out of such vital relationship, necessarily mars and mutilates them. A theology that holds back from exhibiting God except as he manifests himself in express sensible revelation by vision or by deed, or in ordinances and rites, ignoring his utterances in his works of creation and providence, and above all disregarding the declared image of his rational nature in man or fellow-beings, cannot but be sadly defective; as also must be an ethical system that does not find in the moral nature of man a true and positive instinct towards the supernatural, the super-human, the super-angelic even—towards the truly Absolute and Infinite One, or that does not recognize obligations and duties which respect a real being who is other and higher than any fel-

low-creature or even than any imagined totality of finite existence. Theology magnifies God most when it discloses his presence and his sway in nature and in history, as well as in temple and in shrine. And ethics magnifies the moral man and perfects its own teachings as it distinctly finds its ideal in the God-like and terminates all duty in the person of God himself or those that bear his image.

In exact correspondence with this view of the organic relationship of theology and ethics as systems of doctrine, the religious life and practice reciprocates with true moral conduct a dependent helpfulness. A piety divorced from morals is a contradiction or an impossibility; "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" "Inasmuch as ye did it not unto these, ye did it not unto me." As there is no true piety that does not extend its love to man in due honor, courtesy, sympathy, and beneficence, so piety absolutely depends on moral behavior for its culture, and cannot thrive or be healthy without it. It learns duty to God in observing claims of fellow-man as bearing God's image; all gracious affections—reverence, trust, obedience, gratitude, love—are soonest evoked in social relations, in "piety at home," requiting parental care, and through that household love and service and trust grow out and up towards the heavenly Father, and so thrive in the spiritual house of God on earth that not merely prefigures, but as a living temple actually germinates and develops into, the future glory. Upright walking towards God confirms and establishes itself in upright dealings with men; reverence towards him is nurtured in respectful deference to superiority in station, in age, in worth among men; faith in him grows in the exercise of confidence and trust in them, as obedience to him is learned and encouraged in dutiful submission to human authority. The religious life thus finds its rudiments, its nursery-bed, its occasions for exertion and expansion, the cheering evidence of its reality and purity, to a very large extent in the ordinary moralities. The heavenly virtues and graces are the same in essence with those that enter into our ideals of true earthly excellence, only vitalized by a positive divine ingredient, tempering, shaping, glorifying it—the good olive engrafted into an olive though

wild before. And, conversely, a moral life can be sustained and matured only as it grows up in God. It cannot thrive but in actual personal relationships; in a personal trust in a personal friend and helper; in a personal sympathy reaching down to its deepest cravings and out and up to its largest desires and aspirations; in a personal authority enforced by worthiness of character, right of rule, and certainty of approval or of condemnation; in a personal communion with an ever-present comforter and an infinite Saviour. Only as it can surely lean on an arm that is mightiest can it triumph over fear, perplexity, despondency, in the dangers and the difficulties that beset all earthly experience; only as it is strong in God can it resist severe temptation. Reforms, whether in individual or in social life, move heavily, trippingly, failingly, if the higher springs of action found in religion are not invoked. The history of national as of personal reforms abundantly evinces this. The slave-trade, the institution of slavery itself, have yielded to the courage, the determination, the enthusiasm which religion has inspired. Intemperance has proved itself too mighty for merely moral assaults. Giving way, it may be for the moment, it reappears with new opportunity when vigilance is relaxed, or energy is wearied, or friendly help is removed. The tiger may be subdued by determined effort prompted by conscience, or wretchedness, or friendly persuasion; but so long as the spirit inhabits a body with craving lusts and appetites inherited or acquired, the law in the members persists, and vicious habit, even in reform, is a tiger, chained may be, but with one eye still open watching its opportunities; and only grace, with eyes that never sleep and arms that never yield nor tire, can assure permanence and completeness of reform. Social temperance may be the fashion of a day; but the fashion of this world is a fickle and perishing thing after all. Temperance is stable only as it is based in divine obligation and support—only as it is rooted in a true religious life. So generally the morals of a people or of an age have found their life and maintenance in the religious men of the community or the times. The sentiment that may be supposed to be inculcated in the familiar effusion of Leigh Hunt—"Abou Ben Adhem"—that the divine favor exalts him highest who loves his fellow-man best although without love to

God, if the supposition were not itself as a possible realization utterly preposterous, is as contradictory to a sound ethics as a sound theology, and as fatal to practical morality as to practical piety. Love to a brother, so far as it ignores the common fatherhood, separates itself from the very spring and source of its life. Men are brethren only as God is their Father. Philanthropy has its roots in fraternity ; and fraternity among men, except as God is recognized as father, is contradictory in thought and visionary in life. Piety and morals cannot be divorced but with peril and loss on either side.

IV. It is altogether reasonable, moreover, to anticipate conflicts in doctrine and in duty arising from the two diverse interpretations by an imperfect intelligence, the one from the moral nature of man and the other from the revelations of the divine character and claims. That such conflicts appear, should occasion no perplexity or discouragement, either to the philanthropist or to the believer. They should in reason be expected, and be met in the assured confidence that they need imperil neither reason nor faith ; in the warranted conviction, indeed, that to the absolute reason they are perfectly at one, and that man's best interest is concerned in earnest and confident endeavor to reconcile them. Such hopeful endeavor, finding its occasion all along the pathway of human experience, is well fitted to maintain vigilance, to nourish piety and moral purity, to introduce into ever new visions of the essential harmony between right reason and true faith. As of very necessity grounded in the oneness of nature to which they belong, in the unity of universal being and of the creative source out of which all things spring, reason can have no fundamental antagonism with faith, while at the same time the specific deductions of the one may seem to be at variance with the several apprehensions of the other ; so the theologian and the ethical teacher may be brought into occasional strife over principles and methods and applications, and the believer and the moralist may encounter each other at the crossings here and there of their respective pathways, devious because human, and yet the encounter give no cause for either one repudiating or forbidding the other, or even for shrinking from the closest fellowship.

As the mysteries of faith must necessarily break in with a surprise on the lower visions of unaided human reason and sometimes even shock and stumble it—something as the large experiences of mature life outspan the narrow range of a child's apprehension, yet cannot, when properly authenticated revelations, be reasonably rejected unless demonstrably contradictory and absurd in strictest logic; so the revelations of religion may seem beyond the comprehension of a moral philosophy that necessarily bounds itself within the comparatively small circumference of human capacity and experience, and yet claim allowance from it unless clearly in logical contradiction to demonstrated truth. The history of discovery, the history of human progress, is full of surprises that seem to the old experience incredible. The marvels of modern science and art are as beyond the comprehension of former ages as the deepest mysteries of religion can be imagined to be to the matured reason. Those great characteristics of Christian faith—the miracles of the incarnation, the crucifixion, the resurrection, the pentecostal baptism—are above the invention of human reason, above its comprehension, even as to their necessity, the manner of their coming to be, and of their working, their relationship generally to the system of God's righteous rule; but being accredited as facts on probable evidence, cannot be denied, inasmuch as they are neither self-contradictory nor absolutely incongruous with other attested facts. Just so human ethics may find no room in its conception of a righteous rule for forgiveness, for an atonement, for vicarious sacrifice; but the revealed truth on these points is in no necessary contradiction to any facts in man's moral nature. Alongside of the maturest and soundest ethics may lie the revelation that God may be "just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus," breaking down no principle, no precept of morality, supplementing perhaps, but not subverting one particle of purely moral truth. Until such subversion, such contradiction, can be shown beyond the possibility of doubt, can a properly authenticated teaching of religion be reasonably denied. Doctrines may be true that human reason may not in its present light be able to harmonize, much less to comprehend in their ultimate ground and their relation to the divine

system of the universe. Morality can reasonably reject only a demonstrably false religion.

It may be that specific rules of duty, as derived from the moral nature of man on the one hand or the word of faith, may sometimes come into conflict. This is by no means strange. The several rules of morality itself often thus come into conflict, as do even dictates of religion as humanly interpreted. But it is certain that the actual religious instincts of man cannot be in natural disharmony with his moral instincts ; nor can there be in any conflict of humanly interpreted rules but one line of duty. What that line is to be in the case of any conflict of rules is to be determined on the principles of legitimate casuistry. The principles of the higher authority or the higher source of authority must give the religious so far the predominance over the merely moral rule ; while yet other principles of casuistry, as the greater nearness and directness or greater beneficence, may in a supposed case give the moral the precedence. For the trial of faith, for the strengthening and enlightenment of reason, for wise purposes of discipline, the prescriptions of faith and of reason, as man interprets them, may be in disharmony : but they are not at bottom antagonistic ; solution is probable ; man's privilege is to seek this solution and strive for it, in confidence of ever-growing success.

V. Once more, it is possible that one put himself more immediately and controllingly under the sway of religion and walk more by faith—by obedience to revealed law and trust in revealed guidance and help and promise ; or, on the other hand, put himself more under the control of conscience—of the practical reason dictating the right and the good. While the true course, prescribed both by right reason and by divine direction, is so far as possible to follow ever all light that comes assured from God, whether directly beaming from his Word or reflected from his works in man and nature, to strengthen and expand faith by reason and elevate and guide reason by faith, to maintain as may be a rational faith and a believing reason, according as faith or reason leads at the time, yet between the two there is room for choice. It certainly cannot be a matter of question whether in the light of immortality it is better to be an ignorant, even often stumbling, believer in God and so a

child of promise, or the sagest and most stoical of philosophical atheists, without hope as without God. But not to push the inquiry to this extreme, we may yet maintain that, all other things being equal, the life which is prompted and guided and nurtured and cheered more habitually by religious faith must be a higher, purer, better life than that which relies more upon proper moral truth. The proper religious instinct is deeper, stronger, more pervasive than the proper moral instinct, if this distinction be accepted in the only allowable sense—that which admits their essential harmony and devotes only a different outlook from the same rational spirit on the same rational nature and field. The ideal of character and attainment given by faith is the image of the divine perfection ; that reasoned out of man's moral nature is but human at best. The aim to be God-like is loftier than the aim to be manly. An endless and tireless, rather a forever strengthening development into an infinite perfection, as it is worthier of a being of immortality, is a higher, every way better, hope and aspiration than the survey bounded by the moral nature of man, even although it take in God as the ground and the predominant object of duty, can bring to light. There are grand elements of character indeed standing out on the foreground of the truest and most perfect of all religions which ethics can hardly be supposed to be adequate of its own strength to conceive or of its own authority to prescribe, although it may unhesitatingly admit them when presented and then invest them with its own imperatives and sanctions; such are the divine elements of self-abnegation and filial trust. To lose the life in order to save it, to let go all to gain all, the more and better to give than to receive—this is of proper divine teaching and exemplification : it enters into the proper religious ideal of character ; it is its crown and glory. On the other hand, the goal of practical morality is only to be just and equal, and so falls far below the Christian mark and aspiration. The significance of trust as an element of character is incomparably broader and richer from the properly religious point of view than from the merely moral. The sense of dependence as a native germ of the very being of man, out of which all true and stable trust must spring and grow, is immeasurably deeper and stronger as

it starts directly from the view of the Infinite and Absolute One than when it is directly prompted by the finite and dependent ; reliance immediately on the all-perfect Creator in strength and value must be confessed to be far above any trust in created being, however exalted.

The growth of character receives, too, from religion its strongest impulses. The highest morality is comparatively cold—chiefly, perhaps, because it necessarily leaves out to a great extent the power of personality. The morally perfect man is, alas ! for man, but an ideal ; no real has ever been found in mere humanity. Even if ever real, the perfect man could be model and sympathizing helper only to a small circle of acquaintance, and could unfold himself in the fulness of his aims and methods and excellences not to even one, not to the closest friend and follower. Morality, if complete, must bring in a personal God, indeed ; but he is not here logically placed at the front and foreground : he lies in the depths or is consigned to a corner. Religion places a personal God immediately and commandingly before the human soul. Thus comes from it the inspiration of a true rational sympathy, as between congenial spirits—between the infinite and perfect Creator and the finite and imperfect creature, indeed, yet the one created in the image of the other, whose very inferior and dependent and needy nature and condition is a ground of sympathy, real and as broad as the finite capacity, although it may not be paralleled in some other respects with the grounds of sympathy given by sameness of nature and condition. This inspiration from personal sympathy, personal communion, personal trust, breathing in upon the spirit always and everywhere, and strongest in time of greatest need, is matched by nothing supplied by morality. For the formation and growth of character the whole combined power to impel or attract, to drive or draw, from the instincts of the moral nature, from the authority of conscience, from the attractiveness of a human ideal of excellence, is feebleness itself in comparison with the single call of God's grace through his Son, "Come unto Me," breaking upon the ears and hearts of men weary and heavy laden with sin and sorrow. Redemption from guilt without a personal Redeemer, salvation from

sin and death without a personal Saviour, restoration to the favor and friendship of God without a personal Mediator and Intercessor, rise from the depths of a fallen nature to the holiness of heaven without a personal helper and guide and comforter, a true Holy Ghost — were hopeless indeed: but morality knows nothing of such divine personal agencies; revelation brings these grounds of help and hope to man.

There is still another view of the comparative rank and importance of religion and morality which is perhaps more decisive, because more fundamental and comprehensive. Religion is the one bond that binds indissolubly the truest philosophy, the highest art, and the purest morals. There is an elemental truth in the common phrases of "a divine philosophy," "a divine art," "a divine character:" they denote the grand root and centre of the true, the beautiful, and the good as being in God, in whom, as such root and centre, they have a vital union, and so stand in most sympathetic and helpful relationship to one another—even that of being members of one body.

Philosophy finds its last and lowest foundation in God as the former and disposer of the universe, and so the fountain of all truth, as the root of all being. Science, dealing professedly with this or that branch only of truth, ignores the root and trunk—"the physical philosopher, as such, must be a pure materialist," says a leader of scientific thought—and equally fails to discern the divine hue and form which really characterize every ramification of truth. Philosophy, which carries science into grounds and principles and ends, is constrained to acknowledge God as the only conceivable ultimate source of knowledge, and the one sphere that is comprehensive of all truth.

In the same way, high art which seizes the loftiest idea and embodies in the fittest body for the most perfect of form, has found in the past and will ever find both its ideal and its idea, as well as the kindlings of its enthusiasm, in the contemplation of God and the manifestations of the divine in nature and in grace.

So, too, the best types of human excellence are of a divine mould, designed and shaped after a divine pattern, drawing their

life and nourishment from God, and so exhibiting a true growth into the divine image. The best morals in human history we find exemplified in religious men taught and led by God. The power of mere morality to shape and elevate character has, indeed, been mainly confined to a meagre few of exceptional natures or surroundings; religion has shown its power on every class and condition. The best of ethical systems—the Stoic—blessed only a little circle whom a child can count; the only true religion—Christianity—is blessing a world.

But philosophy, art, and morals are mutually dependent on one another; they become perfect only as in organic relation; and the only ground and bond and life of this union is the divine—the religious—since in it is the one ultimate spring of all. They grow from one root, one trunk; they necessarily fail in vigor as they become dissevered members. Happy would it be for each and for the whole race of men if the man of thought, the man of letters and of art, and the man that seeks to lift his fellow, were practically to recognize their kinship, their brotherhood, as having a common fatherhood; if science, art, and philanthropy in all their respective branches were brought into a true fraternal sympathy and reciprocal helpfulness by becoming in the truest and highest sense and degree rational—by becoming impregnated with that living reason which is one with the divine reason.

HENRY N. DAY.

THE PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN WILL, AS RELATED TO SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHIC THEORIES.

IN a previous article[1] attention was directed upon the relation of the will-problem to scientific investigations concerning the nature of man. Having granted the reasonableness of the demand that human nature be brought within the sweep of scientific inquiry, it was indicated how far science had included brain and nerve within its circle, by ascertaining the laws which regulate the activity of the nerve system. Science has not, indeed, offered any thing approaching a complete explanation of the cerebrum and subordinate portions of the great nerve centre, or of their relation to the nerve system, or of its relation to the muscles and the periphery. But science has disclosed a unity of system in the physical organism illustrated by dependence of the nerve centre upon blood-supply; dependence of the nerve system on nerve energy generated in the brain; and dependence of the muscular system and the general sensibility of the body on the nerve energy carried along by the nerve fibres. A large amount of human activity is thus scientifically explained. Reflex and spontaneous action are accounted for under recognized laws of the nerve system. But it was shown that this is very far from being a science of human nature, if human activity be taken as the test. Restricting attention to physical action alone, it was pointed out that the will-problem remains unanswered by all that science has accomplished. Besides reflex muscular action, and besides spon-

[1] September, 1878, p. 329.

taneous action, originating in the vital forces of the organism, there is no explanation of a *voluntary* use of the muscles. This implies an application of the laws of muscular activity, and these of nerve activity, but it involves also an application of the laws of will activity, of which physiology has been able to tell us nothing. So far as physiology is concerned, the region of volition is a territory unknown. From personal experience we know that certain of our physical efforts are voluntary, but physiological inquiries take no account of this singular feature in human activity. Still, it is hard for science to rest contented with an avowal of ignorance. The scientific spirit—here provisionally set in contrast with the philosophic spirit—is a spirit of inquiry stimulated and directed by confidence in the instrument of external observation, and doubtful of every other. This scientific spirit, eager for the victory of the observational method, and guarding against any acknowledgment of a wider realm of being than the physical, cannot rest in the admission of ignorance. It cannot allow for such a division of labor as assigns a distinct field, with distinct instruments and efforts, for those who are known as mental philosophers. To this aggressive spirit there is a scientific answer. The facts of voluntary muscular activity are not scientifically explained. After all has been said that physiology has to tell about muscular fibre and muscular energy, after all it has to announce concerning nerve fibre and nerve energy, there remains the fact of personal determination—the will-problem—which science has not solved. Man knows his own deliberation and determination : human physiology cannot explain them. The scientific man is naturally reluctant to acknowledge this. He finds it difficult even to occupy a standpoint whence he may see the facts to which we refer. He works the ploughshare in his own field, believing that there is no true cultivation beyond his own furrow, and no need for the furrows being deeper than those familiar to him. The psychologist avers that the ploughing of the scientist is not deep enough. The dispute between them may be brought to this clear issue—distinguish and explain the voluntary element in human activity.

In the former article attention was restricted to muscular action in order to meet the physiologist on his own ground.

In this, the line of investigation must be advanced into the inner region of human activity—the sphere of consciousness—where thoughts are shaped, and purposes are formed. This is the real centre of human life, and not that animal activity seen by the outward observer, and which in reality constitutes only an outer circumference of action. What a man's life is cannot be decided by observing him as he hurries along the street; nor by closer observation, enabling one to say whether he is sickly or robust; nor by outward measurements, which may warrant inference as to mass of brain; nor even by surmises as to the brain's quality: but by such discovery as the man himself makes of his own thoughts and plans; best of all is it known to the man himself, as he is conscious of the conflict within, and the decision which he reaches in matters concerning the regulation of his conduct. Into this inner region we have now to attempt an entrance, with the view of ascertaining more exactly what is involved in voluntary determination, and afterward what is the relation of philosophy to the will-problem.

There is in our consciousness a knowledge of what we properly designate *personal agency*. A man knows himself as the cause of his activity, and knows his action as the product of his own determination or volition. Viewing human conduct in this way, we find that voluntary activity embraces a wide range of external or physical action, and also of internal or mental action. And these two phases of activity, the outer and inner, are so related to each other that the latter carries within it the key to the former. For scientific purposes, we must concentrate on what we name "mental" activity, in order to explain such a title as "voluntary" when it is applied to muscular action. And beyond this, we must seek a scientific explanation of the order and relation of mental acts, in so far as these are regarded as voluntary. Among the familiar facts of mental life are such things as these: personal concentration of thought, resulting in a process which is tested by the measure in which it is distinguished by clearness, connectedness, and force; deliberation as to the rightness of motive forces stirring within us; and, granting their rightness, as to the duty of giving them indulgence; consequently, conflict with dispositions which have much force; and self-control, implying mastery over inclina-

tions, by determination to act in accordance with a higher law of life, designated moral law. All these discover a voluntary element, thereby raising a problem which science and philosophy must acknowledge, and attempt to solve. If physiological science does not even reach this problem, it stands conspicuously within the region of psychological inquiry, and is there so prominent that the treatment of it must prove a crucial test for every system of philosophy.

The first requisite here is to distinguish the fact of volition, or personal determination of activity, so as to separate it completely from other phases of action. Let us, if possible, place beyond dispute what is the thing to be explained. This will be best done by careful exclusion. 1. Reflex action is excluded, that is, activity arising from the inter-action of two nerve fibres, presenting the simplest phase of automatic action. 2. Sensori-motor activity is excluded, that is, activity of the muscular system, on account of consciousness of excitation of the sensory system. 3. Physical appetite is excluded, that is, hunger, thirst, and sex, forms of spontaneous physical impulse, common to man with the lower animals. 4. Irritability of the physical nature impelling to resistance and conflict, common to man and animals, is also set aside as a purely spontaneous impulse. 5. Desires more properly mental, such as desire of knowledge (or curiosity), desire of power, and desire of fame, are out of account, being spontaneous impulses, as truly as the physical appetites. When we rise still higher, to include associations or recollections, the facts are more mixed, and discrimination becomes more difficult, for there is a voluntary element and an involuntary, needing to be distinguished. But in the five examples named, we have five forms of action which do not raise the will-problem. There is further help toward a rigid discrimination, if we notice that will-power is capable of *restraining* all these. This becomes, indeed, a natural measure of the degree of will-power exercised by an individual. The restraint of sensori-motor action, or of appetite, or of irritability, or of desire, is an illustration of personal determination—that higher form of power whose exercise illustrates personal agency. When sensori-motor action is checked, man shows that he is more than an automaton. When the power of appetite or irasci-

bility is held in check, the fact is exactly that which we are here seeking to signalize and explain, the activity of man is something more than merely spontaneous action. Passing from restraint to direct action, we complete the view of the fact described as voluntary activity. Taking this view, we see that voluntary power is associated with higher intellectual action. Appetite is restrained at the call of duty, that is, the intelligent agent shows regard to a higher law of conduct, and determines upon self-denial in accordance with that law. Perseverance in work is maintained at the call of duty. The intelligent agent recognizes a moral necessity—a law which says, "Thou shalt," and in submission to that, powers are concentrated, distracting considerations are shunned, and effort is maintained until the moral end is achieved. This presents the type of personal agency. This is voluntary action, specially calling for a clear explanation, if there is to be a science of human nature and of human life.

From these few illustrations, it appears that there are involuntary actions and voluntary actions, the latter including voluntary restraint upon involuntary action. This guides to some well-known and fruitful distinctions. In various directions, the voluntary and involuntary shade into each other, and that in such a manner as to indicate more strikingly the superiority of volition. The involuntary actions of childhood are largely absorbed into the voluntary actions of manhood. In this way, some actions disappear altogether; others appear in a new phase. What the child does, the man refuses to do; what the child does spontaneously, that is, quite unreflectingly, the man performs deliberately and of set purpose. On the other hand, there is a region of acquired facilities, from which volition gradually disappears. What the child at first finds to be impossible, that it gradually and by much effort acquires. Soon the need for effort disappears, and with it the absence of direct volition is manifest, even though the action continues to be regarded as a voluntary action. This class of actions, Dr. Carpenter has suggested, we may describe as voluntary, but not volitional; actions which really are under control of the will, though there is not a direct exercise of the will in their continuance. Of these we have an example in walking. Quite

above such actions, and showing the true superiority of human life, we have the whole range of actions which are accomplished only by persistent determination influencing every stage in our procedure. All these different phases of human activity are quite familiar, so that no room is left for disputation as to the reality of the distinctions, however much we may dispute as to their explanation. And it is only when we have them all in view, that we perceive the real nature of the will-problem, and recognize how certain it is that our mode of disposing of this problem will determine the whole character of our philosophy. In the power of Will, analyze our experience as we may, we find a real distinction of human life. We see how such life can become a system, an organized whole, with its subordinate and superior elements, arranged according to a recognized ideal. We perceive the conditions under which it becomes possible for each individual of the race to strive after the ideal of human life, making steady progress toward it, by throwing off what is obstructive and developing what is contributory. In the will-problem we find the greatest difficulty to be encountered in the structure of a philosophy of human nature. In the solution offered, we have the test of every philosophic system.

The alternative courses open to those who search for a philosophy of human nature are clear enough. On the one hand, we may inquire how far human action is found to maintain some analogy with the action common to lower orders of being. On the other hand, we may concentrate on the highest forms of personal determination, with the view of ascertaining the special distinction of human life. Either course is competent; but it may be well to notice, that a risk of incompleteness belongs to an exclusive prosecution of either. In the study of analogies, there is danger of overlooking differences or reducing them to a minimum. In the study of the distinctive, there is a tendency to slight resemblances and underestimate their number. The history of philosophy gives ample illustration of these risks and their consequences. The two rival philosophic theories may be said to represent the two alternative lines of inquiry: the one affirming that men act as the animals do, only with the advantage of a more complex organism; the other, that man is capable of acting, and does in a greater or

less degree act, in a manner altogether different, exercising a power of self-determination in harmony with an intelligible ideal. There is, however, this difference between the two theories, roughly represented as having been shaped according to the method preferred—the one seeks to account for all human actions as if they were of a single class ; the other does not attempt to draw all human actions up to the level of self-determination. The latter thus professes to be more discriminating, and challenges criticism of the ground in which a radical difference among human actions is affirmed. The necessitarian or determinist theory brings all to a common level ; the free-will theory lifts some actions to a higher level, and affirms that these higher actions are proper to human life, and become the governing actions in personal history. There is thus on both sides a theory and a criticism of a rival theory, and it may be desirable to give some attention to the theoretic and critical elements in both.

The theory which seeks to explain all mental phenomena by tracing their development from sensation, undertakes to include our volitions. As our sensations are determined by conditions around us, and within our organism, so, says the Determinist theory, are the efforts of our will determined by conditions without and within, over which we have no more control than we have over those which induce sensation. Voluntary activity is, according to this view, only a phase of determined activity. Of such a theory the test is twofold. First, *analytic*, resulting in the clear discrimination of volition from other facts of experience. Let us make certain that the fact to be explained is clearly distinguished from the various mental phenomena described by other terms. This is the first requisite for any theory, but it needs special attention when we would judge of a theory which professes to bring the complex from the simple, the higher from the lower. Second, *logical*, by application of which we may reach a conclusion as to the sufficiency of the philosophy of volition. By means of this test we shall judge of the philosophic worth of the Determinist theory of will.

1. Voluntary activity—what is it? By way of exclusion, we have seen it is neither reflex action, nor sensori-motor activity, nor the spontaneous moving of appetite, nor its increase

by means of external inducement, nor irritation, nor desire. All these belong to the class "involuntary." When we look down the enumeration, these are found to be examples of *determined* actions, that is, forms of activity which may arise without any choice of our own. They are indeed forms of activity to be controlled, but they contain no element illustrating self-control, or personal agency. By contrast with these, voluntary activity is of a higher nature. It is not of the nature of force, mechanical agency, or impulse acting in a single direction toward the accomplishment of a single end. From the days of Aristotle downward, it has been regarded as "deliberate determination," that is, an intelligent regard to alternatives, choice amongst them, and activity determined by this choice. Thus by negative and positive characteristics, we recognize a set of actions standing in direct contrast to another set, and calling for an explanation of their peculiar features.

2. The explanation offered by a Determinist theory. It is briefly this, that outward circumstances, passing dispositions, and general cast of individual nature account for the actions which we call voluntary. This is in substance the theory as it has appeared at all stages and under pressure of various intellectual requirements. Whether it is introduced to meet the demands of a Pantheistic scheme, such as that of Spinoza; or a Theistic scheme, such as that of Jonathan Edwards; or the sensational and materialistic philosophy of human life, as represented more recently by James Mill, J. S. Mill, Professor Bain, and others, it is in form quite similar. The theory is such as we have given, and under it the popular views of liberty of choice are explained by general ignorance of motives. Variety of motives is held to account for variety of action; similar motives occasion similarity of action. Theories of existence so opposed as to be at the opposite extremes, find a common meeting-place in the theory of will which they accept. The theory of voluntary action accepted by Edwards to meet the requirements of theologic necessitarianism, will be accepted as suitable for the materialistic scheme which assigns all human action to organism, if only the needful deviation in the use of "mind" be allowed for. It does, indeed, make an immense difference in the structure of philosophic theory

when on the one hand "mind" is regarded as higher and spiritual existence, and, on the other, it is taken to be a mere function, a manifestation of organic activity. But it is deserving of notice as a historic fact, and as raising an important logical problem, that theories the most opposite land in the determinist or necessitarian view of voluntary activity. To linger over this would occupy too much space, but it is something of moment to remark that the characteristics of certain theories of existence lead of necessity to a determinist theory of will. My present object, however, is to examine the determinist theory of voluntary action, and to that I restrict attention.

In its essence the theory is this, that all voluntary action is accounted for by susceptibility, natural or acquired, and the impulsive power attendant on such susceptibility. In other words, our so-called voluntary actions are determined by the impulsive tendencies of our nature; or, man's action is according to his prevailing desires. Man has a susceptible nature; it is acted upon by surrounding objects; he acts in a manner responsive to the influence exerted upon him; the oftener he acts in this way, the greater facility there is in repeating the exercise; and, making allowance for original bias and acquired tendency, the summary of his actions is according to the sum of his desires. He is, indeed, an intelligent being, and his intelligence greatly widens the range of his susceptibilities, and enlarges the area of acquired tendencies, but intelligence accomplishes no greater result in the history of human activity. Intelligence is an important tributary power, but Desire is the ruling power.

Under this theory of volition, the will-problem is reduced to a matter of arithmetic. Could any thing be more completely in harmony with the requirements of science, or contribute more strikingly to the vindication of the claim of mental philosophy to take rank among the "exact sciences"?

But a theory is nothing unless supported by sufficient evidence, and simplicity can always be attained by the simple method of omitting the perplexities. It is granted equally by materialists and upholders of the distinctive nature of mind that there are manifold perplexities involved in voluntary activity; are these perplexities examined, disentangled, and ex-

plained under the materialistic scheme of volition? If voluntary activity is only a phase of organic action, results should come out with mechanical exactness, and thus prove calculable. Materialists should, therefore, favor us with their enumeration and combination of impulses which account for a given action; and enable us to classify actions according to the motive forces which have determined them. This is a reasonable expectation of those who maintain that actions resulting from choice can be "classified with the ordinary phenomena of causation, in respect to their invariable order and conditional certainty." The doctrine of will must be established on "an objective basis, as an induction from the facts of human conduct." These quotations I take from an upholder of the determinist theory.[1] The tests applicable must be directed on both theories, and the adherents of determinism cannot object if we take guidance from themselves as to the manner in which a professed philosophy of voluntary action should be tried.

There is much in the determinist theory which belongs to it in common with the libertarian, and we need not dwell upon what is common. Nor can we overlook these elements, since our critical aim makes it essential that we do not credit either theory with that which belongs also to its rival. We must, therefore, enumerate the following points as common to both, being denied by no one. There are natural forms of sensibility; there are acquired tendencies; there are spontaneous appetites; there are higher forms of disposition natural to us, such as benevolence and pity; there are intellectual processes occupied with means and ends; and all these are concerned with human activity. These characteristics belong to human nature, and are admitted as data before we attempt to construct a theory of voluntary action. The will-problem, that is, the problem of voluntary, as contrasted with involuntary activity, rises out of the midst of them. The object of the determinist is to show that these are sufficient to account for voluntary as well as involuntary action. The object of the libertarian is to show that such facts only account for the involuntary, but do not solve the problem of volition. What

[1] "Sensation and Intuition," by James Sully, M.A., pp. 218, 219.

evidence have we that sensibility, appetite, higher disposition, and reflection as to means and ends afford a philosophy of volition?

The theory is not established on "an objective basis, as an induction from the facts of human conduct." When a man acts through appetite, or rage, the force of appetite or anger may be sufficient to account for what he does. But such action does not present the type of voluntary activity. He acts as an animal does, and gives us no illustration of the distinctive feature of human life known as voluntary activity. The example is very favorable for the theory, but worthless for the purpose contemplated by the theory. When a person is moved to pity by sight of extreme suffering, we account sufficiently for the facts by the sight and his natural susceptibility. This example also is favorable for determinism, but it contributes nothing by way of evidence for it, because it explains nothing of the nature of voluntary activity. When the angry man begins to reflect on the foolishness, unseemliness and wrongfulness of his rage, and begins to restrain its force; or when the person suddenly moved by pity, considers what he can do, and resorts first to one measure, then to another for mitigation of suffering, and help of the sufferer, we come upon illustrations more to our purpose, but the facts are less manageable under the theory. We come to thought as something different from impulse; thought which is not produced by appetite, or anger, or pity; thought which controls so as to restrain rage; thought which serves, so as to gratify, pity; yet is not caused or guided by pity, but is often obstructed and enfeebled by force of the emotion, so that the efficient helper has to restrain the direct action of pity, in order that he may truly act to the aid of the sufferer. We are here coming into the midst of the complexities of human action, and the simplicity of the determinist theory fails us, or adds to our perplexities by insisting that our whole philosophic task is a calculation of forces. The induction from the facts of human conduct is carrying us beyond the theory, and that on the very threshold of investigation, when we are beginning to move among the examples of voluntary activity. When passing beyond this, we note all that we regard as more properly characteristic of man in the control of his feelings, the moulding of

his character, and the achievement of ends greater than those which inclination or sensibility prompts—all that makes the individual a true man amongst men—we see what a troublesome problem human life presents to the determinist. In view of this, we readily understand how it happens that he speaks more boldly of "invariable order," when he is theoretically enlarging on the laws of the universe as the laws of life for man; and how, by contrast, when he is attempting to marshal evidence, to set in array the induction of facts, that he speaks more guardedly of "*an approximate generalization.*" We cannot wonder that this guarded phrase stands intrenched behind the acknowledgment, that "the peculiar complexity of volitional phenomena makes it a very difficult matter to prove the presence of a prevailing motive in all cases of voluntary action."[1]

Entering now more into particulars, we have to consider the influence of motives. The theory runs thus—Motives determine voluntary activity, as well as involuntary. Whence, then, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary among actions? If both are determined by motives, should not the distinction into two classes disappear? If there be a real difference, it must be a difference in the action of motives in the two cases, and that is a difference which the determinist is reluctant to allow. "Invariable order" is what is maintained; but that is the express characteristic of involuntary activity; how then shall we differentiate the "voluntary activity" of human life? The determinist offers no sufficient answer. He does indeed speak of greater complexity of motives, but this affords no definition of voluntary activity. It is not merely activity of which the motives are varied and complicated. For any true philosophy of our conduct, we must seek an explanation of the action of motives in the history of voluntary activity. It is not alleged by the libertarian that the action of motives is wanting in any case; it is not suggested by any one who has the least faith in philosophy, that motives are forces which do not operate in accordance with law. We must, therefore, trace the action of motives in cases which clearly belong to the category of voluntary activity. When a man feels pity for

[1] Sully's "Sensation and Intuition," p. 119.

one whom he sees suffering, his emotion is involuntary. The on-looker has a susceptibility of nature which is acted upon by the sight of anguish. The pity which he suddenly feels is not the result of personal determination, but the consequence of sensitiveness belonging to his nature. There is no dispute between determinists and libertarians as to this experience. If only determinists can as clearly make out the action of motive force in an exercise of voluntary activity, they have gained their case. But it is the complete contrast in the history of activity which constitutes a distinct problem. Pity is an involuntary experience; but when the person moved to sympathy begins to think what help he can render, and sets about doing something to soothe the sufferer, or abate his pain, that is voluntary. The contrast here between voluntary and involuntary is established on a clear objective basis, as well as by personal experience. As the physical frame shrinks under injury, so does the observer feel sad at sight of suffering. The accuracy of the latter statement is not affected by the fact that some men are found to look on with indifference while others suffer, and that some come even to take pleasure in inflicting injury. Such want of feeling, and wickedness of feeling are not the spontaneous expression of natural sensibility, but are pronounced "unnatural," and in reality illustrate the voluntary element, not the involuntary, thus presenting in the field of activity a contrast to the rise of the "natural" feeling of pity. Hence our condemnation of callousness and cruelty. When, however, the man moved to pity begins to reflect upon what service he can render, there is in that thought a new exercise of activity, which stands so much in contrast with the feeling of compassion, that we distinguish reflection as a voluntary exercise. How, then, is the rise of thought to be explained, and how do we account for the course of reflection which the on-looker pursues? Does pity cause thought, as the sight of suffering causes pity? Assuredly not. At the very least, we have no such simple and direct illustration of causality as in the former case. The sight of suffering acts upon susceptibility of nature, and does so inevitably and invariably, so that it needs a direct effort on our part to command our feelings if the example of suffering be of a serious nature. But pity does

not by a like direct and invariable influence produce thought. Neither by objective tests, nor by inward experience, can it be shown to be true that the more pity a man feels the more thought he exercises for the good of the sufferer. The converse is often true, and that by reason of the overwhelming power of emotion : the more of pity, the less of thought. Thus we break with the theory which makes susceptibility the key to thought, and thus far we dishonor the claims of determinism. But our analysis is not completed. Because pity is shown to lack the causal energy which would account for thought, it does not, therefore, follow that we are free to deny all relation between pity and thought, or regard the reflective process as exclusively voluntary. Though pity does not cause thought, the reflection of the on-looker would not have taken the course it has done had he not been witness of the anguish of another. Pity is thus an essential element in the whole state of mind, though it cannot account for all that belongs to that state. The emotion gives *direction* to thought in this respect, that the object which awakens pity gives *occasion* for thought, and the emotion implies *interest* in the object of sympathy. These two things, occasion and interest, are essential conditions in the exercise of an intelligent nature, and they are supplied in the case before us in part by the object which awakens the feeling, in part by the feeling awakened. But neither occasion nor interest account for thought, and we are still without the required explanation. The intelligent nature has, however, its associations with the past, and involuntary associations or recollections may play a part in the mental exercise. But recollections or associations only present past thoughts—do not account for the use made of these as applicable to the present circumstances. By reference to them, we recognize some additional elements of the mental state, showing how complex it is ; but we still want an explanation of the activity directed to meet present demands. If pity does not of itself cause thought ; if thought is not caused by the occasion or by the intelligent interest felt ; neither is it caused by the associations which arise from the stores of recollection. All of these do in a sense move to thought ; they may all be included among motives ; but all of them together do not produce thought, and the theory which

seeks to explain voluntary activity by the activity of motives fails to accomplish what it professes. Voluntary activity involves more than the movement of susceptibility and consequent impulse. Personality is more than a bundle of motive forces played upon by external agency. Tested by this illustration, determinism fails by reason of incomplete analysis and faulty logic.

So satisfied, however, are the upholders of the theory with the sufficiency of their scheme of motive agency, that determinism is prone to bring the whole philosophy of volition into the simple formula, "The strongest motive determines the will." The above analysis is sufficient as a test of the formula, whether we select some one out of the group of motive influences, or combine them into an aggregate of motive force. An additional test may, however, be found by aid of the formula, if we select the history of a single motive, and seek a theory of its increasing power. Let us take a motive exciting and naturally prone to show itself in action, thereby giving us the advantage of objective, as well as subjective tests, such as Revenge. We know something of the growth of a revengeful feeling, and we know something of its suppression. What is the history of these two opposite occurrences? The short answer according to the formula is, Revenge being strong masters the better dispositions of the mind; better dispositions being stronger, revenge is mastered by them. The strongest prevails. A short and easy answer, with all the dangers which come from a ready-cut formula. But where is will, and the whole will-problem? Revenge as against the better dispositions, or the better dispositions as against revenge, are two alternatives in which the voluntary power does not appear even in name. Whether we judge by observation of our fellow-men or by our own experience, we know that the conflict between revenge and benevolent feelings is not a matter of weights and measures. Human life does not so run its course, excitedly according as passion is heated, more quietly as passion is unstirred, by outward circumstances, making man the plaything of the elements. Such a representation caricatures our existence. The popular belief in free-will is certain to hold its sway against any thing which such a philosophy of human conduct can pre-

sent. It is true, indeed, as we all know to our cost, that a man may become the *slave* of revengeful feeling ; and it is no less true, though we are less ready to perceive and own it, that benevolent feeling may be a mere *spontaneous* disposition, drawn forth by favoring influences around, and giving no indication of power of will, or strength of character. The determinist theory has, indeed, enough hold on fact to find materials for its support, and these are materials which the libertarian theory allows as available, and recognizes as occupying an important place in the natural history of human activity. But besides dispositions with their varying strength, there is Will ; and in the midst of the variations of excitement and calm which belong to all experience, there is strength of Character, as well as strength of nature, and of these the determinist theory has no philosophy. In the history of revengeful feeling, there is a progress from less to greater. It gains in strength. What is the history of this increase ? The question is essential to the philosophic inquiry. The injury done does not account for it, since the revengeful feeling is often found to be much stronger long after the deed was done, than at the time. The tendency to such feeling in the nature of the man does not account for it, since the feeling did not blaze up in full force when the combustibles were applied to it. The feeling has been nourished within, not fed from without. Its growing strength is the consequence of the *thought* which has been given to the injury received. The man has brooded over it ; turned consideration to it time after time ; compared his experience with that of his injurer, and so "nursed his wrath." The disposition threatening to break forth into violence, is the child of his own rearing, and if the strong arm of the law be required to keep it in check, full account will be made of the paternity. Now, the growth of this disposition is itself a course of activity. What determines this course of action ? The injury received causes irritation ; does irritation cause thought, and thought cause greater irritation ? Then a less irritation causes a greater ; less causal energy is the generating power of the greater energy ; and thus "the strongest motive determines the will." Most admirable logic ! Revenge cannot be at once the cause of thought, and an effect of thought. Nor can we wait for

some outburst of revengeful feeling, to witness how truly the strongest motive determines the will. There is action of will throughout the course of development. When the motive is weak, the will is determining that it become stronger; the injured man is wilfully turning attention on the injury done him, and giving additional force to the evil disposition, in accordance with the recognized law of emotional development. The causal energy is found in thought—in the "deliberation" which leads to fresh decision; and of that, determinism has no adequate philosophy.

Taking the converse in human history—the conquest over revenge—the power of thought becomes more conspicuous. The intelligent nature rules over the emotional and brings it into subjection. As must be true in each conquest, the stronger overcomes the weaker, and there is room enough for use of the formula, "the strongest motive determines the will;" but analysis will show that the formula renders us little service, and that we are nearer the truth in saying that the will determines which motive shall be the stronger, when it determines that revenge shall not rule, even though the injury done, and the feeling stirred, conspire to favor an opposite result. Another power meets the rising disposition, staying its progress. Under what laws is the change of action induced? The disposition cannot cause the thought which resists it, and the determinist theory has special difficulty when it seeks to account for the result. The injury inflicted tends to but one result. The revengeful feeling when it arises seeks gratification. But, on a line directly antagonistic to both, intelligence deals with the question of duty, and setting it against indulgence of the existing disposition, and under its influence a new direction is given to feeling and action, so that the force of revenge is not allowed to appear in the field of external observation. Whence the lack of active result from a disposition naturally so turbulent; whence the force of thought determining the right in human action, and providing for the abatement of the disturbing feeling? Thought cannot be likened as a force to such a disposition as revenge. The law of action in the two cases is quite different, and any attempt to set the one against the other for measurement as if each were so much force, is misleading. A

reasoning process differs in nature from passionate feeling. If the former accomplishes results which include the suppression of passion, it does so not by laying so many more pounds weight of force against the force already existing in mind, but by a method entirely different, involving an action which must be differently explained. Intelligence reckons far more in human history than blind impulse ; discrimination clears the field of action, first making a better course visible, and thereafter attainable. The will-problem demands an explanation of the distinctive action of thought—for Intelligence and Will reign together or retreat in company. Blind passion is no manifestation of will : governed passion illustrates the action of both intelligence and volition. The determinist theory is driven from its line of operations, and fails to prove that all human activity finds its philosophy in the balance of contending forces. To account for voluntary discrimination is the real demand upon those who would solve the will-problem. Every thing which tends to drag intelligent reflection to the level of a competing force amongst clamorous passions, favors departure from the pathway of philosophy. Little better is done toward supplying a philosophy, when we are asked to make account of associations, education, and companionship. All attempts to show us that we are simply what we have been made, fall wide of the object. We have, no doubt, our stores of associations which play their part unbidden ; we are what our education has made us, and hence it happens that some have a harder battle to fight than others in striving to do the right : companionship affects us all less or more in what we do ; but no one of these, nor all of them together, can supply what we search for in order to solve the problem of voluntary activity. Associations are but recollections of what has been ; education has given a degree of fixedness to the pliable elements in our nature : companions can lend some influence of their own dispositions to give force to ours ; but the problem remains. Man is not a child in leading-strings, with the past as an ogre determining the future. Human nature is not even half understood, when it is treated of as a bundle of associations, habits, and sensibilities. Nor is human activity half explained if it be represented that intelligence does nothing better than open a

channel along which a rising disposition may flow to determine outward conduct. To seek the key to volition in appetite, rather than in intelligence, is to confuse the most obvious results of analysis. To say that appetite is a species of volition, as Professor Bain does,[1] and then to treat of appetites as "cravings," which they undoubtedly are, is to expose the confusion more effectually. To speak of a regard to the pleasurable and the painful as exciting to action is obviously legitimate, but it leaves still before us the problem how the regard to these forms of experience is controlled, so that the desire of pleasure is refused gratification, and suffering is bravely endured. Unfortunately for the theory, which is strong as to the impulsive power of the desire of the agreeable, it is weak in its account of the control of such desire. It is most true, as Mr. James Mill said,[2] "When we have obtained a command over the ideas, we have obtained a command over the motions;" but under a determinist theory, which accounts for voluntary action by the dominion of the strongest motive, we have no adequate philosophy of the mode in which we obtain command over our ideas, and by means of this command over our appetites and other desires.

I pass now to the libertarian theory as the one which seems to me to meet the requirements of the problem. Rational conduct is the only free action. There is no example of voluntary activity where intelligence is not the governing power determining what is prudent, appropriate, or right. There is, indeed, no action independeent of motive power or inducement to act; but there is no voluntary action in which motive power is not regulated by rational power. The libertarian theory makes account of the power of motives, and of the laws in accordance with which an increase in motive force occurs; but it seeks to explain voluntary action, not by reference to appetite, or the relative force of motives, but by reference to the functions of intelligence and the possibility of determining personal action in accordance with its dictates.

This brief explanatory statement is sufficient to indicate that a large amount of misrepresentation or misunderstanding

[1] "Senses and Intellect," p. 225.

[2] "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," ii., p. 274.

of the libertarian theory appears in the numerous adverse criticisms from those who are the upholders of the opposite scheme of human activity. It is at the very outset a misrepresentation of the libertarian view of the problem to say that under this theory a free action is regarded as an uncaused action, or a motiveless action, or an action resulting from a mind in a state of indifference as to the act itself, and the end it is to serve. We have, indeed, had discussions on the libertarian side, as to "liberty of indifference," but no one who applies any adequate test to philosophic investigation will treat such discussions otherwise than as examples of recoil from the opposite extreme. "Liberty of indifference" may be laid on the shelf as a philosophic curiosity, along with the statement of Spinoza, "A thing is free which acts by the sole necessity of its nature." Activity implies adaptation of means to ends, and voluntary activity implies an intelligent and deliberate use of means for an end contemplated. The libertarian clearly recognizes this, and even insists upon it, so that the description of the libertarian interpretation of the problem of voluntary activity is so greatly at fault, as to amount to a caricature, which says that "voluntary actions are the unconditional products of perfectly spontaneous beings, . . . the fortuitous and unpredictable selection of an undetermined mind or will."[1] To suppose that libertarianism has so utterly mistaken the very nature of the problem to be discussed, is something surprising on the part of one who undertakes to trace "the genesis of the free-will doctrine." A philosophy of "unconditional products" would be a curiosity greater than any thing found in history; and it is certainly a natural thing after this description of a voluntary action that the belief in such a form of activity should be designated a "curious tenet." By universal agreement voluntary activity involves the play of motive, direction of energy, and contemplated end. No terms could be more unsuited for its description than "unconditional" and "spontaneous." When we speak of "human actions done consciously and with choice," we expressly indicate certain conditions of their performance; both the consciousness and the choice must be ac-

[1] Sully's "Sensation and Intuition," p. 118.

counted for; and it is only in this way that we can profess to offer a theory of voluntary activity. As, then, consciousness is the test of certainty in all cases, the specialty to be explained is the "choice," and in attempting this, we must recognize alternatives, with selection and rejection deliberately carried through. It will thus appear from the nature of the thing to be explained, that whatever account the libertarian theory gives of the nature of man as a voluntary agent, it does not reach any such conclusion as this, that we are "perfectly spontaneous beings," but a conclusion as far removed from that as any thing can well be.

Brushing aside the confusion which has arisen on account of the tendency to treat of freedom of choice as equivalent to uncaused activity, we should find common ground for both theories in the facts to be explained. Such common ground we have, first, presence and power of *motives* within consciousness—sensibilities inclining to action—appetites, dispositions, tendencies of our nature which stimulate to action, and are in themselves a form of activity. Again, it is admitted that these motive forces vary in strength, growing in power and abating in influence. An explanation of these varying degrees of strength is required under any theory. Further, as consciousness testifies to the presence of motives, *intelligence* concerns itself with their presence, their varying power, and their government. We need a philosophy of this intellectual action. Again, under the guidance of intelligence, there is *choice* between motives, in accordance with which some are checked, others are encouraged and directed for the attainment of a deliberately preferred end. We need a philosophy of this choice, and of the activity which flows from it. These are the facts. Whether a complete philosophy of the facts can be supplied, or whether there is a large degree of the unknown connected with mind, as there is with brain, remains to be seen. I have indicated why the determinist scheme of human action seems to me to be no philosophy of voluntary activity; I shall now endeavor briefly to indicate the grounds on which the libertarian scheme appears to have a claim to acceptance.

To admit that motives rise in consciousness, gain in strength, and fade away, in accordance with fixed laws; that there are

besides definite and fixed laws of intellectual action ; and that there are also laws in accordance with which a personal choice can be exercised among conflicting motives : these are the necessary conditions on which any start can be made in attempting to construct a philosophy of voluntary action. The most outstanding and important feature here is *choice ;* it is this which makes the contrast between nature and mind, when the former term is employed to designate the material universe ; it marks the contrast between the mechanical and the voluntary ; and round this distinctive feature the main difficulties gather.

The first stage toward a philosophy of voluntary activity is passed without raising dispute. We possess a sensitive nature, liable to be acted upon by external influence, and awakening inclination toward action by the laws which pertain to its own life. According to impressions made upon us, or the operation of forces within us, we are moved to act. The greater the impression made on us, the stronger the tendency to act. The libertarian does not dispute with the determinist at this point. So far as the *rise* of motives is concerned, we are determined *toward* action without exercise of choice. The dispute begins when we say that these motives present the materials of choice to man, and do not of themselves determine his action.

The second stage is that by which the transition is made from tendency, inclination, or impulse to choice. We possess an intellectual nature, capable of contemplating our dispositions, comparing them, and judging of their fitness in the circumstances. Without the possibility of such contemplation, comparison, and judgment, there could be no choice ; the possibility of these provides an essential requisite for choice. That the intelligent nature concerns itself with the motive forces which arise in our experience, distinguishing between them as to nature and quality, and that it *should* so distinguish, are things insisted upon under the utilitarianism expounded by the upholders of determinism. These considerations, therefore, do not afford legitimate ground for dispute.

But the third and last stage is, that along with a power of discrimination, there is in our nature a power of control in the exercise of which motives can be developed or restrained. This

is Will. As intelligence is essential for its exercise, will is exercised only in so far as intelligence is employed for the direction of motives. The value of the guidance depends upon the value of the intellectual exercise which gives it direction, and hence it may be wise or unwise, right or wrong in conduct; but in either case the fact of direction illustrates choice; the contrast between the wise and the unwise establishes the difference between Intelligence and Will. In this relation we come at once on the "peculiar complexity of volitional phenomena." The Will uses the Intelligence, and by it controls motives, yet this control proceeds only in accordance with the fixed laws which determine the rise and fall of motive-force. Will cannot change the nature of the objects which influence us, and cannot alter the sensibilities of our nature; but, these remaining as they are, will takes government over the action allowed to objects, and the play given to our sensibilities, and this is accomplished in the exercise of rational direction of the life. The mystery of man's nature is the control he has over his thoughts, and this it is which occasions the speciality in his conduct which we call freedom of choice. It is only as a thinker that man escapes being the slave of passion; only as a thinker that he gives illustration of what is involved in true control of his life; only as he persists in regulating his conduct in accordance with intelligence that he forms a character which can prove itself superior to sensibility and appetite. Here there is more than can be fully explained; but no philosophy of the will can be reached otherwise than by study of the relations of intelligence to activity. I have already shown that to make intelligence only an instrument for more widely gratifying current dispositions is to miss the interpretation of voluntary activity. What remains to be shown is that a philosophy of the application of intelligence to activity will give us a philosophy of voluntary action.

Intelligence is a governing power in our nature; it governs by directing how dispositions and passions should be allowed exercise; this direction is practically efficient in each case by observation and use of the laws which regulate the rise and fall of motive force; and, in a wider measure, in accordance with the laws which regulate the formation of character. In saying

these things we do not remove the mystery of free choice, but only indicate the laws of its exercise, showing that it is always and necessarily separated from the uncertain, spontaneous, and wayward. Freedom is the supremacy of rational law, and is calculable accordingly, though not always "predictable," for man is not always rational; but in proportion as conduct is rational, it is predictable. Freedom does imply the *possibility* of many things, but its true manifestation is not in the doing of any thing at random; or the doing of a particular thing under passion; but in the doing what reason directs. If, then, complexity and uncertainty belong to human conduct, as assuredly they do, it is because the motive forces of our nature are many, and the authority of reason is not fully established over these subordinate powers.

When we say that control of our thoughts is the key to our voluntary activity, and that such activity implies freedom of choice, there are two conditions essential to the power of choice in the government of life. The one is *power to regulate our attention*, and so control the avenues to our sensibility and the development of motive force. By this we are delivered from subjection to the susceptibilities of our nature in contrast with what holds true in animal life. The other is *a fixed and common law of rational life*, determining what rational conduct is, and presenting an invariable standard—an ideal of excellence—which a rational being is required to aim after. By this all the diversities of individuality are brought under regulation by a common rational law for all. To be able to recognize such rational law, to strive after its fulfilment, to attain to a certain degree of harmony with it, and to make such attainment helpful for still higher achievement: these are the characteristics of a life of rational freedom. Such is the libertarian scheme of voluntary activity; a scheme which will harmonize with the demands of moral law, whether represented under Utilitarian or Intuitional forms; a scheme which its critics will find to be wide as the poles asunder from a theory which would make men "perfectly spontaneous beings," and would represent a free action as an act of "sudden caprice."

HENRY CALDERWOOD.

THE LAWS OF WAR IN THEIR BEARING ON PEACE.

IT was a maxim of the arch-thief Jonathan Wild, as recorded by Fielding, his biographer, that he and his comrades should "never do more mischief to another than was necessary to the effecting his purpose; for that mischief was too precious a thing to be thrown away." The last twenty-five years have been distinguished by a series of conscious efforts to give a practical application to this doctrine; and these efforts have been made as much by the people who delight in war as by those who have become the reluctant victims of it. Laws for the limitation of severity in war are of very ancient date in European history; and it may be important to consider the modes in which these laws originated, as well as the moral justification on which they rest. But before entering on the broader inquiry, it will be convenient to recapitulate briefly the more patent efforts that have been made of late years to establish on a firmer basis, to codify, and to amend the chief rules which, in practice, have long regulated and restricted the extreme use of the so-called rights of war.

The Crimean war, in 1854, which first broke up the calm of forty years of peace, was happily signalized not only by an extremity of courteous regard, on the part of all the belligerents, for the interests of neutrals, but also by an almost unprecedented consideration for the claims of non-combatants in the belligerent States, of prisoners of war, and even, in some respects, of the private commerce conducted by citizens of the belligerent States themselves. This courtesy and amenity in practical action were embodied as a principle and starting-point for the future in the Declaration annexed to the Treaty of Paris

of 1856, signed by the representatives of France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey, and England, and to which about forty other States have since given in their adhesion. The immediate object of this Declaration was the conciliation of neutral interests; but it was in practice impossible to conciliate these interests, so far as maritime warfare was concerned, without mitigating the severity of war in its effects on citizens of the belligerent States. The abolition of privateering and the protection of an enemy's merchandise under a neutral flag, as well as the stricter interpretation to be thenceforward applied to blockades, were benefits conferred not only upon neutral States, but in which the private citizens and traders of the belligerent States also have their share.

The next epoch in the republication and amendment of the Laws of War is marked by a code, which was drawn up by Professor Lieber, and—after being submitted to and approved by a committee of officers—sanctioned by President Lincoln just before the commencement of hostilities between the Northern and Southern States of America. This code is entitled "Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field." Professor Lieber, the author, was a Prussian by birth, and in his youth had served in the Prussian army, taking part in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815. This is a matter of some interest, because of the close relationship observable between these "Instructions" and the regulations of the so-called "Prussian Military Code"—a code which has never been published, but the substance of which can be pretty accurately collected from the constant references made to it by Prussian commanders in the proclamations and manifestoes issued in the course of the late invasion of France. The Instructions here referred to were, in fact, the first attempt to make a comprehensive survey of all the exigencies to which a war of invasion is likely to give rise; and it is said on good authority that, with one exception (that of concealing in an occupied district arms or provisions for the enemy), no case presented itself during the Franco-German war of 1870 which had not been provided for in the American Instructions.

The interval between the outbreak of hostilities in America and the Franco-German war was marked by two humane and

successful efforts, known as the Conventions of Geneva and St. Petersburg, to mitigate by systematic compromises and arrangements the effects of warfare on the sick and wounded, and to discourage the use of barbarous implements which might inflict torturing pain in excess of any military advantage to be gained by the use of them. The Convention of Geneva was signed on August 22d, 1864, by the Plenipotentiaries of Switzerland, Baden, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hesse, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Würtemberg, and subsequently by Great Britain. The Convention provided, in a series of Articles, for the neutralization of ambulances and military hospitals, and of all persons engaged in the medical service or the transport of the wounded, and also of chaplains. A distinctive flag and arm-badge were to be adopted, which were to bear a red cross on a white ground. The Convention of St. Petersburg, in 1868, was entered into, on the proposition of Russia, by Great Britain, Austria and Hungary, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Prussia and the North German Confederation, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Würtemberg. The instrument recited that "the only legitimate "object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war "is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this "purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number "of men; that this object would be exceeded by the employ- "ment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of dis- "abled men or render their death inevitable; that the employ- "ment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of "humanity." The contracting parties thereupon "engage to "renounce, in case of war among themselves, the employment "by their military or naval troops of any projectile of a weight "below 400 grammes which is either explosive or charged with "fulminating or inflammable substances."

The most ambitious effort which has been made in recent times to review and include in a general survey all the chief branches of the Laws of War was inaugurated in 1874 by the Society for the Amelioration of the Condition of Prisoners of War, and was greatly advanced by the proceedings of the Brussels Conference, convoked by the Emperor of Russia in the

course of the same year. The Society owed its existence to the Universal Alliance Congress, which sat at Paris in June, 1872; and its scheme was mainly confined to carrying still further, in the interests of prisoners of war, the beneficent projects to which the Conventions of Geneva and St. Petersburg had already given substantial effect. In the original circular letter addressed by the Comte de Houdetot, President of the Executive Committee of the Society, to foreign Governments, soliciting them to send delegates to a Conference to be opened at Paris in May, 1874, it was said that "the disparity in the "rules already existing relative to the treatment of soldiers who "become prisoners of war, and the absence of any rule whatever "in most countries, have suggested the formation of a Society, "composed of members of various nationalities, with the view of "moving the Governments to conclude an agreement upon a "question so highly interesting to civilization and humanity." This letter was dated March 28th, 1874; and on the 6th of April the Russian Government, in the person of Prince Gortschakof, sent a communication to the foreign Governments, announcing the answer which it had already returned to the proposal of the Society, and further declaring that it had arrived at the intention of "laying before the Cabinets a project for an Interna- "tional Code, with the object of determining the laws and usages "of warfare." The words of Prince Gortschakof in this despatch are noticeable. He says that he incloses the project therewith, and adds: "The motive by which it is inspired is one of hu- "manity, which, we are convinced, will meet a general feeling, "a general interest, and a general need. The more that sol- "idarity becomes developed which tends in these times to bring "together, to unite, nations as the members of one family, the "more their military organization tends to give to their wars "the character of conflicts between armed nations; the more "necessary does it become, therefore, to determine with greater "precision than in past times the laws and usages admissible in "a state of war, in order to limit the consequences and to di- "minish the calamities attendant upon it, so far as may be "possible and desirable. With this end in view, it seems indis- "pensable to establish, by common accord, upon a basis of com- "plete reciprocity, rules which may be made binding on all Gov-

"ernments and their armies. We believe this to be both the "duty and the interest of every State. The project which we "submit to the examination of the Cabinets is only a starting- "point for ulterior deliberations, which we trust will prepare the "way for a general understanding. To this end, we are of "opinion that a Conference of special Plenipotentiaries might be "convoked to discuss these questions and to decide upon a "definite code, which might thenceforth be clothed with an inter- "national character." Prince Gortschakof goes on to suggest the city of Brussels as particularly appropriate for such a Congress, and names the 15th of July as a convenient date of meeting.

The Congress met accordingly at Brussels in July, the English Government having specially guarded itself against doing more than "sending a military officer as delegate, who would "not be invested with any plenipotentiary powers, and who "would simply report the proceedings, reserving to Her Maj- "esty's Government entire liberty of action in regard to them." Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, had also expressly stipulated that such a delegate could only be sent upon his Government receiving from the Russian Government, as well as from the Governments of all the Powers invited to take part in the Conference, the most positive and distinct assurance "that their delegates at the Conference should be in- "structed to confine themselves to the consideration of details "of military operations of the nature of those dealt with in the "Project of the Russian Government, and should not entertain "in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to mari- "time operations or naval warfare."

The results of the Congress are of the highest interest, though no actual convention has as yet resulted from them. The discussions between the representatives of the larger and of the smaller states served to bring to light many of the inherent, but scarcely suspected, obstacles to unanimity in the attempt to codify the Laws of War at the present time, and to expose in the clearest light some insuperable difficulties in the way of conciliating opposing interests, owing to the mere transitory influence of passions already excited by recent wars. A careful review of the original text of the Project for the amendment of the

Laws of War proposed by the Russian Government, of the text as finally "modified by the Conference," and of the arguments or almost desultory conversations in which the different representatives expressed their views on every part of the scheme, will be found to afford the best attainable instruction on the whole subject of the Laws of War, as applicable, and as in fact applied, to the present circumstances of European States.[1] The text, as modified by the Conference, embodies in clear and legal, though not technical, language all the best recognized, as well as all the unwritten, rules and usages relating to the conduct of land warfare. In two clauses it summarily includes all the regulations of the Conventions of Geneva and of St. Petersburg. It further reduces to precise expression the least vague and uncertain of the rules of practice which the more modern requirements of war had already suggested and partially enforced. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the treatment by an invading army of invaded territory and of its inhabitants, the conduct of sieges and bombardments, and, according to the original purport of the whole movement, the situation of prisoners of war, form a series of topics each of which is handled with minuteness, but not with prolixity. Taken together, they constitute a code which, whatever its legally binding force, cannot be henceforth left out of account in any attempt to ascertain the actual customs and usages, as well as the moral sentiments, of many of the most enlightened Governments of the world at the present time. Specimens of the provisions of this code are given at a later page. Two deductions from its value have to be made. One is, the persistent reluctance of England—in the interests, as asserted by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby,[2] of all the smaller States and of England itself—to assent to the terms of the modified text, or to assent to the renewal of the Conference in the following year (1875) for the purpose of giving more cogent effect to its recommendations. Lord Derby went so far as to say that "the result of the Brussels Conference had been to prove that it was not possible to create an "understanding with respect to the really important articles of

[1] Supplement to the *London Gazette*, Oct. 24, 1874.

[2] Despatch of Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus, 20th January, 1875.

"the Russian project; that the interests of the invading and "of the invaded State are irreconcilable; and that, even could "certain Laws of War be published in terms which admitted of "general adhesion, they would only exercise in fact that fictitious "influence which the Russian Government had protested against "at the opening of the Conference. In these circumstances, "Her Majesty's Government could not consent to pursue the "matter, nor to take any part in further negotiations or con-"ferences on the subject."

The second deduction from the value of the results of the Congress is the glaring imperfection of those results in some important respects. This is manifested, for instance, in the total omission from the modified text of the subject of Reprisals, which was a prominent topic of the original scheme, and was discussed at the sittings of the Congress. This omission seems to have been owing to the strong feelings, not yet abated, which had been aroused in the late Franco-German war. The language in which Baron Jomini, the Russian delegate, expressed his regret for the total omission of the topic is interesting, as pointing out the expectations and conceptions which the Russian Government, at all events, professed to have entertained:

"I regret that the uncertainty of silence is to prevail with respect to one of the most bitter necessities of war. If the practice could be suppressed by this reticence, I could but approve of this course. But if it is still to exist, this reticence may, it is to be feared, remove any limits to its exercise. Nevertheless, I believe that the mere mention in the Protocol that the committee, after having endeavored to regulate, to soften, and to restrain reprisals, have shrunk from the task before the general repugnance felt with regard to the subject, will have a most serious moral bearing. It will, perhaps, be the best limitation we have been able to affix to the practice, and especially to the use which may be made of it in future."

Without considering too minutely the motives of the various States which took part in this celebrated Congress, or weighing the amount of the separate interests they may be presumed to have had in its issue, it may be broadly laid down that both the most military and the most pacific States are deeply concerned in the adjustment, in one direction or another, of Laws of War. During the last quarter of a century war

has been conducted on a scale of magnitude, and with the help of scientific inventions, wholly unknown in former times. The notion of an "armed nation" is no longer confined to the attitude of a country at the exceptional crisis of suffering an invasion. The notion has been extended, and is being increasingly extended, to the chronic condition of all the leading States in times of what is apparently the most profound peace. Thus, whenever war actually takes place, its effects on life, limb, commerce, wealth, and honor radiate to a far wider circumference and are intensified at every point to which they reach. The provision for the limitation of war to the combatants professionally engaged, laboriously as it is attempted in form, rather expresses the ever-increasing difficulty of such limitation than indicates any natural tendency towards the separation of the fighting from the non-fighting part of the population. The German Landsturm may be taken as one of the most modern instances of the possible extension of the area of organized warfare. Every member of this force is liable to serve in the national army of defence up to the age of sixty years, the organized German army to be encountered by an invader being thereby raised, it is said, to three millions of men. It is obvious, then, that such questions as the treatment of prisoners of war, the modes of dealing with occupied districts, villages and towns, and their inhabitants, as well as the manner in which an invading army may support itself in a hostile territory, and even the kind of warlike instruments employed, must henceforth come home to private persons in obscure and outlying quarters, such as even in the most ruinous wars of former times have themselves had little to fear from the shock of arms. Thus it comes about that the modern inquiry as to what are, or ought to be, the Laws of War, becomes, in time of war, and so far as the belligerent States are concerned, an inquiry into the whole political constitution under which the population of those States is liable to be, for the time, compelled to live. By the fact of invasion, which, by the hypothesis, may be presumed as likely to befall the one State as the other, the male population may be converted into a standing army, martial law be substituted for the laws and customs of peace, and all the ordinary provisions for personal liberty, for the security of property, for the

just and orderly trial of offenders, be instantly overruled by regulations conceived in the interests of the war, and over which the smallest possible amount of popular control can at any time be exercised. The severer side of Laws of War has been rather epigrammatically expressed by Mr. Sutherland Edwards, one of the *Times* correspondents during the Franco-German war.[1]

"Laws are not silent in the midst of arms, but the laws made to replace ordinary laws are of a primitive and barbarous type. In principle they might not unfairly be summed up as follows: 1. For every offence punish some one; the guilty if possible, but some one. 2. Better a hundred innocents should suffer than that one guilty man should escape. 3. When in doubt, shoot the prisoner."

It does not need any circuitous reasoning to show that, even apart from all considerations of humanity, States which, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, are devoting themselves to a military career, have a strong concern and private interest in ascertaining the limitations which are to be imposed on severity in war. The larger the army and the shorter and more superficial the training its magnitude involves, the more indispensable it is for commanders in the field to be able to apply the sternest rules to the conduct of their own troops. The Government to which an invading army belongs can have no interest whatever in exacerbating on every side the feelings of the population among which the army comes. Beyond the necessity of preventing opposition and securing supplies in the most economic fashion, all the interests of the invaders are in favor of conciliating the friendship, or at least the respect, of those not engaged in the war, and of sparing to the uttermost public as well as private property upon which they have an opportunity of laying their hands. These principles are now so fully acknowledged that the only difficulty remaining is where to draw a line between those persons who are and those who are not engaged in opposing the invasion, and how to impose efficient penalties on persons who disobey the military code in its spirit or its letter.

It may thus be expected that, for the purpose of conducting warfare in the most civilized manner compatible with fighting at all, much will yet be done by conventions, and by more or

[1] "The Germans in France," by H. Sutherland Edwards, p. 285.

less clearly understood practice, to circumscribe in every way now possible the area of war, to reduce its severity, and to substitute the notion of war as a means, rough but necessary, for the attainment of some worthy end, for the notion of war as a casual and ferocious struggle, in which no other end is even plausibly put forward than the satisfaction of cupidity or the indulgence of national animosities.

There are those, however, who are far from content even with this description of the prospect in view for the more civilized countries of the world. Educate your soldiers to the utmost pitch of moral self-restraint, or even of national heroism ; take from them all that imparts to them the character of butchers, and clothe them with all that is most worthy of admiration in the occupations of peace ; give them the highest spirit of self-sacrifice, unmarred even in the heat of conflict by any taste for bloodshed or rapine, or delight in the miseries of their fellow-men ; make your armies models of organization, of individual consecration to the corporate interest, and of loyalty to the State they serve and to the military end which that State has in view. When all this is accomplished, as it might be one day, and as, perhaps, it has been already in one army or another at different epochs, it may still be asked whether wars are likely to become any the less frequent, and whether a reign of permanent peace is any nearer than it was before. For those who attach practical importance to so momentous an issue as this, not only is the more general investigation here suggested one not too remote to attract immediate interest, but inasmuch as every detailed and progressive amendment of the Laws of War prepares the way for a total reconstruction of practices now looked upon with approval, the most far-sighted philanthropist must condescend to discuss even military details for which he naturally may have little taste.

From the times of Livy, writing at the epoch of the Christian era, to those of Grotius, whose great work owed its origin to the felt horrors of the Thirty Years' War, which closed in 1648, the coexistence on the battle-field of two systems of obligation, one to the claims of military necessity, the other to the claims of abstract morality, has been recognized by all the leading writers on the subject, and by those who have been

responsible for the actual conduct of war. The story told by Livy[1] of Camillus when besieging the city of the Falisci was no doubt an anachronism to the extent that the historian imputed to a far earlier age sentiments which had only been formulated in his own time. But the fact of sentiments so memorable being prevalently acknowledged even at that time—intervening between the wars of the Republic and those of the Empire—points out how congenial they are to the instincts of even the most bellicose human nature. In reply to the schoolmaster who, in the course of the siege, had treacherously delivered into his hands the sons of the chief men of the city, Camillus answers that it was true that "the Romans and the Falisci "were bound to one another by no obligations created by man, "but by the obligations which nature had created they were both "of them bound, and ever should be; there were rights of war "as well as of peace, and in conformity to them they had been "taught to do all that justice as well as all that courage prompted." Grotius, always loyally if not servilely following the examples of former times, distinguishes in different chapters all that a military commander is licensed to do by the actual inhuman practice of war, and the modifications of the severity so permitted which a higher morality, or the desultory humanity of particular commanders, seem to recommend as doctrine or precedent. Mr. Ward, in his History of the Law of Nations,[2] fills up the chasm between the times of Livy and Grotius, and points out, with the aid of copious illustrations, how all the institutions and events, through the operation of which the modern States of Europe acquired their existing political form, combined to modify the severity of war and to circumscribe its effects. Mr. Ward passes in review the effect of chivalry, of ecclesiastical institutions, and of the feudal system, and throughout the whole region of International Law he demonstrates that while one series of influences tended to produce dislocation and animosities among the nascent States, another series, far more potent, more continuous, and more universal, was tending to bind the States together, and to make their Governments enter-

[1] Livy. Bk. V. xxvii. See also Cicero, De Legibus II. xiv.

[2] "Inquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations." By Robert Ward. 1795.

tain sentiments of friendliness to one another. The conflict of these two classes of influences, uncertain and spasmodic as it appears on a narrow inspection of it, forms a large part of the history of European civilization ; and the whole of this process is mirrored in the gradual changes which have been brought about in the art and practice of war.

These historical considerations might of themselves suggest that there is some close though hidden connection between improvements in the practice of war, looked at merely from a military point of view, and the growth of those civilized habits which are the only augury of the final establishment of peace.

The amendments of the Laws of War have two distinct aspects and origins. These amendments either have in view the mere increase of efficiency of the army, by preventing insubordination, controlling licentious dispositions, maintaining discipline in exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, and generally securing that the soldier shall only differ from the most manageable of mechanical agencies in his ability to understand and act upon the word of command, and in the power of self-adjustment by which he can mould his own actions in conformity with a common plan ; or they have in view the benefit of those, whether combatants or non-combatants, who belong to the state against which the war is waged. The most highly elaborated system of laws of war would succeed, as far as is possible, in rendering the attainment of these two objects not incompatible ; and, looking at the most recent codes, previously adverted to, it would appear that both have floated simultaneously before the minds of those who have revised the laws, and, in fact, little discrimination has been attempted between them. There must, then, be some ground of unity on which all these amendments rest, and in view of which their value and bearing must be judged.

This ground of unity may perhaps be found in the fact that, whatever are the laws for the restraint and direction of those who carry on war, the differences between one class or kind of laws and another are of infinitely less importance than the difference which exists between a system of warfare in which Laws of War of some sort are recognized and a system in which the will of one who is going forth conquering and to conquer is the supreme and final rule of action for him and his. During

this terrific period of some thousands of years, in which the nations of the world are being made perfect through the suffering of war, the hope of ever attaining the perfection compatible with the natural conditions of human life must wholly rest upon the perpetual sustenance of those moral ties between man and man, and between nation and nation, from which all promising growths can alone spring. There can be no doubt but that by the union, in the way of alliances and of co-operation, which it has promoted, war has done something towards educating and preserving some moral instincts of the most precious kind. But there can also be no doubt but that so far as warfare has become habitual in a State, or as particular wars have lasted long and had their area widely and indefinitely extended, the most flourishing shoots of all moral unity between the populations to which the war has reached have been seriously threatened. So far as wars have incidentally favored fellowship and brotherhood, it has been by force of those very Laws of War on the subsistence of which all durable alliances, all effective co-operation, all concentration of purpose, have depended.

Savages, indeed, make occasional combinations and alliances, and the Book of Judges presents a picture of a more advanced stage, in which a momentary co-operation is secured for a definite end, and a brief warfare is followed by an anarchy of peace, in which everybody does what is right in his own eyes. But in all gradations of warlike practice, from the time of the most primitive and casual expeditions to the modern era of "armed nations" using up in times of peace most of the public revenue and the best physical resources of the country in preparation for ever-renewed war, there are still present the two counter agencies by which mankind is separated on the one hand and is bound together on the other. The hope of progress has turned and will turn upon the narrowing within the smallest possible compass what is casual, accidental, or capricious in warfare. It is in this region that individual passions, national prejudices, the indulgence of narrow and short-sighted selfishness, find their home and pasture-ground.

When once it is recognized that war is the most serious of all pursuits in which man can ever presume to engage, and calls for the contribution of all that legislative science and educated hab-

its of self-restraint can impart to it, the field is at least partially cleared for the natural play of those orderly instincts which belong to conditions of peace. It is in disorder, irregularity, hurry, and confusion that what is truly bellicose, ferocious, and purely animal in man can best range at large. It being assumed that the moral ties which bind man to man, as God's common creatures and children, are not matters of artificial and laborious construction, but are real and innate, only needing the order of social and political existence to discover them and to call them into their appropriate activity, it may follow that they may be hidden or destroyed by one sort of warfare, while they may live and even flourish by the very help of another. Thus, improvements in the mere technical regularity of warfare, which must imply restrictions upon an aimless and reckless severity, may be silently nurturing the very moral sentiments which in time will become the direct agency for the abolition of war itself.

For the main hope of permanent peace turns not so much on the casual adoption of more convenient, less expensive, and less circuitous processes than war for the defence of rights, as on the ultimate preponderance, diffusion, and strength of the sentiments which bind men together, as contrasted with the force of those which separate them. The conspicuous and alarming organization of war in the present day, with all the material appliances employed, and with all the special political and quasi-legal administration to which it gives rise, are far more patent to the eyes of all men, than facts of another class, not indeed so startling and lurid, but of far deeper and more lasting import. It is certain that the mere introduction of free popular institutions in two States, and a single glance or reminiscence of brotherly sentiment between the populations of those States, might supersede in a day all the elaborate contrivances for war which military dynasties had for years before laboriously collected together. It is not so much that novel expedients for terminating differences would be resorted to, as that the differences themselves, where existing in any portentous form, would be of a wholly novel kind. So-called national honor would have a very different interpretation put upon it when the alternative of fighting for it was so repugnant as to seem impossible. All questions capable of reference to arbitration would not be

tardily and hesitatingly referred to it, but such references would be eagerly sought for in anticipation, and as few unsettled questions left open as remain in an assize town after a general gaol delivery.

The impulse towards peace, or rather the dominant repulsion from war, would be favored by a number of circumstances, some of them slight in themselves and almost evading attention, but which in the aggregate would have long prepared the populations of the two States for concord, and indisposed them for quarrels or physical conflicts. Many of these circumstances are negative rather than positive, but none the less influential on that account. Such are the total abandonment of the lust of territory, an easy forgetfulness of transient animosities or disputes, the absence of dynastical apprehensions, the impossibility of those secret diplomatic mismanagements which so frequently generate widespread misunderstandings.

Chief among the more positive influences favoring a pacific disposition is a growing concern for the freedom of commercial intercourse, for unrestricted opportunities of travel and mutual acquaintance, and, in fact, for all that zealous co-operation which, as existing among the citizens of any one State, is the source of its vitality and growth.

These relations, which, stated in this abstract form, seem rather to wear the color of a gorgeous prophecy than the duller drapery of facts which meet the eye, are, really, already found to exist beween more than one pair of States in the civilized world, of equal political importance and, so far as can be conjectured, military or naval strength. They have been described here for the purpose of clearly showing what is the state of things where the true moral ties, which everywhere in truth bind men and States together, have succeded in attaining a supreme ascendency over the accidental elements of selfishness, distrust, or mere dislike, the force of which is represented in armies and navies.

The exact antithesis of the above picture—that is, where the dislocating elements have attained a supreme ascendency over the moral ties—has been, and still is, too faithfully imaged in such abuse of military strength, as characterized the English in their Chinese wars and in some of their Asiatic expeditions, the English again in their barbarous conflicts with the aboriginal

tribes in the neighborhood of some of their colonies, and the French in some of their exploits in the north of Africa. The effect of conduct such as is here alluded to, in which all Laws of War are superseded in the name of military necessity, or are treated as good enough for one hemisphere or country, but not for another, operates as an annihilation of the very idea of moral ties existing between belligerents. The very defence put forward for this unscrupulous indulgence in war, is that moral duties are not necessarily binding on one army, unless they are acknowledged and performed by the combatants on the other side. But this plea rests the performance of moral duties upon the basis of choice, caprice, charity, or bargain, and is nothing else than a repudiation of the absolute obligation of morality and a denial of the moral constitution of every single combatant on either side.

What, however, is important to notice for the purpose of the present argument is that where Laws of War, instead of being made or held obligatory on all combatants on both sides, are merely introduced so far as they are accidentally convenient for the purposes of one, the utmost is done to destroy the basis on which alone real pacific relations can be resumed and permanently maintained. Especially in conflicts with half-civilized races, it is in the exciting moments of battle that the most distinct lessons are taught by those who represent the best moral attainment of the civilized world. If the lessons taught are such as to misrepresent the moral responsibilities of the teacher, every war, or even every engagement, must only plunge the combatants on one side into a deeper abyss of hostility to all civilized institutions, and of general savagery, and react fatally on the other side by teaching the army, and those who follow its movements at home, that duties generally have only to be performed so far and so long as it is safe and convenient to perform them.

Thus, by taking two extreme cases, it has been shown that war, as modified by the laws and restrictions which the conscience of the civilized world, working in concurrence with the dictates of military and political convenience, imposes, marks an intermediate and, it may be hoped, transitory stage between an absolute oblivion of moral obligations and such an ascendency of the sense of these obligations, as would render the cruel

hardships and bitter passions which are inevitable even in the best-conducted wars an anachronism. From this point of view it would be interesting to notice the real effect of some of the leading doctrines and regulations by which the conduct of war is now, so far as Europe is concerned, surrounded by limitations conceived in the interest of humanity, and therefore, as has been shown, of peace.

The "modified text" of the Brussels Congress may be taken as an approximate statement, if not of the actual practice now habitual in European wars, at least of the theoretical rules already either well established or on the verge of receiving such general approval as must lead to their being established. Take, for instance, the leading topic of prisoners of war. According to the resolutions of the Congress, prisoners of war are "lawful "and disarmed enemies;" "they are in the power of the enemy's "Government, but not of the individuals or of the corps who "made them prisoners;" "they should be treated with human-"ity;" "all their personal effects, except their arms, are to be "considered their own property;" while "liable to internment in "a town, fortress, camp, or in any locality whatever, under an "obligation not to go beyond certain fixed limits," they "may "not be placed in confinement, unless absolutely necessary as a "measure of security;" they may be "employed on certain pub-"lic works which have no immediate connection with the opera-"tions on the theatre of war, provided the employment be not "excessive, nor humiliating to their military rank if they belong "to the army, or to their official or social position if they do "not belong to it;" "the pay they receive will go towards "ameliorating their position, or will be put to their credit at "the time of their release;" their maintenance is to be provided for by the Government in whose power they are, and, in default of a mutual understanding on the subject between the belligerents, and as a "general principle," they are to be "treated, as regards food and clothing, on the same footing as "the troops of the Government who made them prisoners."

Take, again, the modified text agreed to, after a rather fiery discussion between the German delegate on the one side and the representatives of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland on the other, respecting the relations of an invading army

to the population of the invaded country. Leaving on one side, as presenting insuperable difficulties, the vexed question of the right of the population of occupied territory to rise in arms against the invader without being treated as rebels and traitors, the modified text confines itself to the following rules, which seem to have been treated as of indisputable authority :

"The population of an occupied territory cannot be compelled to take part in military operations against their own country. The population of occupied territories cannot be compelled to swear allegiance to the enemy's power. The honor and rights of the family, the life and property of individuals, as well as their religious convictions and the exercise of their religion, should be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. Pillage is expressly forbidden."

With respect to the last two clauses, the modified text introduces some explanations and definitions for the purpose of regulating the mode of exacting forced contributions for the support of the invading army.

The text, indeed, though reproducing the actual practice in recent wars of invasion on the European continent, is behind the requirements of some of the most competent authorities on the subject, and, as will be seen lower down, the strong recommendations and experience of the Duke of Wellington. The text says that the enemy, in levying contributions, should proceed as far as possible according to the rules of the distribution and assessment of the taxes in force in the occupied territory ; that for every contribution a receipt should be given to the person furnishing it ; that requisitions should be made only by the authority of the commandant of the locality occupied ; and that for every requisition an indemnity should be granted or receipt given. The text says nothing about the kind of materials to which requisitions may extend, and is certainly most unsatisfactory in respect of the modes of payment which it contemplates. The passage of the text in which it introduces the necessities of war as a ground for determining the sorts of payments and services which may be demanded from parishes and their inhabitants, in fact does nothing more than leave the whole matter to the irresponsible will of the officer in command.

Before leaving this last-mentioned topic, it may be well to recall more precisely the views held by the Duke of Wellington

in 1815, as reported by Lord Palmerston on his visit to Paris in September of that year. The Duke told Lord Palmerston that "the system of individual plunder had been the ruin of the "French army, and would be the destruction of the Prussian. "When officers were allowed to make requisitions for their "troops, they soon began to make them for themselves; and "those who demanded provisions to-day would call for money "to-morrow. War then assumed a new character; the profes- "sion of arms became a mercenary speculation, and the officers' "thoughts grew to be directed to the acquisition of plunder in- "stead of the attainment of glory." Lord Palmerston adds that the Duke had succeeded in keeping his army well in hand; no officer was permitted to make any requisition himself, but was obliged to state his wants to the commissary, who applied to the agents of the French Government for the articles required; and the supply being made through channels known to the people, and by authorities recognized by them, the burden was not felt to be so oppressive as if the exaction had been made by the immediate order of an enemy and at the caprice of individual officers. The consequence was, that though both the Prussians and the English lived equally at the expense of the country, the first were detested and the latter liked.[1]

The general reasoning is applicable to all cases of invasion, though the passage of the allied armies through France could only be called an invasion in a special sense.

In citing the above extracts from the amendments of the Laws of War agreed to at the Brussels Conference, it is not here even so much as hinted that they are anything more than imperfect and tentative approximations to the rules which a pure regard to the interests of humanity would enact, and still less that the rules themselves represent the actual practice even of those States which have been most loud in the vindication of them. It is notorious that in the Franco-German war the most cruel hardships were inflicted on the French nation, not from the want of sufficient rules for restricting severities, or of a sincere desire on the part of the Germans to conduct the war in a civilized manner, but from the wide scope for license which—

[1] "Selections from Private Journals of Tours in France in 1815 and 1818." By the Rt. Hon. Viscount Palmerston, K. G. 1871.

in the hurry andconfusion of an invasion—the strictest rules still leave open, and from the unscrupulous rigor with which an observance of the rules affecting the invaded population was enforced. The mode, indeed, of enforcing Laws of War must always leave a dangerous latitude of discretion to commanders in the field, where it is quite impracticable to substitute for prompt and rough remedies the tardy and dignified procedure of peace. It is in this region of discretion that the perplexed question of reprisals and of what are called military executions —which, in fact, are nothing else than the punishment of the innocent with or for the guilty—would seem destined always to lurk. A special hardship is also involved in the fact that the new crimes which the Laws of War invent are measured on a wholly different principle from the crimes recognized in legislation for peace, and their magnitude bears very little proportion to moral guilt. Thus, in the new circumstances of modern war, there are scarcely any offences which it is more indispensable for an invading army to repress by every method within its reach than those of taking up railway lines, destroying railway bridges, and cutting telegraph wires. Such offences have effects far more serious than the old-fashioned offences of creating impediments on roads of march or of casually intercepting individual messengers. The whole safety of an army and the success of an expedition may be involved in the possibility of a sure reliance on rapid conveyance from point to point, or on communication being maintained hour by hour between widely removed detachments of the army.

These criticisms point to the fact that in discussing the bearing of Laws of War it must be borne in mind that (1) all imaginable Laws of War are imperfect from a purely humanitarian point of view; and however near they approach to perfection from a point of view which is at once military and humanitarian, they must, by their very nature, leave open wide gaps to be filled by the discretion of individual commanders or the peculiar emergencies which the changing events of the war may from time to time present; that (2) the Laws now actually in existence are very far from approaching even the degree of perfection which the philanthropist might be entitled to demand of the military legislator, and express, in fact, nothing

more than the maximum amount of agreement which, in the present circumstances of Europe, the European States, great and small, can, in view of all the separate interests involved or supposed to be involved, arrive at; and that (3), so far as recent experience has gone—an experience which involves wars conducted on the European continent on a wholly unprecedented scale of magnitude—the Laws themselves are most imperfectly obeyed, often scandalously outraged, and, if the conflict long endure, more and more cast on one side and forgotten.

Nevertheless, with all these deductions, the existence of such Laws for the mitigation of severities in war as professedly govern the conduct of modern armies is a great boon to humanity, and affords the best of all guarantees for the gradual abolition of war itself. Over and above the public and constant testimony which any Laws for the limitation of war present to the moral ties which in spite of the war itself continue to bind together the citizens and soldiers of both States, some more particular effects of these Laws on the promotion and maintenance of peace are brought about in certain distinctly intelligible ways, which may be recapitulated as follows:

1. Laws of War, whatever their character and merit, have at least the effect of assigning limits, lines, and boundaries to the conduct of war. If ferocity or individual license cannot be eradicated, they are, at least in outward form, put into fetters. If the distinction between the private citizen and the armed soldier is drawn recklessly or harshly, at any rate the notion of such a distinction is persistently maintained. War, in profession at least, as the Emperor William said at Forbach, in his proclamation on entering France, is made on soldiers and not upon citizens. In this proclamation the Emperor added that French citizens would "continue to enjoy entire security for "their persons and property so long as they did not themselves "deprive him, by hostile enterprises against the German troops, "of the right of granting them his protection." Even if the humane treatment of prisoners of war cannot be absolutely ensured, the moral duty of securing their persons from outrage, and of providing for them with all the care due to the stranger and the guest, is openly confessed. Even if private property is exposed to the utmost risks, and, in spite of every formal

restraint, is still recklessly stolen or injured under the name of requisitions, still a distinct protest continues to be made against the supposition that war can be waged for purposes of self-enrichment, or that unpermitted spoliation is any less robbery in a time of war than in a time of peace.

All these lines and boundaries, imperfect, uncertain, fluctuating, and often undecipherable as they are, at least have the effect of sustaining the idea that war is only made in order to promote a distinct political object outside itself, and not for the purpose of giving vent to those passions and dispositions which are in truth, or ought to be, the disfigurements, and not the characteristic features, of war. The general result must be to bring into ever clearer view the notion of war as merely a means to an end, and therefore possibly one among many other means to the same end. The political use of war is thus constantly encroaching on the mere military appetite for it; and, simultaneously, the various defects of war, as an instrument the most costly, the most uncertain, the most injurious to both belligerents, and the most outrageous to humanity, become matter of grave political consideration in the course of calculating the worth of the object to be attained, and the material or moral expensiveness of various competing means at hand for attaining it. It is obvious, then, that to the extent that war is, in public profession and even in desultory practice, restricted and circumscribed, the arguments for choosing the alternative of peace obtain a better chance of being heard and deliberately weighed. The issue in the course of time can hardly be doubtful.

2. A minor consequence of the imposition of bounds and limits to war by the laws introduced for the mitigation of its severity is that commanders in the field and their Governments thereby retain in their hands the only effective means for bringing the war to an instant close so soon as the political object is attained. The history of long wars, such as the Hundred Years' War of the English in France, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, and even the Bonapartist wars, shows how hard it is to maintain from the outset one steady political purpose, or limited assemblage of purposes, as the cause of the war, without the war itself and its events generating in their progress an

ever-enlarged variety of new purposes which themselves tend to give to the war an indefinite perpetuity, only prevented, in fact, by total exhaustion on one side or on both. It is one of the hardest problems of diplomatists, and exercises all the self-restraint of commanders in the field, upon whom are always cast diplomatic functions of the first importance, to prevent this incessant generation of fresh causes of dispute ; and, of all causes, those due to the license of individual soldiers or the reckless violation and destruction of property are among the most potent. So far as Laws of War are wisely conceived, strictly interpreted, and sternly as well as impartially administered, the original objects of the war are kept free from all perplexing or confusing images which, mostly unreal, are the fruit rather of passion and hatred than of any genuine political differences.

3. It has sometimes been said by the most thoughtless writers on war that the more cruelly and recklessly war is conducted, the more likely it is to become matter of general abomination, and therefore the more effectually are the ultimate interests of peace provided for. Such persons would reduce Laws of War to the narrowest proportions, and would do little more than provide against usages familiar only among the lowest of the savage races. They would connive at, if not applaud, the indiscriminate use of all the implements and all the force in the hands of a commander. Unrestricted violence, even amounting to depopulation, is looked upon with approval as likely to wean the suffering nation forever from a warlike career ; and even the horrors of a long siege followed by bombardment and barbarous assault are counted among the necessities of war, the absence of which might make it only too pleasant and attractive a pastime.

Those who write and speak in this way can only have taken a most superficial view of the meaning of St. James's account of why "wars and fightings" come. They come not from any studied preference for war as an occupation, nor from any misapprehension as to the sufferings it causes, nor even from any forgetfulness of the losses and calamities which a very recent war may have brought with it. So far as war is used as any other than the roughest, the nearest, and the most familiar instrument for the attainment of political ends, it owes its

sustenance to the force of those brutal and unbridled passions which St. James designates as the lusts which war in our members. It is not most, it may be even least of all, the soldier who is easily possessed with the uncontrollable desire to fight. It needs, under the modern conditions of easy communication, but a few paragraphs in any largely circulated daily newspaper about some alleged violation of the national honor, prestige, or what not, or even the narrative of some accidental conflict on the frontiers between the inhabitants of outlying villages, to rouse throughout a whole country the most vindictive and savage passions of which human nature is capable, and which years of civilization and centuries of Christianity seem only to have cloaked, and never disciplined. These feelings become, by means of civil and domestic association, and of all the facile machinery for ascertaining and concentrating public opinion, a dominant rage of a strength far greater and more lasting than is possible in the isolated brute beast. Governments are perforce led or driven by the incendiary vehemence of those they rule; and they can only maintain their own existence by finding some diplomatic artifice for precipitating a war and glutting the popular thirst for blood.

In such a state of things as this, the recurrence of which at frequent intervals is one of the most harrowing phenomena of modern times, it is far more the severities of war than the mitigations of it which are its recommendation to the popular mind. If the people have themselves suffered in previous wars, they wish now to make others suffer equally and in the same way. The strength and blindness of passion make them callous to the possible sufferings of themselves and their countrymen; the familiar experience of the murderer who, with the certainty of conviction and of bringing on himself a shameful death, takes no count of the future in the presence of the enemy who for the moment is before him, is repeated and multiplied over half a continent.

If this be a true explanation of the deep-lying causes which, in the teeth of all the civilizing influences operating directly the other way, continue to make war possible and popular, the remedies for it must be in the exactly opposite direction from that to which the advocates of reckless severity are looking.

The main and only hope for maintaining throughout large populations a balance of mind and moral self-restraint in the presence of irritating incidents and diplomatic controversies, is to be found in such a popular training as shall bring the brutal passions of an associated crowd under exactly the same chronic discipline as the civilized individual man, not to say the Christian, has long learned to exercise in the culture of his own spirit. Human society in a single country could never have existed, or its artificial maintenance would be an intolerable burden, if every occasion of discord, every act or suspicion of an act of wrong-doing, every question of disputed rights, were instantly to call into action, offensive or defensive, the strongest passions of the human breast.

The progress of civilization has been marked, not by the annihilation nor even the weakening of these passions, but by the effective subordination and use of them to the loftiest ends. The disuse of private wars, of trial by battle, and of duelling, has marked the gradual and more overt steps of this great moral achievement. It is only in the relations between nation and nation that it is still believed that brutality, passionateness, cruelty, and selfishness may not only riot to the uttermost, but may legitimately begin to riot on the very slightest provocation. It is impossible for any believer in the progress of the human race, and in the redemption which, day by day and century by century, is searching out all the dark places of the earth and bringing them under a truly Divine dominion, to admit that war represents more than one transient spasm, be it of hard necessity or of still untamed passion, which the world will in no long time have outgrown, and, except for purposes of wholesome reminder, have forgotten. So far as Laws of War exist and operate, their action has been shown to help forward the arrival of this kingdom which cannot be moved, and which alone can hold its own in those moments when the heathen rage and the people imagine a vain thing.

SHELDON AMOS.

SECULARIZED EDUCATION.

WHO is the agent entitled to control education? What is right education? These quesions are interdependent. Two answers have been proposed to the first in history: The State, the Church. In Europe, Liberalism says the State, and insists on secularizing education, by which it means its release from the control of popery. Liberals see clearly that, under that control, there will be no true freedom. But, as they also insist on secularizing the State, their idea of a free education is of one devoid of religion, separating the mental from the spiritual culture. Thus they conclude that education must be Godless, in order to be free. Rome has herself to blame for this error, as for most of European scepticism. She claims that she alone is Christian: independent minds reply, "Then Christianity is evil." So if her education were the only Christian, freemen would have to reject Christian education. If private judgment is sin; if the hierarchy is the Church; if the teacher is a real priest and essential "proxy" between men and salvation; if his teaching is infallible; if the real end of the culture is to enslave the soul to a priesthood with a foreign head; if that head is absolutely superior to the secular sovereignty, such ecclesiastical education will be civil slavery. It is not strange that men seeking civil liberty spurn it.

The mistake is in confounding ecclesiastical with Christian education. Let the Scripture be heard: "The kingdom of God is within you," consisting, not in a greedy hierarchy, but in the rule of Truth; the clergy are not lords over God's heritage, but only "ministers by whom we believe;" it has no penalties but the spiritual, reaching no man's civil rights; its only other function is didactic, and its teaching only binds so far as the

layman's own conscience responds; it is the Church's duty to instruct parents how God would have them rear their children, and enforce the duty by spiritual sanctions; but there its official power ends. It does not usurp the doing of the important task it inculcates. As a Christian private man the minister lends other parents his knowledge and virtues to co-operate in their work. But all this implies no danger either to spiritual or religious liberty.

But it will be well for the modern Liberal to pause and ask whether he secures anything by this transfer of the educating function from Church to State? Does he point to the results of Jesuit teaching, spurious, shallow scholarship, an enslaved and morbid conscience, which dares not even wish to break its fetters, the insatiable greed of the hierarchy for influence and money, the hateful perversion of the sacred task to inspire falsehood and prejudices for this end? The picture is sufficiently repulsive. But are only ecclesiastics grasping? Is human nature depraved? Is it essentially the same in all men? Then why are they not to be expected to act in similar ways, when subjected to the same temptations? And the modern Liberal is the last man to overlook this truth; since he is sceptical of all professions of spiritual principles in clergymen, and prone to ascribe secular motives. He should, then, expect the demagogue to show a misguided ambition exactly like the priests. What is the hierarch but a ghostly demagogue? The demagogue is but the hierarch of Mammon's altar. Does he not, for instance, pervert that other educating agency, the press, just as violently as the Jesuit the school? Now, let him become ruler in the State and the State become educator; and there is just the same risk that the education of youth will be perverted to subserve a faction, and that, by the hateful means of imbuing their minds with error and passion in place of truth and right. The result is despotism of a party instead of a pope. One may be as bad as the other.

But if the State is the educator, in America, at least, education must be secularized totally. In theory our State is *the institute for realizing secular justice*. It has absolutely severed itself from all religions equally; has pledged itself that no man's civil rights shall be modified or equality diminished by any re-

ligion or the lack of any ; and has forbidden the establishment of any religion by law, and the imposition of any burden for a religious pretext on any. But the State school teacher is her official, and teaches by her authority. All school-officials derive their authority from State laws, hence all their functions are as truly State actions as those of the sheriff in hanging, or the judge in sentencing a murderer. Especially is the school fund, raised by taxation, the common and equal property of the people.

But as our people are divided among many religions, that money ought no more to be used in schools to teach one religion in preference to the others, than in a church establishment. Once the people of a small State, like Connecticut, were so homogeneous, that any dissentient minority was minute, and the domninant religion was taught "on State account," without any protest loud enough to be inconvenient. But the mixture of our people, and especially the strength and audacity of popery, now make all this different. Papists make an effective issue, arguing that the State must not use the people's money to teach King James's version, which they, a part of the people, believe heretical. Zealous Protestants, usually zealous State school men, try to flout this plea. But would they assent to the State's teaching their children, with their money, the version which says : "Except ye *do penance* ye shall all likewise perish?" They exclaim : "That is an erroneous version, while King James's is faithful." Theologically that is doubtless true. But the very point of the State's covenant with the people is, *that the State shall not judge, either way, of that proposition.* It has been bargained that, in the State *arena*, we shall respect papists' religious views, precisely as we require them to respect ours. Suppose them, some day, in as large a majority in some State as Protestants are in New England, would we acquiesce in their forcing the study of the *Douay version* in State schools? So, unless we admit that our might makes our right, we ought not to inflict the parallel wrong on the Jews, Mohammedans, Atheists, and Buddhists among us, because they are still few.

It is sought to parry this conclusion thus : While all religions are equal, and no one established, the State is not an atheistic institute, but must ground itself in the will of God, which is the standard of all rights. That the State is an ethical institute,

and for ethical ends. That hence it enjoins the Sabbath, punishes blasphemy, etc. That equally the State, while not establishing one religion to the prejudice of others, ought to teach the divine truths common to all, by the unsectarian use of the Bible. But, whether this be the just basis of a commonwealth or not, our *States do not avow it.* And second, the question is not of the original Scripture in common schools, but of some one version, among other competing ones, which even Protestants do not claim to be infallible. Hence the question, Which version? raises sectarian issues. Third, we do not believe, any more than these reasoners, that the State can be atheistic, because it is an ethical institute, and the divine will is the only valid ethical rule. But the State finds the theistic basis in natural theology. The proof is, that pagan States, resting only on natural theism, were valid, and rightfully (Rom. 13 : 5) possessed the allegiance even of Christians. The evasion therefore is futile.

But be the logic of this question what it may, the actual result is certain. The papists will inevitably carry the point, as they have already done in many places. That they will triumph everywhere else that they care to try, is plain from the growing timidity of the Bible advocates, the poverty of the compromises they offer, and the spreading indifference of the masses to the value of biblical teaching. In fact, on American premises, the Bible advocates have no plea but a pious predilection, and sooner or later logical considerations, when so clear, must assert their force. The difficulty of the problem appears thus: That it agitates other free governments than ours, as the British and Holland, at this day.

For the solution there are, on the theory of State education, four suggestions. The first is the unjust one of forcing the religion of the majority on the minority. The second is what is called in Great Britain the plan of "concurrent endowments." Each denomination may have its own schools endowed by the State, and teach its own religion in it along with secular learning. This is virtually the plan by which New York papists have been partially appeased. It is justly rejected by Protestants everywhere. First, because it offers no solution save where the several denominations are populous enough to sustain a school for each in the same vicinage. Second, because the

State has no right thus virtually to assert the co-ordinate and equal value of opposing creeds, the truth of one of which may imply the positive falsehood of another. Third, because the State has no right to indicate of either of the creeds that it is, or is not, true and valuable. Fourth, because Protestantism is more promotive of thrift and wealth than the erroneous creeds; whence a given number of Protestants will pay more school-tax than the same number of errorists, so that this plan uses a part of their money to foster creeds they conscientiously believe mischievous. Fifth, it gives to error a pecuniary and moral support beyond what it would receive from the spontaneous zeal of its votaries. And last, it disunites the population by training youth in hostile religious camps. Irish and American papists have professed to approve because they gain by the plan. But who dreams that if they were in the majority they would be willing to see "good Catholic money" expended in teaching Protestant heresy?

The third plan proposes to give "unsectarian" religious instruction in the first hour of the day, while parents who dissent from it are allowed to detain their children from school until that hour is passed. This amounts to the State's establishing a religion and using the people's money to teach it, but *permitting dissent* without any other penalty than the taxation for a religious object which the taxpayer condemns. That is to say, it places the matter where England places her established religion, since the "Toleration Act" of William and Mary relieved dissenters of penal pains for absence from the Anglican churches. But the thing Americans claim is *liberty* and not *toleration*. They deny the State's right to select a religion, as the true and useful one, for anybody, willing or unwilling. Those who dissent from the selected religion deny that the State may thus expend the people's money as a bait to careless or erroneous parents to submit their children to the inculcation of error.

The only other alternative is to secularize the State's teaching absolutely, limiting it to matters merely secular, and leaving parents or the Church to supplement it with such religious teaching as they may please, or none. Some Christians, driven by the difficulty which has been disclosed, adopt this conclu-

sion. The larger number, notwithstanding the difficulty, reject it with energy. Let us see whether this plan is either *possible* or *admissible*.

This is really the vital question. It cannot be discussed until we agree what education is, and disperse deceptive misconceptions of it. It is properly the whole man or person that is educated; but the main subject of the work is the spirit. Education is the nurture and development of the whole man for his proper end. The end must be conceived aright in order to understand the process. Even man's earthly end is predominantly moral. Now, if dexterity in any art, as in the handling of printer's type, a musket, a burin, a power-loom, were education, its secularization might be both possible and proper. Is not a confusion here the source of most of the argument in defence of that theory? For instance, "Why may not the State teach reading and writing without any religious adjuncts, as legitimately as the mechanic thus teaches his apprentices filing, planing, or hammering?" Because dexterity in an art is not education. The latter nurtures a soul, the other only drills a sense-organ or muscle; the one has a mechanical end, the other a moral. And this answer cannot be met by saying, "Let it then be agreed that the State is only teaching an art, a dexterity—that, for instance, of letters." For the State refuses to be understood thus: it claims *to educate;* as is witnessed by the universal argument of the advocates of this State function, that she has the right and duty of providing that the young citizens shall be competent to their responsibility as citizens. But these are ethical. Again, if the State professed to bestow, not an education, but a dexterity, equity would require her bestowing not only the arts of letters, but all other useful arts. For only the minority can ever live by literary arts; the great majority of children have equal rights to be taught the other bread-winning arts. Thus government would become the wildest communism. No, the State cannot adopt this evasion; unless she says that she *educates*, she can say nothing.

It should also be remarked here that the arts of reading and writing are rather means of education than education itself, and not the only nor the most effective means. As Macaulay showed, against Dr. S. Johnson, the unlettered part of the

Athenians were, in some respects, highly educated, while we see many minds, with these arts, really undeveloped.

But is a really secularized education either possible or admissible?

First, No people of any age, religion, or civilization, before ours, has ever thought so. Against the present attempt, right or wrong, stands the whole common sense of mankind. Pagan, Papist, Mohammedan, Greek, Protestant, have all hitherto rejected any other education than one grounded in religion, as absurd and wicked. Let Mr. Webster be heard against the Girard will, which enjoined, in order to exclude Christianity from his college, that no minister should ever enter its walls. The argument against the will here was, that the trust it proposed to create was, in this, so opposed to all civilized jurisprudence, as to make it outside the law, and so void. So formidable did the point seem to lawyers, that Mr. Horace Binney, of the defence, went to England to ransack the British laws of trusts. It was in urging this point that Mr. Webster uttered the memorable words:

"In what age, by what sect, where, when, by whom, has religious truth been excluded from the education of youth? Nowhere. Never! Everywhere, and at all times, it has been regarded as essential. *It is of the essence, the vitality of useful instruction.*" And this was not the assertion of Mr. Webster, the politician, but of the learned lawyer, face to face with able opponents, and making one of the most responsible forensic efforts of his life. He knew that he was uttering the weighty voice of history and jurisprudence.

Let another witness be heard, of equal learning and superior character.[1] "It must be acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable phenomena of our perverted humanity, that among a Christian people, and in a Protestant land, such a discussion" (whether the education of youth may not be secularized) "should not seem as absurd as to inquire whether schoolrooms should be located under water or in darksome caverns! The Jew, the Mohammedan, the follower of Confucius, and of Brahma, each and all are careful to instruct the youth of their

[1] John B. Minor, LL.D., University of Virginia.

people in the tenets of the religions they profess, and are not content until, by direct and reiterated teaching, they have been made acquainted with at least the outline of the books which contain, as they believe, the revealed will of Deity. Whence comes it that Christians are so indifferent to a duty so obvious, and so obviously recognized by Jew and Pagan?"

We are attempting then an absolute novelty. But may not the tree be already known by its fruits? State education among Americans tends to be entirely secularized. What is the result? Whence this general revolt from the Christian faith in this country, so full of churches, preachers, and a redundant Christian literature, so boastful of its Sabbaths and its evangelism? What has prepared so many for the dreary absurdities of materialism? Why do the journals which seek a national circulation think it their interest to affect irreligion? Why so many lamentations over public and popular corruptions? He who notes the current of opinion sees that the wisest are full of misgivings as to the fruits of present methods. As a specimen, let these words, from the Governor of Massachusetts, at a recent anniversary, be taken: "He" [Gov. Rice] "lifted up a warning voice, with respect to the inadequacy and perils of our modern system of one-sided education, which supposed it could develop manhood and good citizenship out of mere brain culture."

Second, True education is, in a sense, a spiritual process, the nurture of a soul. By spiritual, the divines mean the acts and states produced by the Holy Ghost, as distinguished from the merely ethical. The nurture of these is not human education, but sanctification. Yet education is the nurture of a spirit which is rational and moral, in which conscience is the regulative and imperative faculty; whose proper end, even in this world, is moral. But God is the only Lord of the conscience; this soul is his miniature likeness; his will is the source of obligation to it; likeness to him is its perfection, and religion is the science of the soul's relations to God. Let these statements be placed together, and the theological and educational processes appear so cognate that they cannot be separated. Hence it is that the common sense of mankind has ever invoked the guidance of the minister of religion for the education of youth; in India the Brahmin, in Turkey the Imam, in Jewry the Rabbi, and

in Christian lands the pastor. So, everywhere, the sacred books have always been the prime text-books. The only exception in the world is that which Rome has made for herself by her intolerable abuse of her powers. Does the secularist answer that this sacerdotal education results in a Boeotian character and puerile culture? Yes, where the sacred books are false Scriptures, but not where it is the Bible which is the text-book. So that these instances prove that the common sense of mankind has been at bottom correct, and has only been abused, in some instances, by imposture.

The soul is a spiritual monad, an indivisible, spiritual unit, without parts, as without extension. Those powers, which we name as separate faculties, are only modes of function with which this unit is qualified, differentiated by the distinctions of the objects on which they operate. The central power is still one. From these truths it would appear that it cannot be successfully cultivated by patches. We cannot have the intellectual workman polish it at one place, and the spiritual at another. A succession of objects may be presented to the soul, to evoke and discipline its several powers; yet the unity of the being would seem to necessitate a unity in its successful culture.

It is the Christian ideas which are most stimulating and ennobling to the soul. He who must needs omit them from his teaching is robbed of the right arm of his strength. Where shall he get such a definition of virtue as is presented in the revealed character of God? Where so ennobling a picture of benevolence as that presented in Christ's sacrifice for his enemies? Can the conception of the inter-stellar spaces so expand the mind as the thought of an infinite God, an eternal existence, and an everlasting destiny?

Every line of true knowledge must find its completeness in its convergency to God, even as every beam of daylight leads the eye to the sun. If religion be excluded from our study, every process of thought will be arrested before it reaches its proper goal. The structure of thought must remain a truncated cone, with its proper apex lacking. Richard Baxter has nervously expressed this truth.[1]

[1] "Reformed Pastor," pp. 94, 96.

Third, If secular education is to be made consistently and honestly non-Christian, then all its more important branches must be omitted, or they must submit to a mutilation and falsification, far worse than absolute omission. It is hard to conceive how a teacher is to keep his covenant faithfully with the State so to teach history, cosmogony, psychology, ethics, the laws of nations, as to insinuate nothing favorable or unfavorable touching the preferred beliefs of either the evangelical Christians, Papists, Socinians, Deists, Pantheists, Materialists, or Fetisch worshippers, who claim equal rights under American institutions. His pædagogics must indeed be "the play of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet omitted." Shall the secular education leave the young citizen totally ignorant of his own ancestry? But how shall he learn the story of those struggles, through which Englishmen achieved those liberties which the colonies inherited, without understanding the fiery persecutions of the Protestants under "Bloody Mary," over which the Pope's own Legate, Cardinal Pole, was sent to preside? How shall the sons of Huguenot sires in New York, Virginia, or Carolina know for what their fathers forsook beautiful France, to hide themselves in the Northern snows or the malarious woods of the South, and read nothing of the violation of the "Edict of Nantes," the "Dragonnades," and the wholesale assassination of St. Bartholomew's day, in honor of which an "infallible" predecessor of the Pope sang *Te Deums* and struck medals? Or, if the physicist attempts to ascend farther in man's history, can he give the genesis of earth and man, without intimating whether Moses or Huxley is his prophet? Or can the science of moral obligation be established in impartial oversight of God's relation to it, and of the question whether or not his will defines and grounds all human duty? Or can a Grotius or a Vattel settle the rights of nature and nations without either affirming along with the Apostle that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation," or else denying it with the infidel ethnologist? How much of the noblest literature must be ostracized, if this plan is to be honestly carried out? The State teacher must not mention to his pupil

Shakespeare, nor Bacon, nor Milton, nor Macaulay. The *Index Expurgatorius* of free democracy will be far more stringent than that of despotic Rome! But it is not necessary to multiply these instances. They show that Christian truths and facts are so woven into the very warp and woof of the knowledge of Americans, and constitute so beneficial and essential a part of our civilization, that the secular teacher, who impartially avoids either the affirmation or denial of them, must reduce his teaching to the bare giving of those scanty rudiments, which are, as we have seen, not knowledge, but the mere signs of knowledge.

Does some one say that practically this showing is exaggerated, for he is teaching some purely secular course, without any such maiming of his subject or prejudicing of Christianity? If his teaching is more than a temporary dealing with some corner of education, the fact will be found to be that it is tacitly anti-Christian: overt assaults are not made; but there is a studied avoidance which is in effect hostile. There can be no neutral position between two extremes, where there is no middle ground, but "a great gulf fixed."

Fourth, Of all rightful human action the will is the executive and the conscience the directive faculty. Unless these be purified and enlightened, to enhance the vigor of the soul's other actions by training is but superfluous mischief. If in a ship the compass be lost and the pilot blind, it is better that there should not be a great force to move her machinery. The more energetic its motion, the greater is the likelihood the ship will speedily be upon the breakers. Surely this is sufficient to show to the reflecting mind that right moral inculcation cannot be separated at any point or for any time from the intellectual without mischief.

One very obvious and yet not the weightiest application of this truth is to the discipline of the school itself. No training of any faculty takes place without some government. On what moral basis shall the teacher who wholly suppresses all appeal to religion rest that authority which he must exercise in the school-room? He will find it necessary to say to the pupil, "Be diligent. Be obedient. Lie not. Defraud not," in order that he may learn his secular knowledge. But on whose au-

thority? There is but one ground of moral obligation, the will of God, and among the people of this country he who does not find the disclosure of that will in the Scriptures, most often finds it nowhere. But this teacher must not inculcate this Bible. Then his mere might must make his right, or else the might of the parent, or of the magistrate, to whose delegated authority he points back. Or his appeal may be to mere self-interest!

Will this government be wholesome for a youth's soul?

But from a pupil the youth becomes a citizen. He passes under wider and more complex obligations. The end of the State schooling is to fit him for this. The same question recurs, with transcendent moment, On what basis of right shall these duties rest? As a man, it is presumable he will act as he was taught while a boy. Of course then the grounds of obligation employed with him in school should be the ones he is to recognize in adult life. In the State school a non-Christian standard alone could be given him. He cannot be expected now to rise to any better; he may sink to a lower, seeing the ground then given him had no foundation under it.

That is to say, young Americans are to assume their responsibilities with pagan morals, for these are just what human reason attains from the non-Christian standard. Will this suffice to sustain American institutions? One may say: Natural theism may deduce quite a high ethical code, as witness the Greek philosophy. So could a man who rightly construed the *data* of his consciousness be an atheist; even the atheist might find in them proof that conscience ought to govern. But he does not, nor does the pagan reason *act* as Epictetus *speculated*. Let us begin to legislate for the people *as they ought to be*, and we shall have a fine card-castle. In fact, Americans, taken as we find them, who do not get their moral restraints from the Bible, have none. If, in our moral training of the young, we let go the "Thus saith the Lord," we shall have no hold left. The training which does not base duty on Christianity is, for us, practically immoral. If testimony to this truth is needed, let the venerable Dr. Griffin, of a former generation, be heard. "To educate the mind of a bad man without correcting his morals is to put a sword into the hands of a ma-

niac." Let John Locke be heard. "It is virtue, then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education." . . . "If virtue and a well-tempered soul be not got and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages and science, and all the other accomplishments of education, will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man." Let Dr. Francis Wayland be heard. "Intellectual cultivation may easily exist without the existence of virtue or love of right. In this case its only effect is to stimulate desire; and this, unrestrained by the love of right, must eventually overturn the social fabric which it at first erected." Last, let Washington be heard, in his farewell address, where he teaches that the virtue of the citizens is the only basis for social safety, and that the Christian religion is the only adequate basis for that virtue.

But, is not mental culture *per se* elevating? It is hard for us to give up this flattery, because hitherto education has been more or less Christian. The minister has been the American school-master. But are not the educated the more elevated? Yes. For the reason just given, and for another; not that their mental culture made them seek higher morals, but their (and their parents') higher morals made them seek mental culture! We are prone to put the cart before the horse. Again I cite evidence. James Anthony Froude, a witness by no means friendly to orthodoxy, quoting Miss Florence Nightingale, emphatically endorses her opinion, that the ordinary as the natural effect of the mere communication of secular knowledge to youths, is only to suggest the desire for more numerous, and, for the bulk of men whose destiny is inevitably narrow, illicit objects of desire. But they plead: In teaching the youth to know of more objects of desire you also teach him to know more restraining considerations. The fatal answer is that knowledge does not rule the heart, but conscience (if anything does); mere knowledge, without God's fear, makes desire grow faster than discretion. Says Sir Henry Bulwer: "I do not place much confidence in the philosopher who pretends that the knowledge which develops the passions is an instrument for their suppression, or that where there are the most desires there is likely to be the most order, and the most abstinence in their gratifica-

tion." Again, the soul should grow symmetrically. Let the boughs of a tree grow, while the roots (without actual disease) stand still; the first gale would blow it over, because of the disproportion of its parts.

Fifth, We need the best men to teach our children. The best are true Christians, who carry their religion into everything. Such men neither can nor will bind themselves to hold so influential a relation to precious souls for whom Christ died, and make no effort to save them. So the tendency must be towards throwing State schools into the hands of half-hearted Christians or of contemptuous unbelievers. Can such be even trusted with an important secular task? Railroads persist in breaking the Sabbath: so they must be served on the track exclusively by profane Sabbath-breakers or truckling professors of religion. The consequence is, they are scourged with negligent officials, drunken engineers, and defaulting cashiers. So the State will fall into the hands of teachers who will not even teach secular learning honestly; money will be wasted, and the schools will become corrupting examples to their own pupils of slighted work and abused trusts.

Sixth, To every Christian citizen, the most conclusive argument against a secularized education is contained in his own creed touching human responsibility. According to this, obligation to God covers all of every man's being and actions. Even if the act be correct in outward form, which is done without any reference to his will, he will judge it a shortcoming. "The ploughing of the wicked is sin." The intentional end to which our action is directed determines its moral complexion supremely. Second, Our Saviour has declared that there is no moral neutrality: "He that is not with him is against him, and he that gathereth not with him scattereth abroad." Add now the third fact, that every man is born in a state of alienation from God; that practical enmity and atheism are the natural outgrowth of this disposition; that the only remedy for this natural disease of man's spirit is gospel truth. The comparison of these truths will make it perfectly plain that *a non-Christian training* is literally *an anti-Christian training*.

This is the conclusive argument. The rejoinder is attempted; that Christians hold this theology as church mem-

bers, and not as citizens ; and that we have ourselves urged that the State is not an evangelical agent, and its proper business is not to convert souls from original sin. True, but neither has it a right to become an anti-evangelical agency and resist the work of the spiritual commonwealth. While the State does not authorize the theological beliefs of the Christian citizens, neither has it a right to war against them. While we have no right to ask the State to propagate our theology, we have a right to demand that it shall not oppose it. But to educate souls thus is to oppose it, because a non-Christian training is an anti-Christian training. It may be urged again, that this result, if evil, will not be lessened by the State's ceasing to teach at all, for then the training of youth will be, so far as she is concerned, equally non-Christian. The answer is, that it is one thing to tolerate a wrong as done by a party over whom we have not lawful control, but wholly another to perpetrate that wrong ourselves. For the State thus to do what she ought to condemn in the godless parent, though she be not authorized to interfere, would be the sin of "*framing mischief by a law*," the very trait of that "throne of iniquity" with which the Lord cannot have fellowship.

It is objected again, that if the State may govern and punish, which are moral functions, she may also teach. If we are prepared for the theocratic idea of the State, which makes it the universal human association, *To Παν* of human organisms, bound to do everything for society from mending a road or draining a marsh up to supporting a religion, then we can conclude thus. But then consistency will add to State schools a State religion, a beneficed clergy, a religious test for office, and State power wielded to suppress theological as well as social error. Again, while secular ruling and punishing are ethical functions, they are sufficiently grounded in the light of natural theism. But teaching is a spiritual function—in the sense defined—and for teaching beings fallen, and in moral ruin, natural theism is wholly inadequate, as witness the state of pagan society. Christian citizens are entitled (not by the State, but by one higher, God) to hold that the only teaching adequate for this fallen soul is *redemption*. But of this the State, as such, knows nothing. As God's institute for realizing secular justice, she does know

enough of moral right to be a praise to them that do well and a terror to evil-doers.

The most plausible evasion is this: Since education is so comprehensive a work, why may there not be a "division of labor"? Let the State train the intellect and the Christian parent and the Church train the conscience and heart in the home and the house of worship. With this solution some Christians profess themselves satisfied. Of course such an arrangement would not be so bad as the neglect of the heart by both State and parent.

Points already made contain fatal answers. Since conscience is the regulative faculty of all, he who must not deal with conscience cannot deal well with any. Since the soul is a *monad*, it cannot be equipped as to different parts at different times and places, as a man might get his hat at one shop and his boots at another; it has no parts. Since all truths converge towards God, he who is not to name God, must have all his teachings fragmentary; he can only construct a truncated figure. In history, ethics, philosopy, jurisprudence, religious facts and propositions are absolutely inseparable. The necessary discipline of a school-room and secular fidelity of teachers call for religion, or we miss of them. And no person nor organism has a right to seem to say to a responsible, immortal soul, "In this large and intelligent and even ethical segment of your doings you are entitled to be godless." For this teaching State must not venture to disclaim that construction of its own proceeding to its own pupil. *That disclaimer would be a religious inculcation!*

But farther: Why do people wish the State to interfere in educating? Because she has the power, the revenues to do it better. Then, unless her intervention is to be a cheat, her secularized teaching must be some very impressive thing. Then its impression, which is to be non-Christian, according to the theory, will be too preponderant in the youth's soul, to be counterpoised by the feebler inculcation of the seventh day. The natural heart is carnal, and leans to the secular and away from the gospel truths. To the ingenuous youth, quickened by animating studies, his teacher is *Magnus Apollo*, and according

to this plan he must be to his ardent young votary wholly a heathen deity. The Christian side of the luminary, if there is one, must not be revealed to the worshipper! Then how pale and cold will the infrequent ray of gospel truth appear when it falls on him upon the seventh day! In a word, to the successful pupil under an efficient teacher, *the school is his world.* Make that godless, and his life is made godless.

If it be asked again: Why may not the State save itself trouble by leaving all education to parents? the answer is, Because so many parents are too incapable or careless to be trusted with the task. Evidently, if most parents did the work well enough, the State would have no motive to meddle. Then the very *raison d'être* of the State school is in this large class of negligent parents. But man is a carnal being, alienated from godliness, whence all those who neglect their children's mental, will, *à fortiori*, neglect their spiritual, culture. Hence we must expect that, *as to the very class* which constitutes the pretext for the State's interposition, *the fatally one-sided culture she gives will remain one-sided.* She has no right to presume anything else. But, it may be asked: Is not there the Church to take up this part, neglected by both secularized State and godless parent? The answer is, The State, thus secularized, cannot claim to know the Church as an ally. Besides, if the Church be found sufficiently omnipresent, willing, and efficient, throughout the commonwealth, to be thus relied on, why will she not inspire in parents and individual philanthropists zeal enough to care for the whole education of youth? Thus again, the whole *raison d'être* for the State's intervention would be gone. In fact the Church does not and cannot repair the mischief which her more powerful, rich, and ubiquitous rival, the secularized State, is doing in thus giving, under the guise of a non-Christian, an anti-Christian training.

It is also well known to practical men that State common schools *obstruct* parental and philanthropic effort. Thus, parents who, if not meddled with, would follow the impulse of enlightened Christian neighbors, their natural guides, in creating a private school for their children, to make it both primary and classical, now always stop at the primary. "The school tax

must be paid anyhow, which is heavy, and that is all they can do." Next, children of poor parents who showed aspiration for learning found their opportunity for classical tuition near their homes, in the innumerable private schools created by parental interest and public spirit, and kindly neighborhood charity never suffered such deserving youths to be arrested for the mere lack of tuition. Now, in country places not populous enough to sustain "State High Schools," all such youths must stop at the rudiments. Thus the country loses a multitude of the most useful educated men. Next, the best men being the natural leaders of their neighbors, would draw a large part of the children of the class next them upward into the private schools created for their own families, which, for the same reason, were sure to be Christian schools. The result is, that while a larger number of children is brought into primary schools, and while the statistics of the illiterate are somewhat changed, to the great delectation of shallow philanthropists, the number of youths well educated in branches above mere rudiments, and especially of those brought under daily Christian training, is diminished. In cities [where public opinion is chiefly manufactured] high schools may be sustained, and this evil obviated so far as secular tuition goes. But in the vast country regions, literary culture is lowered just as it is extended. It is chiefly the country which fills the useful professions—town youths go into trade.

The actual and consistent secularization of education is inadmissible.

But nearly all public men and divines declare that the State schools are the glory of America, that they are a finality, and in no event to be surrendered. And we have seen that their complete secularization is logically inevitable. Christians must prepare themselves then, for the following results: All prayers, catechisms, and bibles will ultimately be driven out of the schools. But this will not satisfy Papists, who obstinately—and correctly were their religion correct—insist that education shall be Christian for their children. Their power over the hopes and fears of the demagogues will secure, what Protestants cannot consistently ask for, a separate endowment out of the common funds. Rome will enjoy, relatively to Protestantism, a grand

advantage in the race of propagandism; for humanity always finds out, sooner or later, that it cannot get on without a religion, and it will take a false one in preference to none. Infidelity and practical ungodliness will become increasingly prevalent among Protetstant youth, and our churches will have a more arduous contest for growth if not for existence.

Perhaps American Protestants might be led, not to abandon but to revise their opinions touching education, by recalling the conditions under which the theory of State education came to be first accepted in this country. This came about in the colonies which at the same time held firmly to a union of Church and State. The Massachusetts and Connecticut colonies, for instance, honorable pioneers in State education in this country, were decidedly theocratic in their constitution. The Reformed religion was intimately interwoven. So all the Protestant States of Europe, whose successful example is cited, as Scotland and Prussia, have the Protestant as an established religion. This and State primary education have always been parts of one consistent system in the minds of their rulers in Church and State. A secularized education, such as that which is rapidly becoming the result of our State school system, would have been indignantly reprobated by the Winthrops and Mathers, the Knoxs, Melvilles, and Chalmers, and, it is presumed, by the Tholucks and even Bismarcks of those commonwealths, which are pointed to as precedents and models. It is submitted, whether it is exactly candid to quote the opinions and acts of all these great men, for what is, in fact, another thing from what they advocated? Knox, for instance, urged the primary education of every child in Scotland by the State. But it was because the State he had helped to reconstruct there was clothed with a recognized power of teaching the Reformed religion (through the allied Church), and because it was therefore able, in teaching the child to read, also to teach it the Scriptures and the Assembly's Catechism. Had Knox seen himself compelled to a severance of Church and and State [which he would have denounced as wicked and paganish], and therefore to the giving by the State of a secularized education, which trained the intellect without the conscience or heart, his heroic tongue would have

given no uncertain sound. Seeing then that wise and good men, in adopting and successfully working this system, did so only for communities which united Church and State, and mental and spiritual training, the question for candid consideration is: What modifications the theory should receive, when it is imported into commonwealths whose civil governments have absolutely secularized themselves and made the union of the secular and spiritual powers illegal and impossible?

The answer may, perhaps, be found by going back to a first principle hinted in the outset of this discussion. Is the direction of the education of children either a civic or an ecclesiastical function? Is it not properly a domestic and parental function? First, we read in holy writ that God ordained the family by the union of one woman to one man, in one flesh, for life, for the declared end of "seeking a godly seed." Does not this imply that he looks to parents, in whom the family is founded, as the responsible agents of this result? He has also in the fifth Commandment connected the child proximately, not with either presbyter or magistrate, but with the parents, which, of course, confers on them the adequate and the prior authority. This argument appears again in the very order of the historical genesis of the family and State, as well as of the visible Church. The family was first. Parents at the outset were the only social heads existing. The right rearing of children by them was in order to the right creation of the other two institutes. It thus appears that naturally the parents' authority over their children could not have come by deputation from either State or visible Church, any more than the water in a fountain by derivation from its reservoir below. Second, the dispensation of Divine Providence in the course of nature shows where the power and duty of educating are deposited. That ordering is that *the parents* decide in what *status* the child shall begin his adult career. The son inherits the fortune, the social position, the respectability, or the ill-fame of his father. Third, God has provided for the parents social and moral influences so unique, so extensive, that no other earthly power, or all others together, can substitute them in fashioning the child's character. The home example, armed with the venerable authority of the father and the mother, repeated amidst the

constant intimacies of the fireside, seconded by filial reverence, ought to have the most potent plastic force over character. And this unique power God has guarded by an affection, the strongest, most deathless, and most unselfish, which remains in the breast of fallen man. Until the magistrate can feel a love, and be nerved by it to a self-denying care and toil, equal to that of a father and a mother, he can show no pretext for assuming any parental function.

But the best argument here is the heart's own instinct. No parent can fail to resent, with a righteous indignation, the intrusion of any authority between his conscience and convictions and the soul of his child. If the father conscientiously believes that his own creed is true and righteous and obligatory before God, then he must intuitively regard the intrusion of any other power between him and his minor child, to cause the rejection of that creed, as a usurpation. The freedom of mind of the child alone, when become an adult, and his father's equal, can justly interpose. If this usurpation is made by the visible Church, it is felt to be in the direction of popery; if by the magistrate, in the direction of despotism.

It may be said that this theory makes the parent sovereign, during the child's mental and moral minority, in the moulding of his opinions and character, whereas, seeing the parent is fallible, and may form his child amiss, there ought to be a superior authority to superintend and intervene. But the complete answer is, that inasmuch as the supreme authority *must be placed somewhere*, God has indicated that, on the whole, no place is so safe for it as the hands of the parent, who has the supreme love for the child and the superior opportunity. But many parents nevertheless neglect or pervert the power? Yes, and does the State never neglect and pervert its powers? With the lessons of history to teach us the horrible and almost universal abuses of power in the hands of civil rulers, that question is conclusive. In an imperfect state of society, the instances of parental abuse of the educational function will be partial and individual. In the case of an unjust or godless State, the evil would be universal and sweeping. Doubtless God has deposited the duty in the safest place.

The competitions of the State and the Church for the educating power have been so engrossing that we have almost forgotten the parent, as the third and the rightful competitor. And now many look at his claim almost contemptuously. Because the civic and the ecclesiastical spheres are so much wider and more populous than his, they are prone to regard it as every way inferior. Have we not seen that the smaller circle is, in fact, the most original and best authorized of the three? Will any thinking man admit that he *derives his right* to marry, to be a father, from the permission of the State? Yet there is an illusion here, because civil constitutions confer on the State certain police functions, so to speak, concerning marriage and families. So there are State laws concerning certain ecclesiastical belongings. But what Protestant concedes therefrom that his religious rights were either conferred, or can be rightfully taken away, by civil authority? The truth is, that God has immediately and authoritatively instituted three organisms for man on earth, the State, the visible Church, and the Family, and these are coordinate in rights and mutual independence. The State or Church has no more right to invade the parental sphere than the parent to invade theirs. The right distribution of all duties and power between the three circles would be the complete solution of that problem of good government which has never yet been solved with full success. It is vital to a true theory of human rights, that the real independence of the smallest yet highest realm, that of the parent, be respected. Has it not been proved that the direction of education is one of its prerogatives?

But does not the State's right to exist imply the right to secure all the conditions of its existence? And as parents may so pervert or neglect education as to rear a generation incompetent to preserve their civil institutions, does not this give the State control over education? I answer, first, it is not even a pretext for the State's invading the parental sphere any farther than the destructive neglect exists, that is, to stimulate, or help, or compel the neglectful parents alone. Second, precisely the same argument may authorize the State to intrude into the spiritual circle and establish and teach a religion. But the

sophism is here: It is assumed that a particular form of civil institutions has a prescriptive right to perpetuate itself. It has none. So the American theory teaches, in asserting for the people the inherent right to change their institutions. Did our republican fathers hold that any people have ever the right to subvert the moral order of society ordained by God and nature? Surely not. Here then is disclosed that distinction between *the moral order* and any particular *civil order*, so often overlooked, but so eloquently drawn by *Cousin*. So far is it from being true that the civil authority is entitled to shape a people to suit itself; the opposite is true, the people should shape the civil authority.

It is a maxim in political philosophy, as in mechanics, that when an organism is applied to a function for which it was not designed, it is injured and the function is ill done. Here is a farmer who has a mill designed and well fitted to grind his meal. He resolves that it shall also thresh his sheaves. The consequence is that he has wretched threshing and a crippled mill. I repeat, God designed the State to be the organ for securing secular justice. When it turns to teaching or preaching it repeats the farmer's experience. The Chinese Government and people are an example precisely in point. The Government has been for a thousand years educating the people for its own ends. The result is what we see.

Government powerfully affects national character by the mode in which it performs its proper functions, and if the administration is equitable, pure, and free, it exalts the people. But it is by the indirect influence. This is all it can do well. As for the other part of the national elevation (an object which every good man must desire), it must come from other agencies; from the dispensation of Almighty Providence; from fruitful ideas and heroic acts with which he inspires the great men whom he sovereignly gives to the nations he designs to bless: chiefly from the energy of divine Truth and the Christian virtues, first in individuals, next in families, and last in visible churches.

Let us suppose, then, that both State and Church recognize the parent as the educating power; that they assume towards him an ancillary instead of a dominating atti-

tude; that the State shall encourage individual and voluntary efforts by holding the impartial shield of legal protection over all property which may be devoted to education; that it shall encourage all private efforts; and that in its eleemosynary character it shall aid those whose poverty and misfortunes disable them from properly rearing their own children. Thus the insoluble problems touching religion in State schools would be solved, because the State was not the responsible creator of the schools, but the parents. Our educational system might present less mechanical symmetry, but it would be more flexible, more practical, and more useful.

ROBERT L. DABNEY.

VIRGIL AS A PRECURSOR OF CHRISTIANITY.

SCRIPTURE and reason alike combine to show that before the world could possibly have received Christianity it needed to pass through many centuries of preparatory discipline. It was only when this had been undergone that what St. Paul speaks of as "the fulness of the time" was come. All historians of the Christian Church have dwelt on this—none with more power than Neander in the opening of his great work. If this preparation is an intrinsic part of the providential purpose that runs through history, we would naturally expect that while it embraced all nations it would be seen most eminently in those two nations which led the van of the ancient world's civilization. This has been generally recognized, and writers have agreed to look to the Hellenic race as the intellectual and in some measure the moral teachers of mankind; to the Romans they have assigned pre-eminently the political and practical education of the world. But to confine the function of the Romans to this would not be to give them all their due. If they contributed little or nothing by speculation to the grand result, the Romans did as much as, probably more than, the degenerate Greeks of the Christian era, by their standard of character, as the best of them conceived it. In the ideal *Humanitas* of Cicero and of Virgil, though each of these would conceive it with a characteristic difference, there lies the best seed-ground which the ancient world supplied for the sowing of the heavenly grain. In spite of all his vanity and vacillation, in spite of the "many grave infirmities and defects of temper with which he stands justly charged," it has been

truly said of Cicero that "he lived and died in faith. He has made converts to the belief in virtue, and had disciples in the wisdom of love." Such is the verdict of the historian of the "Romans under the Empire"—a verdict which we willingly accept. And as to Virgil, though he too has been much reviled for his acceptance of the Imperial régime and his friendship with Mecænas and Augustus, yet there breathed no spirit of purer aspiration in the day in which he lived; and falling on a time of decadence in faith and morals he did the best he could, and kept himself unspotted from the world. And for openness of heart and quick susceptibility to whatever highest religious influence he knew, there are few even among Christian poets who can be compared to him. It is on this side of Virgil's character and work, his openness to religious impressions, on which I propose to dwell for a little. This is one aspect of him which has of late years been almost entirely put out of sight, while critics have been content to regard him only as the consummate artist. It was not always so. It was not in this way that the early Christian centuries and the middle age regarded him, but as the devoutest, most religious, among the ancient poets. And this view of him, which has in recent times been disregarded, it may be worth while for a little to consider.

It is well known in what special honor the early Christian Fathers held Virgil. St. Augustine styled him the finest and noblest of poets. St. Jerome, who looked severely on all heathen writers, allows that to read Virgil was a necessity for boys, but complains that even priests in his day turned to him for pleasure.

In the middle age he was regarded by some as a magician; by others as a prophet or a saint. His form was found sculptured in the stalls of a cathedral among the Old Testament worthies; in a picture of the Nativity where David and the prophets were singing round The Child, Virgil is seen leading the concert. His verses are found in the burial-places of the catacombs, associated with the cross and the monogram of our Lord. The power with which he has laid hold of the Christian imagination is proved by nothing more than by the place Dante assigns him in his "Divina Commedia" as his teacher

and his guide to the nether world. You remember the words with which Dante addresses him on his first appearance :

> "Art thou, then, that Virgil—that fountain
> Which pours forth abroad so rich a stream of speech ?
> O glory and light of other poets !
> May the long zeal avail me, and the great love
> That made me search thy volume.
> Thou art my master and my author;
> Thou alone art he from whom I took
> The good style that hath done me honor."

This general consent of the primitive and middle ages to adopt Virgil among the possible if not actual saints of Christendom arose, no doubt, from the belief that in his fourth Eclogue he had prophesied the advent of Christ. Constantine in his discourse "Ad sanctos" quoted it as a prophecy. Lactantius agreed that it had a Christian meaning. St. Augustine accepted it as a genuine prophecy, and read in the thirteenth and fourteenth verses of that eclogue a distinct prediction of the remission of sins.

This interpretation of the Eclogue, which would seem to have lingered on till Pope's time, when he imitated it in his Messiah, has for long been discredited. The Child that was to be born of which the eclogue speaks, whether the son of Pollio or the daughter of Augustus, was far enough from being a regenerator of the world. While, however, we reject the grounds which the early Fathers and the men of the middle age would have given for their belief in Virgil's religious, even Christian, spirit, we need not reject the belief itself. Though the reason they gave for it was false, the belief may have been true. There is in Virgil a vein of thought and sentiment more devout, more humane, more akin to the Christian, than is to be found in any other ancient poet, whether Greek or Roman. The religious feeling which Virgil preserved in his own heart is made the more conspicuous when we remember amidst what almost overpowering difficulties it was that he preserved it. It was not only that, in the words of Dante, "he lived at Rome under the good Augustus in the time of the false and lying gods," but he lived at a time when the traditional faith in these gods was dead among almost all educated men. As has been lately said, "The old religions were dead from the Pillars

of Hercules to the Euphrates and the Nile, and the principles on which human society had been constructed were dead also. There remained of spiritual conviction only the common and human sense of justice and morality; and out of this sense some ordered system of government had to be constructed under which men could live and labor and eat the fruit of their industry. Under a rule of this material kind there can be no enthusiasm, no chivalry, no saintly aspirations, no patriotism of the heroic type." But such was the rule of the Cæsars—"a kingdom where men could work, think, and speak as they pleased, and travel freely among provinces for the most part ruled by Gallios, who protected life and property," and cared for nothing else. This was the world into which Virgil was born, and it is his unique merit that he in some way maintained within himself a sense of poetry and faith and devoutness in a time when, if these things "were slumbering in the heart of humanity," they were nowhere else apparent.

A man of his spirit must have felt himself lonely enough among the literary men and statesmen whom he met at Rome. There must have been secret longings of heart within him for which among them he could find no sympathy. They had ceased to believe in any thing divine, probably mocked and ridiculed it. But, whatever else he might have done, a devout soul like Virgil could never do this. A severe and peculiar kind of trial it is for such a spirit as his to be born into an age when the old forms of religion which have sustained former generations are waxing old and ready to perish. We can imagine that Virgil himself must have felt that those old beliefs had no longer the strength they once had; but his innate modesty and reverence, his love for antiquity and for the scenes of his childhood, his imaginative sympathy, would not suffer him to treat them rudely, but would make him cling to them and make the best of them. In fact, at such a time there are always a few select spirits in whom the inner religious life lives on by its own strength, or, if fed at all from without, it is from sources of which it is unconscious. Instead of deriving nutriment from the old beliefs, it imparts to them from within whatever vitality they still retain. Such we can imagine Virgil to have been. Men of his kind, who still believe that, whatever scoffers may

say, there is "a higher life than this daily one, and a brighter world than that we see," if they fall among a set of acute dialecticians, are often sore bestead to give a reason for the faith that is still in them. If Virgil had been an interlocutor in Cicero's dialogue, "De Natura Deorum," he would probably have cut but a sorry figure against the arguments of Cotta and the sneers of Velleius, and certainly could not have produced any so clear-cut theory as Stoic Balbus did. But it is just the very beauty of such spirits that all the irrefragable arguments and demonstrations of the acutest logicians cannot drive them out of their essential faith in the supernatural and the divine.

My friend Mr. Sellar, in his admirable work on Virgil, has truly said that Virgil has failed to produce a consistent picture of the spiritual life out of the various elements, the popular mystical and philosophical modes of thought, which he strove to combine into a single representation. This may be at once conceded. How could he or any one produce harmony out of elements so discordant as his age supplied? But, nevertheless, inconsistent, irreconcilable, as these elements are, when they have passed through Virgil's mind one spirit pervades them all. Everywhere we see that the touch of his fine and reverent spirit tends to extract from them a moral, if it cannot reduce them into an intellectual harmony.

What were the elements out of which the very composite Virgilian theology was formed? First, there was his native love for the old rustic gods whom in his boyhood he had seen worshipped by the Mantuan husbandmen—Faunus and Picus, Janus and Pilumnus, and the like;

> "Ye gods and goddesses all! whose care is to protect the fields."

His first impressions were of the country and of country people, and Virgil was not a man of the world to forget these among the life of the city and the society of the great. His imagination ever reverted to Mincio's side, and his heart clung to all the recollections of that early time with peculiar tenacity. And therefore we find that both in the Georgics and in the Æneid he dwells on the old rustic worships and the local divinities with something more than a mere antiquary's or poet's attachment. To those primeval traditions, those old

beliefs and practices, he adhered as to his earliest and surest ground of trust. He felt that to eradicate these would be to tear up some of the deepest roots of his spiritual life. Therefore he retained them fondly, and did his best to reconcile them with the beliefs which his later culture had superinduced.

The second element was the Olympian dynasty of gods, with which the influx of Greek literature had saturated the whole educated thought and imagination of Rome. Indeed, the literature of his day would not have allowed him to reject this poetic theology. At first sight it would seem that the Olympian gods had come to Virgil pure and unalloyed from Homer. But when we look more closely there is a deep change. Outwardly they may appear the same, but inwardly the modern spirit had reached and modified them. Virgil introduces his gods far more sparingly than Homer; they interfere far less with the affairs of men. When they do interfere, it is in a gentler and humaner spirit. It is with pity that they look upon men slaughtering each other. When Trojans and Rutulians are hewing each other down,

"The gods in Jove's palace look pityingly on the idle rage of the warring hosts—
Alas that death-doomed men should suffer so terribly!"

Again, Virgil's Jove is more just and impartial than Homer's. When Turnus and Æneas contend he holds the balance with perfect evenness:

"Jove himself holds aloft his scales, poised and level, and lays therein the destinies of the two, to see whom the struggle dooms, and whose the weight that death bears down."

When the gods meet in council their deliberations are more dignified; there is less of the democratic agora in their proceedings. Jove addresses them with a quite Roman dignity—indeed, approaches more nearly to a real king of the gods. Monotheism has evidently colored the conception of him. Venus appears no longer as the voluptuous beguiler, but rather as the mother trembling for her son.

If Virgil cannot altogether hide the follies and vices of the gods which mythology had given to his hands, he does his best to throw a veil over them. If Juno's wrath must still burn implacably, Virgil has for it the well-known cry of surprise—

"Can heavenly natures hate so fiercely?"

Thus we see that if the Homeric forms and even some of the strange doings of the old gods are still retained, the best ideas and scruples of Virgil's own age enter in to inform, to modify, and to moralize them.

But beside the primeval Italian traditions and the Olympian gods, there were probably other extraneous elements which entered into Virgil's very composite theology. Something, perhaps, he may have gathered from the teaching of the Eleusinian or other mysteries, but of this we know too little to speak with any certainty. Some tincture of Oriental worships, too, there is, as is indicated by his mention of the Phrygian goddess Cybele.

Perhaps nowhere in Virgil is the strange medley of faiths forced more upon us than in the invocation to the first Georgic. When we read that opening passage, in which Liber and Ceres, Fauni and Dryades, Neptune, producer of the Horse; Aristæus, feeder of kine; Pan, keeper of sheep; Minerva, discoverer of the olive; Triptolemus, the Attic inventor of the plough; Silvanus, planter of trees—are all jumbled together, we scarce know what to think of it. When finally Cæsar is invoked as a deity—Virgil doubts whether of earth, sky, or sea, surely not of Tartarus, for he would not wish to reign there—we are utterly at a loss whether we are to regard the whole passage fictitious and unreal, or as representing a state of belief not impossible to an imaginative mind in Virgil's day, though by us wholly unconceivable. As Professor Sellar has well said, "it is impossible to find any principle of reconcilement" for such multifarious elements. "Probably not even the poets themselves, least of all Virgil, could have given an explanation of their real state of mind" in composing such a passage. "So far as we can attach any truthful meaning to this invocation, we must look upon it as a symbolical expression of divine agency and superintendence in all the various fields of natural production." Just so. To a reverent mind like Virgil's, unwilling to break with the past, yet accessible to all best influences of the present, it may well have been that these multifarious relics of a fading polytheism expressed only the various functions, attributes, or agencies through which worked that Supreme Will, that one Pronoia in which his deeper mind really believed. Something of the same kind is seen in mediæval belief when the practical faith in

elaborate and active angelic hierarchies may have interfered with, though it did not supersede, the true faith in the divine unity.

If in the time of Augustus the majority of educated men believed nothing, those religious minds to whom as to Virgil belief was a necessity were more and more driven towards a monotheistic faith, towards the belief that the essential Being underlying the many forms of religion was one. The whole progress of the world, practical and social as well as speculative, tended this way. Of intellectual influences making in this direction, the most powerful was Greek philosophy, whether in the shape of Stoicism or of Platonism. Every great poet takes in deeply the philosophy of his time, and certainly Virgil was no exception. Of the three forms of philosophy then current at Rome, the Stoic, the Platonic, and the Epicurean, Virgil began with the last. At Rome he studied under Siron, the Epicurean, and had been profoundly impressed by the great poem of his predecessor, Lucretius, which had expounded so powerfully to the Roman world the Epicurean tenets. For a time he was held charmed by this philosophy, but there were in Virgil's devout and affectionate nature longings which it could never satisfy. When he wrote his Eclogues he may have been a disciple of Epicurus, but in the Georgics we see that if he still retained the physical views of that sect he had bid good-by to their moral and religious teaching. Every one remembers the passage in the second Georgic in which Virgil contrasts the path he had chosen for himself with the grand aim which Lucretius had in view. While according no stinted admiration to the great attempt of Lucretius to lay bare Nature's inner mysteries, he says that he has chosen a humbler path. The import of this passage may be, as the French critic interprets it, to acquaint us that, after having sounded his own nature, Virgil had found that he was not fitted to persevere in those violent speculations which had at first seduced his imagination, and that he had decided to abide by the majority, and to share their beliefs, yet not without casting a look of envy and regret at those daring spirits who were able to dwell without fear in the calm, cold heights of science. Perhaps another interpretation may be given to this famous passage, which evidently describes a crisis in Virgil's mental life, as well as in the direc-

tion of his poetry. After having been fascinated for a time by the seeming grandeur of the Lucretian view of things, he came to a crucial question which meets all thoughtful men in modern as well as in ancient times. He had to ask himself, In what way am I to think of this world; how am I to interpret it? From which side shall I approach it? Shall I think of its central force, its ruling power, under the medium of nature or under that of man? We cannot conceive it barely, absolutely, colorlessly: we must think it under some medium, and there are the only two media possible to us. Between one or other we must make our choice. If we take nature for our medium, we see through it vastness, machinery, motion, order, growth, decay. And the contemplation of these things may lead us to think of some great central power whence all these proceed. Centrality, organization, power, these are the results which mere nature yields. And if we cannot rest in mere abstractions, we may pass from these to the thought of a Being who is the spring of all this machinery, the central power of these vast movements, the arranger of these harmonies. Beyond this, by the aid of mere nature, we cannot get. The central power we thus arrive at is characterless, unmoral. Out of nature we can get no morality. "Nature is an unmoral medium." And this is very much all that Lucretius got to, and all that any ever will get to who start from his point of view and adopt his method.

But take the other medium: start from man—from what is highest and best in him, his moral nature, his moral affections; make man with these moral affections, which are his proper humanity, our medium, and we are led to a very different result. Interpreting the world and its central power through this medium, we are led not to a mere abstraction, but to think of that ruling Power as a personal and moral Being, which is God. That which is chief, highest, central in the universe, cannot possibly be lower than that which is best in man. Using whatever is deepest and best in ourselves as the window though which we look out to what is highest in the universe, in this way alone can we see somewhat into the character divine. This, it may be said, is anthropomorphism; and that is a big word which scares many. But there is an anthropomorphism

which is true, the only true theology—when we refer to God all those moral qualities, righteous love, righteous hatred, mercy, truth, of which there are some faint traces in ourselves—refer them to God as their true centre and source, not in a mere matter-of-fact way with our human adjuncts and weaknesses attached to them, but in a "high, transcendental, incomprehensible way." High humanity, then, is our guide to God. There is no other medium through which we can see Him as a moral being. Of the two methods, the "physical view," as has been said, "reduces God to a mechanical principle, the human and moral view raises him into a person and a character." The day may come when these two may coalesce and be seen in perfect harmony. But that day is not yet. Till it comes we shall cling to that which is deepest, most essential, and must always be paramount, and regard man's moral nature as the truest key to the interpretation of the universe—as our access to the divine nature.

All this, of course, is putting the matter in modern language, answering to the thought of our own day. But we may well conceive it was some such process of thought, though he would have expressed it very differently, which led Virgil to renounce the Lucretian philosophy and to attach himself to that humbler, more human mode of thought, which breathes through all his poetry. Not but that he once and again reverts in his poems to philosophic speculations. In the song of Silenus in the sixth Eclogue, he gives us a piece of the Lucretian cosmogony. In the fourth Georgic, when speaking of the wisdom of the bees, he alludes with evident sympathy to the theory, whether learnt from Pythagoras, or Plato, or the Stoics, that all creation, animate and inanimate, is inspired by the breath of one universal soul. To this theory he again returns in the sixth book of the Æneid, where Anchises in Elysium expounds it still more earnestly. Yet it is characteristic of Virgil's happy inconsistency that his Pantheism, if he really did in some sense hold it, had not any of the results it usually has in more consecutive thinkers. It did not in the least obliterate for him moral distinctions, or make him at all less sensitive to the everlasting difference between right and wrong. This is at once apparent in the whole sentiment of the

Georgics. That greatest of didactic poems is Virgil's tribute to his love of Italian scenery and to his interest in Italian rustics, in converse with whom he had spent his childhood and youth. I cannot now even glance at the many and great beauties of the poem, and at the wonderful way in which, as all travellers testify, it conveys the feeling of the Italian landscape. A young poet, fresh from visiting the neighborhood of Mantua, has lately well expressed this :

> "O sweetest singer ! stateliest head,
> And gentlest, ever crowned with bay,
> It seemed that from the holy dead
> Thy soul came near to mine to-day ;
> And all fair places to my view
> Seemed fairer ;—such delight I had
> To deem that these thy presence knew,
> And at thy coming oft were glad."

But it is not of this, but of the religious sentiment which pervades the Georgics, of which I have now to speak. It is seen not only in that Virgil exhorts the husbandmen to piety—

> "First of all worship the gods"—

and throws himself as far as he can into the rustic's reverence for Ceres and other rural deities. This he does. But his religious feeling shows itself in a more genuine and unconventional way.

Virgil's whole view of the relation of man to nature is in marked contrast to that of Lucretius. He felt as strongly as Lucretius that the country is no mere Arcadian paradise ; that nature, if a nurse at all, is a rough and intractable one—often seems to fight against man—is traversed by what seems to us inherent defects and imperfections. Looking on these, Lucretius had maintained that the work which was so defective could not be divine :

> "This universe has by no means been fashioned for us by divine wisdom—with so deep a flaw it stands endowed."

And among the defects he enumerates many features—mountains, seas, the arctic and the torrid zones, and other things which we now know to be essential blessings. Virgil saw and

felt the seeming defects, acknowledges them not less feelingly, but interprets them differently. He saw that one end of their existence was to discipline man, to draw out in him the hardy and self-denying virtues, and that if man so accepted them they turned to his good.

> "The great sire himself would not have the path of tillage to be a smooth one, and first disturbed the fields by the husbandman's art, and whetted human wit by many a care, nor suffered heavy sloth to waste his realm."

He regards the husbandman's lot as one full of toil, often thankless, of suffering and disappointment. The first days of life are the best:

> "Poor mortals that we are, all the best days of life are the first to fly—come on apace diseases and the gloom of age, and suffering sweeps us off, and the unrelenting cruelty of death."

And again in such words as—

> "all things are destined to hurry towards decay,"

here is a tone of deep sadness, almost of pessimism, but yet this does not engender in Virgil unbelief or despair, much less anger or revolt. Rather, in view of these acknowledged hardships and evils, he counsels perseverance, patience, watchfulness, self-restraint, reverence. In Virgil's sadness there is no bitterness, but rather a sweet pensiveness, which looks to be comforted. His advice to the husbandman sums itself up into the mediæval motto, "Ora et labora." For nature is not, any more than man, independent. Both are under the control of a spiritual power, a supreme will, and this will ordains that man should by patient toil subdue reluctant nature, and in doing so should find not his sustenance only, but his happiness and peace.

In fine, with regard to the religious sentiment of the Georgics, Mr. Sellar thinks that Virgil's faith is purer and happier than that of Hesiod, because it is "trust in a just and beneficent Father, rather than fear of a jealous taskmaster." But he thinks it less noble than the faith of Æschylus and Sophocles, because it is "a passive yielding to the longing of the human heart and to æsthetic emotion, rather than that union of natural piety with insight into the mystery of life" which characterize the religion of the two great dramatists. Without attempting

now to pass judgment on this contrast which Mr. Sellar has drawn, I leave it to the reflections of my readers.

As the Georgics are the poem of Italy, so the Æneid is the poem of Rome—the epic of the empire. Patriotism is its key-note, its inspiring motive : pride in the past history of Rome, her present prosperity, her future destiny—all these strangely interwoven with the fortunes of the Julian House. Yet along with this motive, behind it, in harmony with it, there moves a great background of religious sentiment, so powerful and omnipresent that the Æneid may be called a great religious epic.

In Virgil, however it may have been with other Romans, the sense of universal empire, the belief in the eternal existence of Rome, were founded not on presumption. They were guaranteed to her by her divine origin, and by the continual presence of an overruling destiny—a Fortuna urbis, Fatum, or Fata, whose behests it was Rome's mission to fulfil. This Fatum was something different from Jove. But "Jupiter Capitolinus in ancient, the living emperor in later times, were its visible vicegerents." This mysterious power which ruled the destiny of Rome was neither a quite personal nor moral power. But in Virgil's view it assumed a beneficent aspect, just as with him the mission of Rome was not merely to conquer the world and rule it, but to bring in law and peace, and to put an end to war—"pacisque imponere morem."

Another religious aspect of the Æneid is well seen, as the French critic has remarked, in the view taken of the mission intrusted to Æneas. It was not to conquer Italy, but to find there a home and refuge for the exiled deities and penates of Troy. This runs through the poem from end to end. It is seen in the opening lines of the poem. It is seen in the words which Hector's ghost addresses to Æneas :

> "Troy entrusts to thee now her worship and her gods. Take them to share your destiny—seek for them a mighty city."

It is seen at the close, in Æneas's own words :

> "I will ordain sacred rites and divinities ; let my father-in-law Latinus hold to the rule of war."

The Romans would never have tolerated to hear that their ancestors, Latin and Sabine, of whom they were so proud, were

conquered by Phrygians, whom they despised. But the East they looked on as the land of mystery, the birthplace of religion, and they were not unwilling to receive thence their first lessons in things divine. It is as the bearer of the Trojan gods to Italy that Æneas appears, from first to last. This is his main function, and this achieved, his mission is ended, his work done. At the close of the poem, when all difficulties are to be smoothed away, the last of these, Juno's vindictiveness, is appeased when she is told by Jupiter that her favorite Italians were to be unremoved, their place and name preserved, the Trojans were only to hand on to them their worship and their name, and then to disappear. "The Ausonians shall keep their native tongue, their native customs: the name shall remain as it is. The Teucrians shall merge in the nation they join—that and no more; their rites and worship shall be my gift; all shall be Latins and speak the Latin tongue" (Æn. xii., 834).

This view of the mission of Æneas as essentially a religious one throws, I think, some light on his character as Virgil portrays it. That character, as we all know, has generally been voted uninteresting, not to say insipid. Every one has felt the contrast between him and the hero of the Iliad, or even such subordinate characters as Ulysses, Hector, Ajax, even Nestor. These are living men, full of like passions with ourselves, only of more heroic mould. The glow of health is in their cheek, the strong throb in their pulses. Beside them, how pale, washed-out is the countenance of Æneas! No doubt he is in some sort a composite conception—an attempt to embody somewhat diverse attributes, rather than a man moved by one strong human impulse. On one side he represents that latest product of civilization, the humane man, in whom "humanitas," as Cicero and Virgil conceived it, is embodied. On another side, some of his traits are taken from Augustus and meant to recall him. These two elements are both present in him. But far more potent than either is the conception of him as the man of destiny, whom the fates had called to go forth he knows not whither, and to seek in some strange land which the fates would show him a home for his country's gods and for himself; a sad, contemplative man, to whom the present is

nothing, who ever feels that he has a mournful past behind him, and a great future decreed by fate before him. He has no strong impulses of his own ; natural interests have ceased to move him.

> "In him the savage virtues of the race—
> Revenge and all ferocious thoughts, are dead."

As the French critic has well expressed it : "He has secured from heaven a mission which lies heavy on him ; and he accepts it pensively. He toils and endures hardness to find a resting-place for his Penates, a kingdom for his son, a glorious future for his race. Before these great interests his own personality has effaced itself. He obeys the behest of fate in spite of natural reluctance, and sacrifices himself to the commands of heaven." Herein lies the "pietas" which Virgil has made his fixed characteristic. The chief motive-power within him is "pietas," in its widest sense, including all human affections—love to family, love to country, fidelity to the dead, above all, dependence on a higher power, and obedience to it, controlling, sanctifying all his actions. To meet these duties, to fulfil the destiny he is called to, is his one absorbing thought. He has no other.

Even that part of his conduct which to moderns seems most unforgivable, his heartless desertion of Dido, is explained by this principle, if it is not justified. He leaves her not from heartlessness, but in obedience to an overmastering call from heaven. Whatever his attachment may have been, one word brought by Mercury from Jove suffices to startle him from his dream. At the god's approach—

> "Art thou not helping to build the walls of lofty Carthage, and in the fondness of weak affection piling up a fair city !"

he at once awakes and longs to be gone.

> "He is on fire to fly, and leave the too-well-loved city, astounded at so unlooked-for a warning and at the command of the gods."

Hence we see why the character of Æneas as portrayed in the first six books of the Æneid is so much more consistent than it appears to be in the last six. In the former he is entirely the absorbed, devoted man, obeying the behests of heaven. In the latter he has to do the fighting business, to

play the part of Achilles or Ajax. When we see him lopping off the heads of the Rutulians, we feel that this is not in keeping with the original conception of him. His bearing becomes unnatural, his words truculent, altogether unlike the humane, pensive, contemplative man of the earlier books. But it could not be avoided : the plan of the poem required that he should be the warrior as well as the religious exile, and, as the warrior, bloody work had to be done, and in describing this Virgil could not be original, but must needs fall back on imitation of the Iliad and of the Homeric heroes.

If we cannot get over an impression of baseness in his conduct to the Carthagenian Queen, we should remember that in Virgil's intention this but proves the greatness of his self-sacrifice, the depth of his conviction that Heaven had called him to another destiny. Had his abandonment of Dido been his own deed it would have been the basest treachery. If it does not become interesting, it is changed in character when we see it as done at the behest of Heaven, as an act of religious obedience.

> " Cease to kindle by your complaints both yourself and me ;
> it is not by my choice I follow Italy."

It makes him, no doubt, less interesting as a man, but it proves more entirely that he is a religious hero, that his inspiration comes from the sense of a divine mission. This was the poet's fundamental conception of him, so he wished to represent him. Unless we continually remember this, we shall misinterpret Æneas not only in his conduct to Dido, but we shall miss the key to his whole character and to the main purpose of the poem.

It has often been remarked how much more attractive is the character of Turnus that that of Æneas. Turnus and his companions represent the natural passions, the spontaneous impulses, in a much freer, more human way than Æneas and his Trojans. The individuality of these last is, as it were, obliterated by the weight of destiny which they feel themselves under. What is this but to say that in poetry or romance it is much easier to invest with interest an ordinary man, with all the human feelings and infirmities about him, than to portray a

religious hero in such verse that he shall at once command our reverence and win our affection. If Virgil has failed to do so, and I grant he has, who is there of poets or novelists that in this kind of portraiture has succeeded better?

But more than in any other portion of his work, the strength of Virgil's moral and religious feeling comes out in the sixth book of the Æneid. His whole conception of the condition of the departed souls is a thoroughly moral one—a projection into the unseen future of the everlasting difference between good and evil. That which lies at the bottom of all the elaborate imagery of the book is the belief that judgment awaits men there for what they have been and what they have done here; that their works follow them into the unseen state; that the pollution which men have contracted here must be purged away before they can attain to peace. To show in detail how these conceptions pervade that sixth book would require a whole essay devoted to itself, and space forbids me to do more than allude to it now.

It is not, however, the definite teaching either of the sixth or of any other book of the Æneid that most clearly reveals the essential piety of Virgil's soul. It is the incidental expressions, the half-uttered thoughts, the sighs which escape him unawares, that show what his habitual feeling about man's life and destiny was—how solemn! how tender! how religious!

Consider the great purity of his mind as seen in his poems. One or two passages only occur in all his works from which the most perfect modesty would shrink. And this in an age when the great men of the day, with few exceptions, were steeped in all impurity. When we first become acquainted with Virgil in boyhood we are not, of course, aware of this characteristic. It requires larger acquaintance with literature and with the world to make us feel how great is the contrast in this respect between Virgil and most of the ancient, and indeed many of the modern, poets. Horace, who lived much in society, was conscious of the rare beauty of Virgil's character, and speaks of him as one of the whitest souls among the sons of men. Indeed, Horace never alludes to Virgil but his voice hushes itself into a tone of tender reverence unusual with him.

Again, observe how though he is compelled to speak of war

and bloodshed, his soul evidently abhors it. We see this in such lines as—

"The fever of the steel, the guilty madness of bloodshed rage within him.—

By degrees crept in an age degenerate and of duller hue,
and the frenzy for war and the greed of gain."

This sounds strange language from the lips of the great poet of the conquerors of the world, but it was the true language of Virgil's own heart, though not of his people's. Keble has remarked how from the thick of battle and slaughter he turns away to soothe himself with rustic images, as in the description of the conflicts of Æneas in the tenth book of the Æneid. Every death is described, not with stern delight, but with a sigh, as of one who felt for the miseries of men. As each warrior falls Virgil turns aside to recall his home, his family, his peaceful pursuits, as in the well-known—

"and dreams in death of his darling Argos."

Note, again, Virgil's unworldliness of spirit. He had evidently no relish for the material splendors that fascinate lower natures. It would seem as if unworldliness were the very condition of all high poetry, and as if a great poet's heart could not be given to those things which the worldling admires. Yet no one of ancient and few of modern poets have shown so decidedly that riches, rank, splendor, have no charm for them. Homer in his simplicity, and being probably poor himself, looks with evident satisfaction on the riches of the great. Andromache is "rich in gifts;" Æneas boasts that his ancester was "the wealthiest of mortal men." For Virgil

"the high mansion with proud portals,
Discharging from all the palace its huge tide of early visitants,"

has no attraction. From the palace of Augustus and from the home of Mæcenas on the Esquiline he turns away instinctively to the woods and the fields and the men who lived among them. The country housewife going about her work more pleases him than the grandest of patrician matrons. You remember his picture in the eighth book of the Æneid of the thrifty dame at the middle of the night, "just when a woman compelled to support life by spinning wakes to light the fire that

slumbered in the embers, adding night to her day's work, and keeps her handmaids laboring long by the blaze, all that she may be able to preserve her wedded life in purity, and bring up her infant sons." Evidently this was more to his mind than all the Tyrian purple and fretted ceilings of Roman mansions.

Connected with this unworldliness is Virgil's continual remembrance of the poor, and his feeling for the miserable. This he has expressed in one immortal line.

> ——"Tears there are for human things,
> and hearts are tŏuched by mortal sufferings,"

is the spirit of all his poetry. If men forget or despise the unfortunate, he is sure that Heaven does not :

> "If you defy the race of men, and the weapons that mortals wield,
> yet look to have to do with the gods, who forget not right
> and wrong."

No poet ever admired less mere outward success, and felt more sure that there is a tribunal somewhere which will test men and things by another standard, according to which

> "a noble aim
> Faithfully kept is as a noble deed.
> In whose pure sight all virtue doth succeed."

You remember his

> "Learn, O boy ! from me what virtue means and genuine toil.
> Let others teach you the meaning of success."

While gentleness and natural piety, in the wide sense which I have already explained, are Virgil's characteristic virtues, not less inculcated by him is another virtue which might seem opposed to these ; I mean patience, fortitude, manly endurance.

> "Whatever may befall, every misfortune must be overcome
> by enduring it."

This is the undertone of all his morality.

Again, another side of his unworldliness appears in that his heart refuses to find full satisfaction in any thing here. Not wealth, not honor, nor future fame, not the loveliness of nature, not the voice of friend, are enough for him. For even if for a time they pleased, does he not keenly feel that—

> "Poor mortals that we are, our brightest days of life
> are ever the first to fly,"

This has been called pessimism in Virgil. It is, however, only his keen feeling of the fleetingness and unsufficingness of this earthly life. He does not rail at it, as some poets have done—upbraids neither the world nor the power that made it, but accepts it and learns from it reverent patience. And this experience would seem to have wakened within him a longing and aspiration after something purer, higher, lovelier, than eye or ear here discover. His poetry has the tone as of one of whom it may be said in his own words :

> "He was stretching forth his hands with longing desire
> for the farther shore."

Therefore, while we may not, as former ages did, accept the fourth Eclogue as in any sense a prophecy of the Messiah, we need not be blind to that which it does contain—the hope of better things, the expectation that some relief was at hand for the miseries of an outworn and distracted world. This expectation was, we know, widely spread in Virgil's day, and probably none felt it more than he. Likely enough he expected that the relief would come through the establishment and universal sway of the Roman Empire ; but the ideal empire, as he conceived it, was something more humane and beneficent than any thing the earth had yet seen—something such as Trajan may perhaps have dreamed of, but which none ever saw realized. His conception of the future work which he imagined the Empire had to do contained elements which belonged to a kingdom not of this world. In his enthusiastic predictions regarding it we may say, in Keble's words,

> "Thoughts beyond their thought to those high bards were given."

Taking, then, all these qualities of Virgil together, his purity, his unworldliness, his tenderness towards the weak and down-trodden, his weariness of the state of things he saw around him, his lofty ideal, his longing for "a higher life than this daily one," I think we may say that in him the ancient civilization reached its moral culmination. When that civilization could produce such a spirit as his, which it could so little satisfy, does it not appear that "the fulness of the time was come"? He was a spirit prepared and waiting, though he knew it not, for some better thing to be revealed.

J. C. SHAIRP.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S EXPOSITION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY.[1]

PROFESSOR HUXLEY is always an interesting writer, whatever may be his theme. He never fails to be clear and forcible, and is usually both vivacious and amusing. It is true his positiveness makes him defiant and contemptuous of men and opinions of whom and of which he has very little knowledge, and ought to say little or nothing. And yet his ignorance is often so complete and unconscious that his positiveness becomes diverting, while his self-complacent good-nature is always so manifest that the critic loses all sense of irritation in sympathy with his serene self-satisfaction, and abates even much of his moral displeasure at his frivolous trifling with the most important moral and religious truths, by reason of the succession of surprises which his audacious paradoxes occasion. Professor Huxley may not inaptly be styled the William Cobbett of our current philosophical radicalism. He is like Cobbett in acuteness, directness, humor, and earthliness. He is like Cobbett in the clearness, directness, and vigor of his style. Above all, he is like Cobbett in being never weary of having a fling at "the parsons."

The writer informs his readers that it was at the desire and suggestion of Mr. Morley, the editor of the series of "Biographies of English Men of Letters," that he undertook the task of writing upon David Hume. He half apologizes for his audacity in making the attempt, inasmuch as he does not profess to be himself a man of letters. He excuses himself, however, by the consideration that Mr. Hume has at present greater significance

[1] "Hume," by Professor Huxley. New York, 1879.

and reputation as a philosopher than as a literary man, and that his own familiarity with science in some sense qualifies him to write upon Hume's philosophical system.

The reader who is at all familiar with the special signification in which the term science is persistently used by men of Professor Huxley's way of thinking, as synonymous with physics, will perhaps be surprised that he should find any meaning or place left for philosophy either in his thinking or his terminology. That he attempts to find both is made to appear as he proceeds. Indeed, this biography derives its chief importance from the circumstance that it is an elaborate attempt on the part of an ultra-physiological materialist to recognize, after a fashion of his own, the significance of the problems which have been proposed by metaphysicians proper, and to solve them in such a way as to reconcile Hume with Kant, Locke with Descartes, upon the irenical basis furnished by the metaphysics of associationalism and the psychology of cerebralism!

Prof. Huxley divides his treatise into two parts, entitled respectively "Mr. Hume's Life" and "Mr. Hume's Philosophy," the first occupying 45 and the second 160 pages. The biography states concisely the principal external incidents of Mr. Hume's life, and the salient features of his character as seen by the common eye. So far it is well enough. And yet we cannot but regret that a life and character so eminently individual and original, and so suggestive of the times, had not been treated by a writer competent vividly to conceive and graphically to depict both the man and his age. Indeed, for a biographer of the requisite intellectual and moral qualifications, we cannot conceive a finer subject than Hume the man, and the man of letters. A life of Hume both as a man of letters and philosopher, vividly conceived and graphically set off by some just and lively portraiture of his times, might be given within the compass of one of Mr. Morley's volumes, and be a priceless addition to English biography, were it written by more than one man whom we could name. But then how different would that man be in his stand-point from Mr. Huxley, and how different would be the impressions and lessons from the story and the criticism!

Part II., on Mr. Hume's Philosophy, was doubtless designed to be what Prof. Huxley describes it, an "exposition of Hume's

philosophy." He informs us that in preparing it he "applied himself to the task of selecting and arranging in systematic order the passages which appeared to him to contain the clearest statements of Hume's opinions." He adds he should have been glad to confine himself to the comments which might serve to connect these excerpts, but excuses himself for overstepping these limits by "an ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear." The reader would expect from this announcement to find a tolerably complete statement of Mr. Hume's philosophical opinions, made clearer, perhaps, by explanatory remarks, with here and there a brief criticism interposed, or perhaps a supplementary observation. He would certainly have reason to look for very much of Mr. Hume's philosophizing and very little comparatively of Professor Huxley's. He may reasonably be surprised, therefore, when he finds that the treatise contains as much or more of Mr. Huxley's philosophy than it does of the philosophy of Mr. Hume. He could not object to an exposition of Mr. Hume's philosophy in Professor Huxley's own language. He would have no reason to be offended had Professor Huxley now and then expressed his dissent from Mr. Hume's opinions, and his reasons for the same. Nor, indeed, could he reasonably complain had he drawn his illustrations, confirmations, or refutations from modern science, whether physiological or any other. But he may certainly feel some surprise to find that the philosophy is in the main Professor Huxley's, reinforced now and then by Mr. Hume's, and not infrequently substituted in place of that of the great Scottish leader. The treatise is certainly a striking example of the tendency of modern physics and physiology to rush into metaphysics. It is certainly not the first time that Professor Huxley has essayed an attempt at philosophy. His well-known lecture on Descartes seems to have prepared the way for his discussion of Hume — resembling it strikingly in its manner of treatment, its conclusions, its audacity, and its blunders.

It is comparatively of little consequence, however, whether the present treatise ought to be called Mr. Hume's Philosophy or Mr. Huxley's. So far, however, as it contains the latter it invites and demands a candid criticism, even though the results of such a criticism should show that the author's "ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear" has resulted only in making clear his

own failure to vindicate his materialistic and atheistic conclusions, even with the authority and prestige which he sought from Mr. Hume.

Before entering upon this critical examination, we would call attention to the hope expressed by the author "that there is nothing in what he may have said which is inconsistent with the logical development of Hume's principles." This suggests the important question which has been agitated by critical students, viz., whether Hume held any fixed and logical system of philosophy, either in its principles or conclusions. Hamilton insists that he was not a dogmatist, but a sceptic; that he did not assert his own principles and proceed to derive from them their logical consequences as his own conclusions, but expounded the principles of the received philosophy, *i.e.*, the philosophy of Locke, with the inferences which they necessarily involved; leaving it for his readers to decide whether the inferences disproved the premises by a *reductio ad absurdum*, or whether the difficulty of reaching or phrasing any trustworthy *data* might not justify a sceptical distrust or despair of any philosophical exactness of statement (Met. Lects., xvi., xxxix.). There is much in the spirit of Hume's earliest treatise which would indicate that he often wrote in a spirit of mischievous banter, which found its chief delight in puzzling the average mind with the lucid statement of current metaphysical theories and the logical derivation of incredible paradoxes from the premises furnished by the received philosophy. As we follow the movements of his mind in his later treatises, we find him more cautious of dogmatism, more guarded and *suave* in his manner of writing, and more careful to avoid giving offence to other thinkers, theologians being always excepted. His famous Essay on Miracles is as remarkable for its sly indirectness as it is for its skilful argumentation. Even the dialogues on Natural Religion, which he declined to publish during his lifetime, indicate a singular indecision or indefiniteness of philosophical opinion united to a sensitive timidity in avowing his real or even his prevailing conclusions. Hence the question has often been raised, and never satisfactorily answered, which of the personages in these masterly dialogues represented his own sentiments. The most plausible answer to this question seems to us to be that each of them

represents Hume in one of his varying moods, and all together bespeak a man who was gifted with great intellectual subtlety conjoined with the mastery over a singularly lucid style, but was perpetually vacillating with the changes of his own half-formed convictions. There are strong internal evidences in his writings that the statements are true which Huxley treats with such lightness, that Hume in his more earnest moods relaxed from the frivolous temper which he usually assumed when he touched theological questions or religious truth.

Professor Huxley is no such man. He is downright in the opinions which he holds, and outright in expressing them. He is least of all an Academic, but as Sidney Smith said of Lord Macaulay, "is always cocksure of everything" — of the worthlessness of what he calls "pure metaphysics," of the scientific certainty of his biological psychology—in short, of every point of the philosophy which he finds in or reads into Hume, and of the conclusions which he deduces from it. Every step which he takes is positive and firm. He would have his readers believe that Hume was the forerunner of the modern metaphysics of which Mr. Huxley is the acknowledged head in physiology, Mr. Bain the most distinguished analysist in psychology, and Mr. Spencer the most profound and comprehensive philosopher and theologian. He goes even further in his sanguine positiveness. He tries to persuade himself and his readers that Locke, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant all approximated on many points to the same principles with himself, and are worthy of the very highest respect in the temple of the new philosophy.

Professor Huxley begins his exposition with a chapter on *The Object and Scope of Philosophy*. It is worthy of note that at the very outset he recognizes a distinction between science and philosophy. Both have to do with knowledge. Philosophy attempts to answer the question, What can I know? "What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or biological, consists of the answers which mankind have been able to give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of the mental operations which constitute thinking; while philosophy in the stricter sense of the term inquires into the foundation of the first principles which those operations assume or imply." He soon discovers that this comprehensive question

can be answered satisfactorily only by that analysis of the power of knowing which we call psychological. Thus far we find no difficulty in keeping company with the critic, when all at once he brings us to a pause by turning upon us with the assertion, "*Psychology is a part of the science of life, or biology*, which differs from the other branches of that science merely in so far as it deals with the psychical instead of the physical phenomena of life." From one point of view this assertion might be considered as harmless enough. From another it simply begs a score of questions and commits us to his entire theory of physiological, not to say materialistic, philosophizing. He supports this view by the remark that as the physiologist studies "functions," so the psychologist searches after "faculties." He adds the not very original or profound remark that mental phenomena are more or less affected by bodily states, and that as in physiology we must know something of physics, which treats of the lower operations of the body, so in psychology we ought to consider those higher functions of which physiology treats. From all this he concludes that psychology and physiology must follow the same method of investigation, and can differ only in the subject-matter with which they are concerned. That psychology has a special subject-matter he defends against the positivists, but not before, in almost the same breath, he had turned against the "pure metaphysicians" who "attempt to base the theory of knowing upon supposed necessary and universal truths,and assert that scientific observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or implied," apparently forgetting that two pages earlier he had affirmed that "philosophy, in the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the first principles which these operations assume or imply." It will be seen that the Professor has already fallen into deep water, and has begun to flounder where very many have floundered before him. In other words, he has first classed biology among the sciences, as contrasted with philosophy, and then has placed philosophy under psychology, and psychology under biology, and thus brought back philosophy to a special science, even the science of life, which means a science of the brain, and finally given it the *coup de grace* by attacking the pure metaphysicians for doing what he had said all philosophers

must do, *i.e.*, seeking to find "the first principles which the psychological operations assume or imply."

He does not seem aware, however, that he has lost his footing, or that he flounders at all; for he seems to recover his footing by saying that "it is assuredly one of Hume's greatest merits that he clearly recognized the fact that philosophy is based upon psychology." He refers here to the title of his first work as a "Treatise of Human Nature, being an attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects." The title is certainly very significant, and the explanation of its import as given by Hume himself, in the passage which Huxley quotes on page 51, very clearly sets forth his views as to what the "experimental method" is. It shows very satisfactorily that Hume, so far as he reached definite views, anticipated the modern physical school in a then novel theory of the soul, and the method of studying its phenomena. We cannot complain or wonder that Prof. Huxley at this point claims for his own views the authority of Hume. But he commits a grave offence when he proceeds to refer to Descartes and Locke and Kant as sanctioning similar opinions in regard either to the nature of the soul or the method of attaining to psychological and philosophical knowledge. In citing their authority he not only makes a muddle of their opinions, but leaves his readers in a muddle as to the object for which he quotes them. He first observes (p. 53) that "the memorable service rendered to the cause of sound thinking by Descartes consisted in this, that he laid the foundation of modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of certainty," and that it is a clear result of the investigation started by Descartes "that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained," "and that is the momentary consciousness we call a *present thought of feeling*." We beg Professor Huxley's pardon. This is not the doctrine of Descartes at all. What he insisted upon in his famous argument, *Cogito, ergo sum*, was the existence of the *ego*, as involved in and clearly discerned "in each momentary state we call a present thought or feeling." This is the truth which Hume ridiculed and denied most persistently. In proof of our assertion we refer to the second of his Meditations, and to Mr. Huxley's own lecture

upon Descartes, published in his "Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews" (p. 328, Am. ed.), in which he asserts that in the proposition I *think* three propositions are included. "The first of these is 'something called *I* exists;' the second is 'something called *thought* exists;' and the third is 'the thought is the result of the *action* of the I.'" He then proceeds to argue that, of these three propositions, in his opinion the second only can be true. That is, Professor Huxley does not quote from Descartes either in word or thought, but cites what Professor Huxley argues Descartes *ought to have said.* If any tenet was characteristic for Descartes to affirm and for Hume to deny (cf. pp. 165–6), it was the existence of the *ego* as given in every state of consciousness. For Professor Huxley to cite the authority of Descartes in favor of this doctrine is singularly audacious.

Scarcely less daring is his citation of sundry passages from Hume as containing an anticipation of the technical theory of modern Agnosticism, whereas they are simply expressive of his contemptuous disesteem of the frivolous logomachies of the metaphysical speculation current in his time. Scarcely less cool is the effrontery with which he cites Locke's sensible remarks in respect to the necessity of recognizing the limits of human knowledge, and Kant's restriction of all logical knowledge to the sphere of the phenomenal as tending in the same direction. Indeed, this first chapter, on the Object and Scope of Philosophy, is wholly disappointing. It neither gives us the views of Mr. Hume with any appreciation of his historic position nor the views of Professor Huxley with any frankness. The citations and arguments from Descartes, Locke, and Kant are of no significance to any reader who knows anything of their teachings. Even the just recognition of philosophy as different from science, and of the relation of philosophy to psychology, is annulled by the degradation of psychology to biology, and the obvious preparation for his subsequent argument that metaphysical relations are nothing more than cerebral outgrowths.

The second chapter treats of *The Contents of the Mind.* What the precise signification of this phrase may be does not appear at once. Whether the objections urged by Huxley are valid, that the conception of the mind as an entity endowed with faculties is a legacy "of ancient philosophy more or less

leavened by theology," or the doctrine quoted from Hume be correct, that "what we call the mind is nothing but a *heap or collection* of different perceptions united together by certain relations," or the cautious view finally sanctioned by the critic be the only one which it is safe to adopt, "that we know nothing more of the mind than that it is a series of perceptions," it still remains true that the contents of the mind must signify the various kinds of phenomena which make up the heap or series.

We do not accept this doctrine, but hold to that of Descartes that the mind is itself an agent capable of those various modes of acting and suffering which are called by Huxley its contents. But waiving this point, we limit ourselves to Mr. Huxley's exposition and critical analysis of Hume's doctrine of the elementary phenomena of which the mind is the subject. These are correctly stated as reducible to two classes, viz., *impressions and ideas*, the first of which includes "all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul," and the second the faint images of impressions or antecedent ideas. Huxley criticises very justly this view of Hume, on the ground that it does not include "relations." In doing so he might have referred to Hume's own words already quoted, as teaching a better doctrine, in which he speaks of "different perceptions united together by certain relations." As a decisive example that Hume is wrong he appeals to every act of memory as necessarily involving in one case "the feeling of the *succession* of two impressions," and in the other "the feeling of their *similarity*." He very justly makes a stronger point against Hume, that relations figure largely in his fundamental doctrine of association and are altogether essential to his explanation of causation. He urges also against him that in his own account of the nature and origin of relations he is inconsistent with himself. For these reasons he ventures to amend Hume's catalogue of the contents of the mind by an additional or third class of original impressions—viz., *relations*.

Having enlarged Hume's inventory of the contents of the mind by adding relations to impressions and ideas, he raises the very important question whether the possession of one or all of these simple elements involves an act of knowledge. Of all the questions which he could possibly ask, this is fundamental to an

understanding of the historical position of Hume's theory and to a successful criticism of its fatal defect. Stated fully the question is this: Must the mind exercise the act of knowledge in *gaining* what Huxley called its contents, *i.e.*, its elementary states, whether these are impressions, ideas, or relations; or must it first *possess* these elements before it proceeds to unite them in an act of knowledge? This we affirm to be the most important question which could possibly be proposed for an answer.

Professor Huxley refers us at once to Locke's definition of knowledge "as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas," which Hume tacitly accepts. According to this definition, he rightly reasons, the mind must have ideas, etc., before it can unite them in relations. This would involve the inference that the mind cannot know its simple states, as of pain, however violent, or any specific sensation, however definite, because, forsooth, it must first possess ideas before it can discern their agreement or disagreement—that is, before it can know. But surely, Huxley rightly reasons, whenever we have a sensation we must know it; the distinction between the two being merely verbal. Is not Locke's definition defective? Huxley does not suggest the thought. He makes a joke of the matter. Instead of extricating himself from his embarrassment he frankly confesses it, and even more frankly owns that "the 'pure metaphysicians' make great capital out of the ambiguity" by "declaring that even the simplest act of sensation contains two terms and a relation—the sensitive subject, the sensigenous object, and that masterful entity the ego. From which great triad, as from a Gnostic trinity, emanates an endless procession of other logical shadows and all the fata morgana of philosophical dreamland." With this jocose confession of weakness, our philosophical scene-shifter lets fall the curtain upon the second act of his promised exhibition, leaving the act of knowledge wholly unexplained by which "the contents of the mind" are gained.

We cannot suffer our manager to raise the curtain again and discuss the "origin of the impressions" without calling attention to the dexterity with which he omits a discussion of this cardinal question in the philosophy of Hume, and indeed in all phi-

losophy. Every tyro in philosophy knows, or ought to know, that the idealism of Berkeley was logically derived from Locke's definition of knowledge as the perception of an agreement or disagreement of ideas, or from the assumption which this definition implied, that we must first gain ideas before we can discern them in relations. Berkeley took Locke's definition to be literally correct, and reasoned from it that we know only *the ideas* of matter and their relations, but never can know matter itself. Hume made a similar application of it to our ideas of spirit, and concluded that all that we know of spirit are our ideas of it; that we do not and cannot know the *ego* or agent—because the "masterful ego" is only a heap or collection of impressions. Berkeley and Hume together furnished the *reductio ad absurdum* of Locke's defective definition of knowledge, and forced upon philosophers the necessity of revising and correcting it in the way indicated by Professor Huxley, by adding relations to the contents of the mind. Many of the so-called "pure metaphysicians" also go still farther, and give a corrected definition of knowledge which the materialists and associationalists overlook or reject. This corrected definition would be as follows: The mind, "that masterful entity the *ego*," gains its ideas by observing existing entities in relations (or as related) to one another. This is its function, and in the exercise of this function it finds the authority to trust the contents gained by its own acts. It does not find itself in possession of its materials, it knows not how—as "the contents of the mind," as impressions or ideas, nor even as relations—and then proceed to compound them into knowledge, but it finds things or entities in combination, or related together, and proceeds subsequently to decompose them into ideas, and to express these ideas in language. As Professor Huxley himself explains of memory, the mind not only views ideas previously present with more or less vividness, but it recalls these in a relation of succession. So it is of all experiences or mental activities: they are known to exist, and not only are known to exist, but to exist in relations to one another. They are necessarily and uniformly given in combination. They are affirmed in propositions which the mind subsequently analyzes into subject, predicate, and copula. As everything living is essentially complex; as the vegetable and

animal cell already exist, or the protoplasm is certain to show itself in distinguishable elements united into living wholes—so the mind apprehends whatever it knows, in elements. These as known become "the contents of the mind," as united or separated by the several relations which itself discerns.

How widely contrasted this view of the mind and its functions is with that which Professor Huxley assumes and teaches will appear as we follow his expositions in detail. What excellent reasons he has to dismiss it with a jest may appear in the sequel. The arts of thimblerigging are not confined to the *manual* dexterity by which the attention is diverted from a movement which the operator is desirous to conceal perhaps from himself!

If our view of knowledge is correct, the mind in knowledge is pre-eminently active, and its position in respect to whatever it knows is a position of complete and independent self-reliance. The function itself is altogether unique—so unique that it will suffer a comparison with no other. Whether the ego perceives or is conscious, whether it remembers or reasons, whether it invents or interprets, it appears as an individual agent which is in no sense the servant of the objects which it discerns or explains. To interpret its acts by materialistic analogies, or to explain them by the laws which control the world of matter, is simply to destroy its capacity to judge of matter and explain its phenomena. To interpret its phenomena or products by the phenomena which address the senses, or to calculate its results by weight or measure, is to destroy the authority of the agent that weighs and measures. To assume that the acts of scientific judgment by which biology is created are themselves only biological phenomena of a subtler complexion, is to make biology itself an uncertain product of cerebral excitement. In like manner, to degrade the science of the mind under the guise of applying to it the experimental method, by forgetting or denying that it discovers and enforces the principles and laws which are essential to all scientific method, past, present, and future; to make this agent to be the possible product of a changing constitution, or of the progressive growths of an accidental environment—is to be untrue to the most elementary experiences which we have of the nature of knowledge, and to the most splendid achievements of "that mas-

terful entity" which in these modern times speaketh such great things, and often such presumptuous things, and always such brilliant things by the mouth of Professor Huxley and those who think with him.

In Chapter III. our critic proceeds to expound Hume's corrected theory of *The Origin of the Impressions.* He ought here to throw much needed light on important problems. The reader should keep in mind that the word Impressions is used as equivalent to sensations *plus* relations, both of which make up "the primary irresolvable states of consciousness." We notice, first of all, that in this discussion the defective theory of knowledge to which we have adverted is continually assumed, and in several features which we have not yet stated. First of all, it seems to be implied that in the act of knowing *the object known* is the efficient agent, and not the mind. The impression is represented as produced by "the *sensigenous* object" upon the mind, whatever that may be, whether it be the brain or "a heap," "a collection" or "a bundle of impressions." Whatever it is, it is only the passive recipient of whatever effect the object produces in or imposes upon it. Next, the relations which Huxley had noticed as not adequately recognized by Hume are grouped and treated as on a par with sensations so far as their "origin" and method of production are concerned. They also are simply the effects of the object as it operates on the mind. It is marvellous in the eyes of a "pure metaphysician" to observe that Professor Huxley goes so far in the right direction in recognizing relations as essential elements in knowledge, and yet after all so readily sinks them to the level of sensations. He is not so outspoken as Herbert Spencer, who, after making as much or more of relations in the economy of knowledge than he, proceeds to define, say for example, the relation of likeness or equality between two colors or sounds as the *sensations* that are experienced in effecting a transition from the sensations of color or sound in question. Huxley does not say this, but his theory logically requires him to hold it.

In expounding Hume, the Professor observes that he agrees with Descartes that "all our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits." He also shows, and correctly enough, that Hume taught that the

primary qualities and the two classes of secondary qualities are alike, in being impressions produced on the senses. Whereupon Mr. Huxley leaps to the conclusion that Mr. Hume "fully adopted the conclusion to which all that we know of psychological physiology tends, that the origin of the elements of consciousness is to be sought in bodily changes the seat of which can only be placed in the brain." He quotes again from Hume to the effect that there can be no possible objection from the nature of matter or mind, as known *à priori*, "against the possibility of a causal connection between the modes of motion of the cerebral substance and states of consciousness." The substance of Hume's argument is that, inasmuch as causation is resolvable into casual associations, anything can be the cause of anything else if only it is constantly conjoined with it. Whereupon Huxley waxes bolder in the affirmation that what Hume had provided for as possible has now been established as certain—that "what we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity." He then adds: "It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine first laid down is what is commonly called materialism. In fact, I am not sure that the adjective 'crass,' which appears to have a special charm for rhetorical sciolists, would not be applied to it. But it is nevertheless true that the doctrine contains nothing inconsistent with the purest idealism." The readers of Mr. Huxley will not be surprised at this statement or the argument on which it is founded. It is no strange thing to find him urging with the utmost confidence the truth that the brain is all the mind which science can recognize, and the phenomena of spirit are altogether dependent on modes of motion, and then turn about and add: but after all it is of no consequence what we say, for modes of motion on the one side and the corresponding spiritual states on the other are simply two uniformly adherent phenomena of we know not and care not what substratum, call it what you will. In a similar fashion reason Spencer, Bain, and Lewes. We submit, however, that it is not altogether fair to make Hume teach doctrines like these and anticipate the modern dogmatic two-faced materialism. The ambitious and deferential references of Huxley to the "pure metaphysicians" Leibnitz and Fichte, in this

connection, do not relieve him of the charge of reading the philosophy of Huxley between the lines of Hume. It is true, Hume the sceptic did suggest that everything which we call the substance of matter and spirit is utterly beyond our apprehension, and that all we do know of either is simply sensations; that both matter and spirit themselves are nothing more than collections of sensations and emotions. But Hume the dogmatist, when he suggested that, for aught we know, the several changes in the animal spirits or the nervous system are adequate to account for every description of mental phenomena, treated matter as the substance well known and real to the solid common-sense of common man, and as the producing agent of all spiritual manifestations, and therefore the only permanently existing agent in the universe. Mr. Hume the acute reasoner against the possibility of any philosophy is one man, and Mr. Hume the assailant of those spiritual truths which are vital to all morality, faith, and worship is altogether another.

Mr. Huxley himself is also an example of a man who can play two *rôles* in reasoning and scarcely know when he passes from the one to the other. When Mr. Huxley reasons as a physiologist or paleontologist, there is no man so positive an assertor of the reality of matter and its infinite capacities for evolution into forms of wonder and beauty. But Mr. Huxley the metaphysician is the most uncertain and timid of men as to whether matter or spirit have any existence, and does not care what name you give to either or its phenomena. When he comes before an American audience with his enthusiasm freshly excited by the remains which had been freshly gathered in an American museum, he stamps forth with his feet his irrepressible and enthusiastic conviction that evolution is a demonstrated fact; but when he enacts the *rôle* of a "physiological metaphysician," then matter and spirit, the old horses and new, with their infinite number of intervening forms, are all, in the generosity of his idealistic candor, at once converted into sensations, and sensations and emotions are declared to be all that we know of matter and mind. Forsooth, the successions and associations of these sensations and emotions constitute the facts and science of either and of both. On the one hand, he asseverates that physiological psychology has taught with absolute positiveness that all the varieties of so-called

spiritual activity are produced by modes of motion in the cerebral substance. But again putting on his metaphysical robes, he declares that modes of motion, bulk, and figure are nothing but sensations, and consequently materialism and idealism are interchangeable, and it is folly to ask which you will prefer, for at bottom they are one.

Growing so liberal in his catholicity, he condescends, in this very chapter, to accept the long-discarded doctrine of innate ideas, and invites Descartes, the former high-priest of spiritualism, to enter into the temple of the new philosophic faith, and officiate with distinguished honors. These innate ideas, he informs us, are nothing more nor less than "the product of the reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an unknown cause, which is Descartes' *je ne sais quoi*." This assertion might be admitted to be true if the phrases *organ of the mind* and *je ne sais quoi* were omitted. But against both of these Descartes would have protested with his utmost energy, and his school would have exclaimed with philosophic horror, *Procul, O procul!*

We ought not to be surprised that with this liberal construction of Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas he should administer a reproof to Locke for grossly misunderstanding him, nor perhaps that he should extend to Kant a patronizing expression of gratification that he had the penetration to anticipate the doctrine propounded by Mr. Huxley, that "coexistence and succession are mental phenomena not given in the sense-experience." We are all of us greatly obliged to Mr. Huxley for the small favors bestowed in the recognition of these relations as superadded to pure sense-experiences, but we confess that we cannot clearly discern in what way they are the products of "modes of motion" in the cerebral apparatus. We apprehend that however cordial may have been the invitation to Kant and Descartes to enter the temple of Mr. Huxley's faith, on condition that they would assert that the relations which are superadded to sense-experiences are themselves brain-growths, they would be rather slow to accept it.

In Chapter IV. the author proceeds to give his views of the higher operations of the mind, under the title *The Classification and the Nomenclature of Mental Operations*. He reasserts at the beginning, more roundly than ever, the doctrine that all mental states are effects of physical causes; that they occur in

assignable portions of the cerebral substance, both the impressions and relations when originally received, and also in all the subsequent modifications to which they are subjected. Every intellectual activity falls into one of the three groups of sensation, correlation, and ideation; ideation signifies the recall of sensations, either in the relations originally experienced or as more or less modified. In one point only Huxley differs from Hume. Whereas Hume makes memory and imagination to differ from sensation chiefly in that their phenomena are less vivacious, Huxley insists that in memory the objects remembered must have coexisted with other ideas in the past and preceded impressions or ideas now present. This is what he means by correlation, emphasizing coexistence and succession, on which Hume had placed but little stress. It is to be remembered, however, that the relations themselves are conceived by Huxley, especially with sensations, as "feelings produced by cerebral changes." He emphasizes also expectation as equally important with memory. But the element of knowledge as related to reality, whether in the past or the future, is left wholly unexplained. Recognition, or the certainty that the event revivified actually occurred, is resolved wholly into the phenomena that one idea is recalled in connection with another. Knowledge or belief of the future is explained as a so-called present state of consciousness, having no relation to the "sensigenous object" or "the masterful ego." Knowledge in the form of memory is the recall of two or more ideas in the relation of succession to one another and some present impression, while expectation is equally destitute of the element of any belief in the future conception as real.

Generic ideas, also, which play so important a *rôle* in scientific processes, are the result of the frequent revival of a few elements in individual impressions, to the neglect of the great number which only occur occasionally, the element in the process of forming and using such ideas which is of any significance to knowledge being wholly left out. The conjunction of two or more generic ideas, "as heat and flame, weight and solidity," in the so-called relations of causation, is explained by both Hume and Huxley by association and custom. If generic memories of succession are strengthened by repeating similar combinations in new impressions, the process is called *verification*, every case of

which strengthens belief by simply giving greater energy to association. This is all that either Hume or Huxley has to say of the higher intellectual processes, so far as these can be performed without the aid of language. Knowledge is but the occurrence of successive or similar states of consciousness, which, whether they represent realities of matter or spirit, are not known to be either and are not known to be anything, even what they are interpreted to be, and are the attendants of the modes of motion in the sensigenous object, in connection with changes in the cerebral functions. The relations of succession, coexistence, and similarity are also products of modes of motion and cerebral correlates. Memory is but the recall of conjunctions of ideas and impressions. Classification is the result of association. Propositions of causation, with their explanations of the past and their predictions of the future, are founded on custom, which signifies the more or less frequent association of impressions or ideas. Last of all, the experiment which verifies every theory does this only by making stronger the bonds which association has already established.

This is the theory of the higher operations of the mind which Mr. Huxley, in the name of Mr. Hume, commends to the men of the present generation as the net result on the one hand of the new philosophy, which is the outcome of physiological psychology, and which he would have us believe is not only enforced by Hume, but in a sense sanctioned by Locke, Descartes, and Kant, and on the other hand as sufficient to explain and justify the supreme confidence which present and future science exacts from all its votaries, however bold are its assertions concerning the history of the past or confident its theories concerning phenomena that cannot possibly be verified. Science nowadays erects a tower that rises beyond the clouds, and threatens to overtop the very battlements of the heavens beyond which faith had imagined it now and then could catch some glimpses. It would seem that in order to support so lofty a structure it would require a foundation broader and deeper than Mr. Huxley's metaphysical analysis of the higher intellectual processes.

We ought not to be surprised to find, after Mr. Huxley has lowered the highest operations of the human intellect to cerebral

motions and associational combinations, that he should be prepared to find no difference between the mental phenomena of animals and the mental phenomena of men. This doctrine he proceeds to establish in detail in Chapter V., which is devoted to the discussion of this point. He begins by adverting to the truth that as the use of language is proved by the example of children and deaf-mutes not to be essential to these higher processes, it follows that the absence of language on the part of animals does not of necessity involve the entire absence of these higher activities. He urges still further that "whatever reason we have for believing that the changes which take place in the normal cerebral substance of man give rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists in the belief that the modes of motion of the cerebral substance of an ape or of a dog produce like effects." Moreover, the actions of an ape or a dog give evidence similar to that which is furnished by man, that both are capable of every variety of intellectual activity which is achieved by him. Dogs remember and dream and generalize and reason. Comparative psychology, now reinforced by comparative physiology, sanctions this conclusion, and Huxley notices that although Hume in some sense anticipated the existence of this science, with its incidental testimony to the likeness of intellectual processes in both animals and men, he yet hesitates to find any similarity between the "inference of the animal" and "the process of argument or reasoning in man." On second thought, however, he finds him to hold that even the "experimental reasoning" in man "on which the whole conduct of life depends" is "nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves." From this Huxley gives his own theory, which is simply what we should expect to find, viz., that instinct covers every mental process—from the reflex acts of the nervous system up to the most deliberately reasoned process of scientific deduction. But this view of the matter, Huxley proceeds to observe, involves in some sense the doctrine of innate ideas as held by Descartes, and he for the second or third time extends to him the right hand of fellowship. But he fails to note that the innate ideas of Mr. Huxley are simply the more highly developed capacities of a well-trained and well-descended brain, and the

innate ideas of Descartes are in no sense whatever dependent on the brain or the animal spirits, but would be excluded from holding any relations whatever to matter.

Language remains to be disposed of as something peculiar to man. It is noticeable that Mr. Huxley is in haste to despatch it in a very speedy and summary fashion. He certainly throws no light whatever upon its nature, and evidently feels no little embarrassment in explaining how, by means of its potent alchemy, thought becomes visible and science is made possible. All the explanation which he gives of it is summed up in the commonplaces: Substantives are signs of mental wholes; attributes, of the parts of which these wholes are composed. Predication is a sign of "the feeling of a relation," which carries us back to the resolution of an experienced or felt relation into an impression, and smuggles in the knowing or a predicating agent, who has been resolved into "a heap or collection of impressions and ideas," through the phrase "feeling of a relation," in which an agent who can feel is implied but not confessed.

From language Huxley proceeds to the verbal propositions in which "men enshrine their beliefs." Of these beliefs he considers Hume's Philosophical Theory of Necessary Truths, The Order of Nature, The Soul, Theism, The Passions and Volitions, and The Principle of Morals. We do not propose to follow Mr. Huxley in his remarks upon Mr. Hume's opinions upon these topics. But we cannot refrain from noticing a few of them. He finds to his discomfiture, it would seem, that Mr. Hume recognizes a clear distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and that under the first he comprehends mathematical relations and all the so-called intuitive and even all demonstrated truths. Mr. Huxley's "ineradicable tendency to make things clear" finds it hard to reconcile this statement with either his own or Hume's theory of impressions or relations, or the doctrine of instincts or custom. Had he chosen to avail himself of Hume's doctrine of the origin and nature of mathematical knowledge as expounded in the Treatise of Human Nature, he would have found one more harmonious with the drift of his psychology and metaphysics. It is a doctrine which would set most modern mathematicians aghast, and we do not wonder that Prof. Huxley does not refer to it, but rather gives him-

self to the work of explaining away the distinction which Hume had recognized as existing between intuitive relations and matters of fact! He urges that had not "matters of fact" been given to us through the senses, we should never "in fact" have apprehended mathematical entities or the relations which they involve. It follows that geometrical and numerical quanta are in some sense matters of fact! Moreover the axiom, "Things which are equal to the same are equal to another, is only a particular case of the predication of similarity, and if there come no impressions it is obvious there could be no predicates," and breaks out with the *naïve* interrogation, "But what is an existence in the universe but an impression?" Indeed, thou solid, matter-of-fact, critical, defiant Mr. Huxley! Has it come to this, that, misled by a narrow psychology and ensnared by shallow metaphysics, thou hast been brought so far as to confess that this solid universe of matter, with its wondrous protoplasm containing within itself such wonder-working power and potency, and gathered in vast reservoirs in the abysmal depths, and baptized with a name befitting its mysterious hiding-place—that all these are nothing but *impressions?*

But we return from our digression, as Huxley returns to his logic after this exclamation, to say if what are called necessary truths are analyzed they will be found to be of two kinds: "Either they depend on the convention which underlies the possibility of intelligible speech, that terms shall have the same meaning, or they are propositions the negation of which implies the dissolution of some association in memory or expectation, which is in fact indissoluble, or the denial of some fact of immediate consciousness." The resolution of what are called logical laws into a convention in order to the possibility of communication between man and man reminds one of the exclamation of Sancho Panza, "Blessed is the man who *invented* sleep!" inasmuch as it attributes the recognition and use of conceptions as identical with one another to a convention or contract suggested by the desirableness of language.

Our necessary beliefs of matters of fact are resolved into propositions which cannot be denied without breaking some association of memory or expectation, "or the denial of some immediate fact of consciousness." We stop at this last phrase

with delighted surprise at discovering that Mr. Huxley has allowed himself for once to recognize man as a being who can know something, even though what he knows is only a fleeting impression. Hitherto, in common with Hume, he had made the elements of all mental activity to be impressions produced by the "sensigenous object" and existing only as fleeting phenomena, and out of which, by means of custom and association, all else was built up. But here at last he confesses that man can know a fact, viz., a fact of consciousness; that is, that knowledge or belief is exercised by the mind in immediate consciousness, and the reality known may not be denied.

When Mr. Huxley, in still further confirmation of his meaning, explains that "the denial of the necessary truth that the thought now in mind exists involves the denial of consciousness," he asserts what we think a most obvious and elementary truth—a truth that is fundamental to our confidence in either knowledge or philosophy. But in asserting this truth he abandons the very corner-stone of Hume's teaching, that impressions are the elements of our intellectual states.

In order still further to weaken our confidence in necessary truth as contrasted with matters of fact, he observes that what we call matters of fact almost universally include their relations, as when we say red is unlike blue we have a fact or relation of similarity, or when we recall a fact of memory we assert for it a relation of time. This is all true enough, but it does not meet the case, inasmuch as the so-called necessary relations that are also self-evident are not of this sort at all. Mr. Huxley does not care to present the subject of necessary truths as against the concessions of Hume any further than to assert that it is impossible to prove that the cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than early-formed, constantly-repeated, and perpetually-verified associations. And here he leaves the matter. It would seem to be especially unfortunate for his cause that Professor Huxley has treated so superficially, and in a sense disposed so flippantly, of mathematical quanta and their relations. The majority of modern scientists are disposed to trust in mathematics, whatever else they may distrust. Few if any of them, unless they have been previously committed to the consequences of the metaphysical theory of physiological

evolution, will accept that view which brings these relations down to a level with matters of fact, or resolves them into the unbroken associations which come from often-repeated experiences. The pure mathematics are a strong outwork of sound philosophy which the believers of solid science and solid metaphysics and solid faith are under a common necessity to defend, because here is a central rallying-point for each and all, whether they make an onset or a defence. The axioms and constructions of pure geometry are a standing protest against modern cerebralism.

Professor Huxley deals almost as lightly and more inconsequently and inconsistently with the causal relation than he does with the mathematical, at one time criticising Hume, and then sanctioning the very error which he had criticised. In one breath he calls attention to the point that it is one thing to be indebted to experience for the belief that a particular cause is invariably connected with an effect, and altogether another to derive from it the belief which every scientist must accept, that every event is caused. And yet on the very next page he argues at considerable length to show that multitudes of men believe that the majority of events are wholly uncaused. The only possible reconciliation of the apparent inconsistency would be found in the theory which Stuart Mill holds, that the belief in the universality of the relation is as truly the result of experience as the belief of a single exemplification of it. This is doubtless Professor Huxley's own theory, but he passes the whole of this fundamental matter over too lightly to invite criticism. Inasmuch as he does not attempt to give his own metaphysics of causation and the uniformity of nature, we must be excused from noticing the scanty views which he seems to favor. We observe, however, that he does not undertake to reconcile Hume's theory of mathematical or causal relations with either Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas or Kant's doctrine of the *à priori* forms of the sensory or categories of the understanding. That would be an effort beyond the audacity of even Huxley's ingenious effrontery.

As Professor Huxley proceeds to Hume's doctrine of miracles he grows still more shy and reserved, finding himself in deeper water than that to which he is accustomed. He shows himself incompetent to measure the philosophical strength of Hume's

argument for the *à priori* improbability of any violation of the laws of nature whatever, as also to estimate the preponderating force of the counter-argument in support of the *à priori* probability of miraculous intervention whenever the necessities or ends of the spiritual universe demand or justify such an intervention. A belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature, which is founded solely on the generalization of experience, is too weak, as Mr. Stuart Mill confesses, to establish any conclusion that may not be overturned by a single example to the contrary. Prof. Huxley, however, says: "The day-fly has better grounds for calling a thunder-storm supernatural than has man, with his experience of an infinitesimal fraction of duration, to say that the most astonishing event that can be imagined is beyond the scope of natural causes." But why not say, in reply, that man, from his limited experience, is equally incompetent *to deny* that such an event is beyond the scope of *supernatural* causes? Upon Prof. Huxley's or Mr. Hume's explanation of the grounds of our belief in the natural and its uniformities, we cannot see why what has been considered to be uniformly natural should not be regarded as exceptional. To the suggestion that what seems to be exceptional may be referred to some law as yet undiscovered, we reply that the faith in uniformity or law even, if it be held to be derived from experience only and to be the product of association, may be overturned or weakened by such experience or association, so far as any *à priori* probability is concerned. In other words, it is on *à priori* grounds derived from the relations of purpose in nature that experience learns, in ordinary cases, to pronounce a miracle impossible and incredible. The fact that men do thus judge, in ordinary circumstances, of reported miracles gave to Hume's argument its plausibility, or rather its strength, as against credulity and fanaticism. It is true that on the grounds furnished by his own metaphysics or philosophy Hume had no right to appeal to experience at all as he did, as furnishing the grounds for faith in the uniformity of nature. But Hume the keen-sighted man of the world and the sensitive satirist of superstitious credulity was another person than Hume the logical metaphysician. Therefore, when he turned to the Christian miracles, he had so little appreciation of their import and the occasion for their occurrence that it was impossible he should

find any difference between them and those which offended his common-sense, and so, as a man of the world, he rejected them: but persuaded himself that it was on grounds of a profound philosophy, a philosophy certainly more profound than his own metaphysics ever provided. But Professor Huxley has no insight for this construction of Hume's argument, and he alternately flounders in his own incapacity to dispose of the problem with any satisfaction to himself or others, and sneers in his own contemptuous ignorance at truths and reasons for which he has no insight.

He fares even worse when he proceeds in the next chapter to the discussion of *Theism and the Evolution of Theology.* He remarks at the outset very truly that "Hume seems to have had but two hearty dislikes: the one to the English nation, and the other to all the professors of dogmatic theology." He did not add, which he might have done very truly, that if *contempt* were substituted for *dislike*, he himself sympathizes most cordially with Hume. This contempt is manifest in the want of interest which he manifests in the exposition and criticism of Hume's discussion of theism. In Hume's treatises, particularly in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, there is more acuteness, comprehensiveness, and earnestness than in any or all of his other philosophical writings. Despite the sceptical uncertainty into which he very frequently falls, he now and then seems to forget the pyrrhonist and to reason as a man, with a subtlety, force, and eloquence which are most honorable to what we may suppose to have been his prevailing convictions. The words which he puts into the mouth of Cleanthes, the advocate for the argument from design, are often strong and glowing. Professor Huxley has no sympathy with arguments in this direction, as indeed his thorough-paced associational metaphysics would allow no standing-place for a moment for design in Nature, and he slides over the discussion as easily as possible, interposing here and there a sharp remark to give energy to every negative conclusion and to weaken the force of any positive utterances. At the end of his comments on both Hume and Bishop Butler, he gives us the following: "Surely on this topic silence is golden, while speech reaches not even the dignity of sounding brass or tinkling cymbal, and is but the weary clatter of endless logomachy. One can but suspect that Hume also had reached this

conclusion; and that his shadowy and inconsistent theism was the expression of his desire to rest in a state of mind which distinctly excluded negation, while it included as little as possible of affirmation, respecting a problem which he felt to be hopelessly insoluble."

After having thus brought the authority of Hume, as far as possible, over to the side of the modern Agnostics, he proceeds to quote from the Essay on the Natural History of Religions, as a tentative effort in the direction of the modern doctrine that monotheism is the product of evolution. His scientific interest in this matter, however, is easily turned aside by the opportunity to satirize the free application to one another, by religionists of all classes, of the term Atheist as a term of reproach. Characteristically enough, having begun this chapter with the saying that "if Hume was ever bitter in his public utterances, it is against priests in general and theological enthusiasts and fanatics in particular," he concludes it with quoting a stanza or two of bitter and biting lines from Burns' "Holy Fair" against the professors of Scottish religion and theology.

The three remaining chapters are entitled *The Soul*, *The Doctrine of Immortality*, *Volition*, *Liberty and Necessity*, and *The Principles of Morals*. They contain no matter worthy any special attention, and the author shows in writing them that he had become weary of his task. He attempts to dispose of Descartes' doctrine of the immateriality of the soul by discoursing of the absurdity of his other doctrine, that a being whose essence is spiritual can hold no relations to matter. He quotes with approbation Hume's dogmatic assertions, that as for *himself* he never found that he could find in *himself* anything which he could call *himself*, but only "a *bundle* or collection of different perceptions," or "a *kind of theatre* where several perceptions successively make their appearance." He next subjoins several well-known puzzles from Hume and himself to illustrate the loose and variable application of identity to material objects. He thinks it quite enough to find that in respect to the evidences of the natural and necessary immortality of the human soul Archbishop Whately agrees with Hume, to whom he thinks the prelate was indebted for his own views. As to the moral argument, he sneers at the attempt to know anything about the divine justice, and the

necessity of another life for the vindication and completion of its work, and brings in Kant to endorse the position of Hume that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated by the intellect, dismissing Kant's moral demonstration with a flippant word. The chapter on Volition, etc., furnishes an opportunity for him to utter the dogma that "so far, therefore, from necessity destroying moral responsibility, it is the foundation of all praise and blame; and moral admiration reaches its climax in the ascription of necessary goodness to the Deity." He then endeavors to meet the objection brought against necessity, that it makes God the author of sin, by observing that Hume attempts no answer to it, "probably because none is possible;" but subjoins in the next breath that the objection is "the direct consequence of every known form of monotheism," and adverts to the fact "that not long after the publication of Hume's treatise Jonathan Edwards, President of the College of New Jersey, produced, in the interests of the strictest orthodoxy, a demonstration of the necessarian thesis which has never been equalled in power, and certainly has never been refuted." Here, again, he must bring in Kant, with his intelligible freedom as pertaining to the human soul as a *noumenon*, for the purpose of a witticism about metaphysicians, which we may be pardoned for saying is as applicable to the "physiological" as to the "pure metaphysicians."

He concludes with a few pages upon Hume's Principles of Morals, in which this same Professor Huxley, whose psychology is materialism, whose metaphysics is evolutionism, and whose theology is atheism, avows himself a *sentimentalist* in ethics, declaring in so many words that, "in whichever way we look at the matter, morality is based on feeling, not on reason," and "the moral law, like the laws of physical nature, rests upon instinctive intuitions, and is neither more nor less innate and necessary than they are." Some men are destitute of a mathematical sense, others of any sensibility to art, and "some there may be who, devoid of sympathy, are incapable of a sense of duty."

In closing this critical examination of Professor Huxley's exposition of Hume, the writer finds himself inclined, if not constrained, to apologize for the detail and the length of a paper

that, as would appear, has been occupied with material which has proved so weak and unworthy. His apology is furnished in the importance of the theme, and the reputation and ability of the critic. The philosophy of Hume is rightly judged by Professor Huxley to have very great significance at the present time, by reason of its intimate relations to the metaphysics of that very influential school with which Professor Huxley is very closely identified. It also has a very definite genesis, having been evolved very directly and by stages which can be traced most distinctly from Descartes and Locke. It has awakened severe and constant criticism, notably from the Scottish and German schools, and been challenged in every one of its assertions and assumptions by a long succession of acute antagonists. Of all this Professor Huxley knows something, enough at least to impress him with the importance of his theme, and to prompt him to acquaint himself with the opinions and writings of Kant —how thoroughly and appreciatively may be gathered from the course of the present criticism. It would seem that his knowledge of the place which Hume continues to hold in modern thinking should have prompted him at least to treat his theme with greater thoroughness, and to acquaint himself more completely with Hume's critics and antagonists. It happens that not very many years before Professor Huxley's work was undertaken, a new edition of the works of Hume, accompanied by a very able and searching critical examination of the principles of his philosophy, was edited at the University of Oxford. Of the existence of this able criticism Professor Huxley makes no recognition. He does not often condescend to notice or refer to this edition of his works, although he makes some little parade of his bibliographical recognition of and reference to the only other complete English edition, which was published in 1810.

It is doubtless true that Professor Huxley is so well satisfied that the physiological metaphysics with the materialistic psychology and atheistic theology are so far established beyond all refutation as to release every one of their adherents from the obligation to fight any battle in their defence. As long, however, as the opposite party make a respectable showing and retain a manifest hold upon the faith of men who are disposed to defend

their opinions, it would seem to be no more than courteous for those who are so confident of their strength to exercise it after the methods generally recognized in legitimate warfare, especially when the challenge comes from their own side.

Professor Huxley in undertaking to state and define the philosophy of Hume, especially in relation to modern theories, might be held to the duty of doing his work with the candor and thoroughness which would command the respect of his opponents, by exhibiting an adequate knowledge of his subject-matter, and by opposing to their well-known arguments some earnest counter-discussion. In failing to do this, he has produced a work which rises no higher than a clever *jeu d'esprit*, but can have no influence except with that one-sided set of writers who, having fired away all the shot which they have at command in the defence of atheistic evolutionism, employ themselves in discharging rockets over their imagined success. In the mean time, no one is deceived but themselves and those lookers-on who mistake brilliant coruscations and repeated shoutings for effective arguments.

On the other hand, it makes a sober man sad to observe that these are indications of a decay of the truly scientific spirit among a certain class of educated men, which threatens a greater evil, if such were possible, than a temporary weakening or destruction of ethical and religious faith. We appreciate and enjoy Professor Huxley's acuteness and wit, without a thought of whom or what he strikes; but we cannot enjoy his superficial ignorance or shallow appreciation of considerations to which men of the highest rank in the world of thought have attached supreme importance. We regret that he should have lent his example to a tendency which is rapidly gathering strength—to the division of men of scientific spirit into two separate encampments, which instead of engaging in brave and vigorous controversy shall retire beyond even fighting distance, under intrenchments which are only strong enough to serve the needs of those who dare not measure their strength in the open field. Whether the indignant fulminations of unscientific and ignorant religionists or the contemptuous asseverations of unphilosophical and one-sided scientists do the greater harm is of little use to inquire. Mr. Hume did if possible infinitely greater harm to the world

by the uncandid and frivolous spirit which grew out of his utter distrust of the possibility of scientific certainty than by his attacks upon natural theism and supernatural Christianity. Professor Huxley is likely to do infinitely greater harm by the example of unscientific and superficial philosophizing which this biography furnishes than by the direct aid and comfort which he has furnished by his sneers and his dogmatism to scientific unbelief.

NOAH PORTER.

UNIVERSITY QUESTIONS IN ENGLAND.

ALL the great university questions are now under consideration in England, in connection with the intellectual and social progress of the nation. With regard to some of them, what is going on there is instructive to us here. The general subject is, perhaps, even more important in our case than in that of England, because, apart from the interests of literature and science, a democratic society stands in special need of the elevating, refining, and moderating influence which is exercised by great intellectual institutions. We have been made sensible by recent occurrences in Canada of the folly of attempting to import into the New World the conservatism, or what is deemed such, of the Old World; but there is another kind of conservatism, consisting in the development of tempering agencies of a rational and permanent kind, which good citizens in a democratic country are specially called upon to cultivate. The improvement of these means of training national character is perhaps a more hopeful, while to many it is certainly a more congenial, line of reformatory effort than direct conflict with demagogism, faction, and corruption in the political arena.

1. There is one difficult problem with which the reorganizers of universities have to deal in England, but which does not specially concern us here—the adaptation of the medieval colleges to the requirements of modern society. Oxford and Cambridge were, till the other day, exclusively, and they still are distinctively and substantially, federations of colleges; and all the colleges either were founded in the middle ages, or if founded after the Reformation, preserved the medieval type. All were originally clerical, celibate, and quasi-monastic in their rule of life, as well as in their structure, though their objects were not, like those of

the monasteries, prayer and religious contemplation, but prayer and study; All Souls' College at Oxford alone being intended rather as a chantry than as a literary institution by its founder, whose wish in later times was negatively observed by sinecurism combined with social exclusiveness. Till 1854 the medieval codes of statutes remained legally in force and continued to cut off the colleges from intellectual progress. But in 1856 the bulk of them were swept away by a Commission of Reform under the authority of Parliament. The British Parliament never formulates principles, but in the University Reform Act it practically established the principle that the inviolability of a founder's will must be confined to his main object, and that all details must be subject to revision by proper authority whenever change of circumstances might render it expedient. Fifty years were the period taken as the limit beyond which no founder's foresight with regard to the best means of giving effect to his main object could be expected to extend; and the commissioners were empowered to deal freely with the details of every foundation which had been in existence for that period. This question is one which the people of the United States may some day be called upon to consider, if they do not wish their noble treasury of endowments to become a museum of donors' whims; at present it seems to be governed not so much by the philosophy of Turgot, the writer of the famous article in the Encyclopedia, as by the arguments of Daniel Webster, which are not philosophical, but forensic. A covenant with the dead may be kept in the letter, but if Time, the unceasing innovator, has broken it in the spirit, and there is no legislative power of bringing the spirit and the letter again into agreement with each other, the dead man himself is the most wronged. Scrupulous respect for the sanctity of property is a popular feeling so invaluable that we might well bear much inconvenience rather than impair it in the slightest degree; but it would surely not be difficult to make it plain to popular apprehension that there is no robbery in abrogating provisions which a founder himself, supposing him to be a reasonable being, would have abrogated had he lived to see their effect. A wise and thoroughly generous man would deprecate the compulsory observance of the details of his will in a public institution for fifty years, perhaps even for a single year, after his death.

Even where munificence is common, as we have every year illustrious proof of its being in the United States, munificence combined with entire freedom from vanity and from the lurking desire of self-perpetuation is comparatively rare. The most noble-hearted founders of intellectual institutions are sometimes personally unacquainted with the essential conditions of success; and bounty saddled with the enactments of ignorance may be a dead loss to the unwary recipient. "Never look a gift-horse in the mouth' is a foolish proverb, as many a public museum and other institution can testify. If the Trojans had looked a gift-horse in the mouth, they would have seen something which concerned them deeply.

The Reform Commissioners of 1854, however, failed to deal comprehensively with the question of celibacy. Their hesitation was not unnatural. On the one hand, compulsory celibacy is at variance with the principles of modern society, and fatal to the permanency of the college faculty, the members of which, in fact, have usually taken up teaching only as a mode of employing their time and increasing their income while they were waiting for a college living or other preferment. On the other hand, to abrogate the rule would be to put an end to the social life and break up the whole system of the college as it now exists. When the subject is mentioned, the thoughts of an Oxford man go back to an ancient dining-hall, a beautiful and noble room, hung round with old portraits of college worthies, in which all the members of the society are assembled at their meal, the fellows on the dais, the students at long tables down the room. Grace is said by the presiding fellow, and one of the scholars or junior members of the foundation, in a Latin form handed down from the middle ages. If it is a college festival, the "loving cup" goes round. Dinner over, the students retire to their own rooms, and there often make up parties of their own. The fellows withdraw to their "common room," where, while the wine is passed round after the fashion of the old country, the talk often runs on the affairs of the college and the characters, doings, and prospects of its junior members. The strength of corporate feeling and the attachment to the old house fostered by this system are valuable; still more valuable are the close personal relations and constant intercourse between

tutor and pupil which it encourages, and upon which an old Oxford or Cambridge tutor often looks back with no common pleasure. The social bond between the undergraduate members of the college is also favorable to the formation of character and to friendship: perhaps it is partly the want of such a bond in the American universities that leads students to seek a substitute in the "secret societies." If the fellows marry, they must live separately with their families, and for the most part out of college, for the arrangement of the monastic building repels married life. There will then be an end of the college as a society: as a barrack it may remain; but as a barrack it will probably be a nuisance, for, in England at least, it would be scarcely possible to maintain discipline, or even manners, among a large body of students rooming in the same building without the presence of the seniors. Still the quality of the teaching is the first object, and it can be secured only by the permanent devotion of the fellows, or such of them as constitute the college faculty, to their calling, with which the rule of celibacy fatally interferes. If the present commissioners can devise a mode of reconciling the improvement of the teaching with the preservation of the social life of a college, their ingenuity will deserve a crown.

2. The hideous system of religious tests imposed in Stuart times to keep the universities under the dominion of the state church has, after a protracted struggle, been removed: at least it has ceased to be compulsory; though we believe it is still legally open to the graduating student, if he thinks fit and has the clerical profession in view, to bind his conscience to formularies comprising several hundred propositions in theology, many of them controverted, before he has had time to form any well-grounded opinion. The university of Laud and Sheldon is now open to "Jews, Turks, infidels, and heretics," all of whom have taken advantage of the concessions, for the heir of the late Khedive was a student at Oxford. The major part of the fellowships has also been thrown open to laymen. But the remainder of the fellowships, amounting in some colleges to a moiety of the whole number, and all the headships except two or three remain tenable only by clergymen of the Church of England. In the middle ages everything literary was clerical; so that

when a medieval founder enjoined his fellows to take orders at a certain standing, he in no way prejudiced the literary objects of his foundation. But at the Reformation, literature, and science with it, passed in the main to the laity: the functions of the clergy were narrowed to the pastoral office and theological study; and institutions of which all the officers were clergymen underwent a corresponding contraction of scope and character, besides being enslaved politically to the reactionary party with which the Established Church was identified. Clerical restrictions on elections to headships and fellowships, especially those on headships, now act as powerful guarantees for the ascendancy of the Church of England in the universities. This fortress of Establishmentarianism is closely besieged by the Liberal forces, and in the end will no doubt fall. It is being daily rendered less tenable by the manifest progress of the new opinions among the academical clergy. The presidency of a layman, even if he were neutral in theological questions, could hardly be so subversive of religion as is that of a clergyman who, as everybody believes, would at once doff his black coat and white tie if he could do so without at the same time doffing his academical dignity with an income of $10,000 a year.

Anglican or clerical ascendancy is one question; religious education is another, though the two are naturally confounded in a country accustomed to identify religion with a state church. In a period of religious division, such as that through which we are passing, the happiest solution of the problem would seem to be a secular university open to all, with colleges each of which, while availing itself of the professoriate, libraries, and apparatus of the university, and sending its students into the common examinations, might carry on its special system of religious instruction and moral discipline within its own walls. But it would be impracticable now to appropriate the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge to different churches; and on this continent the practice of local separation has gone so far that a formation of colleges on the Oxford and Cambridge plan appears beyond our reach. The progress of religious thought, if it continues in the present direction and at the present rate, will soon change the aspect of this question. In the mean time, one who has been a student and tutor in a religious college at

Oxford, and who is now connected with a secular university in America, may be permitted to avow his conviction that, whatever may be the case with children, in those who are of an age to go to college spontaneity is the essence of religion; that compulsion breeds antipathy at least as often as it does the reverse; and that morally as well as intellectually the most industrious college is the best.

3. The curriculum both at Oxford and Cambridge, till about five-and-twenty years ago, was confined to classics and mathematics; and the study of classics at Cambridge was purely philological, while at Oxford it included ancient philosophy, with Aristotle for a text-book, and ancient history. Now, physical science, history, and jurisprudence are included as optional subjects for the final examinations, and admitted to equal honors with the old studies, though classics and mathematics are still retained as the general basis, and preserve their ascendancy to a great extent. Physical science, though it has immense attractions and will probably in time become the basis of education, does not lend itself very easily to the purposes of a university curriculum: lectures in it may be attended and notes of the lectures may be taken, but the real benefit of the study as a mental discipline cannot be reaped without going through a course of actual investigation and experiment which can scarcely be compressed into three years, even if the other studies are set aside. The system is in a state of transition and uncertainty, which will not be terminated till we have arrived at a more definite idea than we now possess of the object and functions of universities. In the middle ages a university was a place both of liberal and professional education, as well as a place of general study. The liberal education was preliminary and designated by arts, the professional education was final and designated by the faculties, the whole course, liberal and professional, extending over some fourteen years. In England the professional studies of law and medicine have now migrated from the universities to London. Is it desirable and possible that they, or the more scientific parts of them, should be recalled to their ancient home? Ought the university to be content with giving the student a liberal education, or ought it to put him in the way of winning his bread and but-

ter? Behind these questions there is coming up one of a more fundamental kind which is likely to press upon us more and more. What is the benefit derived from residence at a university by the general mass of young men who have no particular taste for learning or science, and are not destined to lead learned or scientific lives? Do they, on the average, get anything in the way of useful culture or preparation for active life which repays them for the sacrifice of time, the expense, and the moral risk? Would not their minds be just as well trained by the study of a profession or by business? Would they not pick up from books and journals read at home nearly as much of liberal culture as they carry away from the university? In the middle ages knowledge could be obtained only in the lecture-room of the professor; now it comes to you through the press wherever you are: you must still attend the demonstrator, but the lecturer might almost as well be attended by a short-hand writer as by the class. Perhaps the answer may somewhat vary with the circumstances of different countries. In England the number is very large of young men, the sons of the territorial aristocracy and the destined rulers of the community, who do not go into professions, and who, if they were not learning something and undergoing some sort of discipline at the university, would be learning nothing and undergoing no discipline at all. Small enough, no doubt, is the benefit that many of them receive; still it is better than nothing, and by giving their sons a long course of education men of wealth and leisure pay the highest tribute in their power to the country. It is said that a young nobleman at Oxford was heard to call out from his window, "If any fellow is going anywhere to do anything, I'll go with him." In his father's halls his lordly listnessness would have been the same, and at Oxford there were, at all events, one or two places to which university discipline forbade him to go. These remarks may be extended to such young heirs of wealth as there are in the United States, and in one respect with greater emphasis. The young English nobleman or squire has, by the institutions of the country, enough political or administrative work cut out for him to prevent his sinking, as a rule, to the lowest depth of Sybaritism; but the young American millionaire, take away his college culture and the

tastes that it may awaken, has no such salt provided to keep his mind and character from rotting.

It may be observed, in passing, that the effects of the old classical culture in England are not to be measured by the number and writings of the professional scholars. In these Germany has been far ahead of England, though, whoever may have been the greatest paleographist or antiquarian, it would be hard to name a greater "Grecian" than Porson. But it would scarcely be a paradox to say that the reason why Englishmen have edited and commented upon the classics less is that they have read them more. If perfect familiarity with the classics and a thoroughly classical taste are enough to constitute a scholar, much of the best scholarship of England would be found among amateurs. Many are the instances of statesmen and proconsuls who through life have kept up their classical studies in the intervals of business, and have turned to them as an intellectual haven in their old age; while the political sentiment of the ruling class has had in it, for the last three centuries, a strong ingredient drawn from republican antiquity.

4. It became clear at least thirty years ago that a measure of university extension would be needed, especially in the interest of a large class in the north of England, generated by the marvellous growth of commerce, which desired a high education, but shrank not only from the expense of Oxford and Cambridge and the sacrifice of time, but still more from the contagion of aristocratic extravagance and the complete interruption of all business connections and ideas. A plan was framed at Oxford by those who recognized this exigency, but at the same time wished to preserve the great historic centres, the purity of the national system, and the standard of national degrees. It was proposed to affiliate local colleges, of which there were several already in existence, and to permit the junior course to be gone through and the lower degree taken at the local college, the university prescribing the curriculum and holding the examinations; while those who desired to go through the senior course and to take the higher degree would be required to come into residence at the university. It was thought that the junior course and degree would meet the wants of men destined for business, and that a local college might provide an adequate

staff of teachers and apparatus for that purpose. The plan was tabled at the time, richly endowed bodies being rather slow in their movements; but it has now been called up again, and is likely to be adopted. In the mean time, however, circumstances have changed. Owens College, Manchester, which would once have accepted affiliation, has grown to what it deems the dimensions of a university. It has claimed university powers, and, after a long controversy and much hesitation on the part of the government, it has carried its point. The resistance, which found sympathy even among the trustees of Owens College, and the hesitation of the government, marked the aversion of the friends of high education in England to the multiplication of universities which they know will be followed by a lowering of the standard.

It remains to be seen whether England, having once got upon the dangerous slope, will be able to prevent herself from sliding into that "one-horse" university system which is the bane alike of Canada and the United States, and, like some other things among us—the state of the municipal franchise, for instance—seems to be at once deplorable and past remedy, since the weaker a college is the more certain it is to cling to its isolation. If the English need a warning example, several of our one-horse universities will furnish it to them with a vengeance. Nothing can be more patent or more flagrant than the inadequacy of some of these institutions to the functions which they pretend to discharge. A primary school convicted of anything like a proportionate deficiency of teachers, books, and apparatus would be at once closed. A small university must of necessity be a bad university. It must of necessity be narrow intellectually and socially: it cannot provide itself with a proper staff of professors, or with a good library, or with the collections and teaching apparatus which science now demands. All this is undeniable, but it will not induce weak colleges to give up their university powers.

In another way the one-horse university system is likely to do mischief. An untrammelled facility of graduation, with the present tendencies of American society, is pretty sure to produce a supply of graduates in excess of the demand. In an early stage of civilization the difficulty is in inducing men to

take to intellectual callings; but now, and especially on this continent, the difficulty is the other way. Founders of new colleges hardly consider what is to be done with all the alumni whom they will send forth. The intellectual callings are becoming overstocked, and it is cruel kindness to multiply the number of cultivated and sensitive natures condemned to destitution.

Oxford and Cambridge are so richly dowered with wealth, beauty, and history, and have such a hold on the heart of the nation, that if they are true to themselves they will probably keep their place. Possibly they may even reabsorb the University of London. That institution was called into existence only by the fatal bigotry which, in the supposed interest of a privileged church, excluded half the nation from the national universities. It has no staff of teachers, and is, properly speaking, not a university but a central examining board, conferring degrees on all comers without reference to their place of education or to the course which they have gone through, otherwise than as it is indicated by the examination. About fifty years ago a new university was founded, on the model of an Oxford College, at Durham, out of the surplus revenues of the cathedral. This was an unseasonable revival of a project of Cromwell, formed at a time when the communication between the north and south of England was less easy than at present. It has failed, and the university is fain to give substance to its spectral existence by an alliance with a medical school at Newcastle.

4. Another subject of discussion, and rather vehement discussion, is the system of examinations. At Oxford and Cambridge the examinations for students ambitious of honors are competitive, and more highly so at Cambridge, where the candidates are placed in order of merit, than at Oxford, where they are ranked in four classes and placed alphabetically in each class. The intensity of competition is greatly increased by such prizes as the fellowships, which are now bestowed on graduates by examination, and are of the average value of $1000 a year. Various objections are now brought against the system. It is said that the examination test is imperfect, that students are apt to be overstrained and exhausted by the effort, above all that the proper objects of study are supplanted by ambition or

pecuniary motives, and that the genuine student is prevented from following his natural bent, and forced to direct his reading to the impending examination. The practical question must be whether the good or the evil preponderates, and in England, perhaps, the weight in the scale of good may be increased by considerations which have no place in America. England is an aristocratic country, and these university honors and prizes, especially the fellowships, keep a door open for plebeian merit. On the other hand, there are aristocratic students in the English universities out of whom it is impossible to get any work without the spur. The life of Lord Althorp is in every way interesting as a history of an upright public man; and it contains a remarkable proof of the usefulness in some cases of competitive examination. Evidently, as Lord Althorp said himself, he would have sunk into a mere sportsman, absorbed in hunting or shooting, and have been lost to the country, had not his sense of his powers been awakened and his ambition kindled by a college competition. Against mere test examinations, without competition, such as are usual in American colleges, nothing can well be said. No other method of ascertaining proficiency has been devised, and it will hardly be pretended that Newton or Faraday would have been turned from his natural bent by having to pass a college examination in mathematics or chemistry. No doubt love of the study and the duty of self-culture are much to be preferred as motives to compulsion or ambition. But to trust to these alone would be to consign a large proportion of our present students to idleness and vice. If examinations are to be abolished, the students must be picked. Imperfect, of course, any examination test is; but at Oxford and Cambridge the result generally accords with the previous reputation of the students, so that the injustice can hardly be very great. A university, of course, is concerned only with the results of literary and scientific education; it does not pretend either to impart or to test any practical qualities, except industry and perseverance, and to quarrel with the examination system for not selecting men of action is to quarrel with a circle for not being a square. That in any examination which is tolerably managed mere "cram"—that is, facts got up by rote—can compete with real knowledge few who have had experience

in examinations will assert. We should like to see the man who being ignorant of mathematics could be crammed so as to solve mathematical problems, or who being ignorant of Latin could be crammed so as to write the language correctly. But, as Mr. Lowe said, "Cram is what I know and you don't."

The student's health, no doubt, is sometimes injured by overstrain in preparing for examinations: it is probably injured at least ten times as often by the indulgences to which idleness is prone. But there is no need for overstraining. Even under the competitive system regular work for a moderate number of hours each day will do all that can possibly be done. The mind is not a pitcher; it can take in knowledge only by an active effort, of which it becomes incapable when it is jaded. In the examination itself to produce your knowledge you must be fresh and vigorous; and the candidate who wishes to succeed had better reduce than increase the number of his hours of work as the time for the ordeal draws near. Bad habits will tell on the student as well as on other men. If your pupil breaks down, inquire whether he is overreading himself; but inquire also how many cigars he smokes, and whether he works late at night. The late Lord Westbury, at the time when he was holding the post of Attorney-General, which, as it combines the most tremendous legal work with nightly attendance in Parliament, is one of the most laborious in the world, was complimented on his wonderful freshness. "Yes," he replied in his singular mincing way, "and I owe it entirely to my habit of working early in the morning and not late at night: I set out in life with many dear friends who were in the habit of working late at night; I have lived to bury them all." Rise early, reward your own virtue in so doing with a cup of tea or coffee, if Dr. Dio Lewis is not looking on; get a good deal of your work done before breakfast, when the understanding, though not the fancy, is at its best; spend the evening in recreation, and sleep well. Then if you break down, you may justly charge it to the account of examination or Evolution.

The proposal to abolish examinations presents itself in rather ominous conjunction with an almost avowed desire on the part of the holders of academical endowments to rid them of educational duty, indeed of fixed duty of every kind, and to

turn the headships and fellowships into places of literary and scientific leisure. Universities, it is said, ought to be dedicated not to education, but to research. Scepticism still prevails as to the possibility of selecting "researchers," or of securing their activity when they have been selected; and it is not likely to be allayed by the disdainful tone in which the spokesmen of the movement denounce the idea of exacting anything of the researcher beyond his existence. Experience is against their policy. Neither the headships of colleges, which have been hitherto almost sinecures, nor the deaneries and canonries of cathedrals, which have been entirely so, have ever produced anything, even in the theological line, at all proportionate to their revenues, or which could even justify their existence. But those who do not wish to cast out education, or to bring in sinecurism, do wish to provide for research. The professoriate both at Oxford and Cambridge will certainly be enlarged; the incomes of professors will be increased, and leisure enough for private research will be secured to the professors. A certain number of fellowships will probably be left without educational duties, and the headships—the value of which ranges from $5000 to $20,000 a year—saving the clerical restrictions, are likely to remain much as they are at present. The universities will also be provided with funds for the assistance of special researches, which most people deem a more prudent investment than the endowment of researchers. Already the university presses bring out books, such as the Icelandic Dictionary, which require a large preliminary outlay, and would hardly be taken up as a commercial speculation by ordinary publishers. Ample provision will thus be made for the objects which, in America, the Johns Hopkins University is specially intended to promote. But universities, if they do their work well, will beget research beyond their own precincts. They will make the professions more scientific, and thus multiply Austins, John Hunters, and Maines. They will cause many a private income to be employed like that of Cavendish or Fynes Clinton. Mr. Morgan, of Rochester, and Mr. Lea, of Philadelphia, are just as much devoted to research as they would be if they were living within college walls. The intellectual and scientific world has grown far wider than it was when everything was concentrated in the universities.

6. In throwing open the fellowships and scholarships to examination, while many obsolete preferences in elections were unhesitatingly removed, hesitation was felt in abolishing the preference to poverty. It was done, however, and in the interests of poverty itself, as is attested by the most competent authorities, who assure us that more poor youths make their way at Oxford under the new than under the old system. Need is indefinite, and the person most in need is apt to be the most importunate or the best befriended. It is a cruel benevolence which tempts a poor and virtuous youth, who would be happy as he is, into an ambitious line of life without satisfactory proof of his being able to maintain himself at the new level; and the only satisfactory proof is his success in open competition. If anything in the eleemosynary way is to be done, let it be by means of a fund secretly administered by the college authorities for the assistance of deserving students in their need. The point is mentioned because it seems to have been mooted in the United States.

7. Union of manual labor with study, the generous vision of the founder of Cornell, has never been proposed in England, though in the little universities of Scotland, it is believed, there are still students who work on the paternal farm in the vacation. The experiment appears to have failed. Study and manual labor draw on the same fund of nervous energy, which is not sufficient to feed both; and a man exhausted by study requires relaxation, not toil. Some people seem to fancy that the labor of the hands alone is worthy of the name, and that there is something despicable in working with the brain; they might as well despise an engraving tool for not being a ploughshare. That university graduates will go back to the farm seems, under the present conditions of society, to be a dream.

8. Lastly, there is coeducation. The University of London has admitted women, not without strong opposition by a part of its governing body; but the University of London, as has been already said, is nothing but an examining board. Oxford and Cambridge have undertaken the examination of women who wish to become teachers; they have always allowed every one, whether students or not, and without distinction of sex, to attend the public lectures of professors; but they still hold out

against the admission of female students, though Cambridge is closely besieged by an outpost of the invader, Girton College, planted at its very gates. Every engine is plied, appeals are made not to reason only, but to sentiment, and enforced by a gentle intimidation, to which those who cherish a reputation for liberalism especially are apt to yield. Clearly enough not only this special question, but the more general and far graver question as to the future relations between the sexes, is likely to be settled by other influences than that of argument. Nature will break a settlement which reason has not dictated; but the experiment may cost us dear: we may find that it is possible to unmake women, though it is not possible to make men.

That the education of women ought to be high we are all agreed. But unless the functions of the two sexes are the same, high is not necessarily male. If the function of men, as a sex, is labor, that of women maternity and the management of a household (and it is difficult to see how the species can be preserved under any other arrangement), the presumption is in favor of some corresponding difference in final education, and there can be no illiberality in assigning to each sex that which it needs, not that which it does not need. If the two are destined by nature to be complements of each other, to train them up as competitors is not large-mindedness but folly. The wealth of marriage will certainly not be increased by the change. No man or woman can master the whole circle of knowledge and accomplishments; the more diverse, therefore, the acquirements of the two partners, the richer the union will be. Thoroughgoing radicals spurn the idea that the interest of wedlock is to be allowed to regulate these questions; but they will find themselves in collision with very deeply-rooted prejudice. Physiological questions we leave to physiologists, who are certainly not unanimous in pronouncing that the full male burden of intellectual labor can be safely imposed on the future wife and mother. The danger would of course be greater under the competitive system of examination at Oxford and Cambridge than under the system which prevails in the United States. But it is hardly conceivable that the feelings of young men and young women towards each other in England should undergo such a change as to admit of their competing against each other. Nor are

there many who would wish to awaken in the breasts of women the feelings which rivalry awakens in those of men, and which, it must be allowed, are a drawback on the good effect of the prize. No cast-iron rule need be laid down: our system must be framed not for Mrs. Somerville or Miss Martineau, but for women as a sex.

Supposing, however, that the final education of men and women is to be the same, it is a separate question whether they can receive it in the same universities. We cannot draw an affirmative conclusion from an experiment made with a few young women probably of an exceptional character, and certainly under the restraints of a novel and delicate position; even granting such experiments to have been successful, which in the case of the female students of Zurich appears more than doubtful. We have to ask ourselves whether the young women of the wealthier class generally can be safely mingled in a university with the young men of the same class. Let any mother, provided she is not an extreme radical, decide. In America there are excellent colleges for women, with full university powers, though we understand that those among them which at the outset professed and attempted to give a complete male education have found it necessary to make concessions to sex, as all universities would if the number of females in them became large. There is, in some quarters, a manifest desire to burst open doors merely because they are closed; but gratitude is due those who, like the liberal though stalwart President of Harvard, decline, in mere deference to such a desire, to jeopardize institutions which are doing good work in their own way.

8. Perhaps the list even of serious subjects would hardly be complete if we left out athleticism, the extravagant development of which in the English universities fills with apprehension many who are perfectly aware of the connection between a sound body and a sound mind. Success in athletics, notably in rowing, has now become an object competing nearly on a par with the proper objects of a university, and students plead training as a ground for the intermission of their studies, which, in fact, are incompatible with the animalism of an athlete. This may be partly the Nemesis of previous neglect of physique, though the young gentry of England can hardly be accused of having

habitually sacrificed the body to the mind; but it is difficult to believe that the abnormal and temporary development of muscle can really be conducive, as regular exercise and exhilarating pastimes are, to the normal and permanent health required to sustain intellectual labor in after-life. Whether it is not the reverse of conducive to such health is a question not to be decided by statistics confined to the cases of celebrated boating crews, which are sure to have been made up of picked men. The main source, however, of the mania, for it is nothing less, is, in England, the *ennui* of a wealthy and unemployed class; in the United States, imitation of England. University authorities have too often made themselves responsible for the growth of the tendency by the homage they have suffered themselves to pay to it. If their universities are gymnasia, their position is hardly a sound one: raw beefsteaks and the services of a trainer can be had without the expense and risk of going to college.

Horse-racing, the great pastime of the aristocracy in England, has become a sink of gambling and worse things. Rowing, pedestrianism, and other sports are being rapidly sucked into the same vortex. All alike are gathering a train of "professionals," who turn a liberal pastime into a disreputable trade. These men, mere brutes many of them, are exalted into idols, their coarse society is courted, their stolid sayings are repeated, the most ridiculous details of their bodily condition, the tidings of their catarrhs and boils, are mingled in cablegrams with the most momentous items of intelligence. They are compared to the athletes of Greece, and their matches to the Grecian games. Here, as we write, we are presented, in an account of a walking-match at New York, with a picture of the new Olympia, and of the heroes who are to awaken the lyre of another Pindar.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26.—It is estimated that the receipts will reach $72,000, giving the winner about $26,000 for his week's work. The reason for attempting to disable Hazael last night, by throwing a stone at him, was that a pool of $1500 had been formed on Rowell, Guyon, and Merritt for the first three places. O'Leary claims that his challenge to the winner of the present match takes precedence of Panchot's. Ennis is in the best of condition, and says he will now do splendid work. Weston's body is good, but his mind is certainly unsettled.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26, Noon.—An exciting finish between Merritt and Hazael is expected, as the second prize may amount to $12,000. Merritt does not seem in as good condition as might be. Guyon and Hart are going steadily and easily. Guyon makes some good running, but his feet are paining him dreadfully. It is reported that as soon as the men get themselves within the limit when they will be certain of making 450 miles and saving their entrance-money, some rapid running may be looked for. The fear of breaking down prevents quick work at present. Krohne and Hart rest but little. Taylor left the track last night at 9.45, and never appeared until 7.56.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26, 1 p.m.—Rowell on the track again at 12.11, looking sick. He left the track at 12.30, having made only one mile and two laps. His tent is tightly closed, and it is said that he has just had another fit of vomiting. Bottles of brandy and other liquors have just been brought hurriedly into Rowell's tent. Book-makers are afraid to bet until they can learn whether Rowell is really breaking up or not. He looks decidedly sick. There are dark rims around his eyes.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26, 1.16 p.m.—It is rumored that Rowell has been poisoned. Outsiders are now betting 3 to 1 that 550 miles will not be made.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26, 1.30 p.m.—Rowell is still in his tent, and it is said has been seized with colic and cramps. The excitement is intense. That Rowell is very sick is beyond all doubt. The rumor has been started that he will have to be withdrawn. Betting at 1 p.m. stood 1 to 5 against Rowell; 3 to 1 against Hazael; 2 to 1 against Merritt; 20 to 1 against Guyon; 40 to 1 against Hart; 20 to 1 against Weston; 50 to 1 against Ennis; 100 to 1 against Krohne.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26, 2 p.m.—Rowell has come on the track again, and is making good time, though looking ill.

As Mr. Weston's mind is said to be certainly unsettled, though his body is good, it appears that the connection between bodily and mental health is not invariable.

It is idle to think that in the industrial communities of modern times we can revive the habits of the ancient Greeks, bodies of slave-owners dividing the leisure secured to them by the labor of their slaves between the gymnasium and war. Life now is too busy and too serious. The ideal of "noble boys at play," which the Greeks are said to have realized, may be poetic, but it cannot be ours. With the Greeks, however, athleticism was not mere play; it had in it an element of usefulness which preserved it from being childish; it was a preparation for war when war was the principal business of life, and when battles

were decided by personal prowess, not by long-range rifles. Rowing a shell or walking against time is almost as little connected with anything useful as trundling a hoop.

Moreover, the ancients did not confound muscular strength with intellect, or put them on a par. Hercules is represented with an unintellectual head; and there are representations of gladiators at Rome which are evidently caricatures of brute strength by artists who despised it.

At Oxford, while athletics flourished in superabundant measure, the volunteer rifle corps of the university languished and was with difficulty kept on foot. Yet here was something really Greek; here was the modern counterpart of the military duty performed to the country by every citizen of an ancient republic. At Cornell University and other institutions enjoying Federal endowments, the American Legislature has introduced the requirement of military drill and instruction. It is to be hoped that the law will take effect. Drill and rifle practice are almost as good a recreation as any game; they are not exhausting like athletics; they are likely to give the too bookish student just the bracing and the tone he needs. If they are not so necessary to the modern citizen as warlike training was to the Greek, they are necessary, though in a different way. War is not likely to afflict this continent since slavery is dead and Jingoism will probably not be long-lived. But war is not the only danger. The labor riots which occurred three years ago at Pittsburg and elsewhere revealed, by the lurid light of incendiary fires, the peril in which a society unarmed and without habits of military co-operation always stands. America is annually receiving from Europe masses of immigrants more or less malcontent and unaccustomed to any government but one of force; often she receives men whose trade is industrial conspiracy, and who have been ringleaders in the bitter conflict between labor and capital in the Old World. The army of the United States is very small, and there appears to be a disposition to reduce it still further, on the ground that it may be dangerous to liberty, though it has never swerved or shown the slightest disposition to swerve from its civil duty, even under the exciting and demoralizing influence of a great civil war. A practical recognition by American youth of the military duty of all citi-

zens in extremity is the only possible way of guarding liberty against anarchy, relieving society of its fears, saving honest industry itself from ruin, and making conspirators feel that while every one has full liberty of speech, however wild his opinions may be, those who proceed to lay violent hands on American civilization will do it at their peril.

GOLDWIN SMITH.

PROFESSOR TYNDALL UPON THE ORIGIN OF THE COSMOS.

IN his Belfast address as President of the British Association for the Promotion of Science, and in his defence of that address as criticized by Mr. Martineau, Professor Tyndall discussed the origin of the cosmos. The address and the defence have gone into permanent literature, and may be considered as embodying all that can be said by one of the foremost advocates of the materialistic philosophy, now so much the subject of thought and controversy. The following article upon the general topics involved is drawn from materials prepared somewhat in reference to the discussions of Professor Tyndall as they appeared; Part I. dealing with the address, and Part II. with its defence.

I.

After gaining primitive and necessary knowledge man attempts to pursue three lines of investigation. These are, first, to translate appearances into reality; second, to bring, by classification, apparent diversity into unity; third, to find out causes and understand the mode of their operation. In the first two we find the province of science. In them, with proper caution, reliable results may be reached, going so far as to include an orderly and classified cosmos. We propose to consider the third line of investigation mentioned, that of causes and their mode of operation.

In the first line of investigation the inquiry respects being. We inquire what is, as opposed to appearances. In the second

it respects the classification of what is. In both we have science. In the third it respects causation and explanation. In each of these the mind of man has been busy from the first, and it is within these that we must find the sphere of both science and philosophy. Let us but be able to translate all appearances into reality, to put all objects and subjects into their classes, and to know all causes with the mode of their operation, and we shall be prepared to graduate at the university of this present cosmos.

That the third line of inquiry is of deeper interest than either of the others there can be no doubt. It would seem indeed to be supposed by some to be the sole region of science, and that the whole interest of science and the impulse toward it are derived from this. Of this number is Professor Tyndall, for in the opening sentence of his discourse at Belfast he says: "An impulse inherent in primeval man turned his thoughts and questionings betimes toward the sources of natural phenomena." "The same interest," he continues, "inherited and intensified, is the spur of scientific interest to-day." Is this correct? Is the interest scientific, or philosophic? This will lead to an inquiry which needs to be made in the interest of clear thinking, after the difference between science and philosophy.

I have said that investigations in regard to what is, and the classification of what is, are scientific. They are so, so far as they involve a knowledge of fixed relations and of mathematical deductions from them. If there be, as there often are, connected with those inquiries, forecastings, conjectures, tentations, hypotheses, these, remaining such, are not science. Scientific knowledge is certain knowledge. I have also said that results properly gained in those investigations are scientific. They are so, because we seek and find in these results simply a knowledge of what is, and of its classification, and not a knowledge of its cause, or of the mode of operation of that cause.

And this gives us, I think, the best distinction between science and philosophy. Science is the systematic knowledge of fixed relations, as in pure mathematics, or of things in fixed

relations of resemblance, construction, or succession. It always assumes uniformity, and within the limits of that uniformity, certainty. The moment these elements of uniformity and certainty are eliminated you have no longer science.

Philosophy, on the other hand, teaches the causes and explanations of what has been, and is. Sometimes a knowledge of the cause is itself the explanation, but sometimes not. A man may know that light is the cause of the rainbow, but may need an explanation of the mode in which it is reflected and refracted in order to produce it. Not knowing each of these he would not know fully the philosophy of the rainbow.

This distinction between the knowledge of things as existing in fixed relations, and a knowledge of their causes and of their mode of operation, is a real one, and while usage has vacillated, and there has been a considerable border ground within which the terms have been used without much discrimination, it does, I think, lie at the basis of the distinction between science and philosophy, at least as those terms have been used in England and this country. The question of causation does not respect fixed relations already established, whether of resemblance, structure, or movement, but the origination and perpetuation of such relations. If we are to make a distinction at all between science and philosophy, the whole subject of causation must, undoubtedly, belong to philosophy. So long ago as the time of Cicero, he defined philosophy to be the knowledge of causes.

If, then, Professor Tyndall, or any one else, may choose to discuss the question concerning causes and their mode of operation as a philosopher, there can be no objection ; but so far as he comes to this line of inquiry as a scientific man, in the name of science with its imposing auspices as involving certainty, and with an assumption of superior penetration, through science, in this direction, he is in a false position. So far as Professor Tyndall, or any one else, may suppose or imply, as is constantly done, that a scientific man has, as such, any advantage in the discussion of questions on this line, it is a mistake. On the contrary, there are reasons why such a man is peculiarly liable to be unfitted for the fair discussion of such questions.

As scientific, men always work within fixed relations. They stand inside of them, and not outside, and nothing is more common than for men to be skilled in their own line of work while they know nothing of the philosophy that underlies it. This is notably the case with mathematicians and physicists. There are good mathematicians who do not know what the philosophy that underlies mathematics is, and skilful scientists who are ignorant of the philosophy that underlies science, and do not know the difference between science and philosophy. Some of the relations in physics, indeed many of them, have a precision and fixedness which brings them within the range of mathematical calculation, and then the mathematician and physicist transfer the necessity involved in the relations of mathematics over to the physical movements and combinations with which they coincide. Constantly dwelling thus upon fixed relations and their apparent necessity, they insensibly come to exclude that freedom of choice which belongs to another sphere, and is the opposite of necessity. They fall into the very anthropomorphism of which they sometimes speak with contempt, and are unable to conceive of a Being possessed of intelligence and will as constituting and sustaining these relations for a wise end. That they *are* for a wise end we can see, and it is the merest anthropomorphism to suppose, because we can not comprehend these relations in their infinity, and because continuous effort soon exhausts us, that there may not be an "everlasting God, the Lord the Creator of the ends of the earth, whose understanding there is no searching, and who fainteth not neither is weary."

It may, indeed, be said that the scientific man has an advantage in discussing the origin of all things from matter because he knows more about it. Perhaps so, but that depends on what it is that he knows. And what does he know, scientifically or at all, about matter in those conditions in which he attributes to it a potency to originate all things? This potency is ascribed to matter only as it exists in atoms and in molecules. but what evidence has the scientific man for the existence of the atom, or even of the molecule? Not the evidence of the senses. That he does not claim. No power of the microscope, marvel-

lous as that now is, has yet enabled him to penetrate so far into the depths of an infinite littleness as to discover a molecule even, and yet that is supposed to be much larger than the atom.

There is, however, as I have said, no evidence from the senses, no experimental evidence whatever, that either atoms or molecules exist, but they are believed to exist simply because, on that supposition, certain phenomena can be better accounted for than in any other way. It is simply a hypothesis. The scientific man who adopts it is, however, scripturally sound on one point. He believes with the apostle that "the things which are seen were not made of things that do appear." He, as well as we, must go back to the invisible. He may not believe in that "invisible God," the king eternal and immortal, of whom the apostle speaks, and to whom he ascribes honor and glory for ever and ever, but he does believe in invisible atoms to which he ascribes whatever honor and glory there may be from the construction of this marvellous cosmos, and of the puny creatures who speculate about it for a moment, and then, to quote the language of Professor Tyndall, "like streaks of morning cloud, melt into the infinite azure of the past." How sublime and charming—*to melt into the infinite azure of the past!*

Not allowing then, either that these inquiries are scientific, or that the scientific man has any special advantage in prosecuting them, we seek the origin or cause of the cosmos. This is what Professor Tyndall sought in his discourse. He is no positivist. He accepts as legitimate the impulse to inquire after causes, with the implication of course, as in all other natural impulses, of a satisfactory result. His object was to ascertain by a process which he evidently thought scientific, what that is which caused the cosmos, or underlies it, or lies back of it, and on which it depends. We desire to ascertain the same thing, and in doing this we wish for ourselves and for others the utmost freedom of inquiry.

Let us then look at the two possible methods which may be adopted in this inquiry. These are indicated by Professor Tyndall as the method from below, and that from above; and he adopts the method from below. This he does as a scientific man. This it is that we have to do with—the method, and the

method as adopted by science, and not at all with Professor Tyndall, except as he represents this. With the question whether he is an atheist or not, or whether, if he would be consistent, he must be, we have nothing to do. On either of these points there may be doubt, or no doubt, but it is certain that the method adopted in his discourse, and which he lauds as having been adopted by the most penetrating thinkers in past time, of solving the problem of this universe, is from below, and not from above; from the "subsensible," and not from the "supersensible."

Let us see, then, looking at the first method, how Professor Tyndall, as representing science, *states* and *solves* this problem. The problem, it will be observed, is precisely that which we have in inquiring after the existence of each other. In both cases we have an immediate knowledge of motion as produced by force, and in both the inquiry is, what lies back of that which is revealed to the senses, and which originates the force and directs the motions. In both inquiries, too, we are under the necessity of judging what kind of cause it is, by what we know of ourselves as originating force and directing motion.

This parallelism we insist on, and from it it will be seen that he who adopts the method of solving the problem from below has a double task to perform. He must first prove the existence of the atoms. This, in the present state of science, he cannot do, nor can he render it probable except by arguments which, as far as they go, are the same in kind as those by which we prove the being of God. In both cases the argument is from the visible to the invisible. We say with the apostle that "the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." The scientific man says that the invisible things called atoms from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made—and there he stops. So far as they go the arguments are precisely the same, but here is the difference. Prove the being of God, and you solve every thing. One mystery, really no greater than that of the being of atoms, lightens up and explains all others; but prove the being of atoms and you have

still the far harder task of proving that they could have originated the present scene of things. These are the tasks, and accordingly, either by historical statement or by direct argument, they are both attempted by Professor Tyndall in his address.

First, then, how does Professor Tyndall, or science as represented by him, state the general question?

As already intimated, he either ignores, or fails to recognize, the distinction between science and philosophy, and, doing so, we inquire whether he does not, at the very opening of his discourse, both beg and narrow the question. In the sentence immediately following those I have already quoted in regard to the impulse of the primeval man and the spur to scientific inquiry, he says: "determined by it," that is, the impulse, "by a process of abstraction from experience we form *physical* theories which lie beyond the pale of experience, but which satisfy the desire of the mind to see every natural occurrence resting on a cause." This sentence, I venture to say, no man standing where Professor Tyndall did, and not far gone in science, could have written, for a sentence more unconsciously, and yet more transparently fallacious, is seldom found. The question respects "the *sources* of natural phenomena." In seeking these, having assumed, as he had no right to do, that the impulse inherent in primeval man is the spur to *scientific* rather than to philosophic inquiry, he says, "Determined by it we form *physical* theories to satisfy the desire of the mind to see every natural occurrence resting upon a cause." Physical theories! As if primeval mind could form only these. To satisfy the desire of the mind to see every natural occurrence resting upon *a* cause! As if the question were between no cause at all and one to be found in a *physical* theory! That is the way he puts it. He assumes that the original impulse impels to science only, and only to physical theories; and that the mind, failing to find these, must rest satisfied with no cause at all. This sentence is the original sin of the discourse, and corrupts the whole. The true statement I suppose to be, that the mind knows by necessity that every natural occurrence has a cause, and then seeks in the broadest way, not confining itself to physical theories, to find what that cause is.

Seeing thus how the scientific man begs and narrows the question, let us suppose the existence of his invisible atoms to be proved, and see how he proceeds to construct the eye. If this is to be done from below it must be through the inherent properties of matter. But this would be inconsistent with the definition of matter as hitherto given. This Professor Tyndall sees, and says that we need a new definition, but does not give it. I venture to say that no definition that will answer his purpose can be given without begging the question by first putting into matter by the definition all that he takes out of it. In constructing the eye he needs life to begin with, and also some low form of organization. How does he get them? Except from spontaneous generation, which he denies, he cannot get them. He has no right to them. But for the sake of the argument we will concede him these. We will grant him, in his own words, "a low form of organism with a kind of tactual sense diffused over the entire body;" and also a suitable "environment," to which, again, he has no right, and we shall then see how, with the aid of that scientific imagination for which, as we are told, our language has no name, the eye is formed. I quote, and ask special attention to the quotation, parts of which I take the liberty of putting in italics: "The action of light in the first instance appears to be a mere disturbance of the chemical processes in the animal organism similar to that which occurs in the leaves of plants. By degrees the action becomes localized in a few pigment cells more sensitive to light than the surrounding tissue. *The eye is incipient.* At first it is merely capable of revealing differences of light and shade produced by bodies close at hand. The adjustment continues. A slight bulging out of the epidermis over the pigment granules supervenes. *A lens is incipient.* And through the operation of *infinite* adjustments, at length reaches the perfection that it displays in the hawk and the eagle."

Is this science? It claims to be, but if there be any instance of credulity in the worshipper of an African fetich that goes beyond that of the man who can accept such a statement, I should like to see it produced. A slight bulging out of the epidermis over pigment granules is an incipient lens! Credulity

cannot go beyond that. "Infinite adjustments" in a low organism, with no provision for its own preservation or that of its species, and without an infinite adjuster or any adjuster at all! Compared with such a camel as that there is nothing in the Scriptures that is not a mere gnat. If this be the process of forming an eye as it shapes itself to the scientific imagination, commend me to that rather than to the imagination of the author of the Arabian Nights for feats of the impossible. Aladdin had a lamp to be rubbed for the imagination to fix on and only a palace to form, while here we have only "a kind of tactual sense diffused over the whole body, and the action of light to form the eye, more wonderful than any palace. There the work was done at once; here the work must have been continued through ages, and then the power of light and low organisms to produce incipient eyes seems, strangely enough, to have been exhausted in the beginning, and to have been handed over subsequently to a wholly different process called generation and growth.

And this account of a single eye formed on the surface of a "low organism," at whatever point the more sensitive pigment cells might happen to be, is seriously put forth as solving the problem of eyes as they now exist. It would not begin to solve it even if we were to allow that a single eye might be thus formed. What we have to account for is the *two* eyes, in the right place, with their optic nerves, and connections with the brain, and their muscles for motion, and defences, and fountains for tears, and ducts for carrying the tears away.

Nor was it the eye alone that was formed in this way. Professor Tyndall says, "So of the other senses; they are special differentiations of a tissue which was originally vaguely sensitive all over." Taking this basis we have seen how the scientific imagination got on with the eye, but I should like to see it try its powers on the ear. The problem here would be to form, by the pulses of sound, acting on "a tissue vaguely sensitive all over," the external and internal ear, or rather, to form for each such tissue two ears in the right place. How such pulses, acting from without, could form the external ear of a man, or of an ass, it is not easy to see; but how they could

open canals through bones, and form membranes, and little bones acting with a leverage, and the cochlea, and the eustachian tube inside the skull, I should like to bring to Professor Tyndall's test of "mental presentation." The nose would be less difficult. It is easy to imagine "a slight bulging out of the epidermis" caused by some pungent odor, or perhaps by an incipient attempt of the low organism to sneeze. The difficulty with the nose, however, would be to imagine the countless ages it must have required to pass from such "slight bulging" to the size sometimes attained by that organ at the present day.

Looking, then, at the way in which science states and begs the general question; at the uncertainty whether there are any atoms at all; and, if there are, whether they could originate life in "a very low organism vaguely sensitive all over;" and then looking at the task the scientific imagination has to construct from that the different senses, to say nothing of their "environment," and of the infinitely varied adaptations around us, we shall, I think, hardly regard the method from below as adequate to account for the present cosmos.

II.

In seeking the origin of the cosmos we may adopt the method from below or that from above. In the first case its origin will be from matter; in the second, from spirit. A spirit is an invisible agent, possessed of intelligence, feeling, and a moral nature, involving free will and the power of causation. For the existence of such an agent I hold that we have the same kind of evidence, and at least as much evidence, as we have for the existence of magnetism or gravitation. Magnetism is an invisible force or agent known only by its effects. Gravitation reveals itself to none of the senses, but the effect of the invisible force acting according to law, so reveals itself through the senses that we have no more doubt of the existence of the force than we have of the phenomena through which it is revealed. Not in vital action alone, but wherever matter is moved in ac-

cordance with law so as to produce either regular movements or regular forms, we have, through matter, the revelation of *thought*. We have that by which the universe becomes intelligible to us. The movement reveals the force ; the law reveals the intelligence, and I hold that he who passes, as all philosophers except positivists do, from the movement to the force that is back of the movement, is bound to pass from the law to the intelligence that is back of the law. Seeing movement we infer force ; seeing intelligible movement we infer intelligence. The steps are precisely the same. We may deny that law reveals intelligence and so be guilty of the absurdity of spending our lives in the study of a universe that has no thought in it and means nothing. But admitting that there is intelligible movement, the step to intelligence in the mover is the same as that from motion to force. Nor is there any thing more vague, or indefinite, or mystical about an intelligent force than there is about a force that is unintelligent.

As I have said elsewhere,[1] matter, as under the law of gravitation, presents itself in two aspects, one, that of necessity, the other, that of being controlled with reference to an end. The necessity is apparently absolute, since there can be nothing in matter to resist the force, and since its movements under this law can be mathematically calculated. These movements would therefore seem to have not only the necessity that belongs to physical law as uniform, but that absolute necessity which is involved in mathematical relations. On the other hand, we have, in the control of force directed to an end, evidence of choice and of freedom, and that matter under the control of gravitation is directed to an end there can be no doubt. And so these two aspects or faces of matter under law have looked, one toward necessity and atheism, the other toward freedom and God, and men have failed to see their reconciliation in the fact that absolute uniformity — even that which may be expressed by mathematical relations—may be the highest and most perfect result of an intelligent will working toward an end which could be best accomplished only in that way. These two aspects present themselves in every form of physical law.

[1] Outline Study of Man.

Nor do we find evidence of the presence of an invisible and intelligent agent only in law as involving the conception of regular forms and movements, and the control of matter with reference to an end, but also in that very uniformity and apparent necessity which is supposed to exclude intelligence. The highest form of activity known to us, that toward which every thing looks as a preparation and condition, is free and responsible causation. This world was evidently fitted up as a theatre for the action of man as a responsbible cause. For this responsibility we all agree that freedom in him is a condition. It is not so generally apprehended, or indeed thought of at all, that a theatre of uniformities simulating necessity, and in relation to the will of the agent actually necessary, is as necessary to responsible action as freedom itself. That it is so is evident because, without such uniformity and relative necessity, no one could so foresee the consequences of his actions as to be responsible for them. Saying nothing then of this uniformity and apparent necessity as the basis of experience, and so of all education, we see that it is necessary to responsible action, and find in it a signal instance of intelligence and wise design.

And not only do we see design in the uniformity and apparent necessity of the movements of matter, but also in the marvellous combination there is in movements, all of them equally under law, of an absolute and patent uniformity, and of an almost infinite diversity. The revolution of the earth on its axis is absolutely uniform. For thousands of years it has not varied in its time the fraction of a second. In the same way, that movement of the earth in its orbit which determines the march of the seasons is uniform. This was needed for stability, for the feeling of orderliness and quiet that belongs to a home; but in the weather and the winds, in the movements and forms of the clouds, all equally subject to law, there is an endless diversity. So with the qualities and forms of all natural objects. And this was equally needed to stimulate the faculties and give interest to life.

If now we look at this combination of stability and apparent necessity with movement and diversity, we shall see such an adjustment of the constant movements of matter to the purposes

not only of intelligence, but of responsible action, as to require the presence and action of an invisible spiritual agent on the same grounds that the movement itself requires the presence of force. Marvellous, indeed, is it when we turn from the appearance of things to their reality to find apparent stability resolving itself into movements the broadest and most intense, and to find the apparent necessity of physical law taking its place among the most signal evidences of wise design. And when that design obviously is to provide the conditions for responsible action, the implication is direct that such provision could be made only by an intelligent agent recognizing moral distinctions, and so by a spirit.

The common and unanswerable argument for the moral nature of God is the moral nature of man, and human history viewed on a broad scale; but if we find, as we do, in the movements and adjustments of matter provision for moral action, if we find the upbuilding and sustaining of a theatre for that, especially if we find in such provision and upbuilding the culmination of those movements and adjustments, then do we have the same evidence in kind for moral discrimination and purpose in the force that lies back of the movements that we have for the force itself.

Putting thus the inquiry in regard to intelligence and moral discrimination on the same plane with that in regard to force, I am of the opinion that, aside from the human mind and from history, we have evidence for an invisible agency or force pervading the movements of matter that works not only intelligently, but for moral ends, and that to this force we may as properly give a name and call it spirit as we give a name to the force that attracts iron filings and call it magnetism. I hold it to be an utter begging of the question on the part of Professor Tyndall to assume, as he does in his reply to Mr. Martineau, that in the evaporation of water and the formation of snow crystals there is no agency present but that of the sunbeams and the water. How does he know? He can see nothing else, but are his senses the test of a form of being that claims to reveal itself only by its effects? When the iron filings rise he can see nothing but the magnet and the filings. Nothing else is

revealed to any of his senses. Does he then deny that there is any thing else? If so, why does he speak of magnetism at all? When two bodies floating in the stellar spaces tend toward each other according to a law is there nothing but matter? If so, why speak of gravitation? Why of force? Did he ever see force? Does he know any thing about it except from its effects? If not, why not argue from its effects in full? If there are evidences of magnetic or electrical effects, we argue from them to magnetism or electricity in the cause. If then there be evidence of intelligence, of moral apprehension and purpose in the effect, why not argue that there is intelligence and a moral element in the cause? We say that wherever there is law manifesting itself through force in regular movements and in the construction of regular forms, there is evidence of a preconception and an idea that can belong only to what we call mind, and that whenever we find in the effect a reference to moral results we are to argue to a moral element in the cause.

In the first part of this essay I spoke of Professor Tyndall as accounting for the present state of things, man included, by a movement from below, and complained of him for saying that the origin of the cosmos could be attributed to matter only as it should receive a new definition, and then not giving the definition. He has since given it, and has also expressed himself more fully on other important points, as the origin and nature of life. This he has done with remarkable rhetorical power in the reply to Mr. Martineau above referred to, and the remaining part of the discussion will refer more directly to that reply.

First, then, I observe that Professor Tyndall disclaims any knowledge whatever of the power manifested in the universe. I suppose he knows it to be power, for he calls it so, but that is all. "When I attempt," says he, "to give the power which I see manifested in the universe an objective form, personal or otherwise, it slips away from me, declining all intellectual manipulation. I dare not, save poetically, use the pronoun 'he' regarding it; I dare not call it a mind: I refuse to call it a cause. Its mystery overshadows me, but it remains a mystery, while the objective frames which my neighbors try to make it

fit simply distort and desecrate it." Observe here, in connection with a recognition of mystery that is to be honored, and that could come only from a nature capable of religion, the nescience, almost infantine ; the reverent fear that does not dare to call "it" a mind, or to use the pronoun "he" regarding it ; the apprehension so great of any thing unfit than he runs into the absurdity of recognizing a power that he refuses to call a cause ; the sensitive dread of distorting and desecrating that which he knows nothing about ; the implication that not only his neighbors, but holy prophets and apostles whose example they follow, should stand abashed before the humility of science, and repent of having tried to make the mystery of the universe fit into objective frames that distort and desecrate it. "Mr. Martineau," he says, "professes to *know* where I claim only to *feel*." But feeling that has not its root in knowledge, what is it but fanaticism? Is the philosopher going over to the fanatics?

I observe, second, that this nescience precludes the possibility of any rational ground for worship. If Professor Tyndall would not *dare* to call the power, manifested in the universe a mind, much less would he dare to call it Father. Precisely what he would be afraid of I do not know, but he would not dare to do it, and so it would be impossible for him to put up the Lord's prayer, and, so far as I can see, any prayer. He seems at times to believe in some power besides the potency he ascribes to matter ; but a power so vaguely related to us that it cannot be known either as a person, or a mind, or a cause, may, and ought to be, practically disregarded. Such a power can never be the object of faith, or love, or worship, or furnish the "basis" of any religion that shall have the value of moonshine.

We now pass from the consideration of this vague power to the interpretation of nature, a field where Professor Tyndall finds himself at home. In such interpretation he claims to be guided by a philosophical organ called by the Germans "Vorstellungsfähigkeit," but which has no English name. This he has often mentioned in his previous writings as a valuable aid in philosophical investigation. He says it means "the power

of definite mental presentation, of attaching to words the corresponding objects of thought, and of seeing these in their proper relations without the interior haze and soft penumbral borders which the theologian loves." Instead of "picturesqueness," he says this power demands "cold precision."

It is under the guidance of the power just mentioned that Professor Tyndall gives us his opinion, which, he says, is also "the conclusion of science," in respect to the origin of life on this planet. He does not, like a previous President of the British Association, seek that origin in meteoric stones from other worlds, but in the planet itself. "We have," he says, "strong ground for concluding that the earth was once a molten mass. We now find it crowded with living things." The question is, How were they introduced? In reply to this he says, "The conclusion of science, which recognizes unbroken causal connection between the past and the present, would undoubtedly be that the molten earth contained within it elements of life which grouped themselves in their present forms as the planet cooled."

We are here taught, first, that life is made up of elements which were originally in a molten mass. We are taught, second, that these elements of life were matter, for only matter can be "grouped into forms." Life therefore consists of matter. We are taught, third, that these elements remained uninjured in a molten mass. In fact it was their native element. We are taught, fourth, that as the mass cooled these elements "grouped themselves into their present forms." They *grouped themselves*. There was no external agency, no permeating or formative intelligence except that inherent in the elements themselves, and this intelligence was held so tenaciously that the fires of a molten planet could not drive it off. Why the elements should have waited for the planet to cool it is not easy to see. They would naturally find each other most readily when the mass was most fluid, and if one of them could resist the heat singly much more might a number when confederate. All this Professor Tyndall sees by means of the Vorstellungsfähigkeit, with none of "the interior haze and soft penumbral borders which the theologian loves." And this becomes the more luminous when we notice what that is in which Professor

Tyndall says that life consists—life itself after the elements are so combined as to make it up. Speaking of the potency of "pure matter," that is his expression, "*pure* matter," free from any dross, or any contamination of spirit, to build a tree, he says, "Think of the acorn, of the earth, of the solar light and heat—was ever such necromancy dreamed of as the production of that massive trunk, those swaying boughs and whispering leaves from the interaction of these three factors? In this interaction, moreover, consists what we call life." I had supposed that the life was in the germ of the acorn and might remain there for ages, as it is known to have done in grains of wheat in the Egyptian mummies without reference to the earth or solar light. But no; Professor Tyndall says it is in the interaction of these three factors that what we call life consists, and it will be seen at once with what power the Vorstellungsfähigkeit must have acted to enable him to see with "cold precision" within the mass of the molten planet the "interaction of the acorn, the earth, and the solar light." Professor Tyndall adds, "It will be seen that I am not in the least insensible to the wonder of the tree; nay, I should not be surprised if in the presence of this wonder I feel more perplexed and overwhelmed than Mr. Martineau himself." He certainly ought to. So far as appears, this assumption of the elements of life as inherent in matter necessitates spontaneous generation.

The next point relates to the diffusion at the present time of those elements of life, or of life itself. On this point the Professor is less confident, but it is clearly his opinion that life is so diffused that inorganic substances and vegetables, as well as animals, have consciousness and sensation. Speaking of the processes and wonderful results of vegetable life, he asks, "Does consciousness mix in any way with these processes?"

His reply is, "No man can tell." "In such inquiries," he goes on, "we are necessarily limited by our own powers. Alter the capacity and the evidence would alter too. Would that which is to us a total absence of any manifestation of consciousness be the same to a being with our capacities indefinitely multiplied? To such a being I can imagine not only the vegetable, but the mineral world responsive to the proper irri-

tants, the response differing only in degree from those exaggerated manifestations, which, in virtue of their grossness, appeal to our weak powers of observation." Then, after stating the relation of the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral kingdoms to each other, he says, "From this point of view all three worlds would constitute a unity in which I picture," using of course the Vorstellungsfähigkeit, "life as immanent everywhere."

According to this there is no knowing how far the jurisdiction of Mr. Bergh may yet extend. I hope this is not so, for I am a citizen of Massachusetts and have some responsibility for the Hoosac Tunnel, and I should be sorry to have laid at my door any part of the sufferings the rocks must have undergone through these long years, and especially since the discovery of nitro-glycerine. It would be too much, if, after being at such expense, the State is to be charged with cruelty toward those blasted rocks.

I next ask attention to the important fact that Professor Tyndall has now supplied the definition of matter, the absence of which I complained of in the former part of this essay. "Matter," he says, "I define to be that mysterious thing by which all this is accomplished." Here we are told what matter is. It is "*a mysterious thing.*" This is the only part of the sentence that is of the nature of a definition. The other part tells us, not what matter is, but what it does. But inasmuch as the confession of a mystery—and I am happy to know that the Professor believes in mysteries—does not let us far into the nature of the thing, let us turn to what matter does, and see if we cannot succeed better. "Matter is that mysterious thing by which all this is accomplished." All what? All the movements and processes, the adjustments and contrivances that we observe in inorganic or organic nature. To show this is the one object of the essay. In order to this he begins, as he says, "low down."

He takes water evaporated from the Caribbean Sea, and follows it to the Alps, where, through the formative power that belongs to "pure matter," it becomes a beautiful snow crystal. He then speaks of the oak, as already referred to, as the pro-

duct of the three factors, the acorn, the earth, and solar light, and says, "If the power to build a tree be conceded to pure matter," as he thinks it must be, "what an amazing expansion of our notions of the potency of matter is implied in the concession!" Amazing to be sure! He next passes to the animal world, and to man, and proceeds to show that man is formed by pure matter, thus: "Physiologists say that every human being comes from an egg not more than $\frac{1}{120}$th of an inch in diameter. Is this egg matter? I hold it to be so, as much as the seed of a fern or of an oak. Nine months go to the making of it into a man. Are the additions made during this period of gestation drawn from matter? I think so undoubtedly. If there be any thing besides matter in the egg, or in the infant slumbering in the womb, what is it? "Consider," he says, "the work accomplished during these nine months in forming the eye alone with its lens, and its humors, and its miraculous retina behind." Matter, we see, can perform miracles, though God can not. "Consider the ear, with tympanum, cochlea, and Corti's organ, an instrument of three thousand strings built adjacent to the brain, and employed by it to sift, separate and interpret, antecedent to all consciousness, the sonorous tremors of the external world. All this has been accomplished, not only without man's contrivance, but without his knowledge, the secret of his own organization having been withheld from him since his birth in the immeasurable past till the other day." Now comes the definition. "Matter I define as that mysterious thing by which all this is accomplished."

Have we, then, in this potency of matter, by which "all this is accomplished," that which was spoken of by Professor Tyndall previously as "the power which I see manifested in the universe," and which he regarded so reverentially? I suppose so, for if the power which carries on these processes be not the power manifested in the universe, we have no evidence that there is such a power. But whether this be so or not, Professor Tyndall asserts explicitly that man was made, not only of matter, but by matter. From this it will follow:

First, that man, who is a person, was made by a *thing*—

a mysterious thing to be sure, but still a *thing*. Hence the origin of slavery, which treats men as things.

It will follow, second, that matter is to be worshipped—that is, if any thing is. It is the dictate of both reason and the Scriptures that man should worship his Maker. "O come," says one of old, "let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our Maker, for He is our God."

It will follow, third, that a man is to worship himself. It is not all matter by which a man was made, but that only of which he is composed. I see no good reason why a man should worship the matter that is in the topmost cone of a pine tree, for that had nothing to do with making him, but the matter of which he is composed, those elements that "*grouped themselves*" into a man, they were the maker of the man. But here is a difficulty, or rather there was originally, for how could a man bow down and kneel before himself? This must have painfully frustrated the original devout impulse till some person, specially moved by it, invented the looking-glass. Perhaps we may also get a hint here of the part of the body that is most worthy of being worshipped. It would naturally be that which had the most formative influence—that is, the stomach. Hence we see the fine philosophic instinct of some spoken of in the Bible, "whose god was their belly," or, as we should now say, their stomach. Hence too we may readily account for those Eastern devotees who spend whole days and even months in gazing upon their stomachs.

Such, so far as I can see, are the legitimate consequences of believing that man was made by matter, at least, if we allow, as Professor Tyndall does, that man has a religious nature that must in some way find satisfaction. In saying that man was thus made, and identifying as we must the power that made him with that which we see manifested in the universe, we see the progress made by Professor Tyndall both in knowledge and in courage during the time he was preparing his essay. In the earlier part of it the power which he saw manifested in the universe slipped away from him, declining all intellectual manipulation. He did not *dare* to call it a mind; he refused to call it a cause. Near the close of the essay he has no doubt what the

cause is. He dares to call it matter, and does not hesitate to call it a cause. "Matter I define as that mysterious thing by which all this is accomplished"—that is, *caused*.

But while Professor Tyndall speaks thus explicitly, it is instructive to notice how he is compelled to do the very thing he complains of in others, and ridicules them for. What, I would ask, is that *life*, the elements of which were, as he says, in the molten planet? Was it matter? Then why not call it so? Why speak of life at all? Why say that life consists in the interaction of the three factors, the acorn, the earth, and the solar light, when, if that little germ of the acorn that may be laid on the point of a penknife be removed, there will be interaction all the same, only the acorn will rot? That same life which he pictures as now immanent everywhere, in rocks as well as in organic beings—doubtless still in the molten masses of the volcano—is that matter? It ought to be something very definite and distinct thus to have a separate name, and to be pictured by the Vorstellungsfähigkeit, which "demands not picturesqueness, but cold precision." I venture to say that no conception of spirit as pervading and informing matter can be more indefinite, or hazy, or farther removed from any thing that can be properly called matter, than this of a "life immanent everywhere."

Thus does the necessity for the human mind of something back of matter assert itself even where it is formally denied; and if we must have something thus back of matter, why not admit that which is adequate to produce the effects which we see produced? Neither life, nor force without intelligence, is thus adequate. By excluding spirit we gain nothing in the way of comprehension, for it cannot be more mysterious than that mysterious thing called matter. In finding God as a Spirit, while we recognize the mystery that belongs to His being, as it must to all being, we solve minor mysteries in a way that gives a significance and grandeur to life that are in themselves an argument for the truth of that way. According to the scientist, the origin of the present order of things and the production of passing phenomena are due to pure matter. What a contrast between this and the statement of the Scriptures that comes to us

as fresh and appropriate to-day as when it was uttered near three thousand years ago: "But the Lord is the true God, he is the living God, and an everlasting king. He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and stretched out the heavens by his discretion." So much for the origin, now for the phenomena. "When he uttereth his voice there is a multitude of waters in the heavens, and he causeth the vapors to ascend from the ends of the earth. He maketh lightnings with rain and bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures. HE *is the* FORMER *of all things*, the Lord of Hosts is his name."

MARK HOPKINS.

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF AMERICAN PROGRESS.

IF the reader will take the trouble to glance at Walker's Statistical Atlas of the United States, he will observe that prior to the Louisiana purchase in 1803, the United States was bounded by the Mississippi River on the west and the Spanish possession of Florida on the south. The cession of Louisiana gave us all west of the Mississippi and north of the Red River, and of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean—a territory considerably exceeding the previous Union. The annexation of Texas in 1845, and the Texas cession of 1850, added a domain nearly equal to the States north of the line of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi; and the first and second Mexican sessions of 1848 and 1852 completed the line of our "scientific frontier" by giving us a territory about as large as the States south of the Great Lakes and east of the Mississippi. The United States of 1800 was therefore a country only one ninth as large as the United States of to-day. The centre of population is moving steadily westward. In 1800 it was on the meridian of Washington; in 1840, of Pittsburg; in 1870, of Cincinnati. In 1880 it may be expected to reach Indianapolis; and, as Mr. Walker prophesies, by the end of the century, the Mississippi River. If we compare the growth of population in the United States with the corresponding results for the population of England and Wales, it will be found that the general rate of growth in America is more than double the highest rate (16 per cent) of increase in England.

No country in the world ever exhibited such a regular and enormous rate of increase in the population as the United States does from 1800 to 1860. In England the rate increased from 1 per cent in 1670 to 16 per cent in 1821, when a distinct and

continuous decrease is struck. The rate of 16 per cent diminishes successively to 15, 14, 13, and 12, until it seems to have approached a stationary condition at 12. In regard to ourselves, the census reports show an average rate of increase of 33 per cent every ten years. But it should be borne in mind that an increase of population may be deemed a solid good or a dreadful evil according to the circumstances of the country in which it occurs.[1] If a commensurate increase of food and raiment can be produced by agriculture and by manufacture, an accession of consumers in the home market cannot but be beneficial to all parties; and the increase of population in such case may be deemed equally desirable in itself, and conducive to national strength and national prosperity. In no instance is this better illustrated than in England, where the large manufacturing towns have grown while agriculture has been neglected. Ten years ago Mr. Bright made a series of vigorous speeches embodying advice and counsel to the working classes of Great Britain.[2] He pointed out to them the mistake they were committing in crowding into cities and engaging in mechanical and manufacturing work to the neglect of agriculture. The burden of the advice was, "Go back to the land." He pointed out how much of the land of Great Britain and Ireland was still lying waste, held as deer-forests and grouse-moors, which, if cultivated, would maintain directly many thousands, and the produce of which would cheapen the necessaries of life to many thousands more who worked in cities. In England, Professor Jevons has very clearly shown that the population is divided into the distinct agricultural and manufacturing masses —contrasted as they are in every point of nature, history, and social condition.[3] To show that Mr. Bright was right, and that, had his advice been followed, much of the forcing of trade and overproduction of manufactures which has resulted in the present commercial stagnation and disorganization of the labor market might have been avoided, we will compare the condition of these two great portions by means of the rates of progress

[1] Rickman's "Preliminary Observations to Population Abstracts" (1822), p. 30.

[2] See "The Federation of the English Empire" (*Westminster Review*, July, 1879, p. 22).

[3] "The Progress of the Nation," p. 184.

of some of the most purely agricultural and most purely manufacturing counties:

AGRICULTURAL COUNTIES.

County.	Increase of Population per cent.*					
	1801–11.	1811–21.	1821–31.	1831–41.	1841–51.	1851–61.
Buckingham	9	14	9	6	5	3
Cambridge	13	21	18	14	13	—5
Devon	12	15	13	7	6	3
Dorset	9	16	10	10	5	2
Norfolk	7	18	13	6	7	—2
Somerset	10	17	13	8	2	0
Sussex	19	23	17	10	15	8
Westmoreland	12	12	7	3	3	4
Wilts	4	14	8	8	—1	—2

* Census of 1861. Population Tables, vol. i. p. 18. The negative sign (—) indicates a decrease of population, as in the cases of Cambridge, Norfolk, and Wiltshire.

To demonstrate how clearly Mr. Bright foresaw the dangers that lay ahead, it is only necessary to glance at the following and compare it with the table above:

MANUFACTURING COUNTIES.

County.	Increase of Population per cent.					
	1800–11.	1811–21.	1821–31.	1831–41.	1841–51.	1851–61.
Durham	10	17	24	29	27	30
Lancaster	22	27	27	24	22	20
Monmouth	35	22	29	36	17	11
Northumberland	19	15	11	12	14	13
Stafford	21	17	18	24	20	23
Glamorgan	19	20	24	35	35	37

Thus, while the population in some of the large manufacturing towns in England has increased at the rate of 30 and 37 per cent, 8 per cent is the highest rate of increase in the agricultural districts, and in three counties the population has actually decreased. But as Professor Rogers pointed out in the July number of this REVIEW, emigration has had much to do with this change. In the sixty-two years from 1815 to 1876 the total

number of emigrants who have left the United Kingdom is 8,424,942. Their destinations were as follows:

United States	5,467,075
British North America	1,549,010
Australasia	1,165,628
Other places	243,229
	8,424,942

Taking the money value of these emigrants at $1000 apiece, as is ordinarily assumed in this country, we find they represent a sum of $5,467,075,000 that English emigration has given the United States. But we find that here, as in England, there is a decided tendency to leave the millions of acres of magnificent lands unoccupied, and seek the large towns. Population seems to seek life for the brain, and such excitements as our cities afford prove too attractive for the rural populations, as the following will show:

Year.	Cities and Towns.	Per cent.	Rural.	Per cent.
1850	3,131,675	23.5	10,208,727	76.5
1860	5,081,086	28	13,287,002	72
1870	7,841,950	34	15,215,023	66

No doubt the census of 1880 will show a still larger proportion. In 1850 less than one quarter of the population of the United States lived in cities; now the towns contain upward of one third. The change may be to some extent accounted for in the change of the industrial condition of the West, but in general the immense demand for manufactured products which followed the war drafted the country population into the towns, there to exchange the quiet village for the crowded, squalid alleys, the busy workshop, or the gloomy mine. But it must not be forgotten that in the United States there is a happy medium between the large cities and their toiling thousands and the villages with their half-dozen stores and school-house. I allude to the manufacturing cities of from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, which are growing up so rapidly, especially in our Western

States. Lots are cheap in such towns, and the careful, industrious mechanic soon has a home of his own, and he becomes identified with the city in which he lives.

We are now brought face to face with the real subject of this article—the basis of our prosperity. The actual condition of the United States is generally summed up as follows: The South with cotton, the staple textile fibre of the world's clothing; the West with meat and grain; the Northwest with lumber and leather; the Middle States with coal and iron; New York and New England with textile and other manufactures; the Pacific States and Territories with their vast stores of mineral wealth. But the last ten years has brought about many changes, and the movements of centres of industry make the above statement correct only with many modifications. As Mr. Courtney[1] has shown of England, so in the United States many industries that have died out in one section of the Union have grown up in another. For instance, take the effect of the war from 1861 to 1865 on the production and consumption of domestic cane-sugars. The product of the then three sugar-producing States, Louisiana, Texas, and Florida, for the year 1861–2 was unprecedentedly large, and was estimated at upwards of 191,000 tons, or 427,840,000 pounds. In 1865, however, this branch of industry had become so nearly extinct that it was estimated that no more than 5000 tons of domestic cane-sugar entered into the total sugar consumption of the country. During the last decade the production has rapidly increased.[2] In the early history of Virginia the light lands of the eastern counties were cultivated in tobacco, extensive shipments to England being made from towns on the Chesapeake, long since abandoned. Less than a century of tobacco-growing completely exhausted the coast counties, and left the towns, mansions, and churches that once flourished there buried in a forest of pine. Charleston formerly supplied almost wholly the northern part of Georgia and a large part of Tennessee with nearly everything that the country merchants dealt in, and Savannah shared to

[1] "The Migration of Centres of Industrial Energy" (*Fortnightly Review* December, 1878).

[2] "The Sugar Industry of the United States," by David A. Wells, p. 15.

some extent in this trade also. The two cities did an immense business. Now the channels of trade have changed with the growing competition of transportation. Trade has been diverted from its former course, and a depreciation of the business interests of these cities has followed. Country dealers are doing a large business, and are supplied directly from the North and West by rail, and new towns are springing up along the lines of railroad. Again, prior to the war the Eastern States alone manufactured textile fabrics. Since that time cotton manufactories have been put into operation in the South and West. Some time ago Tennessee had forty cotton-mills, running 56,358 spindles. In Georgia, at Atlanta, Augusta, Columbus, and Macon, are cotton-mills. Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia have mills already in operation. The total amount of cotton manufactured in the South during the year ending September 1, 1879, was 152,000 bales; not a large amount, to be sure, but it indicates the beginning of a change. The South, it has been said, dreams of a period when the vast interest of cotton-weaving shall be distributed through the cotton belt itself. The West similarly has faith in a time when it shall monopolize, at least as far as home consumption is concerned, all those manufactures into which wood and iron enter. The fulfilment of both these expectations would silence and depopulate many of the industrial centres of the East. The following table shows that the contingency of a removal of the cotton-spindles southward is remote:

Year.	Total Takings by the Northern and Southern Mills.		
	Northern Mills. Bales.	Southern Mills. Bales.	Total.
1874	1,177,417	128,526	1,305,943
1875	1,062,522	145,079	1,207,601
1876	1,211,598	145,000	1,356,598
1877	1,288,418	147,000	1,435,418
1878	1,398,298	148,000	1,546,298
1879	1,416,960	152,000	1,568,960

The increased consumption at the South within the last five years has been 7000 bales; at the North, 354,000 bales.

But that a division of the business of those who work in iron and wood between the East and the West is as remote I do not believe, and indeed the facts indicate the reverse. The West is no longer purely given over to meat and grain. It is growing more important every year in manufacturing; and in industries where recent and reliable data can be obtained it will be seen that the strides made within the past few years are surprising, and worthy of the most careful consideration of political economists. In 1878 the State of Illinois alone made as many rails as the whole United States made in any one year prior to 1860. The four States of Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Kansas produced last year 266,783 tons of rails, upward of 30 per cent of all the rails produced in 1878 in the United States. Illinois and Indiana alone produced half a million tons of cut nails, over one ninth of the total production of the country. The spring of the present year witnessed the starting of new rail manufactories at Omaha, Nebraska, and Centralia, Illinois. The total production of rolled iron of all kinds in the United States for 1878 was 1,555,576 tons; of this, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Kansas produced 232,553, or about one seventh. The ore in the iron regions of Michigan and Missouri is very rich and free from injurious ingredients, and is capable of being successfully employed for the manufacture of all varieties of iron and steel. Professor Newberry,[1] one of the best authorities on the subject, has observed that in these two iron districts the inhabitants of the Valley of the Mississippi have a supply of remarkably rich and pure ores, which is not likely to be exhausted for some hundreds of years, and which, from the small amount of phosphorus which they contain, will be the chief dependence of the American people for the manufacture of steel. To Chicago and Milwaukee, and other points on the shores of the Great Lakes, the ore of the Lake Superior iron regions is floated cheaply, and is manufactured where disembarked, or is distributed through the interior of Illinois and neighboring States to be brought in closer proximity to the coal. Already an immense iron rail industry, second only to Pennsylvania, has grown up, based on the relations which have been

[1] "Iron Resources of the United States" (*International Review*, November, 1874).

briefly indicated between the ore and coal. The increase of population on the shores of these lakes within the past quarter century is without parallel in history, and twenty-five years more will witness a still greater growth. The present indication is that the demand for iron will be greater than ever before, and will be met by the Western instead of the Eastern markets. This demand, according to Professor Newberry, must be furnished from three points or lines of manufacture: first, near the mines, where a limited quantity of iron will be produced from charcoal, and coke or coal brought as return freight; second, along the shores of lakes, where the ore is transhipped and meets the coal from the interior, as in Chicago; third, in the vicinity of the coal-mines, to which the ore is brought overland by rail, as at Springfield and Joliet. Neither of these points or lines can monopolize the iron manufacture, since return freights must be furnished to empty coal-cars as well as empty ore-vessels. The preponderance of the lake shores or the interior will be determined mainly by the point to which economy of fuel can be carried in our iron manufacture. With keen foresight and enterprise, the West, and especially Illinois, has taken the newest and now most profitable branch of the iron trade—the manufacture of steel rails. In the manufacture of Bessemer-steel rails Cook County, Illinois, has already distanced Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Last year that great centre of the iron trade manufactured 72,246 tons of Bessemer-steel rails.[1] Chicago, during the same time, turned out 123,000 tons, and if the neighboring county of Will is counted in, the amount is increased to 178,000 tons, or 33,608 tons more than twice the entire production of Allegheny County. Last year the State of Illinois produced nearly one third of all the Bessemer-steel rails produced in the United States. In other branches of industry the same holds true. A few years ago all our best furniture came from Boston. Said a leading Chicago furniture-dealer to the writer the other day, "Not one dollar's worth is now bought east of Grand Rapids, Michigan." The leading hotel at Dundee, Scotland, is furnished from top to bottom with furniture made at Grand Rapids, Michigan; and what is more surprising,

[1] Address of William P. Shinn before American Iron and Steel Association at Pittsburg, June, 1879.

this furniture can be delivered in Scotland 25 per cent cheaper than it can be produced there. A small town in Indiana is now completing a large order for wagons for an English firm, who reship them from Liverpool to South Africa. The proprietor of a Chicago nail-works said the other day, "I remember the time when the first nail-factory was built outside of Pittsburg. The people of Pittsburg smiled, for they thought nails could not be made outside of that smoky town. But the enterprise succeeded, and as far West as Omaha nails are being made to compete with the East."

While the West is competing with the Eastern States in manufactures, the South is coming into public notice as a fine field for emigration. The following tabulated statement very forcibly indicates that until recently public attention has been singularly diverted from eligible colonizing districts, more accessible than the competing West both to the great centres of consumption and to the points of vastly-increasing foreign shipment of various agricultural products:[1]

States.	Unimproved Lands.	Percentage of Unimproved Lands in Farms to total Lands in Farms.
Virginia	9,980,871	55
West Virginia	5,948,140	69.7
Tennessee	12,737,936	65.1
North Carolina	14,576,668	73.5
Kentucky	10,556,256	56.6
Kansas	3,685,876	65.2
Nebraska	1,426,750	68.8
Iowa	6,145,326	39.5

Of course it is not claimed that the vast excess of unimproved lands in the Southern States named above has a present productive value equal to the same class of lands in the three Western States. A large proportion of the former is mountain-land, both inaccessible and wholly untillable. But the greater degree of intelligence now brought to bear in the cultivation, combined with the discovery in South Carolina of immense beds of mineral phosphates, which, when used as a fertilizer, supply the very element the exhausted lands most needed, will have a tendency

[1] This table is compiled from the U. S. Census Report of 1870.

to attract settlers. The abolition of slavery will make it less difficult for white emigrants to compete in agricultural pursuits. The mobility of the laboring population of the South not only excluded immigrants from new territory, and prematurely diminished the laboring population of the older States, but in these latter the slaves became massed together as the competition of the richer States of the Southwest came to be more and more felt there. Thus profitable planting required large capital, and small proprietors were at a disadvantage. Free labor was too expensive for both laborer and employer; hence many of the whites were forced to emigrate.[1] So extensive was this emigration that the census of 1860 showed that of the white persons then living in the United States who had been born in South Carolina, 277,000 remained at home, while 193,000 were permanently settled in other States; North Carolina retained 634,000 and had parted with 272,000; Virginia retained 1,000,000 and had sent off 400,000 of her native white population. The same causes practically prohibited manufactures, because manufactures even more than agriculture depend upon fixity of population. The great development of the manufactures of the West has been due to cheapness of living, uniformity and regularity in the supply of the necessaries of life; but these conditions were not attainable in the South, where, as Mr. Trenholm says, "a large part of the population was always on the move, and another large part lived in expectation of moving." The want of these manufactures was not severely felt in the South until after the war. Before the war all the Southern energy was put into the cotton crop, and with the money that it brought into the South it was easier to buy than to make. Mr. Atkinson, who has recently visited the South, says that the removal of slavery in the South will bring about the greatest industrial revolution ever accomplished. In this we fully agree with the distinguished economist. The incentive of labor in the South has not been wanting, and the mere fact that the last eight crops of cotton raised by free labor exceed the nine ante-war crops of slavery is alone proof sufficient of the advance in the production of wealth that has already ensued. Georgia invites the emigrant to easy

[1] "The Southern States: their Social and Industrial History, Condition, and Needs," by W. L. Trenholm, of South Carolina.

conditions of life. The upper pine-lands of the great State are now to be bought by the hundred thousand acres at a half dollar to a dollar an acre—the true country for the abundant production of wool, where no winter shelter for sheep is needed and where all conditions of health exist. The almost unknown valleys that lie between the Blue Ridge and the lateral ranges of Virginia and North Carolina offer homes for hardy men nearer the centre of civilization than the far West, but passed by until now because of the curse of slavery. If the well-trained tenant farmers of Great Britain, who are now surrendering their farms, should turn their attention to the opportunities offered in many parts of Virginia, they would find that it needs only brains and industry to put that great State once more on the list among the rich and prosperous communities.[1] As Governor Holliday said in his last annual message, "Virginia wants capital. She invites it cordially from beyond the lines. She offers a climate and soil and resources unsurpassed." The able and valuable work[2] recently issued by the State of West Virginia gives ample evidence of the vast and hitherto unknown resources of that State. Recent travellers through the State of South Carolina report marked signs of improvement and progress, much of which was said to have been made within the past two years. Property is changing hands to a great extent. Very many of the old property-holders have disappeared and new men are coming to the front. In the interior the indications of progress were perfectly clear in the new villages, the new lands in cultivation, and in the really vast amount of new fencing around both the old and the new fields.[3] Georgia was never in a better condition than to-day. Her loans are quoted in New York at $1.11 and $1.12, while her six-per-cent bonds are selling in Atlanta at $1.04. Actual figures show[4] that during the past two years more than 7000 immigrants have settled in the State of Tennessee through the agency of the State Bureau of Immigration. They have not come as paupers to increase the burdens of the State, but as purchasers of homes.

[1] "An American View of American Competition," by Edward Atkinson (*Fortnightly Review*, March, 1879, pp. 395, 396).

[2] "Resources of West Virginia," by M. F. Maury and W. M. Fontaine.

[3] New York *Herald* letters, April 23, 1879.

[4] Message of Governor Porter, of Tennessee, 1879, p. 19.

This State needs men of skill, industry, and thrift to occupy its large uncultivated territory. The entire area of Tennessee is 42,000 square miles, or 26,880,000 acres; about 6,000,000 acres are in cultivation, leaving over 20,000,000 acres unoccupied. The labors of the bureau are making Tennessee a formidable rival of States west of it, and with continued efforts the population of the State will be largely increased. Alabama, like the other Southern States, needs immigrants.[1] With a healthful climate, abundance of good and pure water, agricultural fields of rich productive soils inviting labor, mountains of coal and iron ready to be utilized, water-courses well distributed all over the State (of excellent capacity for factories), railroads and steamboats to convey the products of labor to market, a well-regulated and fairly-administered system of common schools—Alabama is certainly prepared to offer good advantages to those who desire to become citizens of that State. During the past two years it is estimated that not less than 100,000 immigrants have settled in Arkansas.[2] North Carolina, pre-eminently an agricultural State, is fairly prosperous.

Stock-raising in the South, especially in Texas, affords an immense field for enterprise. The aggregate of Texas cattle is unknown to the best-informed operators. The production of cattle in that State is about half as much as the total production of all the Southern States put together. Some idea of the magnitude of this trade may be formed from the fact that, from the Red River in Clay County west to the Pease River and south to the Colorado—embracing a territory of perhaps 25,000 miles—every ten miles square will certainly average 8000 head of cattle. The increase of cattle is said to be enormous—from 25 to 40 per cent annually, and frequently it reaches 50 per cent. Mr. Atkinson has pointed out what a field Texas is for German emigration. The German, he tells us, already knows Texas, and in one block of 60,000 square miles of land, by which the State of Texas exceeds the area of the German Empire, we offer more and healthy conditions of life for millions of immigrants; and on that single square of land, if they come in sufficient numbers, they can raise as much cotton as is now raised in the whole

[1] See Message of Governor Houston, 1878, p. 21.

[2] Biennial Report of Commissioner of Lands of Arkansas, p. 60.

South, that is to say 5,000,000 bales, and as much wheat as is now raised in the whole North, that is to say 400,000,000 bushels, and yet subsist themselves besides on what is left of this little patch that will not be needed for these two crops. The development of the cotton trade of Texas would necessarily help St. Louis and Chicago. The cotton trade in St. Louis has increased from 36,421 bales in 1872 to 330,088 bales in nine months of 1879. The cotton crop of Texas for 1878–79 was about 760,000 bales. The estimate for 1879–80 is 830,000 bales. If the leaders of Southern thought would only turn their attention to these large topics instead of constantly kindling anew dead issues that should be forgotten, the South would, according to all commercial and economic principles, attain to great prosperity—a prosperity which, it has been truthfully observed, cannot fail to be beneficial to the whole country, because it cannot be attained without the aid and concurrence of all.

But the East, as I shall presently show by actual figures, is not retrograding, though its public debts are large and mercantile failures since the panic of 1873 have exceeded by upward of $500,000,000 the business misfortunes of the West. So far as textile fabrics are concerned, it has been shown that the increase in manufacture has been upward of 350,000 bales of cotton in the past five years in the North, and only 7000 in the South. The competition with England in the cotton business has fairly begun, and will be carried on in this section of the country. Not only have we deprived the United Kingdom of 40,000,000 of people as customers, but we are threatening them with permanent active rivalry in outside markets. The consumption of British goods in foreign markets no longer grows at its old pace, and the reason is not far to seek. Her rivals are making greater progress; for, since 1870, Great Britain's annual consumption of cotton has increased less than 400,000,000 bales, whilst that of the United States has gone up from 928,000,000 bales in 1870 to 1,439,000,000 bales in 1877, an increase of 511,000,000 bales. One of the most gratifying signs of the stability of the East is the fact that, though the American manufactured goods are selling in all parts of the world and competing with goods from European workshops, the wages of our workmen have not been

lowered. On the contrary, in the State of Massachusetts, the State of all others most actively engaged in this foreign competition, the average weekly wages of workingmen in manufacturing and mechanical industries, allowing for the advance in the cost of living, were *ten per cent higher* in 1878 than they were in 1860; no account being made of the fact that the wages in 1878 were paid for fewer hours of labor per week in many industries than were required in 1860.[1] It has also been proved that the workingmen of Massachusetts, in the majority of cases, have the best quality of food, though not in so great quantity and variety as in previous years; that they are practising a rigid economy in purchases of clothing, dry-goods, boots and shoes, house-furnishing goods, and fuel; and that the majority continue to pay their bills promptly. In 1875, out of the 1,652,000 inhabitants of Massachusetts, 720,000 were depositors in savings banks to the amount of $238,000,000. During the last two years the deposits have slightly decreased. In 1876 the savings banks of the New England States and New York had 2,116,619 depositors, whose aggregate deposits amounted to $751,970,452, an average of $355.26 for each depositor. At the same time the savings banks of all France had 2,365,557 depositors, whose total deposits aggregated $132,082,793, an average of $55.80 for each depositor.

There remains now but one important interest to consider in our comparative view of American progress. Of all pursuits, mining is the most varied and least certain. In 1853 California produced $65,000,000 of gold, and as late as twenty years ago its annual product amounted to $50,000,000. At that time Russia produced about $16,000,000 a year, and Australia about the same as California. At the present time the product of California hardly exceeds $16,000,000 a year, while that of Russia amounts to nearly $25,000,000. But the Union Pacific Railroad has opened up other mines besides those of California, and the production of precious metal in 1878 was greater than in the year preceding. The chief attractions now are the silver mines located along the vast region traversed by the Pacific Railroad.

[1] For a full and, I think, conclusive demonstration of this important fact, the reader is referred to the Tenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor of Massachusetts, pp. 61–95.

The first discoveries of silver within it were made in 1859. At that time the total product of the United States equalled only $200,000 annually. The product the past year equalled $46,726,314, of which $41,311,677 was from the States and Territories tributary to the Pacific Railroad.[1] The following table will show the product of gold and silver in the States in question for 1877 and 1878:[2]

States.	1877.		1878.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
California	$15,000,000	$1,000,000	$15,260,679	$2,373,387
Nevada	18,000,000	26,000,000	19,546,513	28,130,350
Utah	350,000	5,075,000	392,000	5,288,000
Colorado	3,000,000	4,500,000	3,366,404	5,394,940
Oregon	1,000,000	100,000	1,000,000	100,000
Washington	300,000	50,000	300,000	25,000
Dakotah	2,000,000	.....	3,000,000	.....
Total	$39,650,000	$36,725,000	$42,865,596	$41,311,677

The total amount of gold and silver produced in the United States in 1877, according to the same authority, equalled $84,050,000, of which $45,100,000 was gold and $38,950,000 was silver. The amount produced in 1878 equalled $93,952,421, of which $47,226,107 was gold and $46,726,314 was silver. The product of the United States for 1878 equalled one half that of the world; that of the territory opened by the Pacific Railroad for the past year equalled $84,176,273, or nearly one half of the product of the world. There are few men among the most intelligent who fully comprehend the wonderful importance of such railroads as the Pacific and Northern Pacific roads until the facts are almost dramatically brought to their observation.

It has been long since enunciated that man follows, or at all events tries to follow, the lines of least resistance, when his movements are free as within the wide-spreading area of the United States. It has been shown elsewhere that in this way

[1] "The Pacific Railroad," by Henry V. Poor (*North American Review*, June, 1879).

[2] Report of the Superintendent of the U. S. Mint.

industries have shifted to those spots where they are pursued under conditions admitting the greatest return for the least expenditure of labor. It now remains for us to find out by the aid of such facts as we have at hand the present drift of our population. It has been truly said that it is only by a close observation of the entire field before us that we can realize something of the distribution of man, and even attain to some apprehension of the set of the tides of humanity reserved for the future.

The manufacturing States of the West are (if the figures of the Bureau of Statistics are worthy of credence) better places for the mechanic than the Eastern or the Middle States. I have compiled the following tabulated statement showing the average annual and weekly earnings and the annual expenditures of the families of workingmen in the Eastern, Middle, Southern, and Western States respectively:[1]

Eastern States.

Total average yearly expenditures	$670 22
Total average weekly earnings	15 14
Total average yearly earnings	787 28

Middle States.

Total average yearly expenditures	$786 52
Total average weekly earnings	18 95
Total average yearly earnings	985 40

Southern States.

Total average yearly expenditures	$818 07
Total average weekly earnings	16 09
Total average yearly earnings	836 76

Western States.

Total average yearly expenditures	$714 75
Total average weekly earnings	18 19
Total average yearly earnings	945 88

[1] Compiled from statements published in Mr. Young's work on "Labor in America and Europe," 1874, Washington, D.C.

From the above figures we may make the following summary:

	Annual Saving.
1. Western States	$231 13
2. Middle States	198 88
3. Eastern States	117 06
4. Southern States	18 69

These figures naturally suggest the inquiries: Is the West as promising a land to the manufacturer as it is to the agriculturist? Will it attract both industries? Let us compare the three sections. In this comparison Ohio will be left out as the connecting-link between the East and West. Maryland, Delaware, and the Pacific States will also be omitted, that we may better deal with the distinct sections of the country, and base our inquiry as near as possible on an equal population. The population of these regions in 1860 was as follows:

Eastern—1860.		Western—1860.		Southern—1860.	
State.	Population.	State.	Population.	State.	Population.
Maine	628,279	Michigan	749,113	Virginia	1,596,318
New Hampshire	326,073	Indiana	1,350,428	West Virginia	
Vermont	315,098	Illinois	1,711,951	North Carolina	992,622
Massachusetts	1,231,098	Wisconsin	775,881	South Carolina	703,708
Rhode Island	174,620	Minnesota	172,023	Georgia	1,057,286
Connecticut	460,147	Iowa	674,913	Florida	140,424
New York	3,880,735	Missouri	1,182,012	Alabama	964,201
New Jersey	672,035	Kansas	107,206	Mississippi	791,305
Pennsylvania	2,906,215	Nebraska	28,841	Louisiana	708,002
				Texas	604,215
				Arkansas	435,450
				Kentucky	1,155,684
				Tennessee	1,109,801
Total	10,594,300	Total	6,752,368	Total	10,259,016

In 1860 the nine Eastern States had a population of 10,594,300; the nine Western States a population of 6,752,308; and the thirteen Southern States 10,259,016. In the following table, representing the respective population of the same States at the present time, I have used the latest State census as far as possible. In States where no census reports have been taken since the United States census of 1870, the figures are based on

estimates made by Mr. Elliott (one of our ablest statisticians) in the Statistical Atlas of the United States:

Eastern.		Western.		Southern.	
State.	Population.	State.	Population.	State.	Population.
Maine	650,000	Michigan	1,500,000	Virginia	1,300,000
New Hampshire	320,000	Indiana	2,040,000	West Virginia	500,000
Vermont	330,000	Illinois	3,500,000	North Carolina	1,170,000
Massachusetts	1,821,000	Wisconsin	1,400,000	South Carolina	950,000
Rhode Island	300,000	Minnesota	765,000	Georgia	1,375,000
Connecticut	630,000	Iowa	1,700,000	Florida	250,000
New York	4,995,000	Missouri	2,400,000	Alabama	1,150,000
New Jersey	1,132,000	Kansas	850,000	Mississippi	1,000,000
Pennsylvania	4,125,000	Nebraska	500,000	Louisiana	1,000,000
				Texas	2,000,000
				Arkansas	700,000
				Kentucky	1,500,000
				Tennessee	1,400,000
Total	14,303,000	Total	14,655,000	Total	14,295,000

The growth of the population of the Western States in 19 years has been 7,902,632; that of the Southern States, 4,025,984; that of the Eastern States, 3,808,706—the increase in population in the nine Western States being nearly 8,000,000, or equal to the aggregate increase of the Eastern and Southern States in the same period.

Now let us compare the actual number of hands employed in manufacturing in the Eastern, Southern, and Western States in the years 1850, 1860, 1870, and estimate, from the best data at hand, the probable number engaged in manufacturing at the present time. First, I present a very carefully prepared table, showing the number engaged in manufacturing in the Eastern States in 1850 and 1860, and the rate per cent of increase in the decade; also, the number engaged in manufacturing pursuits in 1870, the rate per cent of increase between 1860 and 1870, and the average rate of increase for the 20 years. If we accept for granted that the increase between 1870 and 1880 will be at the same average rate as for the two decades preceding it, a very fair estimate of the probable numerical increase for the decade ending 1880 can be made, and the probable number of persons at present engaged in manufacturing fairly approximated. All the tables have been prepared in the same manner and are verified, and I think as near correct as it is possible to make such estimates:

EASTERN STATES—NUMBER ENGAGED IN MANUFACTURING.

State.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1850.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1860.	Rate per cent of Increase.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1870.	Rate per cent of Increase.	Average Rate per cent of Increase for 20 Years.	Probable Numerical Increase for Decade ending 1880.	Probable Number engaged in Manufacturing in 1880.
Maine	28,020	34,619	24	49,180	42	33	16,229	65,409
New Hampshire	27,092	32,340	19	40,783	26	22	8,972	49,755
Vermont	8,445	10,497	24	18,686	78	51	9,529	28,215
Massachusetts	177,461	217,421	22	279,380	28	25	69,845	349,225
Rhode Island	20,967	32,490	55	49,417	52	53	26,191	75,608
Connecticut	50,731	64,469	27	89,523	39	33	29,542	119,066
New York	199,349	230,112	15	351,800	53	34	119,612	471,412
New Jersey	37,830	56,027	48	75,552	35	41	30,976	106,528
Pennsylvania	146,766	222,132	51	319,487	43	47	150,159	469,645
	696,661	900,107		1,273,808			461,055	1,734,863

The facts here brought to light corroborate the statement heretofore made that the Eastern States are steadily and healthily growing. Both in 1860 and 1870 the percentage of growth in Rhode Island was greater than that of any other Eastern State, rising to 55 and 52 per cent; the lowest was the State of New York. Next is presented the exhibit of the West:

WESTERN STATES—NUMBER ENGAGED IN MANUFACTURING.

State.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1850.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1860.	Rate per cent of Increase.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1870.	Rate per cent of Increase.	Average Rate per cent of Increase for 20 Years.	Probable Numerical Increase for Decade ending 1880.	Probable Number engaged in Manufacturing in 1880.
Michigan	9,344	23,190	148	63,694	175	161	102,547	166,241
Indiana	14,440	21,295	47	58,852	176	112	65,914	124,766
Illinois	11,559	22,964	99	82,979	261	180	149,362	232,341
Wisconsin	6,089	15,414	153	43,910	185	169	74,207	118,117
Minnesota	.....	2,123	...	11,290	432	...	48,773	60,062
Iowa	1,707	6,307	269	25,032	297	283	70,840	95,872
Missouri	15,808	19,681	24	65,354	232	128	83,653	149,007
Kansas	.....	1,735	...	6,844	294	...	20,121	26,965
Nebraska	.....	336	...	2,666	693	...	18,475	21,141
	58,947	113,045		360,621			633,892	994,512

The steady growth of the manufacturing interests of the Eastern States seems tame when compared with the rate of increase in the Western States, whither the population drifts in following the "lines of least resistance." The lowest rate of increase (Michigan) is 175 per cent, which runs up as high as nearly 700 per cent in the new State of Nebraska. In 1850 only 58,947 were engaged in the Western States in manufacturing occupations; at the present time, according to this estimate, not less than 994,512 are employed. Lastly, the Southern exhibit is given:

SOUTHERN STATES—NUMBER ENGAGED IN MANUFACTURING.

State.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1850.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1860.	Rate per cent of Increase.	Number engaged in Manufacturing 1870.	Rate per cent of Increase.	Average Rate per cent of Increase for 20 Years.	Probable Numerical Increase for Decade ending 1880.	Probable Number engaged in Manufacturing in 1880.
Virginia	29,110	36,174	24	26,974	—34	—5	—1,349	25,626
West Virginia	.....	.....	...	11,672	..	..	....	.....
North Carolina	14,601	14,217	—3	13,622	—4	—3	—408	13,214
South Carolina	7,066	6,994	—1	8,141	16	7	569	8,710
Georgia	8,368	11,575	38	17,871	54	46	8,220	26,091
Florida	991	2,454	148	2,749	12	80	2,199	4,948
Alabama	4,936	7,889	60	8,248	4	32	2,639	10,887
Mississippi	3,154	4,775	51	5,941	24	37	2,198	8,139
Louisiana	6,217	8,789	41	30,071	242	141	42,400	72,471
Texas	1,066	3,449	223	7,927	130	176	13,951	21,878
Arkansas	842	1,877	123	3,206	71	97	3,109	6,315
Kentucky	21,476	21,258	—1	30,636	44	21	6,433	37,069
Tennessee	12,039	12,528	4	19,412	55	29	5,629	25,041
	109,866	131,979		186,470			71,919	258,389

The negative sign (—) indicates a decrease of manufacturing population, as in the cases of Virginia and North Carolina.

In the South, as might be expected, the figures reveal a very different story. Still I am inclined to think that the good things already shown about the Southern States may make the real facts in 1880 more pleasant to dwell on than our estimate. With reviving business the South should have 300,000 persons engaged in manufacturing in 1880. The result of the investigation may be thus epitomized:

RECAPITULATION.

State.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1850.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1860.	Number engaged in Manufacturing, 1870.	Probable Numerical Increase for Decade ending 1880.	Probable Number engaged in Manufacturing in 1880.
Eastern States.....	696,661	900,107	1,273,808	461,055	1,734,863
Western States.....	58,947	113,045	360,621	633,892	994,512
Southern States.....	109,866	131,979	186,470	71,919	258,389

Unfortunately I have not at hand the data to make the same extensive investigation in relation to agricultural occupations. In 1870 the Southern States were far ahead of the Western and Eastern States in this particular, but when we take into consideration the extension of manufactories in the West as compared with the South, the difference is more than made up. Here are the actual figures:[1]

EASTERN STATES.		WESTERN STATES.		SOUTHERN STATES.	
State.	No. engaged in Farming.	State.	No. engaged in Farming.	State.	No. engaged in Farming.
Maine.....	82,011	Michigan	187,211	Virginia	244,550
New Hampshire..	46,573	Indiana.....	266,777	West Virginia....	73,960
Vermont	57,983	Illinois	376,441	North Carolina...	269,238
Massachusetts....	72,810	Wisconsin.....	159,687	South Carolina...	206,654
Rhode Island.....	11,780	Minnesota.....	75,157	Georgia.....	336,145
Connecticut.....	43,653	Iowa.....	260,263	Florida	42,492
New York.....	374,323	Missouri.....	263,918	Alabama.....	291,628
New Jersey.....	63,128	Kansas.....	73,228	Mississippi	259,199
Pennsylvania	260,051	Nebraska	23,115	Louisiana.....	141,467
				Texas	166,753
				Arkansas.....	109,310
				Kentucky.....	261,080
				Tennessee	267,020
Total	1,012,312	Total	1,685,797	Total	2,669,496

It has been shown that the main crops of the South are cotton and tobacco. There was a time when the Southern States cared to produce nothing else, and with the foreign gold those crops brought they could buy the necessaries of life. That

[1] This table is compiled from the U. S. Census of 1870.

day has passed, and the farmers and planters of the Southern States see the advantage of not depending on a single crop. The following table has been prepared from the best official sources:[1]

	Corn.	Wheat.	Oats.	Hay.	Potatoes.
Eastern States.	$47,210,900	$45,213,875	$37,021,000	$144,825,000	$37,036,500
Western States	225,128,500	208,992,854	48,536,900	80,211,570	24,603,960
Southern States	157,390,500	55,627,800	19,238,900	13,844,380	5,199,390

The great difference in the value of the products near to and far from the seaboard makes the above comparison rather unfavorable for the West. Below I have prepared a table showing the average yield of corn, wheat, and oats, and also the value per acre in the Eastern, Western, and Southern States:[2]

States.	Average Yield per Acre. Bushels.			Average Value per Acre.		
	Corn.	Wheat.	Oats.	Corn.	Wheat.	Oats.
Eastern States	35	17	34.8	$24.65	$24.27	$15.05
Western States.....	31.4	15.4	35.3	9.05	15.09	7.92
Southern States.....	18.4	9.7	19.1	9.19	11.60	9.38

The highest average yield of wheat is in the Eastern States, where wheat averages 17 bushels to the acre; in the Western States, 15.4; and in the Southern States, only 9.7 bushels. The average value in the Western States of the wheat crop is $9 per acre less than in the Eastern States; corn, $15 an acre less; and oats, $7 less. Lastly, in this connection is given a table showing the value of the oxen, cattle, sheep, and hogs annually produced in the three great geographical divisions of the United States:

[1] Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for 1878.
[2] This statement is based on the Reports of 1877.

	Oxen and other Cattle.	Sheep.	Hogs.
Eastern States	$61,006,452	$14,587,249	$20,552,899
Western States	121,503,102	17,912,600	68,262,653
Southern States	90,116,341	17,706,577	52,530,936

The Hon. David A. Wells, in his valuable essay on the "Elements of National Wealth," says:

"Be the value of the annual product what it may, by far the largest proportion of such product must necessarily be consumed as rapidly as produced, in order that the individual constituents of the nation—its men, women, and children—may simply live and make good the loss and waste of capital previously accumulated, leaving but a small fraction of the annual product in the form of surplus, or accumulation, which can be used for effecting future increased production and development."

The progress of a nation does not depend on what it has accumulated, but on the continuity of those processes and resources by which the wealth was won in the first place. In this, as our tables abundantly prove, the nine Western States stand pre-eminently ahead. The greatest wealth, the highest prosperity, is achieved where the two great occupations are the most equally divided. We have seen the dangers of an excessive development of manufacturing interests in England, and a neglect of agriculture; we have seen the evil effects of the other extreme in the Southern States. Each of the great geographical sections of our country may profit by the few facts herewith presented. The Eastern States have already awakened to the necessity of more scientific farming. The rapid increase in number of those engaged in manufacturing occupations in the nine Western States shows that every year the two great industries are becoming more evenly distributed in the West. In its eagerness to compete with the Eastern States the West should not forget that the foundation of its strength lies in its food-producing powers. Cheap food as well as cheap products of the mill and shop should be the aim. These comparative statements aid greatly in studying the nation as a whole. It is only by such

a study that we may hope to find out its strength and weakness, its success and failure. It is from such a view of our wants that all of us gain common-sense, common aims, and a deeper faith in the future of the Republic.

ROBERT P. PORTER.

THE A PRIORI NOVUM ORGANUM OF CHRISTIANITY.

MACHIAVELLI is credited with saying that "there are three classes of men: one who see things in their own light, another who see them when they are shown, and a third who cannot see them even then."[1] We have been thankful, as respects the mysteries of supernatural redemption, for a place in the second class, enabling us to see them when shown us by the authority of God in his Word. We confess that the effort to obey the earnest, not to say imperious, summons of those who would fain enter the first class, by assuming to see things more perfectly in their own *a priori* light, begets a feeling of perilous and growing nearness to the third.

We have no controversy with the advocates of *a priori* knowledge as such, even in the Kantian sense. We are no mere empiricists. We only object to the extravagant lengths to which some carry it, either in itself, or its uses and applications. We hold it to be unquestionable that pure mathematics and logic, *i.e.*, purely formal sciences, are capable of being established *a priori* in the strictest sense, or without proof from experience. Indeed, all universal and necessary propositions must rest upon such evidence, intuitive or deductive. They cannot be proved by experience or by any induction from particular facts, which are themselves contingent. Good and sufficient proof of many laws of nature may be obtained inductively from experience, or *a posteriori*. But *ex vi termini* necessary truths, which cannot but be, never can be proved from contingent facts which in their own nature might or might not be. No ex-

[1] PRINCETON REVIEW, April, 1849, p. 262.

perience of ours can grasp all possible instances of two straight lines, or of fraud and blasphemy, or all space and time. Yet we know with absolute certainty that no two straight lines can enclose a space; that fraud and blasphemy are immoral; that space and time are and must be illimitable. This *a priori* knowledge, however, beyond such formal sciences, is limited to a few first principles and elementary axioms. When we come to sciences which involve facts and truths of actual being, it cannot safely proceed a step without the support of *a posteriori* investigation and proof. Trigonometry will establish the height of a steeple, the length of a base-line and the magnitude of the angles formed by this with two other lines being first given. But how can these be ascertained unless by *a posteriori* investigation and measurement?

The history of human thought abounds in abortive, though often brilliant, efforts to construct ontologies, cosmologies, theologies, psychologies, systems of physics, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, by exclusive *a priori* methods. These can only result in signal failure in all the departments of applied science, and sciences of actual being. If any human mind could thus attempt to overfly human nature without a disastrous downfall, surely the mighty philosophic genius of Emanuel Kant, the foremost modern inaugurator of *a priorism* in philosophy, was equal to the task. But even he was a conspicuous example of his own illustration of philosophic speculation soaring to heights above its reach, when he likened it to the case of the bird flying upward into an atmosphere too rare to support its pinions. Baffled in the attempt, it is compelled to sink to its appropriate level. His speculative reason, after soaring to altitudes where it could neither "fly nor go," dropped down into a thicket of contradictions and antinomies, thus wrecking itself in the wreck of all objective knowledge. With "a noble inconsistency" he asserted the validity of the affirmations of the moral reason or conscience, although claiming for it an absolute infallibility inconsistent with the disorder of our moral nature, and the paramount infallibility of revelation. Fichte spun out the thread thus started from Kant's distaff into a subjective, egoistic pantheism, ending one of his lectures, according to Madame de Staël, with this piece of supersublimated transcendentalism: "In the next

lecture we will proceed to create God"! From this subjective egoism, Schelling ascended to the absolute ego grasped by an intellectual intuition so transcendant as to transcend consciousness; whence Hegel, lowering it into the domain of conscious thinking, brought this transcendant philosophizing *à priori* to its grand climacteric in the formulas, "Thought and Being are Identical;" "Pure Being = Nothing;" or in the paraphrase of the famous "Rejected Addresses,"

> "And Naught
> Is Everything, and Everything is Naught."

Another striking instance of the *à priori* method misapplied and overdone, in our judgment, is its use by the Rev. W. J. Irons, D.D., Prebendary of St. Paul's, London, in his article in the PRINCETON REVIEW for July, 1879. The topic treated is of the first importance: "Reason, Conscience, and Authority in Reference to Rationalism and Ultramontanism." His grand solvent of all questions in reference to every branch of this subject is the *à priori.* Indeed he appears to invest it with the prerogatives of a *Novum Organum* of matchless power and oracular authority for determining all Christian controversies. So far as we can gather from this and other writings of Dr. Irons, the outcome of it all, as will soon appear, is a strange complex of Kantian *à priori* Rationalism, Hierarchical Sacramentarianism, Anglo-Catholicism, pre-Reformation Christianity resting on tradition, historic creeds, and the Scriptures—all being kept in due subordination to the *à priori.*

On page 87 of the article referred to he complains that "men of education, but uneducated in philosophical thought, and with no knowledge of revelation as the enlargement of our perception of the *à priori*, not unwillingly accept the most illiterate revivalism as Christianity." On page 92 he speaks of "that enlarged knowledge of the *à priori* which the gospel gives." On page 73 he charges Catholics and Rationalists with "alike abandoning the *à priori*" and holding that if Christianity is to be "admitted at all, it must be so, right or wrong (as we have said), on the authority of the Pope or the authority of the Bible." Queer rationalists these, by the way! And who are justly or

even plausibly chargeable with holding that any system is to be espoused on any pretext, be it right or wrong? Again, page 78, he charges that "the previous question as to the possibility, *à priori*, of serving or pleasing the Supreme and All-perfect against our reason has been as little considered among the assertors of private judgment as among its deniers." As if, indeed, it could be against our reason to serve and please such a Being!

Again, page 81: "Our phenomena, experiences, or conditions may often be to us of the nature of authorities, but still such authorities as imply the *à priori*." On page 83 he complains of the "absence in Cornewall Lewis of the poetry of *à priori* thought, to a degree quite surprising." We think, in the potency ascribed to it by the Prebendary, it must be rather a faculty for poetical creations than for exact truth. In this we are confirmed both by the stupendous results achieved through it by Dr. Irons in this article, and the functions ascribed to it by him in antecedent publications of which this is a small but somewhat explosive echo. While we hold fast by the *à priori* in its legitimate sphere, we protest against the abuse of it when "shot madly from its sphere" in gross misapplication. The justness of the applications made of it may be fairly tested by their results *à posteriori*. We shall not argue the propriety of judging of the tree by its fruits, even if this should incur a fulmination of Dr. Irons against us for bowing to the authority of the Scriptures.

We are now prepared to notice a number of the astounding decrees of this new imperial authority, which comes with somewhat of the pomp and circumstance of a *Novum Organum* in ethics and religion. Of these the first is that submission to the authority of the Pope, and to that of the Bible, are the same in principle.

He says, pages 69–70:

"With a majority of Christendom, at this time, it is the Bishop of Rome, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, who is the "authority" to which reason and conscience is said ultimately to defer. With others it is the authority of Scripture, which, they think, is absolutely to be bowed to, even when it seems opposed to what men feel to be right in principle and true in fact. This idea of "authority" is essentially the same with both sides, and is based on

the supposition that divine truth must come to us in a form of external infallible certainty, even in detail."

Again, page 78:

"The appeals often made to the Divine Scriptures as the practical authority to which reason must surrender, after a certain amount of examination and criticism, are *eo modo* as difficult to reconcile to the rights of conscience as any put forth by Rome."

Does Dr. Irons believe that the "Divine Scriptures" are really divine, that they are the Word of God? If so, are they or are they not true with an "infallible certainty" guaranteed by the omniscient holiness of their author, whether "external" or not? And if so, are acceptance of their teachings and obedience to their precepts to be stigmatized as essentially the same with obedience to a fallible mortal? Does God speak in his Word, and are faith in and submission to his utterances on the same footing as unquestioning submission to the Roman Pontiff? Let him stake his soul on this principle who will. For ourselves, we have and desire no alternative but to obey "the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. 3:15.) That final ordeal which "shall try every man's work, of what sort it is," will show who has builded on the rock, and who on the sand.

One clause of the foregoing quotation puts in its strongest form what Dr. Irons, by innumerable forms of assertion and implication, is constantly imputing to evangelical Protestants, who receive the Scriptures not as the word of men, but as it is in truth the Word of God, which worketh effectually in them that believe (1 Thess. 2:13.) It is that they recognize the obligation to bow to the Scriptures when they seem "opposed to what men feel to be right in principle and true in fact." This, like so many of the author's representations of this type, is true or false according to the interpretation it is made to bear, and is so put by him as to convey a false charge or innuendo. No person, on the authority of Scripture, accepts that as true which he feels, *i.e.* knows, to be wrong "in principle" or false "in fact." To do so would be to accept contradictions and upturn the very foundations of all truth in sight and intelligence. No person would believe that two and two make five, or that a square is a circle, or

that the acceptance of bribes to pervert justice is right upon any supposed authority, unless some wild *ultra-fidian* whose motto is *credo quia impossibile*. No sane or intelligent believer would hold that such a meaning could arise from a right interpretation of the Scriptures.

Here is a legitimate case for an *a priori judicium contradictionis*. But this is not what Dr. Irons chiefly aims at. He refers to statements of fact, doctrine, or precept, for practical guidance, in the Scriptures, and believed and acted on by evangelical Christians upon the authority of the Bible, which involve what human reason, especially when under a hostile bias, cannot readily solve, or see in their harmony with other indisputable moral truths. To some minds these difficulties seem greater, to others less. For most Christians they have been gradually cleared up with the advance of spiritual and intellectual life till attenuated to a vanishing point, or quietly remanded to that region of mystery in which naturalists and supernaturalists must (Dr. Irons to the contrary notwithstanding, page 88) ultimately leave all the problems of nature and grace. *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*. We shall find, as we proceed, what special system of doctrines accepted by the great mass of earnest Protestant believers, on the authority of the Bible, Dr. Irons means to brand as antagonistic to his *a priori* standards, and therefore, even if taught in the Scriptures, in his view no more worthy of acceptance than the superstitions of Rome. We shall see, especially, that vicarious atonement, justification by faith, and the system of doctrine and life interlocked with them are particularly referred to.

Meanwhile, let us see how Dr. Irons' *à priori organum* or criteria of righteousness display their efficacy in misrepresentation of his adversaries, and of the issues between him and them. He says of these standards of authority that their advocates "have not succeeded in persuading men that any such standards take the place of reason or conscience among responsible beings" (p. 70). This implies that those who enthrone the authority of the Bible have attempted so to persuade men. Abnormal cases aside, no such attempt has been made, and the imputation of it to evangelical Protestants as a body is a sheer libel. When they betake, or urge others to betake, themselves to the Word of God

for the enlightenment and guidance of their reason and conscience, is this displacing or superseding, or is it elevating and invigorating these faculties? Nay, is it not by the very light of reason and conscience that the Christian is led to the oracles of God for that further and infallible guidance which it thus becomes manifest they alone can give? It is argued to wearisome repetition, as if those accepting the authority of the Bible questioned it, that "whatever comes before us as an obligation should commend itself to our intelligence" (p. 67). Who questions it? But does it follow because a given truth is clearly revealed by God, and for this reason the acceptance of it "commends itself to our intelligence," that we are always able so to grasp it as to bring all its sides at once within our comprehension, or that we are not to believe it till we can fully master it?—that, *e.g.*, the Incarnation is not to be believed till we can understand how a Divine Person could become flesh, and be at once very God and very man? He charges that such submission to external authority, like the Bible, would mean "the suppression of thinking, the persecution of investigation, and the silence of some of the best emotions of the heart of man." "A large proportion of nominal Christians would gladly keep things quiet, and secure peace at the price of truth." This is a grave charge, and if brought, under the somewhat indeterminate term "nominal Christians," against those who incur his objurgations for submitting to the authority of the Scriptures, is simple calumny. Where in all history have free and fruitful thinking and investigation flourished, if not in the atmosphere of biblical religion—a religion born of submission to the authority of the Word of God?

"The thorough desire to be right, the steady aim to be right, must accompany every step of our real progress" (pp. 72, 73). Surely. But what is the aim of the incessant iteration of truisms like this, unless on the assumption and implication that those who accept Christianity on "the authority of the Bible" (see p. 73) proceed in disregard of this principle? "The Catechism of Trent and the Westminster Confession admit the same principle of a formal authority commanding a dead acquiescence in certain points as 'revealed,' whether we can think them true or not" (p. 78). We shall not speak for the Catechism of Trent. With regard to the Westminster Confession, we content ourselves

with an indignant denial. Indeed, we think that candid judges will consider Dr. Irons about the last man to say this, if they will compare some Westminster definitions with his *a priori* ones on the same subjects. The Westminster Shorter Catechism says: "Prayer is an offering up of our desires unto God, for things agreeable to his will, in the name of Christ, with confession of our sins, and thankful acknowledgment of his mercies." Says Dr. Irons: "The Christian philosophy first regards prayer as the effort of the conscious being to hold its true relation with the Absolute. If thought is the effort of the 'Ego' to compare himself with reason, prayer is the effort to compare with the Eternal Good the individual attainment of it. The heart and mind of a man in true prayer are thrown on the *a priori* by a mighty inward *vis*, transcending the individual power, which ever projects itself on reason."[1] It may be due to our weakness, but we confess that, while we give a living acceptance to the Westminster formula on this subject, the best we could give to Dr. Irons' is a "dead acquiescence," if even that were possible. Nor can even the cultivated, to say nothing of the uneducated, masses, whose religious views are so degraded in Dr. Irons' estimation, get as much help from his *a priori* description of faith and religion as from these same maligned formularies. He describes "divine faith as a new sense of *a priori*,"[2] and pronounces religion "a solemn sense of the *a priori*."[3] We will not weaken such deliverances by any comment.

Nor will we consume further space with the quotation of passages asserting or implying that they who are concerned to conform their thinking and beliefs to the teaching of God in his Word, are therefore guilty of indifference to the rightness of their thinking and beliefs. Such charges and insinuations obtrude themselves all through not only this article, but other publications of the author having the remotest relations to the subject that have fallen under our notice. But we pass from these to show that Dr. Irons himself is compelled, after all, to concede the necessity of this deference to external supernatural authority, which he so fiercely denounces but cannot escape—nay, which

[1] "The Church of All Ages," by W. J. Irons, D.D. (London, J. Thayer), pp. 351, 352.

[2] Id., p. 161.

[3] Id., Preface, p. xiii.

form such a network in our moral condition and environment that the more he who holds to any God-given religion tries to escape them, the tighter he often draws them about him. He admits in his article that the "prohibitions of conscience" are sometimes "spurious" (p. 87). "No man, after all, is eager to claim intellectual freedom so far as to dispense with *all* authority" (p. 79). He declares that even on such vital questions as marriage, its lawful degrees of consanguinity, polygamy, parental and marital authority—"all these are questions on which natural morality can give but the vaguest possible decision." And though "all these, and countless other and more complicated questions, are involved in the very beginnings of society, and cannot be settled without the religious aspirations and sentiments being regarded and satisfied; and these all belong to the *a priori*;" yet "natural conscience without religion . . . in its least artificial state decides too indistinctly on such questions for its voice to be of use."[1] Nay, he adopts as unquestionable the following deliverance of Cardinal Newman (P. R. Art., p. 85):

> "The sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its flights, that in the struggle for existence, amid various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous. . . . Natural religion, certain as are its grounds and its doctrines as addressed to thoughtful, serious minds, needs, in order that it may speak to mankind with effect and subdue the world, to be sustained and completed by revelation."

He adds the comment, as if some parties questioned or ignored it [who are they?]—"But then it obliges us to own that we are held responsible for right doing by some direct though dim discernment that we possess, and not in consequence of elaborate definitions." But not only does this "dim discernment" of ethical truth require to be "sustained and completed by revelation." Natural religion, or the light of nature, however completed and clarified, could never give us the first glimpse of the Trinity, Incarnation, Divine Redemption in all its parts,

[1] "Church of All Ages," pp. 363, 364.

however it may prove our perishing need of them. The knowledge of all this must come to us by supernatural revelation from God, and be received upon his authority, if at all. It can only be known *a posteriori* from the testimony of God, and all pretence of knowing it *a priori*, by mere force of native *a priori* conceptions, is but *a priorism* run mad. What pretext then remains, after such concessions, for incessant charges against those who obey the revelations and mandates of the All-wise and All-holy God in his Word, of being disloyal to truth and righteousness, to conscience, and to God?

Whatever the motive for all this, it serves to prepare the way for discharging at that evangelical Christianity, which makes implicit conformity to the Word of God the law of its inner and outer life, the libellous caricatures of Clifford and Huxley, prominent among the agnostic materialists of our day. We come then to these portraitures of Protestant evangelical Christianity by which this hierophant of *a priori* righteousness illustrates its alleged superiority. Let us first make sure what it is at which this vituperation is aimed. He frequently applies the term Calvinism to it, a term with which he is very apt to label whatever lies between the ritualism and sacramentarianism of Rome and Anglo-Catholicism on the one hand, and rationalistic scepticism on the other: especially the religion of the great multitude who make the Bible their supreme rule of life, and adopt the maxim that "the Bible alone is the religion of Protestants." These include the great mass of earnest Christians in the middle and humble, with a large proportion of the higher and cultured classes. Thus we find him speaking of "the natural Calvinism of the uneducated."[1] "The popular Calvinism, and the Roman Catholic controversialists of the day, alike slur over the initial truth" alluded to. "To be one of 'the elect,' or to be 'in the true church,' seems, however, the first hope of modern Christians, Protestant or Catholic."[2] "The former seems the modern Calvinian and the modern Roman method. The latter (*i.e.*, as the whole volume shows him to mean, what he regards as the High-Anglican way) is natural, and leads to the supernatural in a right way. It is ethical, primitive,

[1] "Church of All Ages," p. 378.

[2] Id., pp. 177, 178.

and catholic."[1] Such is the author's *usus loquendi*. By Calvinism he means the form which Christianity naturally takes with the "uneducated," in which it actually prevails with the great mass of Protestants. "Calvinism" is the author's contrast with Romanism and High-Anglicanism. This style of speaking is carried out in the article under review, in which by such phrases as "the popular Calvinism," "the popular Calvinism of the uneducated," used synonymously with such phrases as "the uneducated substitute for Christianity which is so fatally spread among the populace," and "the popular substitute for our religion," represented also as that of "evangelicals." The vast sweep of his denunciations is still further decisively evinced when he speaks of "Chalmers' semi-Calvinian representation of Conscience sitting as a queen among our faculties" ("Church of All Ages," p. 208). This is, for substance, Bishop Butler's doctrine. If this is to be condemned as Calvinistic, very little of much importance in ethics and religion will be left outside of Calvinism, which, whatever its merits or demerits, need not fear such attacks. (For the writer's further views of the "Supremacy of Conscience and of Revelation," he must refer those interested to his article on that subject in this REVIEW for May, 1879, p. 671.) Such denunciations strike at the great body of evangelical Christians in the Church of England who embrace its Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, to which the Anglo-Catholic divines, like our author, seldom do honor: the Presbyterians, the Independents and Congregationalists, the Baptists and the Methodists, who are among the evangelicals, and certainly receive the teaching of the Bible upon the authority of God. It will be seen, too, that the caricatures endorsed by Dr. Irons are, for substance, equally applicable to the faith of all these bodies. That the views of evangelical Christians, within and without the Church of England, are identified in the author's estimation and reprobation appears still further from his language in the "Church of All Ages" (p. 47). "A form of nonconformity sprung up within the Church herself, and became known as 'evangelical,' . . . but the church as a body was unable to take up this movement, which chiefly contributed at the time to quicken the sects."

[1] "Church of All Ages," p. 183.

Indeed, Prof. Clifford is quoted as describing "the popular and received theology of Christian communities, as he understands it," in the following abominable caricature, about as near the truth as some disjointed and broken bones of a skeleton, tumbled together in a heap, would be like the complete body in full flesh and blood sustained by and adorning the same skeleton. Quite possibly fragments could be picked out of crude or passionate utterances of controvertists, and polemics, and even higher sources, including the Bible itself, and so jumbled together as to simulate the ghastly portraiture which we regret to be obliged to spread out again on the pages of this REVIEW:

"The condition of men departed this life depends ultimately on the will of a being who, a long while ago, cursed all mankind because one woman disobeyed him. The curse was no mere symbol of displeasure, but a fixed resolve to keep his victims alive forever, writhing in horrible torments in a place which his divine foreknowledge had prepared beforehand. In consideration, however, of the death of his son, effected by unknowing agents, he consented to feed with the sweets of his favor such poor wretches as should betray their brethren and speak sufficiently soft words to the destroyer of their kindred. For the rest, the old curse survives in its power, condemning them for the manifestation of his glory. To the dead, then, if this be the future life, there is left only the choice between shame and suffering. How well and nobly soever a man shall have worked for his fellows, he must end by being the eternal sycophant of a celestial despot, or the eternal victim of a celestial executioner."

Says Dr. Irons: "This, though expressed with a savage venom for which there is no excuse, is the popular Calvinism." He thus endorses its truth, and, in our view, therein shows a "savage venom" far less excusable in the self-proclaimed *a priori* oracle than in the earth-bound materialist. It is the less excusable that it is deliberate and from no sudden impulse. We find the same thing uttered in substance years ago, when he spoke of "some theories of justification unknown to the Christian creeds, and yet unhappily identified with Christianity itself by such writers as Professor Clifford and the author of 'Christianity a Civilized Heathenism.'"[1] This is an incidental sign that the caricature is applied to all those bodies of Christians which have for their basis the doctrine of justification by faith,

[1] "Church of All Ages," p. 389.

the key-note of the Protestant Reformation. Those who wish to see how far elaborate special pleading can be carried to argue "forensic justification" out of the writings of St. Paul, may consult Dr. Irons' "Bampton Lectures," note F, p. 515. On page 272 of the same volume they will find the whole doctrine "of the substitution of the personal goodness of the Saviour for that of the sinner;" of "his atoning death as a mere equivalent of vicarious suffering appropriated by us; that multiform mechanism of sudden pardon *ab extra* presented in so many ways among various Christians" denounced as "crudities so incompatible with the Gospel that it is amazing that any intelligent conscience has ever accepted them." This, however inaccurately expressed, is aimed at the common faith of evangelical Protestants, by whatever name called.

But says Dr. Irons, "The core of this fanaticism lies, however, in its mechanical predestination, which is equivalent to universal materialism, and is easily admitted by the imperfectly ethical multitude, educated or not" (p. 88). The upholders of mechanical predestination and universal materialism, whoever they may be, may defend them as they see fit. We know of none among evangelical Christians, whatever exceptional and sporadic cases may be hunted up. Certainly the Westminster Confession maintains predestination, "so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established" (chap. iii. 1). And we commend to the attention of Dr. Irons, Bishop Ellicott, and Dr. Washburn, who have of late greeted the readers of this REVIEW with their views of Calvinism and predestination, the Seventeenth Article of their own church, which declares "that the godly consideration of predestination, and our election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons." Dr. Irons, however, much as he detests predestination, does not seem able to get rid of it, as he confronts St. Paul's utterances about it. He says: "It is He who, as St. Paul's teaching is, 'plans' his world, or, as the word is sometimes said, predestinates. . . . Every intelligent being 'plans' beforehand, that is, 'predestinates.' . . . All predestination, too, implies a consideration of its object; election is moral, but predestination is the

inward act, the special thinking of the mind alone. If we speak of God's predestinating, we can only mean that God, the Supreme Mind, always proceeds according to that which he thinks best, in his government of his universe." [1] On this subject Dr. Irons and the creed of his church sufficiently answer Dr. Irons, not less than the following lines quoted by him:

> "To him no high, no low, no great, no small;
> He fills, he bounds, sustains, and *orders* all." [2]

Perhaps the author finds his Calvinian spectre in the slur contained in Professor Clifford's savage reference to the fall of the race in the Fall of its progenitors. There is no necessity of defending or extenuating the biblical and Christian doctrine on this subject, as held substantially by Calvinist, Arminian, Romanist, or Anglo-Catholic. If it could be wrenched out of the Bible or eliminated from Christianity, this would not destroy the facts still remaining in Nature and Providence, which, so far from being aggravated, are rather relieved by the scriptural account of their origin. Inveigh, if you please, against God for the permission of sin and the unsolved origin and wide domination of evil. The moan of the suffering babe, and the awful prevalence of sin, death, and woe in this world, under the dominion of a righteous and merciful God, still present an enigma which it will require a greater than Professor Clifford or Dr. Irons to solve. But why should Dr. Irons endorse scoffing caricatures on this dread theme? Surely, if they are just against Calvinists and evangelicals, they are no less so against himself. For he declares, "*If* there be a God, *since* there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God." [3] Again, he seems to adopt something like the realistic theory both of the Fall and Redemption. "It is an essential part of all the problems connected both with our

[1] "Christianity as Taught by St. Paul," by William J. Irons, D.D., p. 150.
[2] "Church of All Ages," p. 157. (Italics are ours.)
[3] Id., p. 186.

fall and our rising, that it is with associated man that we have to deal. Self-contained as we are [in so awful a solitude for each of us], yet are we, in our destiny throughout, parts of the great human whole. Our 'nature,' our 'humanity' are no nominal conceptions. None can win our assent to the theory that Human Nature is merely a 'collective term.' . . . All inherit physically a certainty of death, which affects the whole career of life. And there is a moral and social inheritance also. . . . The race of moral beings has a unity of its own, notwithstanding the individual unity of each of its members; and some injury has surely befallen the race, whatever be the share of personal responsibility in every one. . . . So that what has in later time come to be called 'original sin' is but a fact, most reasonably stated in the words, 'By one man sin entered' [for a beginning it must have had], 'and so it passed on to all men,' each adding his own sinfulness." [1] "There was to be as real a union for us with the second Adam as we had by nature with the first Adam." [2]

We leave this caricature of that Protestant Christianity which alone prevails or has life and power with the great body of Protestant religious people, to notice his parade of Prof. Huxley's blind fulmination (it lacks even the semblance of similitude requisite to constitute it a caricature), which wants any sign of being hurled more at Calvinism than Arminianism, or at anything less than all evangelical theology and religion. Says this scoffer in the abused name of science: "Who shall exaggerate the deadly influence on personal morality of those theologies which have represented the Deity as vainglorious, irritable, and revengeful, as a sort of pedantic drill-sergeant of mankind, to whom no valor, no long-tried loyalty, could atone for the displacement of a button of the uniform, or the misunderstanding of a paragraph of the regulations and instructions" (p. 88).

These denunciations by a materialist, as vague as bitter, against, for all that appears to the contrary, Christianity in general, the Prebendary quotes as "another example of the revolt of conscience against the prevalent Calvinism of the uneduca-

[1] "Christianity as Taught by St. Paul," by Wm. J. Irons, pp. 120–1–2.
[2] "Church of All Ages," p. 241.

ted." But he soon shows himself shy and wary, lest the charge he has thus exploded against the religion of so many Christian people should rebound upon himself. He suspects "regulations and instructions" may be meant for the Scriptures, and "uniform" for the Creed. When the Creed is impugned in the least iota, Dr. Irons reminds Professor Huxley that "things that look sometimes very small—*e.g.*, Davy's safety-lamp in a mine—may be important," so important that "no 'valor or loyalty' could atone for" the least breach of regulations about it. He shows doubts of having "caught the whole meaning of the passage." He not obscurely intimates that it is defiled with "scoffing," and that its author resorts to "hinting and mocking." Yet he agrees with Professors Huxley and Clifford that "such 'theologies' as they condemn in these places are abominable." Still he seems not to be quite sure that some part of his own may not be included. In fact, Prof. Clifford was specially intolerant of sacerdotalism.

And now what is the grand finale in which this parade and endorsement of these venomous thrusts at all living Protestant Christianity, beyond one narrow section of his own Church which homologates with him, terminates? What is its outcome? Answer, see page 90. "The position with which we began (section 4) is now made plain, that the popular substitute for our religion is what cultivated conscience rejects." We shrink from using the terms which alone can express our sense of the enormity of this conclusion from premises at once so slender and so false. The premises are the ravings of two distinguished materialists, largely classed as agnostics and nihilists, against the principles of the immense majority of earnest and zealous Protestant Christians—caricatures so gross that even Dr. Irons cannot refrain, while endorsing them, from rebuking the "savage venom," the "scoffing" and "mocking" which defile them.[1] And these are the typical dicta of "cultivated conscience:" proofs that "cultivated conscience" rejects the "religion" of the great body of Christian people, which he branded as not being the Christian religion, by declaring it a "substitute"

[1] Prof. Huxley's attitude is well understood. In regard to Prof. Clifford, W. H. Mallock says (*Contemporary Review*, vol. xxix. p. 172): "No one can

therefor. We recommend to Dr. Irons the application of his own well-expressed principle to his own procedure. "Neither have they [objections] any validity if they are directed against a caricature of our religion, and not our religion itself" (p. 87). We greatly prefer the rectitude fostered by the religion denounced as a "substitute" for Christianity, as tested by its fruits, to which we shall presently ask attention. Still further, notwithstanding these denunciations of it as "uneducated," he declares it to be "easily admitted by the imperfectly ethical multitude, educated or not" (p. 88). After all, then, it seems to be accepted easily by the educated as well uneducated multitude; only, to accept it is evidence of being "imperfectly ethical," not in respect to purity of life or fruitfulness of good works, but some kind of *a priori* standard, which is a poor substitute for them. This *a priori* religionism dominating over the authority of the Bible seems, according to this reasoning, to be the differentia of a "cultivated conscience." It must be narrowed down to this, in order to afford even a pretext for the allegation that the religion he stigmatizes is repulsive to the cultivated conscience and intelligence of our time. There is as large intelligence and as generous culture among its adherents as among its rejecters. *A priori* religionists have no monopoly here.

But suppose it were otherwise. While Christianity furnishes the stimulus and the atmosphere in which intellect, culture, science, and knowledge thrive, so that Christendom is the theatre of their greatest advancement and of the highest civilization of modern times, it is no less true that its chief triumphs have not been in the first instance among the philosophers and *savans*, *a priori* or *a posteriori*, but among the humble and average classes

be more vehement, more positive, more explicit than Prof. Clifford in his denial of any belief in God or in immortality. These beliefs, according to him, are absurd, are groundless, are demonstrably false. He attacks them in every conceivable way, with reason and with rhetoric. And yet, when he touches on the moral side of life, he adopts all the warmth and all the indignation of a religious zealot fighting for the glory of God. In the name of a high morality he calls all faith in the supernatural 'blasphemy' and 'unspeakable profanity.' Like the apostles of Christ, he invokes 'the sleepless vengeance of fire' upon those who do not share his unbelief, but who still 'soil their hearts,' as he puts it, with arguing for their gods, their hells, their heavens—'sickly dreams,' so he calls these, 'of hysterical women and of half-starved men.'"

of mankind, of whose elevation it has been the great lever. While welcoming all converts, and rejoicing in the submission of the wise and noble to its standards, it depends on no man's vote, but on the authority of God its Author. If any people, however cultivated, reject or scoff at it, so much the worse for them. They are so far wrongly cultivated, or abusers of their culture. Let them correct their vagaries and come into accord with eternal truth. God's Word standeth sure, and no earthly or unearthly principalities or powers shall prevail against it. With no contempt of learning on his part, it was the common people who heard Christ gladly. With the exception of the "philosophic apostle," who did so much to develop in the Bible the substance and form of Christian doctrine, unlearned men were chosen to the apostolate by him to superintend the planting and founding of the primitive church. The New Testament abounds in manifold representations of the scorn which the Gospel encountered at the hands of the lofty and philosophic, and of its triumphs among the people. It was to the "Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness, but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God; because the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men." Then, as now, the greatest intellectual pretension and pride often went athwart the track of heavenly wisdom. "Professing to be wise, φάσκοντες εἶναὶ σοφοὶ, they became fools." To this grade does all "cultivated conscience" which chafes against the Gospel come.

We now pass to notice the views on these subjects contained in an article in this REVIEW from one tinctured with decided antipathy to Calvinism and evangelicalism, but of a vastly higher tone than that thus far under consideration. We refer to the paper of Dr. Ellicott, Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol,[1] on "The Anglo-Catholic Movement, Past and Future." He says the "shadows of Calvinism were resting on well-nigh one half of the Church of England," *i.e.*, the half made up of the evangelical party, prior to the publication of the Oxford Tracts and the consequent Anglo-Catholic movement growing out of

[1] PRINCETON REVIEW, September, 1878, beginning p. 612.

it. The religious books put in the hands of youth were, says his Lordship, "tinged with a sub-Calvinistic teaching which chilled and antagonized. There was no sunshine. . . . Nay, no genial teaching of that ever-fresh and ever-quickening gospel story. . . . Religion was sombre and unattractive." Yet, on the same page, the venerable prelate assures us that "of the two great schools of thought, only the evangelical had any degree of vitality," and speaks of its "love for souls," its "enthusiasm and glowing devotion which had breathed again the breath of life into the Church of England in the closing decades of the preceding century." True, he says that all this was dying out in what he calls "those dull and dreary days" (p. 616). But the best evidence we can find satisfies us that this, if not wholly a mistake, is greatly overcolored through the learned bishop's prepossessions.[1] Still he is candid enough to say, while invoking the union of the evangelical party with the Anglo-Catholic in the English Church, to arrest the Romanizing movement so portentous in his eyes, "We do not forget the other great party to which the Church of the Reformation already owes so deep a debt of lasting gratitude. If the great evangelical party had not quickened the Church, there could have been no Oxford movement five-and-forty years ago. Nay, those who most influenced the movement were themselves originally of evangelical prin-

[1] Austerity is no way essential to Calvanism or Arminianism. It is simply characteristic of earnest Christianity, when confronted with abounding iniquity, frivolity, and vice, against which it raises an emphatic testimony by proportionately rigid self-denial. So a kind of Puritanism has been apt to attend every great religious reformation from prevalent worldliness, self-indulgence, and licentiousness. Against precisely this state of things the evangelicals raised the standard, and sounded aloud the trumpet-call to repentance. While severely simple and pure in life, they had more than earthly joys. But no Christians, as a class, are more glad and cheerful than Calvinists. Contrariwise, the austerity of the Arminian Wesley was in some respects extreme. We remember that in our youthful days it was an Arminian congregation that adopted the Quaker costume in contrast to the more fashionable attire of Calvinistic congregations on the same town-square. Says Canon Wilberforce: "Cowardice in the service of Jesus is the most insidious of all evils, because it so soon takes to itself some fair name and aspect, calling itself freedom from prejudice, emancipation from prudery, reaction from Puritanism; because when it inspires the fashionable world, it gains fresh might and power every day, until it eats at last the whole heart and life out of religion, leaving only its husk and its mask."

ciples, and owed perhaps all their future influence to that depth of personal religion, and that adoring love of a personal Redeemer, which they had attained to when under the teaching of a very different school of Christian thought. The great evangelical party can never be overlooked in any estimate of the vicissitudes of the church of the future" (p. 638). "The High Church party, on the other hand, has begun to appreciate and to apply that warm, personal, and individualizing ministry of Christ crucified to each sin-laden soul, which has so long and so blessedly characterized the teaching of the best days of the evangelical movement" (p. 640). "The evangelical party, by the blessing of the Holy Ghost, had almost exclusively in the past fifty years sustained the holy and blessed work of the revivification of the Church of England. They had brought back life; they had made salvation to be felt as something real and individual; they had rendered the Redeemer's own vital words as to personal conversion a deep subjective conviction and reality; they had been as the life-bearing wind that had swept over the dry bones of the valley—all this they had been, and may they be forever blessed and honored for this work" (p. 618). The bishop's "shadows of Calvinism," which darken the beginning of his vivid picture of the evangelical movement, vanish under the glow of Christian life and fruitfulness, in which his candor leads him to set forth its actual workings. We shall notice Dr. Ellicott's High Church sacramentarianism in connection with Dr. Irons' views of that subject. Meanwhile, we propose to corroborate our estimate of that type of religion, by decisive testimony of witnesses who are not its adherents, against which the Prebendary has hurled the poisoned shafts of Clifford and Huxley.

In an article on the evangelical movement in the *British Quarterly Review* for July, 1879, Mr. Gladstone, after finding its originators in Wesley, Whitefield, Hervey, Berridge, Romaine, and Toplady, who, unlike Wesley, had decided leanings towards Calvinism, says, not untruly: "The points in which the evangelical school permanently differed from the older and traditional Anglicanism were those of the Church, the Sacraments, and the forensic idea of justification. They are not, in my view, its strong points. . . . That the preaching of the Gospel a

hundred years ago had disappeared, not by denial, but by lapse, from the majority of Anglican pulpits, is, I fear, in large measure, an historic truth. To bring it back again was the aim and work of the evangelical reformers in the sphere of the teaching function. Whether they preached Christ in the best manner may be another question; but of this there is now and can be little question that they preached Christ; they preached Christ largely and fervently where, as a rule, he was but little and but coldly preached before. And who is there that will not say from his heart, 'I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice'?"[1] Again, although Mr. Gladstone is trying to prove Mr. Lecky's estimate of their influence exaggerated, he concedes that in activity and moral influence they counted for a good deal more than their numbers. "The vessels of zeal and fervor, taken man for man, far outweighed the heroes of the ball-room and the hunting-field, or the inert, half-animated minds, and perfunctory performers of a minimum of stipulated duty, who supplied so considerable a number of the clerical host."[2] Again, "it was common, in my early days, for morality to be taught without direct derivation from, or reference to, the Person of Christ."[3] He declares that "the pith and life of the evangelical teaching, as it consists in the reintroduction of Christ our Lord to be the woof and warp of preaching, was the great gift of the movement to the teaching Church, and has now penetrated and possessed it on a scale so general that it may be considered as pervading the whole mass."[4] Whatever its faults, he declares evangelicalism to have been "born to do a noble work, and that the men, to whose hands the work was committed, were men worthy of this high election. Further, in respect to its vivifying and restoring influences, that work is one as permanent as the Gospel; for it is no more or less than an effective inception, if not a full development, of the restoring agency by which the Gospel restores our weak and defaced humanity to more than its ancient beauty. . . . It may also be that a more or less pronounced evangelical school is still required for the general religious welfare of the Anglican Church, in order to maintain, if only by an emulation as between

[1] *British Quarterly Review*, July, 1879, Am. ed., p. 3.
[2] Id., p.4. [3] Id., p. 8. [4] Id., p. 9.

the men of Apollos and of Paul, the vigor and activity in the Anglican body of those 'doctrines of grace' without which the salt of Christianity soon loses all its savor." [1]

Mr. Lecky, in an article in the *Nineteenth Century* (August, 1879), defends still stronger statements, which he had made in his History, of the power of the evangelical movement, against certain criticisms of Mr. Gladstone in the article from which we have already quoted. He is well known to be far enough from any evangelical bias or sympathy. The reader will please note that by evangelicalism he understands that sort of religion, in and out of the Anglican Church, which is earnest in bringing men to faith and newness of life, through the blood of Christ, and regeneration by his Spirit, whether Calvinists, Arminians, or neither. He speaks of it as the "religious revival which began with the writings of Law, found its first exponents in the Wesleys and Whitefields, and which Grimshaw, Berridge, Newton, Romaine, Joy, Venn, and the other leaders of the evangelical party carried over the length and breadth of England. These men and their colleagues gradually changed the whole spirit of the English Church. They infused into it a new fire and passion of devotion, kindled a spirit of fervent philanthropy, raised the standard of clerical duty, and completely altered the tone and tendency of the preaching of its ministers. Before the close of the century the evangelical movement had become dominant in England, and it continued the almost undisputed centre of religious life till the rise of the Tractarian movement in 1830." [2] While Mr. Lecky concedes, in response to the criticisms of Mr. Gladstone, that the word dominant is not happily chosen, and adds that "the ascendancy of evangelicalism in the Nonconformist bodies Mr. Gladstone has not disputed, . . . I must still maintain that at the close of the eighteenth century the evangelical movement had not only fully developed its principles and its powers, but had become, both in Nonconformity and in the Church, the chief centre of religious activity in England. . . . By the end of the eighteenth century the evangelical party had attracted to itself nearly all the fervor, the activity, the spirit of relig-

[1] *British Quarterly Review*, July, 1879, Am. ed., p. 13.
[2] *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1879, p. 280.

ious propagandism and of religious enthusiasm that was circulating in the community" (pp. 280, 281).

He proceeds to prove this by a variety of incontestable facts, such as the prodigious growth of a religious literature from the pens of evangelical authors, which superseded the works previously in vogue, and became the "chief religious reading of the middle and lower, if not of the higher, classes in England." The figures and facts on this subject, produced by him, are simply prodigious.

He justly observes that "few things reflect more clearly the deeper devotional feelings of an age than its hymns, and in hymns the last part of the eighteenth century in England was peculiarly rich. The names of Toplady, Cowper, Madan, Newton, and Charles Wesley will at once occur to the reader. All these were ardent evangelicals; all of them were members of the Anglican Church" (p. 282).

This view of the hymns in favor with bodies of Christians is equally just and profound. It has a much wider reach than he has given it in regard to some charges against the popular religion, whether formulated in Arminian or Calvinistic theological dogmas, with which we have had to deal in this article. The favorite hymns of a communion, and not the strained inferences and imputations of angry polemics, most truly express the manner in which their respective creeds are practically accepted and made operative in the inner life of their adherents. Tried by this test, how are the dismal "shadows," which the supporters of different types of evangelical theology sometimes see in their own distortions of opposing systems, swept away by those hymns of faith, hope, love, resignation, adoration, exultation, which voice the inmost thought and feeling of all true Christians of whatever name? And what a comment is this on all exclusiveness *a priori* and *a posteriori*, when we find the hymns composed by those against whom they vent their bitterest prejudices eagerly appropriated, to express the glad outpourings of their own souls to God, and their most vivid and delighted conceptions of divine truth! Herein we find the strongest proof of the real unity of all the people of God, the whole communion of saints, no matter into how many folds divided, or by what bars of exclusion hindered from visible fellowship with

each other. In this matter no church can say to any other, "I have no need of thee." No satisfactory hymnal can be made up for any one Christian denomination that excludes the choice hymns produced in other communions. We have seen a Roman Catholic book of devotion enriched by Protestant hymns. The collections of the most sacramentarian and ritualistic religionists are always enriched with hymns by evangelicals and dissenters, and *vice versa*. We attended three successive funeral services in Protestant Episcopal churches in which the hymn of Toplady, a great Calvinistic polemic, "Rock of Ages, cleft for me," was most appropriately sung. What collection can do without that sweet song of Muhlenburg, "I would not live alway, I ask not to stay," or that of Dwight, "I love thy kingdom, Lord," or the hymns of Doddridge, Watts, and others of all ages and communions, of Churchmen High and Low, and of evangelical dissenters? We quite agree with Mr. Gladstone when he says: "This very remarkable 'communion of hymns,' so to call it, which now prevails throughout the land, is in truth one among the consolatory signs of the great amount of religious unity still subsisting, though amidst many and even important differences, in this nation" (p. 13). It is along the line of experimental and devotional feelings and utterances, and not of dogmatic controversy (although we are the last to undervalue dogma in its proper place and function), that, in the words of one of the inimitable hymns just referred to, "The saints of all ages in harmony meet."

Mr. Lecky proceeds to prove his position, by citing the great Societies for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Reformation of Morals and Manners originated and supported by the evangelical party. The need of the restoration of the religion embodied in the Articles and with slight exceptions, the Liturgy and Homilies of the Church of England, effected through the evangelical movement, is evident enough from the prevalence of frigid scepticism indicated by Bishop Butler, in his advertisement prefixed to his Analogy, and, making every allowance for possible misunderstanding and exaggeration, from the following statement of Mr. Lecky (p. 284):

"Blackstone relates that early in the reign of George the Third he went from church to church to hear every clergyman of note in London,

and did not hear a single discourse which had more Christianity in it than the writings of Cicero, and that it would be impossible for him to discover from what he heard whether the preacher was a follower of Confucius, of Mahomet, or Christ."

All this is confirmed by equivalent testimonies from Addison, Montesquieu, Sir James Stephen, and Canon Ryle, which want of space compels us to omit. (See "The Later Evangelical Fathers," by M. Seelye, p. 12.)

Further vindication of what has been stigmatized by one—we must hope exceptional—dignitary of the English Church as a "popular substitute for our religion" is superfluous. We must now pass from what he denounces to what he espouses as an "enlargement of the *a priori*."

In the article under review he uses the following language:

"The great advancing power of Christianity lay at first in baptism, which demanded moral preparation, and in the sacrament of Christ's body and blood binding men together for 'eternal life.' The intellectual distinction, or 'belief,' of the Christian community came from these two rites; which again issued in the 'Creeds,' and the same faith was educated by the Peschito Scriptures in the East, and by the Itala in the West; supplemented by the care of Origen and Jerome. Having these—the divine sacraments, creeds, and scriptures—a threefold supernatural growth, the Church, of course, asserted herself outwardly the 'pillar and ground of the truth.' But there was also the work of the interior life, which went on in individual moral agents, and constituted everywhere the indestructible essence of Christianity in man. Ages moved on, but with no definition of the canon, or of its inspiration, or of the atonement of Christ, or of the work of God's grace in man's moral nature, or of other and more numerous points, the correct confession of which men often consider 'necessary to salvation'" (pp. 93, 94).

Elsewhere he tells us that "to the authority of the historical creeds, sacraments, hierarchy, and scriptures, a true return must first be moral."[1] "We received it from our fathers, when they accepted that pre-Reformation Christianity to which I would now ask attention. Our reformers did not affect to proclaim a new Gospel. They took, as I may say, even the organized framework of existing Christianity—Bible, hierarchy, sacra-

[1] "Church of All Ages," p. 201.

ments, creeds." [1] "No theory, however, can evade the conclusion that we have in the creeds, the sacraments, and the hierarchy of Christendom the actual historical 'outcome' of the 'Word made flesh and dwelling among us.'" [2] "AND NOW, and in my last hour, I would cast my lot with the saints of the 'church of all ages'—their creeds, their sacraments, their worship, their hierarchy, their 'GOD with us.'" [3] In the title-page of "The Church of All Ages," he describes its contents as "Four Addresses on the Christian Revelation." His dedication of it reads: "To his Grace the Most Reverend Archibald Campbell, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of all England, this volume is dedicated with his permission—not as implying his Grace's approval in all things, but his recognizing the always acknowledged place in the Church of England of those who loyally adhere to the historic Creeds and Hierarchy of Christianity." The Primate of all England will take good care, we are sure, not to give his imprimatur to the Prebendary's *a priori organum*. But from the foregoing passages, as well as many others, in which he strives to minimize the legitimate scope of the Reformation, and the extent of the change from the "pre-Reformation" basis wrought by it in the English Church, we infer that he maintains the highest views of the efficacy of the sacraments, with the limitation of that efficacy to the hierarchy descended by unbroken, actual succession from the apostles—a hierarchy which constitutes the only lawful ministry ever dreamed of by the Oxford Tractarians, or the Anglo-Catholic party in the English Church which has grown out of it; has furnished such large recruits to the Romish Church; and which, according to Bishop Ellicott's article, unless present tendencies are arrested, will continue to furnish them in alarming abundance. In truth, the impression given us by such of the Prebendary's writings as we have seen, is that he has a hundred points of sympathy with the historic Romish Hierarchy and Church to one with Protestant bodies outside of the Anglo-Catholic party, of the Church of England, and that his strongest repulsion from Rome springs from its recent dogma of Papal Infallibility, which leaves no place for *a priori* Chris-

[1] "Church of All Ages," p. 248. [2] Id., p. 308. [3] Id., p. 315.

tianity. Submission to this seems to him a crime no whit less or greater than submission to the Scriptures as infallible. Scriptures, creeds, sacraments, hierarchy, are apparently placed in the same category as constituting revelations from God, of like authority—at least when duly interpreted, and sanctioned by the requisite *a priori* tribunals. We, too, cast in our "lot with the saints of the 'church of all ages,' their creeds," not as of co-ordinate authority with the Scripture, but because, according to the Eighth of the Thirty-nine Articles, "they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture;" with "the sacraments," also, because (according to Articles XXVII. and XXVIII.) they are full of spiritual benefit to those who receive them "rightly, worthily, and with faith;" their worship, too, when "in spirit and in truth." But we do not see our way to submission to any "hierarchy" which does not teach the truth of God and administer discipline in accordance with it. Dr. Irons' idea of the efficacy of baptism is intimated when he speaks of the "saints who baptized to the Trinity whole nations, 'born in a day'" (Id., p. 317).

Bishop Ellicott, in the article already referred to, in sharp contrast to Dr. Irons, lifts up the Bible as "speaking to all hearts, telling clearly its divine truths to all that had ears to hear—the Bible of Protestant Christendom to which all might confidently appeal, the blessed, fresh, and living Word that to the humble spirit was its own best and truest interpreter." He rebukes those who made it "rather the book of the Church," which "could only be profitably read and truly understood under that specially accredited guidance" (pp. 627, 628). In this and various respects his article is of a much higher tone than that of Dr. Irons. But his Lordship warmly approves the Oxford Tract movement in respect to three features which he contends originally characterized it: 1. "That sacraments, and not preaching, are the sources of the divine grace. 2. That the true efficacy of the sacraments depends on the rightfulness of the commission of those that administer them, or . . . the 'apostolic succession'—the apostolic commission of the bishops, and under them of the presbyters of the church. . . . 3. Fixed and unwavering opposition to the teaching of the Church of Rome. 'No peace with Rome' was at first the watchword of the party"

(p. 622). Of the two first principles he observes "that they are liable to, and now suffering under, great exaggeration."

Of the last principle, in the bishop's estimation so necessary to balance and render safe the other two, he says: "In a few years it had become utterly obscured, and had given way to the sinister influences which from the very first had mingled with the Tractarian theology. . . . The influences to which we allude were all essentially anti-Protestant. . . . Their true representative was Hurrell Froude. . . . His opinions, says Dr. Newman, arrested and *influenced me*, even when they did not gain my assent. He professed openly his admiration of the Church of Rome, and his hatred of the Reformers. He delighted in the notion of an hierarchical system, of sacerdotal power, and of full ecclesiastical liberty [*i.e.*, freedom from state control]. He felt scorn of the maxim, 'The Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants;' and he gloried in accepting tradition as a main instrument of religious teaching. . . . He had a deep devotion to the real Real Presence, in which he had a firm faith. He made me to look with admiration to the Church of Rome, and in the same degree to dislike the Reformation. He fixed deep in me the idea of devotion to the blessed Virgin, and he led me gradually to believe in the Real Presence" (pp. 623, 624). Dr. Irons refers to this Mr. Froude and his modes of thinking in Oxford in terms of great respect as being "very suggestive."[1] Mr. Gladstone says, in the article already referred to: "The disposition of the Tractarians—may it not be said their besetting sin—was to undervalue and disparage these same reformers: a disposition of which, in the case of the 'Remains' of R. H. Froude, published by two of the authors of the Tracts, we have a glaring if not almost a scandalous instance" (p. 9).

We sympathize profoundly with the learned and pious prelate in his desire to eliminate Anglo-Romanism from the Anglo-Catholicism which took impulse and shape from the Oxford Tracts. But we should be uncandid if we disguised the fear, that the two first doctrines of the Oxford Tract school

[1] "First Hundred Years of Christianity," by Rev. Prebendary Irons, D.D., pp. 7, 8.

which he espouses, viz., that grace comes not from preaching but from the sacraments, and these only when administered by a clergy deriving their commission in the line of uninterrupted official succession from the apostles through the hierarchy of the Latin Church, will sooner or later part company with the third—opposition to Rome. They have about as much affinity for it as materialism has for idealism. There is a momentum in the first two principles which is constantly counter-working and severing in the English Church all the ties, hereditary, social, domestic, which so strongly bind men to the church of their nativity and nurture.

We here pause while unuttered thoughts still crowd upon us. We could not say less without being derelict in duty to the faith by which we live, the Saviour we trust, the God we adore, his Word to which we bow, and that vast portion of the communion of saints whose holy living and dying are the best refutation of all charges against them or their religion.

LYMAN H. ATWATER.

BIMETALLISM.

IT has been made a ground of reproach against the professional economists that they have not exerted themselves sufficiently to expose the fallacies of bimetallism, but have been contented to pass it by in contempt. Especial point has been given to this reproach by the observation that a great many persons have only resisted bimetallism by a kind of sound instinct. This instinct does not furnish rational ground for conviction, and many such persons have therefore either wavered or been disturbed in their allegiance to sound doctrine. It belongs to the scientific economists, it is said, to show, upon due analysis of the question, wherein the fallacy lies, and to give rational grounds for sound doctrine.

It is not worth while to mention the reasons or the excuses for the neglect to which this complaint refers. If an economist should undertake to expose and combat all the fallacies which gain more or less acceptance, he would not have time for anything else. In the present instance there are more narrow and peculiar difficulties. If one attempts to refute the whole silver doctrine in all its forms, one must demonstrate a sweeping and general negative. If one attempts to select and refute a single form of the error, he will find that no writer on that side of the subject has stated his opinions and doctrines in a form upon which issues can be joined, and a scientific discussion carried on with any prospect of satisfactory results. He will be compelled to argue both sides at once, to put the adversary's case in shape for him before discussing it, and, if he attempts this, he is sure to be entangled in endless charges of misrepresentation and misapprehension. For instance, one writer adopted the term "concurrent circulation," and gave it frequent and current use to

express his doctrine and aim. I thought the term well chosen to express the writer's idea as I understood it, and it seemed to me that here was an idea so clear and precise that we could join issue upon it, make an analysis, undertake verification, and so refute or demonstrate, which is what I understand by discussion, and not the heaping together of statistics, historical facts, and authorities. In a later publication, however, the same writer says: "The concurrent use of the two metals, side by side, in the same market is a matter wholly of indifference." We have then this proposition: The bimetallists want a concurrent circulation, but it is matter of indifference whether it be concurrent. There is here, then, no proposition to discuss, but only an illustration of the vague and loose thinking upon which the whole notion of the bimetallists is constructed.[1]

I. What I propose now to treat is bimetallism as it is popularly, however vaguely, believed in in the United States, as it is partially adopted in our legislation, and as it was expressed in the Act under which the Silver Commission was sent to Paris. The appearance of the Report of this Commission[2] furnishes the occasion and the means for examining this notion.

It was provided in the Act known as the Silver Bill that the President should invite the governments of other nations to join in a conference "to adopt a common ratio between gold and silver, for the purpose of establishing internationally the use of bimetallic money, and securing a fixity of the relative value between those metals." The legislators who enacted this assumed and believed that there was no impossibility, in the nature of things, in uniting two metals in the circulation at a fixed ratio of value; they believed that, this plan being debarred by no natural impossibility or absurdity, its expediency could be resolved upon in a conference, and that the means by which it could be realized was an international agreement of the chief commercial nations. I understand that these opinions are held more or less distinctly by all those who are popularly called silver men amongst us. I take issue upon both the points involved.

[1] Mr. Horton uses the term "concurrent circulation" constantly in his essay appended to the Report mentioned below.

[2] Senate Executive Document No. 58, Forty-fifth Congress, Third Session. References to "Report" refer to this document.

1. The first raises a scientific question: Is the notion that two metals can be joined in the coinage at a fixed ratio, by any human device or artifice whatever, true in science? I answer, No; it is just as false as the proposition, A perpetual motion is possible, would be in mechanics. This is certainly the first issue to be settled in regard to the silver controversy as between educated men; but the bimetallists have always slurred it over. At Paris, Count Rusconi did indeed recognize the primary importance of this question in the first session, but much contempt was expressed for the "academic" question, and there was great eagerness to be "practical" and to go on to the "practical" question. This is, indeed, the course of the "practical men," so called. They are impatient of the dogmatism of the professors, who say a perpetual motion is impossible, and insist on going on to consider the great practical advantages which would accrue *if* a perpetual motion were possible, and then, because they think they see such advantages, they go to work to construct the machine. The answer is, that if a perpetual motion, or a bimetallic circulation, were possible, this would not be the same world it is now. It might be a better one, but surely any practical man, in the correct sense of the word, will inquire whether there is any insuperable obstacle, in the nature of things, to the object he wishes to accomplish, before wasting his time upon it. If this is not so, what we call education is a pure waste of time. I had supposed that it was understood and agreed, amongst educated men, that the chief end of studying the sciences was to acquire that training by virtue of which we recognize the relations of man to nature, and the limits of human action.

The inference to be drawn from the importance and true position of the scientific question is not that that question ought to have been discussed in the Conference. Far from it. That was no place for such a discussion. The inference is that the Conference was *ab initio* an absurd and senseless undertaking. The requisite antecedents of any joint action of nations are, (1) that all scientific questions involved shall have been maturely discussed by scientific men until a substantial unanimity of conviction has been reached as to what is true; (2) that these convictions shall have been dogmatically taught in books and

periodicals until they have become interwoven with the stock of convictions and faiths of the mass of civilized men; (3) that general opinions as to what it is expedient to do should, by necessary inference, have come to be held by all civilized men. When these conditions are fulfilled it is, of course, found that, for almost all cases, private contract, custom, or the independent legislation of individual states, concurring because proceeding from commonly accepted principles, answers all the purpose. The field for international conventions has therefore hitherto been restricted to postal conventions (common regulations for conducting a form of business which is monopolized by governments, but in which they act like the managers of any other business), or conventions on points of international law (in which the aim is to do justice to humanitarian sentiments wnich have become universal). The difficulty of these latter conventions, even, is instructive for the nature and limits of international conventions, and the history of the Latin Union, as an isolated effort towards international action for other purposes, is certainly a warning and not an encouraging precedent. When, however, the action proposed involves scientific truth, and yet all the necessary conditions precedent are passed over unfulfilled, the proceeding is devoid of sense. It could only have the form of sense if the object were to supersede scientific discussion by action and force—the fallacy of the ecclesiastical councils. The scientific question belongs where I now undertake it: in the forum of academic discussion.

We have then one issue joined; I propose to show that a bimetallic circulation is as absurd and impossible as perpetual motion, so that a convention of the whole human race could not realize it.

2. The second assumption in the Act above quoted relates not to a scientific truth, but to a point of expediency and practicability. It is assumed that an international coinage union, combining and binding the members to a certain programme of action, is a practicable scheme, and needs only a certain degree of consultation to be realized. I shall maintain that such a coinage union is absolutely impracticable. The bearing of this is not directly upon bimetallism, for that is disposed of when it is shown to be absurd, but the coinage union is an element in the

scheme properly known as the alternate or alternative standard. These two schemes, when tested and weighed from the scientific standpoint, are of totally different character and value, as I shall show further on. The question about the alternate standard is a question of expediency and practicability in the main, although it also involves considerations of rights and justice. The difference is that between a perpetual-motion machine and an ordinary machine invented to meet a certain purpose. As to the latter, the questions may be raised whether it will work so as to do what it is made to do, whether it will pay, whether it is dangerous, etc., but if one or all of these questions were decided adversely to the machine, it would still not be an abomination in mechanics like a pretended perpetual motion. The parallel holds in the case before us. The alternate standard is inexpedient for a variety of reasons, and it is impracticable because it involves the necessity of an international coinage union, prescribing regulations and dictating action to its members, and such a union is impracticable. Still the alternate standard involves no scientific absurdity. I therefore join issue, secondly, on the question of the practicability of the coinage union.

II. Before entering upon the subject-matter, a word of explanation is necessary on a certain point. If a monometallist means a man who urges that all nations ought to use gold money, I know of no such person in the world. It is one great error of the bimetallists that they assume to know and judge what money all the world ought to use. No one can reach any such judgment, on the one side or the other, who uses correct processes in the investigation of economic truth. Every nation ought to use just that money which, in its own judgment, its interests and convenience dictate. The economist has to note what course nations pursue under this motive, to study the consequences, interpret the phenomena, and deduce the inferences which are presented to him by the facts themselves. For myself, therefore, I have always repudiated the name Monometallist as a sectarian name, which no scientific economist would be willing to bear.

III. The historical facts bearing on bimetallism and kindred topics have been collected with great zeal during the last few years, but they have rarely been interpreted with the simple

fidelity and loyalty just described. Let us recapitulate as briefly as possible, in their chronological order, the facts which are here of importance.

A. The attempt to use two metals together has been kept up from the earliest use of money to the present time, and has constituted a problem in money. It was deemed necessary to use two metals, but no means has ever been devised for using two which has not failed, besides producing confusion, loss, injustice, and commercial distress. In 1717, still essaying to solve the same problem, the English guinea was rated at 21 silver shillings. It was not worth that amount, and so became the cheaper medium, and the standard of prices and credits. The good silver coins were melted, and those which remained were clipped so as to be worth less than $\frac{1}{21}$ of a guinea. After the clipping once began, it went on from worse to worse, as always under the same circumstances, but the need for "change" kept the silver coins afloat. After the middle of the century the depreciation became so great that it led to a clipping of the gold coins also. In 1773 silver coins were made legal tender for no sums over £25, by weight, at 5*s.* 2*d.* per oz. In 1785 France adopted the ratio of 1 to 15½ in a reformation of the coinage, as another attempt to hit the true ratio and keep the two metals in circulation. In 1803 the same ratio was ratified. The French law of 1785–1803 was therefore no new or special solution of the coinage problem, but only another attempt such as those which had been made before. Under the operation of this law, France used silver as a standard until the middle of the century. In 1816 a new coinage system was adopted in England which really accepted and put into a system the state of things which had grown up by custom during the last century—single gold standard, with silver subsidiary depreciated coins, limited in amount, and limited legal tender. It was from a study of the phenomena produced during the previous century by the operation of the laws of trade upon the legal system that the English statesmen were led to this system. The law, therefore, followed custom and the laws of trade, and did not attempt to coerce them. The sovereign now became a money of moneys, *i.e.*, other moneys and currencies were common denominators of value within certain local limits. When a sec-

ond common denominator was wanted to connect the operations of these local areas with each other, the sovereign met the need. That English money and English commerce thus mutually sustained each other was only an illustration of the principle that good institutions support prosperity and prosperity supports the utility of good institutions. The connection between them is organic, not mechanical. In 1834 the United States passed a new law for a coinage of two metals, but purposely rated the metals so as to get gold. In 1853, having obtained a gold standard by the operation of the law of 1834, they reduced all the silver coins except the dollar to a subsidiary condition, and introduced the English system. In 1853–4, by the fall in gold, France, under the operation of her law, became a gold country. She was burdened with the expense of the change from silver to gold, but this was regarded as a slight price to pay for a change which was opportune to her interests. In 1865 the Latin Union was formed. The nations composing it adopted the French law, and became like France, by the operation of that law, gold countries. In 1867 an International Monetary Conference was held, at which it was proposed to establish, by agreement, what existed in fact—the use of gold as a standard amongst the nations represented. After the formation of the North German Confederation in 1867, an event which to a certain extent met the German aspirations for political unity and national standing, it was felt that one of the greatest obstacles to the realization of the further hopes of commercial and industrial greatness lay in the currency of the country. The standard was silver. The coins were cumbersome. The small coin was, much of it, base billon. The bank-note currency also required reformation. After the war of 1870 and the formation of the empire, all the motives for a currency reform were increased in force, and when such reform was undertaken, all the considerations which had weight dictated that it should be carried through to the adoption of the gold standard. The Scandinavian nations followed the example of Germany. In 1873 the United States codified and simplified their coinage laws according to the existing laws and customs of the country, and according to what would best serve the interests of the country when specie payments should be resumed. They struck the silver dollar from the list of coins

which the mint was permitted to coin, on which list it had stood as an idle and unused permission, and brought the United States to the simple gold standard with subsidiary silver. In 1873 silver began to fall by important steps. The operation of the French law would now have taken away gold and given silver to the Latin Union. The movement in this direction, however, was far differently welcomed from the contrary movement of 1853. The Latin Union refused to give up a gold currency and take silver, and undergo the loss of sustaining silver besides. It closed its mints against silver, and the "double standard" ceased to be.

1. Any one now who reviews this series of historical facts, not in order to interpret them by some ulterior design assumed to have existed,[1] but for just what they are, will see that there was no ulterior design, no set purpose, no agreement or combination, but that each nation acted as its own interests dictated, and that the concord of action and general tendency towards the adoption of gold on the part of all the great commercial nations, substantially in the order of their commercial importance, constitutes one of those great historical movements which are not to be criticised or corrected, but which impose upon the student the convictions which he is to adopt.

2. It is plain from a correct statement of the facts that the action of Germany in demonetizing silver was by no means arbitrary. It had the fullest motives and occasion in the state of that nation, and its interest and convenience.[2]

3. The action of the Scandinavian nations was not arbitrary or destitute of motive. The movement towards gold was now so far advanced that the small nations were forced to join it in self-defence. The last to join it would be loaded with the discarded silver, and would have to endure a large part of the total loss upon it. This is only an illustration of the rapid impulse with which such movements finally complete themselves, when the forces have acquired momentum.

4. The action of the United States in 1873 was guided by

[1] Mr. Horton (Report, p. 240). Mr. Horton speaks (p. 745) of the "partisans of gold and persecutors of silver."

[2] The argument of Gen. Walker before the Conference was based upon the assertion that Germany's action was arbitrary. See Report, p. 74.

previous legislation, custom, fact, convenience, and the interests of the country, as they then appeared, and, so far as any evidence has ever been brought forward, by nothing else.

B. We come now to the latest incident in this historical development—a case of action which was indeed arbitrary and destitute of motive. The United States were in currency trouble of their own, serious enough and difficult enough, in itself considered, but they enjoyed, from the suspension of specie payments, one incidental advantage. They had no part or lot in the silver difficulty.[1] They had no stock of silver on which to suffer loss. Their laws were in proper shape to secure resumption on the best system of coinage yet devised. They had time before them. They could wait for developments and take advantage of any state of affairs which might arise, without taking any speculative risks at all. Mr. Horton thinks the United States had a great interest because the demonetization of silver made resumption harder. Resumption on silver would have been easier than resumption on gold, just as resumption would have been easier if the gold dollar had been reduced ten per cent in weight, and not otherwise. In this state of things, then, the United States wilfully plunged into the silver difficulty, and, moreover, came forward to tell those who were in silver difficulty how to get out, and volunteered to lead the way. All the other nations represented at the Conference had an interest in the silver problem, but all refused to act, with the possible exception of Italy. The United States had no interest, but nevertheless took action. As a consequence, this nation now has thirty million dollars of capital invested in silver, which is lying idle and cannot be disposed of without loss. This sum and a large amount in trade dollars have been retained at home as a new element of disorder in our currency, instead of following their natural course to the East. If the advocates of free coinage for silver had had their way, we should also have received thirty or forty millions in silver instead of the same amount in gold received this Fall. Mr. Horton is of opinion that this was a noble ac-

[1] I suppose it is necessary to say that the interest of American silver producers was no interest of the United States. The iron producers were in worse trouble than the silver producers, but no one proposed that the nation should expend capital to "bull" iron.

tion, on the part of the United States on behalf of mankind in general, which has rarely been paralleled. It was, in fact, a piece of national Quixotism which has no parallel in history. The same writer quotes this action as an exception or offset to the uniform tendency of the historical events above cited, but its arbitrary and unfounded character rob it of any force for such a deduction.

IV. It is impossible that I should, within the limits of the present article, review and criticise the points raised at the Conference. Two or three of the chief of them here demand brief attention.

1. The American delegates began by slandering the legislation of their country, and it was left for a foreigner to show (1) that the historical facts about the legislation of 1873 were incorrectly stated by the American delegates, and (2) that the United States are a constitutional country, not ruled by plebiscites, and that we cannot plead ignorance on the part of "the people" against legislation constitutionally adopted. Gen. Walker endeavored to sustain the allegations of his colleague by saying that he, although a professor of political economy, engaged, at the time, in lecturing on money, did not know what was going on. It does not appear that this argument elicited any reply. Perhaps it was thought that its force all lay in the recoil, and some wonder may have been excited whether all American economists would have been obliged to say the same. The fact is that the Act of 1873 so simply enacted the existing law and facts that no one attributed any importance to it.

2. The chief reasons adduced for the action proposed by the United States were vague and undefined terrors of consequences from the historical movement we have described. It was alleged that half the money in the world has been cancelled. This assertion has no foundation in fact. The amount demonetized is just exactly what has been demonetized, viz., the amount of silver held by Germany and the Scandinavian States, and to this there have been important offsets. In the first place, there has been the production of gold since 1873, which, according to Soetbeer's calculations,[1] must have averaged one hundred and

[1] *Edelmetall-Production* (*Petermann's Mittheilungen, Erg. Heft* No. 57, p. 112).

twenty million dollars per annum. In the second place, all the silver five-franc pieces in existence have been added to the stock of "money." Before the fall in silver they were worth more than gold and were merchandise. Since they fell to an equality with gold (below it in value; held equal by limitation[1]), they have been available as money. It would be very difficult to show that, comparing 1879 with 1873, there has been any contraction whatever of the metallic money of Europe and the United States. The expansions and contractions of paper money in Europe and North and South America, within twenty years, have had far greater influence on credit and prices the world over than the changes connected with silver.

3. The fear was also expressed that the adoption of gold would destroy the par of exchange with silver countries, and it was urged that the bimetallic system would furnish a "normal" par. What is the "par" of exchange? Exchange is a ratio between two quantities. How can the ratio between two quantities be "destroyed" so long as the quantities exist? The par of exchange is an entirely imaginary mean-line between fluctuations which are constant, and it has no importance except for the academic explanation of phenomena. We can make a "normal" par any minute; $4.44=£1$ is as good a par as any. The sovereign and the dollar may then each of them be gold, silver, or anything else; their values will have a ratio to each other, and may be stated in percentages of $4.44.

V. I proposed, however, to examine the bimetallic notion in its essence, and to proceed with that task it is necessary to consider the relation of legislation to value.[2] For the exposition of the bimetallic fallacy, as well as a number of others which are now widely held and even taught, it is necessary to show that legislation cannot affect value at all. If it could, the text-books of political economy are very faulty in their analysis of value, since no one of them specifies legislation amongst the forces by which value is controlled.

[1] The Bank of France in September charged one tenth of one per cent premium on gold over silver.—*Economist*, Sept. 6, p. 1026.

[2] "Let me dwell upon the fundamental error which suggests the measure which has been proposed. That error is the belief that it appertains to governments to call value into existence." (Mr. Pirmez. Report, p. 121.)

1. The value of a thing is controlled by supply and demand and by nothing else. Supply and demand are natural forces and act under natural laws. By this we mean that supply and demand spring into action from the presence, in certain relations to each other, of certain natural facts. The natural facts, in this case, are (1) a society of men having certain needs, and (2) material goods fit to satisfy those needs. The needs of the men for the goods do not exist because the men so choose, but because they are men. The goods are not supply for the needs because the men so decide, but by virtue of natural qualities. Supply and demand are therefore complementary parts of a force which is natural in the same sense that any physical force is natural. This force must arise when its natural conditions exist; it cannot arise unless they exist; when it arises it acts under natural law—that is, produces a regular succession of phenomena in a determined sequence—and the statement of the law in human language must be made by describing the conditions of equilibrium between the complementary parts, since it is by their equilibrium that the supply performs its function, and the needs receive satisfaction, and the economic force is merged in the vital force of man. The action of man on natural forces is restricted to dividing, combining, and diverting them. He can neither create nor destroy them. The forces may be divided, but the sum of the effects must always be perfectly proportioned to the force, neither less nor more. If any portion of the force is missing in the effect, our task is not complete until we have followed it, ascertained its incidence and effect, and united it to the rest.

2. Gold has its own conditions of supply and demand, and silver has its own conditions of supply and demand, and they are both independent of each other. Those conditions are facts in regard to the actual existence of the metals within the reach of man on the one side, and the increasing, decreasing, or changing needs of the human race, as it lives its life on earth, upon the other. Legislation can affect these conditions in no respect whatever. It cannot increase or decrease the amount of the metals within the reach of man, or his willingness to labor to produce them according to the profit of such production. It cannot make men want what they do not want, or cease to want

what they do want. Economic phenomena are due to economic forces, and one of the first lessons the student has to learn is not to rest from his analysis until he has reduced economic phenomena to economic forces and laws.

One might as well tell a physiologist that his science is false because no man ever existed whose organs were all perfectly normal in their functions, as to contradict an economist because no man ever acted from purely economic motives. Indeed the absurdity is far greater in the latter case, since the economist deals with societies, not individuals; so that not only is the inference unfounded, but the fact alleged is untrue of societies. One might as well object against a physiologist, when he states physiological laws, that moral forces (or, rather, more or less immoral forces, for that is what we mean) affect the bodily functions, as to interpose the objection against economic laws that immoral forces affect economic phenomena. The fact in both cases is undeniable; the inference—that these external interferences alter natural forces and laws, and therefore ought to be taken into account in the statement of scientific principles—is equally unfounded in both. One might as well tell a physiologist that a knife thrust into an organ alters physiological forces and laws, as to tell an economist that legislation controls the laws of value. It is because the physiological laws are not altered that the victim dies. The hygiene, pathology, and therapeutics of society are mixed with its physiology in our text-books, but the scientific distinctions must be maintained intact if we would reason correctly. Value belongs to the physiology of society, legislation almost always to its pathology. Legislation creates the conditions of disease, leads to distorted organs, disordered functions, deceptive phenomena (§ 4 below), and taxes the sagacity and clear-headedness of the student to find again the normal forces in their distorted action; but we have to guard ourselves well against the delusion that it changes forces or laws. To adopt that delusion is to lose perception of the difference between social health and social disease. We are struggling here for the introduction into political economy of universal canons of science which are recognized in all other departments which enjoy authority and are making real progress.

3. One chief cause of the notion amongst us that legislation

can regulate the value of money is, no doubt, the provision in the Constitution of the United States that Congress shall have power so to do. Why was it not also provided, in connection with the cognate power "to fix the standard of weights and measures," that Congress might regulate the length and weight of things? Here is a table. It is so long. How long? Just the quantity of extension in one dimension which it has as a physical fact. If you were here, you would see it. As you are not, I have recourse to ratios to other extensions which you do know. It has the same length as the distance from a man's nose to the end of his middle finger. The Congress of the United States, however, has provided an arbitrary standard of length, now grown familiar by use, and if I write that this table is a yard long, it will be a far more convenient and accurate designation, because it will refer to a more accurate length, equally familiar. If Congress had adopted a standard yard as long as what we now call a foot, that would have become familiar, I should then have written three yards instead of one, and the knowledge conveyed would have been the same. Now how large a Congressional majority would it take to make this table one thousandth of an inch longer or shorter than it actually is? The parallel with the case of money is complete. The Constitution of the United States could not confer powers which nature has never given to mankind. Congress cannot regulate the value of money until it can make a man give for a gold dollar one grain of wheat more than supply and demand force him to give, or yield a gold dollar for one grain less than supply and demand will give him for it. To regulate the value of money is to fix prices, and Congress has never tried that since it has existed. Congress can determine how heavy a piece of metal of a certain fineness shall be the standard of value, just as it determines how long a bar shall be the standard of length; but it cannot regulate the value of a coin any more than it can regulate a physical object to make it longer or shorter than it is.

4. The cases of apparent interference with supply and demand by individuals, combinations, and governments are all cases of monopoly, which is only a special case of supply and demand. An artificial monopoly is possible whenever the supply is capable of comprehension and limitation, and the ma-

nipulation of a monopoly consists in so limiting the supply and adjusting it to the demand as to make the market take some amount at some price. If the monopolist wants to sell more, he must yield on his price. If he wants a higher price, he must be content to sell less. It would be a great mistake, however, to say that a monopolist controls value. It is just because he does not control value that he makes anything. There is still a true point of equilibrium which supply and demand would reach, if free, and it is out of the margin between that point and the point at which the monopolist fixes the market price that his gains, as monopolist, come. There is no other scientific explanation of those gains. A "corner" is a modified case of monopoly, in which the first action is exerted upon the demand. All offered is bought at a price above what any other buyer will pay. This operation, however, is only preliminary to the formation of a monopoly, and a monopoly sale. It would be senseless unless there was a demand foreseen, which would, for some reason, be so strong as to ensure the monopolists a sale at a price above what they pay. What the monopolist does, then, in either case, is to fix the ratio at which the exchange actually takes place at a different ratio from that which value would establish. He thereby transfers other men's goods to himself without giving any equivalent, and it is precisely because value gives us a second point of comparison that we are able to say that the action of the monopolist is unjust and oppressive, and that monopolies are justly odious.

5. The apparent cases of legislative interference with value are cases in point. Subsidiary coins are a case of monopoly, and the problem of their management is to limit the supply to the demand of the community for said coins at their nominal value. Paper money is a case of monopoly. The problem of its value, which has troubled so many writers, is to hold the supply at or below the demand of the community for money to do its business with at par with coin. If the supply of paper dollars is made to exceed the number of gold dollars which the country would need, they will no longer hold a value equal to the value of a gold dollar each. The tariff is a case of monopoly. The protected producers can get the market price plus the tariff, only by selling less than the community would take

at the market price. If they increase the supply, they may run down the price in the home market below the price in the world's market. Hence paper money transfers property from its just possessors to the issuers of the paper, without equivalent, and tariffs transfer property from the unprotected owners to the protected producers without an equivalent. The extent to which this takes place depends on the manipulation of the monopoly; the effect of legislation is limited to the creation of the opportunity for a monopoly.

6. Legal-tender laws, when they are what they ought to be, simply enactments of what is the universal custom and understanding, are rarely if ever called into action at all. It seems to be forgotten that this is their original and only proper character, and whenever such laws are proposed or referred to, laws are always meant which involve some coercion, or distortiom of the terms of a contract. Legal-tender laws of this character do not alter truth, justice, or value. They only transfer property. A legal-tender law does not make 90 paid = 100 due a true equation. The only true equation is 90 paid + 10 retained = 100 due. Legal-tender laws alter the line between mine and thine so that something which was on one side is now on the other, but they do not affect the validity of the venerable distinction. The legal-tender law simply provides that the courts which administer justice under the Constitution and laws of the country in question shall not listen, in certain cases, to the plea of the citizen who complains of injustice; in other words, it withdraws the protection of the courts of justice, in certain cases, from citizens who complain of injustice. Some decisions even seem to go so far as to interpret the law so that A may demand B's property and discharge B's claim with an arbitrary allowance to which B never consented. In all cases it is because the forces of nature act in perfect fidelity to their laws that we can see and define the injustice of this legislation. It is because the legislation has not affected the law of value that we can have another state of things in mind as right and just, and can often measure the degree to which legislation has transferred the products of one man's labor and economy to another man's use and enjoyment. It would be difficult indeed to prove that the value of a man's property or his right to it

was affected by stealing it from him. Value is one form of truth, and truth is not affected by majorities. The notion that legislation affects value must therefore be positively condemned as the root-error of a dozen mischievous fallacies. Legislation transfers property, and that is all it ever does.

7. It is necessary to notice also the law which governs all combinations. If a single individual undertakes, for instance, to establish a corner, he may be reasonably sure of his own will, intention, and plan, and may carry it out if he does not lose his head and prove inconsistent with himself—which indeed sometimes occurs. If he finds it necessary to associate another with himself, there arises the need of selecting a congenial comrade and of securing consent, co-operation, loyalty, and good faith between two separate wills. The difficulty of such combination is not double that of an individual operation; it may be twenty-fold greater. If three, five, ten, twenty persons must be combined, the difficulty advances in a tremendous ratio until it becomes a practical impossibility. Hence the manipulation of a corner or a monopoly does not gain force or become easier as the task is widened and the number of participants is increased, but the force decreases in an enormous ratio to the extension of the party, and the practical chances of success diminish in an equally rapid ratio to the number of participants.

VI. Having elucidated these points, which, by the way, show the need, in economic discussions, of firm grasp of elementary notions and principles, we may, in a brief space, bring them to bear on the thesis with which we started.

1. Inasmuch as gold and silver have independent conditions of supply and demand in natural facts, their relative value may remain the same through a long period, or one or the other may grow dearer, and the fluctuations may be rare or frequent, wide or narrow, sudden or gradual, in all possible combinations and sequences. It has been proposed to form an international union, to establish a fixed ratio for the mints of all members of the union, and to make either metal legal tender. By this plan it is proposed to change from one metal to the other as fluctuations take place, and it is expected that the fluctuations will be limited in their range, but it is not expected that a concurrent circulation will be produced, or that the whole

stock of both metals will be brought to act on credit and prices. Reserving for the present the question of the practicability of the coinage union, it may be admitted that, under some circumstances, the fluctuations would be limited, but they would be more frequent and sudden, and the system would be at the sport of chance, as the Latin Union was. These, however, are minor difficulties. The legal-tender law, by which all this is to be accomplished, would simply, as above shown, transfer property. The gain, if any, would be a gain to some at the expense of others. In plain language, the project is one for uniting the debtor classes of all civilized nations in a "corner" on the falling metal. Such a project has no parallel save in some of the wildest plans of the International Society. The profits of the corner would come out of the creditor class and the holders of the rising metal. It would be establishing on a world-wide scale, and by force of law, an injustice by which some men would throw the risks and loss of their business on other men, who already have the risks and losses of their own business to carry. For instance, some Liverpool merchants interested in the South American and East Indian trade have suffered loss by the fall in silver. They are eager for the "double standard" to save them from their losses, and no doubt it would do so, but only by throwing those losses on the whole creditor class of England. Now, the creditor class of England is scattered, unorganized, and unknown, but it is safe to say that it has its own troubles from business and investments, and is suffering from loss of dividends, failure of banks, fall in prices, fall in rents, fire, shipwreck, and all the other chances and accidents of life. The advocates of the "alternate standard" have contented themselves with dilating upon the effect of their scheme in narrowing the fluctuations of the market rate of the metals, without reflecting that no such effect could be attained without an expenditure of force, at somebody's expense, elsewhere.

2. But the coinage union is a practical impossibility. France, a country with a free mint for both metals, standing between Germany, a silver country, and England, a gold country, was able to work a compensatory action between them. There is an obvious fallacy, however, in reasoning that the same action would go on, on a larger scale and with greater efficiency, if the differ-

entiation upon which the interaction depended were obliterated in a coinage union having a uniform system.

There is a further fallacy, and a far more serious one from a scientific point of view, in supposing that the coinage union, if extended, would gain proportionate increments of force to restrain fluctuations until they were reduced to a minimum or to nothing. The law above stated here comes into operation, by virtue of which a combination becomes not stronger, but weaker, as it is extended, and the attempt of all nations to form a corner upon the falling metal would dissipate itself like a corner which united all the buyers—that is, it would become simply identical with demand as we ordinarily use the term. Instead, therefore, of marching towards a realization of bimetallism or a concurrent circulation, the coinage union would work towards the simple free play of natural forces, in which each metal would obey its own conditions of supply and demand. Nor is this all. The coinage union is either unnecessary, or else it is needed in order to impose a set line of action and to enforce co-operation where voluntary co-operation would not be given. How can any one believe that sovereign nations will enter into any such combination, or that, if they did enter into it, they would stay in and obey mandates which conflicted with their interest and will? We are not left to speculation as to the probability that they would so act. We have two facts to which to refer: (1) When the fall in silver took place, the Latin Union would have been disrupted by the secession of Belgium and Switzerland if the coinage of silver had not been suspended. (2) The commissioners of the Latin Union, at their last meeting, agreed that Italy should withdraw her small notes to make room for the return of her small coin with which the other states, especially France, were burdened. I do not understand that Italy has refused to do this, but the remonstrances which were made in the Italian Parliament against this dictation as to what Italy should do with her own currency were just what must be expected in such a case, and they show that an international coinage union would prove a rope of sand so soon as the attempt was made to make it efficient at all. An international coinage union, therefore, to accomplish a definite and set purpose in turning back a movement which all recognize,

whether they deplore it or not, is an absolutely impracticable scheme.

3. I have never seen any argument for the feasibility of bimetallism, or a concurrent circulation, in which the whole of both metals would act on prices and credit, except the facile inference that the coinage union as it grew larger would or might restrain fluctuations more and more, to a minimum or to nothing. As I have broken down every assumption here involved, the inference falls to the ground. It appears that this reasoning follows neither a true relation of facts nor any logical sequence. The coinage union as it grew larger and larger would grow less and less effective, and when it was complete it would have no effect at all. The notion of a concurrent circulation is therefore entirely baseless—snatched from the air. So long as the natural conditions of supply and demand of gold and silver remained the same, whether for a longer or shorter period, so long the forces would remain the same, and the effects would remain the same. So soon, whether sooner or later, as the conditions varied, the forces would vary, and the proportionate effects would vary. To secure a concurrent circulation, then, at a fixed ratio, it is necessary to suppress the effects, which can only be done by suppressing the forces, so that a concurrent circulation could never be realized until we could extinguish economic forces by human agency. But we can no more extinguish a force than we can create one, so that this scheme is in economics what perpetual motion is in mechanics. Every analysis that is attempted of the idea will only issue in new proof that it is an absurdity which cannot be thought, and it is no longer strange that its advocates have never been able to state their notion in intelligible language. It must remain vague, shadowy, and popular, stated at best in symbols, metaphors, and analogies, to exist at all.[1]

VII. If the amount of space which would be required were not out of all proportion to the results for our purpose, I should

[1] "As for the desire which has been expressed that the hope be left open that some day a fixed relation may be established between gold and silver and an international value given to them, the English delegate (Mr. Goschen) declared that, in his view, it was impossible to realize this, impossible to maintain it in theory, and that it was contrary to the principles of science." (Report, p. 166.)

like to analyze some of the analogies which have been employed in this discussion. Some of them deserve to be put into the text-books on logic as classical examples of the mischief of reasoning by analogy. An analogy proves nothing whatever. It only serves to state a theorem in a form to be more easily apprehended. The theorem, then, needs to be proven by its appropriate demonstration. After showing the mischievous character of the notions imported into this discussion by the analogies of tubs of water joined by a tube, and horses driven in span, I should not have advanced the discussion in which I am engaged. The bimetallist says: A concurrent circulation seems to me like driving two horses in span. I answer: To me it seems like yoking the sun and moon together to facilitate the reckoning of time by men by making the lunar month a simple fraction of the solar year. Nothing is accomplished by these statements towards testing the truth of either opinion. I therefore pass by all the analogies which have been offered by the bimetallists with the simple remark that they are all untrue and misleading.

The advocates of the goloid dollar, who think they can give greater fixity to the ratio of the metals by mixing them in the same coin, advocate a more grotesque absurdity, but not a greater one, than the other advocates of a "concurrent circulation."

VIII. We must infer, then, that gold and silver will both be used as components in the world's money, by the adoption by some nations of one and by other nations of the other, as their convenience and interest dictate. The United States, by its legislation so far, has put itself on the way to become one of the silver countries. It is not a dogmatic judgment; it is inference from observation of the course adopted by nations, that gold is more convenient for the purpose of the leading commercial nations, and silver for those which are yet behind.[1] The United States is one of those whose interests require the use of gold, and the way back over the path we are now treading will have to be won by trouble, loss, and inconvenience. Our children, instead of admiring our Quixotic devotion to mankind

[1] Feer-Herzog. Report, p. 60.

in general, will ask us how we could ever commit the folly of plunging into a difficulty which everybody else was trying to escape, and from which our children will have to extricate themselves at heavy expense. I am far from denying that the change from silver to gold is attended by loss and inconvenience, but I do not know of any step of social or economic advance which has ever been made without temporary loss and inconvenience both to capital and labor, and the United States were not exposed to any of this loss at all. Mr. Seyd has just published a book, "The Decline of Prosperity, and its Insidious Cause," in which, as the title indicates, he takes a very lugubrious view of things, and ascribes the mischief to the demonetization of silver. This fear that prosperity was declining has come up every fifteen or twenty years for a century or two, especially in England, and yet prosperity and civilization advance. In 1872 coal and meat were dear, and the newspapers were filled with essays about the sufferings of the people on fixed incomes. Then the woes of the agricultural laborers came up, and the farmers were represented as selfish men, gorged with wealth and prosperity. Now meat is too cheap, the turn has come to the landowners, and the farmers are the objects of public concern. Such changes are the inevitable effects of the continual changes in the conditions of industry and the relations of commerce. It is from and by means of such changes that the prosperity of mankind advances. Every great improvement involves changes and readjustments. They are not welcome, but they are unavoidable. It is not at all improbable that the number and variety of the great improvements of the last twenty years, following so rapidly on each other, crossing and combining with each other, necessitating quick and complicated adjustments, may go for a great deal in the present reaction. It is very probable that the next twenty-five years are to see massive migrations of population, and great transfers of capital, from the old to the new countries, which will not be made until suffering has enforced them. It is probable that the value and rent of land will decline in the old countries and rise in the new. It is possible that social, economic, and political changes are to be accomplished such as we cannot yet guess at. It is certain to

my mind, however, that those years are to be years of unprecedented prosperity.

The fall in silver has its share in the temporary disorder, loss, and suffering; but the use of the single gold standard will be one of the strongest supports of the new prosperity. If this were not so, it would be idle to lament over a movement which comes along in the natural evolution of things. To try to stem that movement and turn it back to the old system of repeated empirical struggles for a bimetallic circulation, it would be necessary for us to be sure of three things: (1) that we understand present phenomena thoroughly,[1] (2) that we can foresee the results of the movement towards gold, if it goes on, and (3) that we are sure of the working of the gigantic experiment involved in the attempt to secure bimetallism, or the alternate standard, by a coinage union. These conditions are absolutely unfulfilled. On the contrary, it seems that international banking is just at the point where its further development, and the transfer of capital from old to new countries, above alluded to, require an international standard of value amongst the great commercial nations such as gold alone can supply. The development of international banking, in its turn, will economize the use of gold, and thus again defeat the fears of those who think there is not gold enough. The movement, therefore, bears all the marks of a true organic development, in which all the parts contribute to and support each other in advancement to a higher stage. It also seems to me that the fall in silver is precisely adapted to favor those extensions of commerce and civilization which lie in the near future. South America is still in the lowest stage of economic development, and will find silver its best money for a long time to come. Asia is scarcely yet upon a monetary system, except where Europeans have penetrated, and can use nothing but silver to advantage for an indefinite future. Africa is an almost untouched continent, which, within fifty years, will probably come into new

[1] The authorities are by no means agreed as to the causes of the fall of silver. This question came up at Paris, and Mr. Feer-Herzog maintained that the key to the phenomenon lay in the state of the East Indian exchanges. (Report, p. 58.) This is the view which I took before the U. S. Silver Committee in 1876, but I have never seen any other confirmation of it.

relations to the civilized world. Silver is the only suitable medium for this extension of commerce. As far, then, as we can foresee, the cheapening of the tool of exchange by which these extensions of trade and civilization must be carried on will only facilitate them; and if bimetallism were not an absurdity, and the alternate standard either an injustice or a delusion, and if either of them were practicable, the adoption of either would now be the grandest mistake the civilized world could commit. I attribute no weight to these prognostications of mine. It is contrary to my opinion of sound procedure in such matters to make them at all. I should consider it the most vicious procedure to make such prognostications the basis of argument that any nation or that all civilized nations "ought" to use the single gold standard. The economic development of human society must go on its way and work out its results, and the human race must make the best of them. The race, however, does not make mistakes, and so long as, in all its parts, it obeys the dictates of its interests, it will push on a true evolution which cannot but serve to enhance the prosperity of the race as a whole. It is only when nations allow their action to be dictated by speculations about the future of civilization and humanity that they may wreck the natural development. It is because these terrors about the future, and prophecies of disaster, have been introduced to play so great a *rôle* on the other side of this question that I venture to set against them the best speculations I can make as to the probable course of affairs.

POSTSCRIPT.—After the above was in type my attention was called, by an editorial in the New York *Tribune*, to a recantation by Mr. Gibbs of the opinions maintained by him at the Conference at Paris. The plan of my article was to make an independent discussion, and not to examine the literature of bimetallism beyond the Report of the Monetary Commission. When, however, a journal which has sustained a uniformly sound and strong position on monetary questions referred to Mr. Gibbs' pamphlet in the terms used by the *Tribune*, it seemed that here perhaps a bimetallist might at last be found

who had some clear ideas, and could state them so as to bear examination. I therefore hastened to secure a copy of Mr. Gibbs' pamphlet,[1] and also a copy of his letter to Cernuschi announcing his conversion, and Cernuschi's reply to the same.[2] My hopes of finding something in these pamphlets solid enough to bear examination for purposes of discussion are all disappointed.

Mr. Gibbs has simply gone over to the bimetallic fallacy, and accepted it in its grossest and crudest form. He has produced no new arguments for it and refuted no objections against it. Incidentally he has shown that the ex-Governor of the Bank of England holds, in regard to money, all the fallacies which constitute the premises of our soft-money men; and if he does not agree with them in their conclusions, it is only because he is less logical and consistent. This, however, might be said of all bimetallists. The *Tribune's* estimate of this pamphlet adds the greatest possible weight to the motive for my article as stated in the first paragraph thereof. I am therefore led to counteract that estimate by amplifying one or two points which I had passed over briefly, and by inserting one or two which I had judged better to omit, in order to show the real significance and value of what Mr. Gibbs has contributed to this controversy.

1. Mr. Gibbs' conversion to bimetallism is due to observation of the losses incurred in Indian finances and Indian trade. He assumes that these losses are due to the fall in silver, and he attributes the fall in silver to demonetization. Hence he argues: Remonetize; that will restore silver; that will stop the losses. It is a pity that the matter is not so simple. I consider it an error to attribute the losses in the India trade to the fall in silver. The fall in silver is not a cause, but a consequence. The financial relations between England and India after 1870 took such shape that the "tribute," as it is called, had to be paid by an excess of exports over imports of India. This could only be accomplished by a fall in prices in India. Nevertheless Europe desired to continue to sell silver to India, while the relation just mentioned would have led

[1] "Silver and Gold," by Henry H. Gibbs, London, 1879.

[2] "Bimetallism in England and Abroad," by Henri Cernuschi, London, 1879.

India to desist from buying it. Instead of a *fall* in prices (silver remaining stable) there therefore has occurred the exactly equivalent phenomenon of a fall in silver *without any rise* in prices. In countries which have a depreciated paper currency prices rise as the medium falls, and so the foreign trade quickly adjusts itself. If prices had risen in India there would have been no trouble; but the forces which would have forced a fall in prices if silver had held firm have prevented a rise in prices while forcing a fall in the medium. A crisis in the Indian exchanges was therefore inevitable in some form or other. Instead of taking place through prices, it has taken place through the medium—silver—and the fall in silver is a consequence and not a cause. This relation of facts accounts for the fall in silver, and nothing else does. The silver thrown on the market by demonetization and by a somewhat increased production (which has been greatly exaggerated) by no means account for the fall. The increased supply fell on a weak market, and had accessory influence, but it does not suffice to account for the principal effect. It follows that it is a great error for those who suffer from losses in the India trade to ascribe their troubles to the fall in silver, and that their troubles cannot be cured by any currency devices. While India has so much interest to pay in England on borrowed capital, to which she has not yet grown up, and while she has to pay in England for an expensive government, to which also she has not yet grown up, she will be a worse country to sell in and a better one to buy in than formerly. However, if English merchants and bankers interested in the India trade could sell their silver to somebody for the old price, it is obvious that they could save themselves from the effect of these changed circumstances in the relations of the two countries.

2. This last observation leads me to amplify what I have said under VI., 1. I have shown there that the alternate standard would only transfer risks and losses from those to whom they belong to somebody else. *A fortiori* bimetallism, if it were practicable, would throw all risks and losses, all the time, on the creditor classes. Gibbs and Cernuschi seem to be entirely blind to this character in their propositions, and they do not see that whatever they gain for some must either be won out of others

or *out of nothing*, as I have shown in my main argument. To show this more fully, let us observe the difference for different classes between the significance of a fall in gold and the significance of a fall in silver. The effect of a fall in gold (rise in prices) would fall on annuitants, pensioners, owners of bonds, etc., beneficiaries of trusts and life assurances, salaried and professional men, wage-receivers, and, generally, on all who have either temporarily or permanently fixed incomes. These are the persons whom I designate as the creditor classes. A fall in silver, as things stood in 1873, affected producers, exchangers, and bankers in certain great lines of business. A fall in gold would therefore affect a large number of small, weak, and scattered recipients of money incomes, belonging to different classes and having no co-operation or even acquaintance with each other. A fall in silver affects great "interests," each of which is marked by very strong cohesion of its parts within itself, and all of which are capable of sudden and easy combination. The former have little power or chance to defend themselves; the latter are powerful and influential in speech, writing, and legislation. The former never attract public attention; the latter fill the public eye and are thought of whenever money, capital, trade, or industry are thought of. The losses of the latter make up appalling figures in the statistics of bankruptcy. The losses of the former figure in no statistics, since they consist in privation, misery, disease, and earlier death for those affected directly and for their dependants. The losses to producers, exchangers, and bankers are what govern the opinions of Mr. Seyd, and now, too, have converted Mr. Gibbs. It is indeed cause for great regret that such losses should occur, and if there were any means of averting the loss altogether, the matter would bear a very different aspect. But there is no such means. There is nothing possible but an alternative, either to leave the losses where they fall by the circumstances of the case, or to throw them on somebody else; and nothing is proposed in these monetary schemes save to throw the losses on those who would have suffered if the fall had been in gold instead of in silver. Now when gold has fallen (prices have risen), notably in 1870–1873, the classes who were affected had to make the best of it without aid from those interested in silver, and so the proposition that

England shall now adopt bimetallism, when stripped of all disguises, is simply another case of the old abuse whereby a few strong, well-organized interests, acting through currency legislation, play at "heads I win, tails you lose" with the large, scattered, unorganized mass of the nation. English statesmen may possibly upset the monetary basis on which all relations of property and credit in England rest, in order to alleviate a temporary strain on some branches of foreign trade, and on the finances of India; but those who have to rely on American newspapers for their information and impressions of what is likely to be done in this matter in Europe will do well to nourish an active incredulousness. Those Americans who have to rely on the Hon. W. D. Kelly's reports of interviews between himself and Bismarck for judgments as to the probable course of Germany will do well to allow for other elements in the report than the probable power of Mr. Kelly to inspire the Prince with expansive and familiar confidence. Mr. Kelly is a man of enthusiastic imagination, and it appears probable that he and Mr. George Walker are just the kind of men to excite the well-known propensity of the German Chancellor to befool people by an ostentatious and effusive frankness while laughing at them in his sleeve. A great deal has been said about the zeal, dogmatism, and fanaticism of the advocates of the single universal gold standard. I do not know who these persons are, nor what they have done. The only persons who, in regard to this monetary question, have organized a sect, adopted a creed, undertaken a propaganda, and sent out missionaries, so far as I know, are the bimetallists. It is charitable to believe that they do not see the political and social significance of their propositions, but that statesmen will not see this long before action is adopted is very improbable.

Now Mr. Gibbs has just found out that the trade between India and England is barter. He is astonished and alarmed at this. He thinks this kind of trade uncivilized and attended by loss to England. He attributes the evil to English gold monometallism, and thinks that the evil effects have been counteracted until recent years by the French law. If it be true, however, as Mr. Gibbs and the other bimetallists argue, that France has done this service by her law, now to gold-using Englishmen

and now to silver-using Germans, then France, through her creditor class, has borne burdens and losses which belonged to other people. Such being the case, we could see why Englishmen and Germans should want the French law to continue, but we should also see why Frenchmen, so soon as they understood it, would certainly want it to stop; and, if universal bimetallism could be or should be established, the next question would be, What class, under the new system, is to take the place formerly filled by the French creditor class and bear the burdens formerly borne by them?

Such is the inference from Mr. Gibbs' premisses, but the premisses are false. Trade with India is barter, but so is all trade, and foreign trade most plainly. The trade for silver has involved inconveniences which will exist until all the world uses a single and universal standard of value. This inconvenience has been paid for, as all other hindrances and difficulties of trade are paid for, in prices. The French mint law has had nothing to do with it. Finally, the French creditors have lost whenever the ratio of the metals has varied so as to change the metal of the French coinage. This loss, however, has been borne once for all; it has not continued after prices have been readjusted; and has not therefore been constant under the operation of the double standard.

Cernuschi, in his reply to Gibbs, gives far more gross expression to the same fallacy about the operation of the French law to prevent losses; for he attaches it not to English traders, but to all metal producers. "At the time of the French $15\frac{1}{2}$, the position of the producers of gold and silver was this: all their produce had by law an unfailing and insatiable customer —the *mint*. No price to haggle about, no competition possible." A customer by law! The mint a customer!? In some large establishments, as a check on salesmen, one person is stationed at a counter to weigh, measure, and count all goods for which the salesmen have made bargains with the customers. It would be as sensible to call this person the "unfailing and insatiable customer" for all the goods sold in the establishment as to call the mint a customer for gold and silver. This gross error, however, is the cloak which covers the fallacy and the injustice of bimetallism. The law does provide a customer, but it is not the

mint. It is the creditor class as above defined. There is "no price to haggle about and no competition to fear" because the law has delivered the victim over helpless, all the more helpless because he is ignorant, the law having concealed the transaction under mysteries of coinage and money. This, however, is the most direct condemnation of the law itself, as well in an economic as a social or political point of view. It is a fallacy to think the mint law has secured the producers of the metals against loss and haggling and competition—that is, against all the inevitable annoyances of industry without hurting anybody else; and it is an injustice to take the annoyances from one industry only to spread them over others. I do not like to say anything which may appear arrogant and unbecoming, but I feel justified in protesting, in the name of all that scholars and scientific men respect, that a man who calls the mint an "unfailing and insatiable customer" does not deserve respectful treatment in the arena of scientific discussion.

Mr. Gibbs sees that bimetallism involves depreciation, but he thinks the evils of it are in this case more nominal than real. The only distinction which men generally make between nominal evils and real evils is that my evils are real and yours are nominal; but that is not a valid distinction which science or justice can recognize. Mr. Gibbs seems to think the evils of depreciation nominal because they would be widely scattered and much concealed, as I have shown above. All evils, however, are real to those who suffer them. If they come from nature, like blight, drought, storms, inundations, and other calamities, they must be borne as philosophically as possible. If they are inflicted by legislation, or are transferred by legislation, nothing can justify or belittle them. Mr. Gibbs wants silver remonetized, not at its present market value, but at the point where it will be when the bimetallic system shall have operated on it. He has not comprehended the full problem which he has to solve. It is this: (1) If in England, for instance, silver is rated at its present market value, all the silver now in England loses 20 per cent of its present value. (2) If silver is rated at the point to which the bimetallic system will bring it up, no one but Cernuschi knows where that will be. If a guess is made, and silver is rated above the market, no debtor will want it, and so

the bimetallic system will never begin. (3) If silver is rated at the market to begin with, and if the mint ratio is advanced as the market ratio advances (assuming that bimetallism would work), then continual recoinage, with heavy expense and endless confusion, will result. I hope that it is plain, then, that the bimetallists of every grade and description are either trying to transfer losses from one group of men to another, or else trying to make something out of nothing.

3. It also seems desirable to notice another error of bimetallism which I had passed over; that is the notion that demand due to a fall in price raises price. This doctrine is essential to the bimetallic theory, and it has been carelessly conceded by some who are not bimetallists. I passed over it in the body of my article because it is the fallacy of that extreme form of bimetallism in which it is believed that the coinage union will lock the two metals so tight together that they will never separate from the legal ratio any more, because there will be no one to whom to sell the rising metal. Every bimetallist would be driven to this doctrine if he followed out his notions consistently; but the bimetallists repudiate it generally when it is ascribed to them. Mr. Gibbs, however, explicitly accepts this notion, and assumes that the bimetallic union would lock the two metals permanently together as such an undoubted fact that it is his chief reliance for refuting objections. Demand due to a fall in price tends to sustain price at the lower level, but not to raise price, since such demand ceases when the price rises. If we have a bimetallic circulation at $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, debtors do not want silver *at* or below $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, but only below. Their demand will only act on it so long as it stays below; therefore their demand never can lift it again to $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. But meanwhile their demand is acting to sustain it only by absorbing any new supply through real purchases. So long, therefore, as there is a new supply, the price must remain below $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, and that new supply must be absorbed. But this is destroying the bimetallic and concurrent circulation just so far as it goes on. The bimetallists seem to think that, *if* silver fell, the debtors of the world would all pounce upon it so unanimously and immediately that it would *not* fall. This is absurd in the statement, and it is absurd in every detail of fact. New silver does not rain down in an equal

deposit over the earth. It comes into human society at certain points. Hence the world-wide demand cannot be concentrated on it. Any demand which does act on it can do so only by real transactions under price fluctuations. This fallacy, therefore, reminds us again of perpetual motion, wherein it is believed that we can get effect out of a force without action, reaction, and "escapement."

4. To meet another point somewhat more explicitly than I have done it above, let me say that if any nation which now uses gold finds that its interests are not served thereby, and thinks that silver would serve them better, it has only to make the experiment on its own risk and responsibility. If it succeeds, others will imitate it, and the inferences now made from the past action of nations will have to be modified. So far the nations have always acted as if they knew they were about to commit folly and incur loss whenever they have taken up any projects about silver, and they have insisted on first joining hands so as to all go into the evil together. We wait, then, for the first nation to give up gold and take silver because it thinks silver will serve its interest and convenience better. Mr. Gibbs is as anxious lest England should become a silver nation as any "gold monometallist" possibly could be.

5. If, then, we are asked which nations will take gold and which silver, and why any should take silver, and, if none take silver, where gold enough is to come from, we answer: (1) That it is not possible or necessary to tell *a priori* who will take silver and who gold. (2) All would prefer gold, and the world will probably ultimately come to use only a single universal standard of value, just as it probably will come to use single and universal standards of weights and measures. This, however, is only an anticipation which it must be left to time and the development of civilization to realize. At present it has no importance. If it is a correct anticipation it is fruitless; if it is an incorrect anticipation it is harmless. (3) If it is said that "there is not gold enough," that assertion is senseless unless we add: "to sustain prices and credits at their present level." If, then, there is not enough, in this sense, the nations will compete for gold until those to whom its advantages are worth most get it, because they give most (goods) for it. Others will

drop out of the competition for gold and take silver whenever its comparative cheapness more than counterbalances its inferior utility. So then, if there is not enough gold, we will use silver, and those will take some silver who think it for their interest, all things considered, so to do.

WILLIAM G. SUMNER.

October 25, 1879.

POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND REVELATION.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE subject of this paper does not lie in the field of that "conflict of science and religion" in which so many theologians and philosophers of our time seem to think that no quarter should be given. It relates to those points, not few or unimportant, in which modern scientific investigation has come into peaceful contact with the revealed Word of God as held by Christians, and has proved itself in harmony therewith, or has illustrated points previously obscure to reason, if held as dogmas by faith. There is perhaps the more necessity to refer to such points of contact, that many of them lie out of the way of ordinary students of nature or of the Bible, and that they are so likely to be overlooked amid the noise and struggle that arise from seeming contradictions.

That profound thinkers should sometimes arrive at truths, as matters of speculation, which others may reach by the slower processes of observation, experiment or calculation, is not surprising, and has often been realized. Nor is it more wonderful that men raised to a high degree of inspiration and of prophetic insight should, in some degree, anticipate our scientific discoveries, more especially in points where natural things present analogies with the supernatural or spiritual. In illustration of such coincidences, I may first refer to a question which perhaps rather relates to the sagacious insight of men in general in very ancient times than to anything properly of the nature of revelation.

A subject at present of considerable scientific interest is the connection of spots on the surface of the sun with famines and

other calamities. Observation has shown that in the course of every period of about eleven years the sun's surface is affected by what has been called "a wave of sun-spots." When these spots are at a minimum, for a year or so the sun may show scarcely any dark spots. In the course of four or five years they increase in number until they attain a maximum, and then diminish, returning to their minimum in about eleven years. The intensity of the maxima and minima are not quite the same in succeeding cycles, appearing to culminate in periods of about fifty-five years.

Now it seems that the more the spots increase the hotter the sun becomes, and the fewer the spots the cooler. The difference is sufficient to cause a perceptible rise and fall in the waters of our great lakes, and notable differences in the dryness or wetness of successive seasons, though the precise effects vary much with local conditions. Thus in 1879, a year of minimum sun-spots, the summer has been disastrously wet and cold in Western Europe, cooler and more moist than usual in Eastern America, and characterized by severe drought in some southern climates, all this apparently depending upon a diminished supply of solar heat. But floods and droughts bring failures of crops and famines, and thus bring diminished trade and financial crises, while these last in turn produce political and social revolutions. Of course all these influences may locally be counteracted in whole or in part by other causes; but it would seem that about every eleventh year we are to anticipate some aggravation of the general struggle for existence, owing to a diminution of the power of the great central heater and lighter of our system.

But again, there is good reason to believe that the periodicity of sun-spots is determined by the attraction of the planets, and more especially of the greatest of them, Jupiter, whose nearest approach to the sun in his annual revolutions of between eleven and twelve years coincides with the maximum of sun-spots, but may be influenced in this by the positions of the other planets. Thus the planets, and more particularly Jupiter, exercise an important influence on human affairs. That they have this power seems to have been discovered so long ago that the astrological ideas based upon the fact can be traced back to the oldest Chaldean literary monuments, of a date nearly as far back as that of

the deluge of Noah. Indications of this belief are thought by some to exist even in the Bible, as in the expression in the Song of Deborah, "The stars in their courses fought against Sisera." It must, however, be admitted that the Bible decidedly opposes astrological divination, as connected with idolatry; and justly so, since the observed facts do not yet warrant any very definite predictions, and they were at a very early period made subservient to imposture and superstition. Still, when we see that such men as Lockyer, Piazzi Smith, Meldrum, and many other astronomers and physicists, repose faith in the connection of sun-spots with sublunary events, we cannot any longer laugh at the Chaldean astrology, or even at the poetical fancy of the old "Mother in Israel," which might be literally true, if Sisera's campaign was in any way determined either by the attitude of the planets or by his belief in their influence, or even if the flood of the Kishon, which cut off his retreat, was aggravated by planetary influence.

Such a fact as that above referred to may have other bearings. It is obvious that by relegating changes of the seasons to cycles determined by natural law, it cuts away the ground from certain astrological superstitions and Sabean idolatries of the ancient world. On the other hand, it seems to remove famines or droughts or floods from the domain of special providence or of direct divine intervention. Yet it is remarkable that it still leaves scope even for miracle. Our knowledge of these cycles is too limited to enable us to predict their precise effects, while their complication with longer cycles on the one hand, and with local causes on the other, makes the result for any one year or place too complex to be certainly worked out, and gives infinite variety to their operation. If, for example, we should discover that the three years of drought in the time of Ahab coincided with a period of minimum or maximum of sun-spots, though this would enable us better to understand the method employed to punish the idolatrous Israelites through the agency of their adopted sun-god, it would not account for the special local aggravation of the calamity and its coincidence with a certain condition of the nation. It would not, therefore, deprive the visitation of its character of a predetermined punishment wrought by the hand of God.

This is, however, but a very slender point of contact, both because we know as yet little from science as to the matter referred to, and because the Bible does not deal in astrology. There are others more marked, and we may now proceed to consider a few of them, more especially some of those which relate to the earlier periods treated of in the record of divine revelation.

EDEN.

Perhaps no portion of Bible history seems to have been more thoroughly set at naught by modern scientific speculations than the golden age of Eden, so dear to the imagination of the poet, so interwoven with the past condition and future prospects of man, as held by all religions. We are now invited to regard as our first ancestors certain dumb and semi-brutal descendants of apes, slowly rising amidst a struggle for existence, through successive stages of filth, savagery, bloodshed, and misery, into the condition of such humanity as we see today in the lowest tribes of men. So much the worse, probably, for the speculations in question; because they not only outrage our feelings, but contravene all natural probability in their fancied pedigree of man. On the other hand, it can easily be shown that there are important points of agreement between the simple story of Eden, as we have it in Genesis, and scientific probabilities as to the origin of man. Let us glance at these probabilities.

It seems plain that the condition of our earth, in all those long periods when it was inhabited by inferior animals only, was unsuitable for man. We do not expect to find remains of men in the formations of the Palæozoic, Mesozoic, or early Tertiary ages. Man is thus a recent animal in our world. Now, under any hypothesis as to his origin, the external conditions must have been suitable to him before he could appear. If, to use the language of evolutionary philosophy, he was himself the product of the environment acting on the nature of a lower animal, this would be all the more necessary. Further, it would be altogether improbable that these favorable conditions should prevail at one time over the whole world. They must, in the nature of things, have prevailed only in some particular region, the special

"centre of creation" of man, and this, whether its conditions arose by chance, as certain theorists would have us believe, or were divinely ordained, must have been to the first men the Eden where they could subsist safely when few, and whence they could extend themselves as they increased in numbers. There is, therefore, in science nothing inconsistent with the Scripture statement that God "prepared a place for man."

Further, no one supposes that man appeared at first with weapons, armor, and arts full-blown. He must have commenced his career naked, destitute of weapons and clothing, and with only such capacities for obtaining food as his hands and feet could give him. For such a being it was absolutely necessary that the region of his *début* should furnish him with suitable food, and should not task his resources as to shelter from cold or as to defence from wild animals. The statements in Genesis that it was a "garden," that is, a locality separated in some way from the uninhabited wilderness around; that it was stocked with trees pleasant to the sight and good for food; and that man was placed therein naked and destitute of all the arts of life, to subsist on the spontaneous fruits of the earth, are thus perfectly in accordance with the requirements of the case.

If we inquire as to the portion of the world in which man at first appeared, the theory of evolution advises us to look at those regions of the world in which the lowest types of men now exist or recently existed, as Tasmania, Tierra del Fuego, and the Cape of Good Hope, or it assures us that those tropical jungles which now afford congenial haunts for anthropoid apes, but are most unsuitable for the higher races of men, are the regions most likely to have witnessed the origin of man. But this is manifestly absurd, since, in the case of any species, we should expect that it would originate where the conditions are most favorable to the existence of that species, and not in those regions where, as shown by the result, it can scarcely exist when introduced. We should look for the centre whence men have spread, to those regions in which they can most easily live and in which they have most multiplied and prospered. In historical times these indications, and also those of tradition, archæology, and affiliation of languages and races, point to Western Asia as the cradle of man. Even Haeckel in his "History of Creation," though it is conve-

nient, in connection with his theoretical views, to assume the origin of man in a region somewhere in the Indian Ocean and now submerged, traces all his lines of affiliation back to the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, in the neighborhood of the districts to which the Bible history restricts the site of Eden.

Again, there is reason to believe that, at the fall of man, climatic or other changes, expressed by the "cursing of the ground," occurred, and that in the Edenic system of things very large portions of the earth were to be or become suitable to the happy residence of man. Geology makes us familiar with the fact that such changes have occurred in the later half of the Tertiary period, to such an extent that at one time the plants of warm temperate regions could flourish in Spitzbergen, and at another ice and snow covered the land far into temperate latitudes. Farther, it would seem that the oldest men known to us by archæological discoveries, probably equivalent to the Antediluvians, lived at a time of somewhat rough and rigorous climate, and which probably succeeded a more favorable period in which man appeared.

Thus it would seem that we are not under any scientific necessity to give up the old and beautiful story of Eden, and that, on the contrary, this better accords with the probabilities as to the origin of man than do those hypotheses of his derivation which have been avowedly founded on scientific considerations.

TIME-WORLDS.

When we speak of the world or the universe, the ordinary hearer perhaps has before his mind merely the idea of bodies occurring in space, and the vast discoveries of modern times as to the distances and magnitudes of the heavenly bodies have contributed to fill the minds of men with conceptions of the immensity of space, perhaps to the exclusion of another direction of thought equally important. Worlds must exist in time as well as in space. This idea is very familiar to the mind of the geologist, who traces the long history of the earth through successive periods, and also knows that each succeeding day has seen it different from the previous ones. This consideration is also before the mind of the physical astronomer, who thinks of suns and

planets as passing through different successive conditions, and as actually presenting different stages in the present.

This point is curiously illustrated by a controversy which raged some time ago as to whether the planets and other heavenly bodies may be inhabited worlds, and especially whether they may be inhabited by rational beings.

If we look at this question with reference to our own world, we shall find that its existence as a vaporous mass, as a heated molten globe, as the abode of merely inferior animals, has been of vast duration as compared with the time in which it has been inhabited by man. Farther, it is gradually approaching to a condition in which it will no longer be habitable, and unless some renovating process shall be applied to it, this desolate condition may be of indefinite duration. Thus, if we imagine ourselves to be beings not limited by time, and that we could visit the earth by chance at any period of its history, the chances would be vastly against our seeing it at that precise period of its existence in which it is fitted for the residence of rational beings. On the other hand, if we were capable of taking in its whole duration, we would comprehend that it has its particular stage for being the abode of intelligence, and that it has a definite and intelligible history as a world in time, which may be more or less parallel to that of all other worlds.

This truth also appears if we consider other planetary bodies. The moon may have been inhabited at a time when our earth was luminous and incandescent, but it has passed into a state of senility and desolation. The planet Mars, which seems physically not unlike the earth, may be in a condition similar to that of our world in the older geological periods. Jupiter and Saturn are probably still intensely heated and encompassed with a vaporous "deep," and may perhaps aid in supporting life on their satellites, while untold ages must elapse before these magnificent orbs can arrive at a stage suitable for maintaining life like that on the earth. But after all these ages have passed, and when all the planets have grown old and lifeless, the sun itself, now a fiery mass, may have arrived at a condition suited for living and rational beings.

Thus the physical conditions of our planetary system teach that if we suppose all worlds capable of supporting life, all are

not so at one time, and that, as ages pass, each may successfully take up this *rôle*, of which in greater or less degree all may at some time or other be capable. So when we ascend to the starry orbs, these suns may have attendant worlds, some in one stage, some in another. There may also be stars and nebulæ still scarcely formed, and others which have passed far beyond the present state of our sun and its planets. Thus the universe is a vastly varied and progressive scene. At no one time can all worlds be seats of life, but of the countless suns and worlds that exist, thousands or millions may at any one time be in this state, while thousands of times as many may be gradually arriving at it or passing from it. Such are the thoughts which necessarily arise in our minds when we consider the existence of worlds in time.

Now these ideas are very old, and they impressed themselves on the mind of antiquity before men could measure the vastness of the universe in space; and it is necessary to have them before our minds if we would enter into the thoughts of the writers of the Old and New Testaments, when they treat of time and eternity. The several stages of the earth in its progress from chaos, the prophetic pictures of its changes in the future, alike embody the idea of time-worlds. It is in this aspect that the universe is compared to a vesture of God, which he can change as a garment, while he himself remains ever the same. It is in contrast to the eternity of truth that the heavens and earth are said to be passing away, but the words of the Redeemer shall never pass away. It is with the same reference that we are told that "the things which are seen are temporal, the things which are unseen are eternal."

The use made of the Hebrew word *olam* and the Greek *aion* in the sense of age, or even of eternity, brings before us still more clearly the biblical idea of time-worlds. In that sublime "prayer of Moses the man of God" which we have in the 90th Psalm, God, who is the "dwelling-place of man in generation to generation," who existed before the mountains were brought forth, with whom a thousand years are "as a watch in the night," is said to be from "olam to olam," from "everlasting to everlasting" as the authorized version has it, but more properly from age to age of those long cosmic ages in which he

creates and furnishes successive worlds. So when God is said to "inhabit eternity," [1] it is not abstract eternity but these successive olams, or time-worlds, which are his habitation. In the Old Testament, God, as revealed to us in his works, dwells in the grand succession of worlds in time, thus continuously and variously manifesting his power, a much more living and attractive view of divinity than the mere abstract affirmation of eternity.

The same thought is taken up and amplified in the New Testament. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who is most deeply imbued with the Old Testament lore, speaks of Christ as God's Son, "whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds," more literally "constituted the aions." He does not refer, as one might conceive from the English translation, to different worlds in space, but to the successive ages of this world, in which it was being gradually prepared and fitted up for man. So Paul, in his doxology at the end of the third chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, ascribes to the Redeemer glory in "all generations of the time-worlds," and in the earlier part of the same chapter he speaks of "God's mystery, hid from the beginning of the ages or time-worlds, and now made known in Christ, by whom also he created all things." So, also, in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews we are told that by faith we understand that "the ages or time-worlds were constituted by the word of God." Another fine illustration of this idea is in Paul's familiar and business-like letter to Titus, where he says that he lives "in hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised before the world began, but hath in due time manifested his word." The expression "the world began" here represents the "ages of time," and the "eternal life" is the "life of the ages." Thus, what the apostle hopes for is life through the unlimited ages of God's working, and this life has been promised, before the beginning of the time-worlds of creation. So the whole past, present, and future of God's working has its relation to us, is included under this remarkable idea of ages or time-worlds, and is appropriated by faith and hope as the possession of God's people. God, who cannot lie, has pledged himself to us from the beginning of those

[1] Isaiah 56 : 15.

long geologic ages in which he founded the earth; he has promised us his favor in all the course of his subsequent work; he has sealed this promise in the mission of his Son, that same glorious Being through whom he arranged all those vast ages of creation and providence, and in the strength of this promise we can look forward by faith to an endless life with him in all the future ages of his boundless working.

CREATIVE DAYS AND THE SABBATH.

It has long appeared to me, and I have elsewhere endeavored to illustrate this idea,[1] that the long creative days of geology throw a most important light on the institution of the weekly Sabbath and its continuance as the Lord's day. If it is true that the seventh or Sabbath day of creation still continues, and was intended to be a day of rest for the creator and his intelligent creature man, we find in this a substantial reason for the place of the Sabbath in the Decalogue, and through our Lord's declaration in reply to the Pharisees, "My Father worketh hitherto and I work," and the argument in the fourth chapter of the Hebrews, can carry it forward into the Christian dispensation.

At first sight the place of the fourth commandment in the Decalogue, and the vast importance attached to this law by the Hebrew writers, strikes us as strange and anomalous. The Sabbath stands as the sole example of a ritual observance, in those "ten words," which otherwise mark the most general moral relations of man to God and to his fellow-men. Farther, the reason given seems trivial. If it is meant that God worked on six natural days and rested on the seventh, the question arises, what is he doing on subsequent days? Does he keep up this alternation of six days' work and one day's rest, and if not, how is this an example to us? If it is argued that the whole reason of God's six days' work and seventh day's rest was to give an example, this conveys the absurdity of doing what is infinitely great for an end comparatively insignificant, and which might have been attained by a command, without any reason assigned. But let us now suppose that when God rested on the

[1] "Origin of the World," chap. vi.

seventh day he entered into an æon of vast duration, intended to be distinguished by the happy Sabbatism of man in an Edenic world, and in which every day would have been a Sabbath; or if there was a weekly Sabbath, it would have been but a memorial of a work leading to a perpetual Sabbath then enjoyed. Let us farther suppose that at the fall of man the Sabbath-day was instituted, or obtained a new significance as a memorial of an Edenic Sabbatism lost, and also as a memorial of God's promise that through a redeemer it would be restored. Then the Sabbath becomes the central point of all religion, the standing and perpetual memorial of an Eden lost and a paradise to be restored by the coming seed of the woman. The commandment "Remember the Sabbath-day" called upon the Israelite to remember the fall of man, to remember the promise of a Saviour, to look forward to a future Sabbatism in the reign of the Redeemer. It is thus the gospel in the Decalogue, giving vitality to the whole, and is most appropriately placed, and with a more full explanation than any other command, between the laws that relate to God and the laws that relate to man. I have elsewhere attempted to show that in this light the Sabbath was regarded by Moses himself, by succeeding prophets, by our Lord, the apostles, and the primitive church,[1] and that the loss of this great truth belongs to the many losses of the church in passing through the dim ages before the reformation. If the investigations of science into the long æons of the pre-adamite earth helps us to regain it now, let us not be ungrateful.

The argument in the Epistle to the Hebrews[2] may help us to understand this, and it is the more valuable that it is not an argument about the Sabbath, but introduces it incidentally, and that it seems to take for granted the belief in a long or olamic Sabbath on the part of those to whom it is addressed. It may be freely rendered as follows:

"'For God hath spoken in a certain place (Gen. 2:2) of the seventh day in this wise—"And God did rest on the seventh day from all his works;" and in this place again—"They shall not enter into my rest" (Ps. 95:11). Seeing, therefore, it still remaineth that some enter therein, and they to whom it (God's Sabbatism) was first proclaimed entered not in, because of disobedience (in the fall, and afterward in the sin of the Israel-

[1] Op. cit.

[2] Chap. iv.

ites in the desert), again he fixes a certain day, saying in David's writings, long after the time of Joshua—"To-day, if ye hear his voice, harden not your hearts." For if Joshua had given them rest in Canaan, he would not afterward have spoken of another day. There is therefore yet reserved a keeping of a Sabbath for the people of God. For he that is entered into his rest (that is, Jesus Christ, who has finished his work and entered into his rest in heaven), he himself also rested from his own works, as God did from his own. Let us therefore earnestly strive to enter into that rest.'

"It is evident that in this passage God's Sabbatism, the rest intended for man in Eden and for Israel in Canaan, Christ's rest in heaven after finishing his work, and the final heavenly rest of Christ's people, are all indefinite periods mutually related, and cannot possibly be natural days."

This passage farther aids us in comprehending the connection of the Lord's day with the Jewish Sabbath. If the latter had a reference to a Sabbatism lost by the fall and restored by the Redeemer, the Son of man must be "Lord of the Sabbath" in the sense of fulfilling and realizing its prophetic import. Therefore, the day on which he finished his work and entered into his rest must of necessity be that to be commemorated by Christians, until the time when the return of Christ shall inaugurate that final and eternal Sabbatism which remains to his people. Thus the Lord's day comes to occupy the same important place formerly occupied by the Jewish Sabbath. It links together God's creative work and Christ's work of redemption; the Sabbatism lost in the fall and restored in the Saviour; the imperfect state of the militant church, still having only a memorial of a rest to come, and the church triumphant, which will enjoy this rest forever. If the Sabbath that carried with it the mournful memory of the first sin was holy, much more that which points forward to a heavenly paradise. If the obligation to remember it was to the Hebrew equal to that of the most binding moral duties, still more must the Lord's day be a day to be remembered by the Christian, as the memorial of Christ's finished work, and of our heirship of all the divine ages, past, present, and to come. Thus we see that the moral and spiritual dignity and obligation of the Lord's day rise far above those of the Jewish Sabbath, and we can understand how naturally the apostles and primitive Christians, almost without note of the change, transferred their allegiance from the seventh to the first day of the week.

ANTEDILUVIANS.

The deluge of Noah has ceased to be a matter solely theological or dependent on the veracity of Genesis. It has now become a fact of ancient Assyrian history, a tradition preserved by many and various races, a pluvial or diluvial age, or time of subsidence, intervening between the oldest race of men known to geology and modern times. We are at least entitled, conjecturally, to identify these things, and through means of these identifications to arrive at some definite conceptions of the condition and character of the earliest men, whether we call them the Antediluvians of the Bible or the Palæocosmic or Palæolithic men of geology.

The Book of Genesis traces man back to Eden, whose characteristics we have already considered, and which certainly is placed by that old record, as by the Assyrian genesis, in the Euphratean valley, whether in its upper table-lands or in its delta. From this Eden man was expelled, the old Aryan traditions say by physical deterioration—the incoming, perhaps, of a glacial age. The Semitic traditions, on the other hand, refer it to a moral fall and a judicial visitation of God. In any case it was a very real evil, involving a change from that condition of happy abundance and freedom from physical toil, which all histories and hypotheses as to human origin must assign to the earliest state of our species, to a condition of privation, exposure, labor, struggle for existence against the uncongenial environment of a wilderness world. Such new conditions of existence must have tended to try the capabilities and endowments of men. Under certain circumstances, and when not too severe, they must have developed energy, inventiveness, and sagacity, and thus must have produced a physical and mental improvement. Under other circumstances they must have had a deteriorating influence, degrading the physical powers and reducing the mental nature almost to a bestial condition. The experience of our modern world, and even of civilized communities, enables us too well to comprehend these opposite effects. In any case, such struggle was, on the whole, better for man when in an imperfect state. Only a creature perfectly simple and harmless morally, could enjoy with advantage the privileges of an Eden.

The Bible story, however, gives us a glimpse of still another and unexpected vicissitude. The human family at a very early period split into two tribes. One of these, the Sethidæ, simple, God-fearing, conservative, shepherds and soil-tillers; the other, the Cainidæ, active, energetic, godless, city-builders and inventors. Among the Cainidæ sprang up another division into citizen peoples, dwelling in dense communities, practising metallurgy and other arts, inventing musical instruments, and otherwise advancing in material civilization; and wandering Jabalites—nomads with beasts of burden and movable tents, migrating widely over the earth, and perhaps locally descending to the rudest forms of human life. Thus from the centre of Eden and the fall sprang three diverse lines of human development.

But a time came when these lines reacted on each other. The artisans and inventors intermarried with the simple country folk. The nomadic tribes threw themselves in invading swarms on the settled communities. Mixed races arose, and wars, conquests, and disturbances, tending to limit more and more the areas of peace and simple plenty, and to make more and more difficult the lives of those who sought to adhere to the old Edenic simplicity; until this was well-nigh rooted out, and the earth was filled with violence. In the midst of this grew up a mixed race of men, strong physically, with fierce passions, daring, adventurous, and cruel, who lorded it over the earth and deprived others of their natural rights and liberties—the giants and men of renown of antediluvian times.

Such, according to the Bible, was the condition of the later antediluvians, and in this was the reason why they were swept away with a flood. Before this catastrophe, we can gather from the story, there must have been great progress in the arts. Intellects of gigantic power, acting through the course of exceedingly long lives, had gained great mastery over nature, and had turned this to practical uses. There must have been antediluvian metallurgists as skilled as any of those in early post-diluvian times; engineers and architects capable of building cities, pyramids, and palaces, and artisans who could have built triremes equal to those of the Carthaginians. At the same time there must have been wild outlying tribes, fierce and barbarous. Farther, the state of society must have been such that there was great pressure for

the means of subsistence in the more densely peopled districts; and as agricultural labor was probably principally manual, and little aided by machines or animals, and as the primitive fertility of the soil must, over large regions, have been much exhausted, we can understand that lament of Lamech as to the hardness of subsistence with which he precedes his hopeful prophecy of better times in the days of Noah.[1]

Another feature of the antediluvian time was its godless and materialistic character. This is quaintly represented in some of the American legends of the deluge by the idea that the antediluvian men were incapable of thanking the gods for the benefits they received. They had, in short, lost the beliefs in a ruling divinity and a promised Saviour, and had thrown themselves wholly into a materialistic struggle for existence, and this was the reason why they were morally and spiritually hopeless and had to be destroyed. We do not hear of any idolatry or superstition in antediluvian times, nor of the lower vices of the more corrupt and degraded races. The vices of the antediluvians were those of a superior race, self-reliant, ambitious, and selfish. Devoting themselves wholly to worldly aims and to the promotion of the arts of life, and utilizing to the utmost the bounties of nature, their motto was "let us eat and drink," not for to-morrow we die, but because we shall live long in our enjoyments. The inevitable result in the tyranny of the strong over the weak, and the rebellion of the weak against the strong, in the accumulation of wealth and luxury in favored spots, and in the desolation of these spots by the violence and rapacity of rude and warlike tribes, came upon them to the full, but brought no repentance. Such a race, to whom God and the spiritual world had become unthinkable, to whom nothing but the material goods of life had any reality, who probably scoffed at the simple beliefs of their ancestors as the dreams of a rude age, had become morally irredeemable, and there was nothing in store for it but a physical destruction.

It is easy to see that these evils must have been greatly aggravated if the life of antediluvian man was prolonged through centuries, and if his physical and mental organization were of a

[1] Genesis 5 : 29.

correspondingly powerful and enduring character. The hardness of heart of a materialist who cannot hope to survive threescore and ten years must be as nothing compared with that of a Methuselah.

The cataclysm by which these men were swept away may have been one of those submersions of our continents which, locally or generally, have occurred over and over again, almost countless times, in the geological history of the earth, and which, though often slow and gradual, must in other cases have been rapid, perhaps much more so than the hundred and fifty years which the Bible record allows us to assign to the whole period of the Noachic catastrophe.

It is an interesting fact that those ancient cave-men whose bones testify to the existence of man in Europe before the last physical changes of the post-glacial age, and while many mammals now locally or wholly extinct still lived in Europe, present characters such as we might expect to find at least in the ruder nomadic tribes of the antediluvian men. Their large brains, great stature, and strong bones point to just such characters as would befit the giants that were in those days. It is farther of interest that the early appearance of skill in the arts of life in the valleys of the Euphrates and Nile in post-diluvian times, points to an inheritance of antediluvian arts by the early Hametic or Turanian nations, and is scarcely explicable on any other hypothesis.[1]

It is a question, raised by certain expressions of Scripture, whether the world will again fall into the condition in which it was before the flood. "As it was in the days of Noah," we are told, so shall it be when the Son of man comes to judgment. To bring the world into such a state it would require that it should shake off all the superstitions, fears, and religious hopes which now affect it; that it should practically cast aside all belief in God, in morality, and in the spiritual nature and higher destiny of man; that it should devote itself wholly to the things that belong to the present life, and in the pursuit of these should

[1] Tyler, in his address to the anthropological section of the British Association, represents me as holding that the Palæocosmic men and the deluge which swept them away were contemporaneous with a continuous and undisturbed civilization in Chaldea and Egypt. This is, of course, an error on his part.

be influenced by nothing higher than a selfish expediency. Then would the earth again be filled with violence, and again would it cry unto God for punishment, and again would he say that "his spirit should no longer strive with men," and that it "repented him that he had made man upon the earth." Who shall say that this is impossible? On the contrary, do we not see in the materialistic philosophy, in the cold, calculating policy, the profound selfishness, and the proud self-confidence of the more civilized races in our times, indications of the same spirit which was in the antediluvians? Should it come to pass that this spirit should again altogether prevail, it might happen that God, who has so long patience with the follies, the superstitions, and the baser appetites of humanity, might again direct his judgments against this higher and more stupendous form of iniquity, and as the earth that then was perished by water, so that which is now might, in consideration of the clearer light it has abused and the greater privileges it has despised, be visited with fire reserved against "the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men," and which nature can in many ways provide.

I have said that such a catastrophe as the deluge of Noah is in no respect incomprehensible as a geological phenomenon, and were we bound to explain it by natural causes, these would not be hard to find. The terms of the narrative in Genesis well accord with a movement of the earth's crust, bringing the waters of the ocean over the land, and at the same time producing great atmospheric disturbances. Such movements seem to have occurred at the close of the post-glacial or palæocosmic age, and were probably connected with the extinction of the palæocosmic or cave men of Europe and of the larger land animals their contemporaries; and these movements closed the later continental period of Lyell, and left the European land permanently at a lower level than formerly. Movements of this kind have been supposed by geologists to be very slow and gradual; but there is no certain evidence of this, since such movements of the land as have occurred in historical times have sometimes been rapid; and there are many geological reasons tending to prove that this was the case with that which closed the post-glacial age. It is to be observed, also, that the narrative in Genesis does not appear to imply a very sudden catastrophe.

There is nothing to prevent us from supposing that the submergence of the land was proceeding during all the period of Noah's preaching, and the actual time in which the deluge covered the district occupied by the narrative was more than a year. It is also to be observed that the narrative in Genesis purports to be that of an eye-witness. He notes the going into the ark, the closing of its door, the first floating of the large ship; then its drifting, then the disappearance of visible land, and the minimum depth of fifteen cubits, probably representing the draft of water of the ark. Then we have the abating of the waters with an intermittent action, going and returning, the grounding of the ark, the gradual appearance of the surrounding hills, the disappearance of the water, and finally the drying of the ground. All this, if historical in any degree, must consist of the notes of an eye-witness, and if understood in this sense, the narrative can raise no question as to the absolute universality of the catastrophe, since the whole earth of the narrator was simply his visible horizon. This will also remove much of the discussion as to the animals taken into the ark, since these must have been limited to the fauna of the district of the narrator, and even within this the lists actually given could exclude the larger carnivorous animals. Thus there would be nothing to prevent our supposing, on the one hand, that some species of animals became altogether extinct, and that the whole faunæ of vast regions not reached by the deluge remained intact. It is further curious that the narrative of the deluge preserved in the Assyrian tablets, like that of Genesis, purports to be the testimony of a witness, and indeed of the Assyrian equivalent of Noah himself.

The "waters of Noah" are thus coming more and more within the cognizance of geology and archæology, and it is more than probable that other points of contact than those above referred to may erelong develop themselves.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

There are certain schools of modern science and philosophy which affect contempt for the doctrine of final causes, and profess to see nothing in nature that points to an unseen Creator. On

the other hand, we find Mill, in one of his last essays, after rejecting every other argument for the existence of a God, admitting that the argument from design in the universe is irresistible, and that nature does testify of its Maker. There can be no question that in this Mill is right, if for no other reason than that old and well-known one that mere blind chance cannot be conceived of as capable of producing an orderly system of things. Farther, there can be no question that the one argument for a God which is convincing to Mill is also the one, and the only one, which the Holy Scriptures condescend to refer to. They habitually take the existence of God for granted, as something not needing to be proven to reasonable minds, but they reason from nature, as, for instance, in that remarkable passage of the apostle Paul where he affirms that to the heathen the "power and divinity" of God are apparent from the things which he has made. But perhaps there is no part of the Bible in which the teaching of nature with reference to divine things is more fully presented than in the Book of Job, and I am inclined to think that not a few even of religious men fail to see precisely the significance of the address of the Almighty to Job, in the concluding chapter of that book.

Job is tortured and brought near to death by severe bodily disease. His friends have exhausted all their divinity and philosophy upon him, in the vain effort to convince him that he deserves this infliction for his special and aggravated sins. At length the Almighty intervenes and gives the final decision. But instead of discussing the ethical and theological difficulties of the case, he enters into a sublime and poetical description of nature. He speaks of the heaven above, of the atmosphere, its vapors and its storms, and of the habits and powers of animals. In short, Job is treated to a lecture on natural history. Yet this instantaneously effects what the arguments of the friends have altogether failed to produce, and Job humbles himself before God in contrition and repentance. His words are very remarkable (Job 42 : 1–12):

"I know that thou canst do all things,
From thee no purpose is withheld ;
(Thou hast said) 'Who is this that obscures counsel without knowledge?'[1]

[1] Ch. 38 : 2.

(And I confess that) I have uttered what I understood not,
Things too hard for me which I know not,
But hear me now and I will speak.
(Thou hast said) 'I will demand of thee
And inform thou me.'[1]
I have heard of thee with the hearing of the ear,
But now mine eye seeth thee;
Therefore do I abhor myself,
And repent in dust and ashes."

What does this import? Simply that, through the presentation to him of God's works, Job had attained a new view of God and of himself. He had not considered or fairly weighed the world around him in its grandeur, its complexity, its unaccountable relations, and contrasted it with his own little sphere of thought and work. Had he done so, he would, like Paul in later times, have said, "Hath not the potter power over the clay?" God, if really the architect of nature, must have thoughts and plans altogether beyond our comprehension. He must be absolute sovereign of all. It is our part to submit with patience to his dealing with us, to lean upon him by faith, and thus to carry this almighty power with us. So Job can now be vindicated against his friends who have taken upon them to explain God's plans and have misrepresented them, as many good men like them are constantly doing; against Satan, who cannot comprehend Job's piety, but believes it to be mere self-interest, and who now sees himself foiled and Job brought into still greater prosperity, which can now be safely granted to him; while by the result and the explanation of it handed down to our time, Satan's kingdom has been severely shaken.

I would put this case of Job before modern Christians in three aspects. (1) Do we attach enough of importance to the Gospel in nature, as vindicating God's sovereignty and fatherhood, and preaching submission, humility, and faith? Might we not here take a lesson from the Bible itself? (2) May there not be many in our own time who, like Job, have "heard of God with the hearing of the ear" but have not seen him with the eye in his works; and on the other hand, are there not many who have seen the works without seeing the Maker, who can even

[1] Ch. 38 : 3 and 40 : 7.

"magnify God's works which men behold" without knowing the author of them? Would it not be well to bring more together in friendly discussion and comparison of notes those who thus look on only one side of the shield? (3) Should we not beware of the error of Job's friends in misrepresenting God's plans, and thereby denouncing those who differ from us? These three wise and well-meaning men had nature all around them, yet they disregarded its teachings, and dwelt on old saws and philosophic dogmas, until God himself had to bring out the whirlwind and the thunder-storm, the ostrich, the horse and the hippopotamus, to teach a better theology. The Book of Job no doubt belongs to a very ancient time, when men had little divine revelation, perhaps none at all in a definite and dogmatic form, yet there are in our time many minds, even cultured minds, as ignorant of revelation as Job's contemporaries, or who, if not ignorant of it, will not receive it. To them the same elementary teaching may afford the training which they need.

THE EXODUS.

Modern geographical exploration has gone over the ground traversed by ancient expeditions, or famous from wars and sieges, with various results as to the historical credibility of the narrators of these events. Bible history has often and in many places been subjected to this test, and has certainly been remarkably vindicated by the spade and the measuring-line. But perhaps no instance of this is more remarkable than that afforded by the magnificent report of the Ordnance Survey of Sinai, both because of the positive and clear character of its results, and of the antiquity and obscurity of the events to which it relates.

Some three thousand years ago, according to a history professedly written by contemporaries, the Hebrew people, migrating from Egypt, sojourned in this inhospitable region for forty years on their way to Palestine. No one in the intervening ages is known to have followed their precise route. Arab and Christian traditions have, it is true, ventured to fix the sites of some of the leading events of the march. Travellers have passed hastily over portions of the ground, and have given to the world the impressions produced on their minds by crude ob-

servation without accurate measurements. The results arrived at were so various and discordant that any one of half a dozen theories might be held as to the actual route and its more important station, and sceptics might be pardoned for supposing that the writer of the history knew less of the ground than many of the subsequent visitors. But now science intervenes with its special methods. A corps of trained surveyors, armed with all the appliances of their art, and prepared to make observations as to climate, geology, and natural history, enter the peninsula at the point where Moses is represented to have entered it, and prepare to follow in his footsteps. They first settle by exhaustive investigation the crossing-place of the fugitives near the present town of Suez, and inform us of the precise circumstances which must have attended that event, not omitting the strong east wind which still sometimes blows with terrific force down the gulf. They examine the wells of Moses and test their water, and describe the structure of that remarkable *Shur*, or wall of rock, from which the locality derives its Bible name, and which barred the way of the Israelites toward the east and caused them to make a long *détour* to the south. They proceed southward from station to station and well to well, noting remarkable coincidences heretofore overlooked, with reference to the characteristics of the terrible wilderness of Sin, the various ways by which the table-land may be penetrated from the coast, the apparently devious course of the Israelites, and their "encampment by the sea." They show how the host must have turned abruptly to the east by Wady Feiran, and how this brought them into conflict with the Amalekites. They explain the tactics of the battle of Rephidim, with the effect of the victory in opening the way to a junction with Jethro and the Midianites, and to the great and well-watered plain of Er Rahah in front of Mount Sinai. They show how this plain and mountain fulfil all the conditions of the narrative of the giving of the Law, and explain the necessity for the miraculous supply of water before the fight with the Amalekites, and the supplies of water and pasture to which that battle gave access.

As we follow the laborious investigations of the surveying party, and note the number and complexity of the undesigned agreements between their observations and the narrative in

Exodus and Numbers, as we study their account of the geology, productions, and antiquities of the country, trace its topography on their beautiful maps and photographs, and weigh their calculations as to the supplies of water, food, and pasturage at different stages of the journey, we feel that the venerable narrative of the Pentateuch must be the testimony of a veracious eye-witness, and all the learned theories as to a late authorship and different documents disappear like mist. The writer of Exodus and Numbers had no idea that after thirty centuries his veracity was to be subjected to the test of a scientific survey; but he has, nevertheless, so provided for this that even his obscurities, imperfect explanations, and omissions now tend to his vindication.

All this would be of extreme interest were the Exodus merely an old story, like the Siege of Troy or the tragical history of Mycenæ. But it is much more than this, much more than even a national movement in assertion of the rights of the oppressed and of the sacredness of freedom. The Exodus was a new departure in the higher life of humanity. It was a great revival of monotheistic religion at a time when it seemed likely to perish. It restored the hopes of a coming Saviour. It initiated a religious literature which reached back to the creation, and which culminated in the New Testament. The roots of all that is most valuable in religion to-day lie in the Exodus. Therefore, it is of the highest importance to know whether the history of this event preserved to us in the Hebrew Scriptures is accurate and trustworthy. If it is a myth or a historical novel, or even a well-meant compilation of traditions and documents by an editor living long after the event, we might feel that its authority in all respects was shaken. As it is, we may rejoice in the possession of at least one true and carefully written history, however we may regret that so many volumes of learned historical criticism have been reduced to waste paper. The authors of the report on the Sinai Survey make no pretensions to be either critics or expositors of the Bible, and they are prepared to state what they see, independently of the consequences to any one. Hence it is most instructive to observe how, as they unsparingly sweep away old traditions, and the conjectures of travellers and historians ancient and modern, the

original record stands in all its integrity, like the great stones of some cromlech from which men have dug away the earth under which it had been buried.

To those who have placed reliance on such theories of the Pentateuch as those of Kalisch, Kuenen, or Colenso, the disclosures of the Survey of Sinai must come like a new revelation. Henceforth the only rational theory as to the composition of the books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, is that they are contemporary journals of the events to which they relate, and that they have not been subsequently revised or altered even to such an extent as to explain facts obscure to any one except a contemporary, or to remove seeming contradictions requiring knowledge of the ground for their solution. It is even startling to find that the apparent omissions, repetitions, and inconsistencies which have been ingeniously employed to sustain theories of a composite and late authorship become, when studied on the ground, the most convincing proofs of contemporary authorship and the absence of any subsequent revision. Had these writings been subjected to any considerable revision between the date of the Exodus and that of the Ordnance Survey, they could scarcely have failed to present less of a photographic truthfulness than that which at present characterizes them. This must at least be the theory which will commend itself to every intelligent student of the report of the Sinai Survey; and it is to be observed that the facts of this report are final in a scientific point of view, and cannot be invalidated by any critical process, so that, in so far as the central books of the Pentateuch are concerned, the occupation of the disintegrating and destructive critics is absolutely gone, or can be valued only by those bookworms and pedants who are determined to shut their eyes against scientific evidence.

BODY, SOUL, AND SPIRIT.

To any thoughtful reader of the New Testament the peculiar use of the words (σάρξ) "flesh," (ψυχη) "soul or life," (πνευμα) "spirit," and the adjectives derived from them, must have formed a subject of attention, and he will have perceived that the uses of these terms are somewhat constant, though

there are of course some exceptional and figurative employments of them, and cases where one of the terms implies another not mentioned.[1] He may have regarded this classification as expressing definite ideas of the writers as to a three-fold constitution of human nature, as merely arbitrary and accidental, or as conforming to a classification current at the time. In either of these cases he may have felt some interest in comparing them with the arrangements of modern psychology. Yet in such comparison he will have found little satisfaction, unless he turns to that reaction of physiology upon mental science which is so influential in our day; but here, if I mistake not, he will find some curious points of contact between modern science and the biblical view of humanity. In making this comparison, we must refer, for the biblical distinction of body, soul, and spirit, and for the conditions under which an eternal life is affirmed to be possible for all three, to the New Testament itself, and to the numerous theological writers who have discussed the subject.

Hitherto it has been somewhat difficult to bring this biblical psychology, if it may be so called, into harmony with the mental science of the schools. But any one who has read the article by Ferrier in a late number of the PRINCETON REVIEW, or Calderwood's recent work, "The Relations of Mind and Brain,"[2] must be aware that physiological facts relating to the organism, the "flesh" of the New Testament, are beginning very seriously to modify our views. We now know that the gray cellular matter of the brain constitutes a reservoir of sensory and motor energy, which supplies the power necessary to place us in relation with things without, and to impress, by means of muscular effort, our own power on the outer world. Further, there seems the best reason to believe that the mass of the brain is directly connected with sensation and motion, though there seem to be means of regulation and co-operation of sensations and actions in connection with the front and back portions of the cerebral hemispheres. There are facts indicating that the anterior portions of the hemispheres are the organs of a certain determin-

[1] We have also the formula, "Body (σῶμα), soul, and spirit" (1 Thess. 5 : 23).

[2] London, 1879.

ing and combining property of the nature of animal intelligence, and that the posterior portions, in association with the sympathetic nerve, are connected with the affections and passions.[1] Now all this belongs, in the first instance, to living nerve-matter, and is possessed by man in common with animals. They, like us, can perform reflex or automatic actions, altogether or partially involuntary. They, like us, can perceive and reflect, and have affections, passions, and appetites. Even in animals this supposes something beyond the mere organism, and which can combine and compare sensations and actions. This is the animal or psychical life, which, whatever its essential nature, is something above and beyond mere nerve-power, though connected with it and acting by means of it. But in man there are other and higher powers, determining his conscious personality, his formation of general principles, his rational and moral volitions and self-restraints. These are manifestations of a higher spiritual nature, which constitutes in man the "image and shadow of God."

Thus the physiologist may fairly claim, not for protoplasm as such, but for the living organism, all the merely reflex actions, as well as the appetites and desires, and much that belongs to perception and ordinary intelligence. These may be regarded as bodily and psychical in the narrow sense. But the higher regulating powers belong to a spiritual domain into which he cannot enter.

It is interesting to observe here that even those who seem most desirous to limit the powers of man to mere properties of the living organism are prevented by their own consciousness, as well as by scientific facts, from fully committing themselves to this. Tyndall admits a "chasm" "intellectually impassable" between physical facts and human consciousness. Huxley's human automaton is a "conscious automaton," and in some sense "endowed with free will," and he declines to admit that he will ever be proved to be only "the cunningest of nature's clocks." Spencer has made similar admissions. Allman, in his British

[1] It is a very old and in some respects well-founded notion that the viscera are connected with the affections. We now know something of the relation of this to the sympathetic nerve system and to the posterior portion of the cerebral lobes. Ferrier, Calderwood, and very recently Bucke, have discussed these points.

Association address, distinctly denies that consciousness can be physiologically explained. There are, it is true, extreme writers like Buchner, with whom matter is the origin and essence of all that exists, but their strong assertions of this, being destitute of proof, can scarcely be held to be scientific.

At present no doubt this whole subject is as a department of science somewhat crude and rudimentary, and it becomes us to speak with some reserve respecting it, but the drift of opinion is in the direction above indicated. It has become evident that the more recent discoveries as to the functions of brain will not warrant the extreme views of materialists, while on the other hand they serve to correct the doctrines of those who have run into the opposite extreme of attaching no importance to the fleshly organism and its endowment of animal life. In like manner, these discoveries are tending to establish definite boundaries between the domain of mere automatism and that of rational will.[1] In so far as these results are attained, we are drawn more closely to that middle ground occupied by the New Testament writers, and which, without requiring us to commit ourselves to any new hypotheses or technical distinctions, gives a fair valuation to all the parts of the composite nature of man. The practical value of this Bible philosophy is well known. It relegates to their proper place the merely somatic and psychical elements of our nature, admits their value in that place, and condemns them only when they usurp the position of the higher determining powers. It seeks to place these last in their true relation to our fellow-men and to God, and to provide for their regulation under God's law and the guidance of his Spirit, with the object of securing a true and perfect equilibrium of all the parts of our nature. It is thus enabled to hold forth a prospect of peace and happiness to body, soul, and spirit, and to point out the meaning and value of the conflicts which rage within the man in our present imperfect state. This practical object,

[1] This is ably argued by Calderwood in the September number of the PRINCETON; and while writing this I have received the address of Prof. St. George Mivart before the Biological Section of the British Association, in which he advocates a threefold distinction into Rational, Animal, and Vegetable, as held by Aristotle, and under the "rational" would apparently recognize a higher and lower grade of psychosis, the former peculiar to man.

in connection with the mission of the Saviour, is what the New Testament has in view; but in arriving at this, it has undoubtedly pointed to solutions of the mysteries of our nature at which science and philosophy are beginning to arrive by their own paths; just as, in another department, the Bible has shadowed forth the great principles and process of creation in advance of the discoveries of geology.

There is at present in many minds a strong indisposition to acknowledge facts of this class, and even a tendency to disparage and treat with contempt the position of revelation relatively to science. It is, however, not difficult to see that this proceeds partly from narrow and prejudiced views, and partly from antagonism to superstition and ecclesiastical practices and assumptions supposed to be supported by the Bible. These prejudices it is to be hoped may disappear before greater light, and in any case it is much to be desired that there should be more of friendly discussion and comparison between the theology of the Bible and other departments of scientific inquiry; for we must not forget that theology is itself a science, and that the doctrines of the Bible admit of a scientific treatment, different on the one hand from captious criticism, and on the other from unreasoning dogmatism.

I have selected a few examples from various departments of scientific investigation to show that, in many respects not usually considered, modern scientific results approach to doctrines of revelation. Such examples might be very much multiplied, and others might be found more striking than some of those above referred to. Enough has, however, been said to show that the paths of science and revelation are at least not divergent, to suggest the necessity of removing from the reading of the Bible that veil of mediævalism which remains on so many minds, to indicate the utility of fairly comparing the new science with the old revelation, and above all to vindicate the fundamental unity and harmony of all truth, whether natural or spiritual, whether discovered by man or revealed by God.

JOHN W. DAWSON.

HERBERT SPENCER'S "DATA OF ETHICS."

HERBERT SPENCER commands our respect by his terrible earnestness. He has an end to live for and he lives for it. For it he has given up professional pursuits and profits (he was an engineer), and for many years immediate fame and popularity. For at least thirty years a grand system of speculative physics, founded on the recent discoveries in biology, has been developing in his brain, and he must unfold it and give it forth in spite of obstacles, with or without encouragement from surroundings in the world. He is to a large extent the author, and is certainly the organizer, and the very embodiment, personification, and expression of development; and he evolves it in the confidence that it, as the fittest, will survive, and as a force will persist till it brings all the environments into accordance with it. It must be towards forty years since he began his literary work in articles chiefly in the dissenting organs of Britain, such as the *Nonconformist* and *British Quarterly*, which early discovered his talents; and since 1850 he has been combining his views into a system in a series of elaborate volumes, which will in the end amount to ten, of which seven have been published entire and the others in part.

All his previous speculations are regarded by him as leading toward the end of finding "for the principles of right and wrong a scientific basis." I am sorry to find him obliged to say that he has intimations that "health may permanently fail even if life does not end;" so he anticipates the proper evolution of his scheme and publishes the work before us, "Data of Ethics," instead of others which should have come before it in logical order, that the world may know, even though he should be laid aside from labor, what has all along been his end, and to which

all the preceding parts are subsidiary. I am happy to find that later accounts speak more favorably of his health, and encourage us in hoping that he may live to finish his structure, of which we will be better able to judge when we see it standing before us complete.

We have now presented to us the basis of his ethics. Bacon has shown that science is to be tried by (not valued for) its fruits; and the English-speaking race have a keen disposition to inquire of every theory what is its moral tendency. It was at this point that the weakness of Locke's theory of the origin of our ideas, which he derived from sensation and reflection, was first detected, and this by the grandson of his patron, Lord Shaftesbury, who showed that our ideas of moral good cannot thus be drawn. Many inclined to follow so far Spencer's development, as containing (as Locke's theory of the origin of ideas did) much truth, are anxious to know what morality it has left us. Thinking men see that if development cannot meet the requirements of ethics, which are quite as valid and certain as heredity or any other laws of physiology, evolutionists will have to modify their theory, and allow that, while it can do much, it cannot accomplish everything, and that it leaves many important facts to be explained by other, and I may add higher, laws.

Our author is sensitively aware that there is great danger in a period of transition from an old faith to a new one. "Few things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it." He assumes and asserts, without deigning to give any proof, that "moral injunctions are losing the authority given them by their supposed sacred origin." This is no doubt true of the school of which Mr. Spencer is the head, and of the *set* associated with him in London, and of his correspondents in various countries. But it may be doubted whether it is true of men in general, even educated men, or of Americans in particular, who I believe have as firm a faith in a morality prompted by an inward power and sanctioned by a Divine Power as they ever had, and are not likely to part with it readily. But there is a danger—not, it may be, to our old men whose beliefs and habits are formed, but to the youth in our colleges, and especially in our scientific schools

and reading only evolutionary books and magazines, and who are told that all things proceed from evolution, which needs no God to guide it—that in throwing off their religion they also throw off their morality, which has been so intimately joined with it. Mr. Spencer will help them to part with their religion, which he consigns to a region unknown and unknowable, which has attractions to nobody; but he would not have them part with their morality. He would not have them part with their religion too speedily; but if positive religion, that is religion with a God, be found untrue, as he tells them, then intelligent youths cannot any longer believe in it, and must by a necessity of their nature part with it, whether evil follows or not. Mr. Spencer is evidently alarmed about this transition period when the old has lost authority and there is no one to take the place of the deposed king. So he hastens, ere he is rendered unfit for the task, to give a new and scientific basis to morality, and this independent of God and of any inward law, both of which have been set aside. I have now to examine this new ethical theory, I trust candidly and impartially, and this, in the first instance, not upon its supposed tendency, which may be looked at subsequently, but upon the evidence advanced in its behalf.

It is now many years ago, and at a time when Mr. Spencer was not appreciated as he now is, I had occasion to give my estimate of him ("Intuitions of the Mind," Part III., b. i., § 8): "His bold generalizations are always instructive, and some of them may in the end be established as the profoundest laws of the knowable universe." I find that the American publishers of his works have been using this testimony of mine in their advertisements, and I have no objections that they continue to do so. But it is proper to state that I represented Mr. Spencer as a Titan making war against the gods that rule in Olympus, to which he seeks to rise not by slow and gradual steps, but by heaping Pelion on Pindos. His system of science and philosophy is a vast structure, professedly and really, with broad if not deep foundations in natural, especially biological, science, and towering into jurisprudence and ethics. This is its excellence, this is its defect.

His method is deductive rather than inductive. He sets out

with an hypothesis—that of development—containing much truth, but it may be guilty of some omissions and requiring to be limited on all sides. He then gathers facts to verify his hypothesis, and sets them forth in order. He examines these facts by the old Greek methods of analysis and synthesis, very sharp instruments, but somewhat perilous because they are so sharp. A great part of his work is described by him as synthetic, the synthesis being facts cut, joined, compressed, and compacted by his own comprehensive mind. His method is not just that enjoined by Bacon, who recommends us not to anticipate but follow nature, to let the facts suggest the laws (axioms, he calls them), and not to neglect noticing the apparent exceptions, which are to be entertained as Abraham entertained the strangers who turned out unawares to be angels. "We shall have good hope of the sciences," he says, "when by a true ladder and steps not broken or gaping we rise from particulars to minor axioms, and thence to middle axioms, rising higher and higher, and thence to the highest of all." Bacon shrewdly remarks that "a cripple on the right road will beat a racer on the wrong," adding language which might at times be applied to Spencer: "This is farther evident that he who is not on the right road will go the farther wrong the greater his fleetness and ability." In his eagerness of thought, our author is not very much inclined to submit to this slow but sure procedure. Possessed of great speculative ability, he is apt to leap from mountain-top to mountain-top without even looking upon the plains or examining the valleys below, in which, after all, are to be found the connections of these lofty ranges which he is so fond of tracing. We may have occasion to call attention to some of these lower facts, obvious to the common observer, but which he has overlooked. He feels that he has a special aptitude to interpret facts. Give him facts and he will explain them. Others, however, without denying his facts, will feel themselves justified in interpreting them otherwise.

At this present time Spencer occupies much the same place among the English-speaking peoples as Hegel did among the pan-Germanics an age ago. Both are characterized by speculative abilities of the very highest order. Both would bring all nature, mind and matter, under their all-embracing systems,

which are as wide as the horizon and as undefined. Both have their minds so filled with their own grand views that they are not inclined to look at the views taken by others, or at the facts which seem inconsistent with their generalizations. Both have had mighty influence over young men bent on having everything explained, by the dogmatism of their assertions and the comprehensiveness of their theories, which seem to explain what cannot otherwise be accounted for. In other respects they widely differ. Hegel had an extensive, though by no means an accurate, acquaintance with the philosophies of ancient Greece and modern Germany; but when he criticised Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries, he simply made himself ridiculous. Spencer, on the other hand, has a large knowledge of the late discoveries which are bringing organisms under the dominion of law — more, however, as an amateur than a practical experimenter; but has not, so it appears to me, studied the actings of the human mind as revealed to consciousness. His apprehension of these and his account of them are commonly given under conceptions and in language derived from matter and motion. Hegel's sun has now set, leaving behind only the glow of a mighty reputation. I believe that you could now count all the thoroughgoing Hegelians in Germany on your ten fingers, and all the eminent Hegelians out of Germany, including those in Naples, Oxford, Glasgow, and St. Louis, on your ten toes. Some do not scruple to call him a pretender and a charlatan. Spencer's sun is now at its zenith. What may be the estimate of his philosophy at the end of this century I will not take upon myself to predict. As embracing so many established facts, I believe that there is much in his system which will abide, and I adhere to the opinion that "his bold generalizations are always instructive, and that some of them may, in the end, be established as the profoundest laws of the knowable universe." It is one of the offices of thinking men in this age carefully to examine the structure which he is rearing, and while they admire its massive walls they may come to discover rents in it, indicating an unsettled and unsettling foundation.

His ethics is professedly an evolution from his development theory. It will be necessary, therefore, to begin with taking a brief survey of the present state of this question. The word

"development" has become one of the most universally employed, and one of the vaguest terms of our language. We hear not only of the development of plants and animals, but of what is considerably different, the development of worlds out of star-dust. Both applications may be legitimate, but taken to embrace both processes, all that the term denotes is that both worlds and animated beings come out of previously-existing materials. We read now of the development of science, of the development of literature, of the development of art, and of the development of trade and commerce. I believe we will soon hear of the development of the tin trade and the oil trade, and I suppose also of our manufactured articles, of our temples, our ships, our houses, our shirts and shoes and toys. The like vagueness attaches to the term "evolution." The looseness of the language tempts confused thinkers to attribute anything and everything to development and evolution. Now the one common truth involved in the language is that one thing comes out of another, and that all things come out of pre-existing materials. It implies, what has been known for ages, the universal reign of causation. I have said in an earlier number of this REVIEW that "since Mr. J. S. Mill showed that there are always two agents in causes, and especially since the discovery of the conservation of energy, or of the *persistence* of energy as Spencer calls it, the whole subject of causation (objective) needs to be carefully reviewed by some one combining scientific knowledge with philosophic comprehension." But it is not necessary for our present purpose to enter farther into this tempting subject. I have said this much simply to show that many are glibly using the phrases development and causation without knowing precisely what is contained in them.

Confining the phrase to the production of plants and animals, it is clear that development or evolution is not a single agent, property, or cause. It implies a combination of a number of forces, mechanical, chemical, electric, magnetic, vital as they used to be called, cosmic as they are now called, the panzoism of Spencer and the physiological units of Darwin; in fact, so many, so varied and complicated, that science at its present stage cannot specify them or determine their nature. When we describe a plant or animal as developed, we mean that it comes from a

combination—I believe a prearranged and adjusted combination —of forces, which cannot as yet be untwined and exposed separately to the view. The grand business of science in the age to which we have now come is not to satisfy itself with loose general processes, but to determine the exact nature of the powers involved in heredity and the evolution of plants and animals. This will clear the way for settling the question of what development can do and what it cannot do.

No one has shown more clearly and conclusively than Mr. Spencer that animate nature has risen from a lower to a higher state. But neither he nor any one else has been able to specify the causes by which this has been produced. If it is said to be by heredity, this is only avoiding the question; for we ask, What are the causes acting in heredity which ever improve the races, which make the streams rise higher than the fountains?

The vulgar account of development is that it starts with atoms and rises to molecules, and masses, and plants, and animals with sensation, and thence to higher and higher intelligences; and now it is supposed to moral agents. Mr. Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the doctrine of natural selection, has been obliged in a late paper to refer this rise in a crude manner to spiritual agency. For this he has been exposed to ridicule by his school, perhaps justly. But his desire is somehow to fill the gap. Mr. Spencer, marching on with his seven-leagued boots, can step over these chasms without noticing them. Any one may see some of these fallen stitches (fa'en steeks, as Hugh Miller used to call them) in the fabric. The latest science has not been able to find that the inanimate can produce the animate, that there can be a *vivum* without an *ovum* or some kind of protoplasm. Huxley and Tyndall have honestly avowed this; Spencer, so far as I know, has uttered no sound on the subject.

Other chasms lie gaping before us. Can the unsentient produce the sentient? Can the unconscious develop the conscious? Spencer's attempt to explain the origin of consciousness in his "Principles of Psychology" is about the greatest philosophic abortion of our day. He first describes the nervous system in a very elaborate manner. Then he brings in consciousness in the stealthiest manner, without even attempting to explain how

this mental quality can arise out of the soft pulpy substance, the nerves. He speaks of separate impressions received by the senses, and of the need of some centre of communication, "so that as the external phenomena become greater in number and more complicated in kind the variety and rapidity of the changes to which the common centre of communication is subject must increase—there result an unbroken series of these changes—there must arise a consciousness" (vol. ii. p. 403). *There must arise a consciousness!!* From changes and a centre which has no consciousness!! He does not even acknowledge the difficulty, apparently does not see it in the eagerness of his march. He fails to notice the like difficulty as it presents itself in the rise of consciousness into the higher attributes of mind, such as judgment and reasoning, emotion and will. As might be expected, he now in the work before us sees no difficulty in developing morality from accumulated experiences of sensations become hereditary.

Those who would account for the rise of the lower natures into the higher, say the ascidians into the fish, of the fish into the monkey, and the monkey into man, are shut up between the horns of a dilemma if they follow the acknowledged principles of causation. This power to rise from the original molecules up to man was either in the original molecules or it was not. If it was in the molecules, then there must have been in it all the mechanical, the chemical, the cosmic forces; in fact, it must be a power only a little lower than the infinite,—of all of which we have no evidence whatsoever. If the other alternative be taken, and it is supposed that in order to produce the higher qualities and beings new powers have always to be introduced, the question arises, Whence did these powers come? If it be said by constant small increments, it removes the difficulty only in appearance. For the increments could only give what they have, and which they have got from the original powers. In fact, the law of development with heredity is after all merely a wide empirical law. A law, as I understand, does not rise beyond the empirical state and become a rational law till the causes operating have been determined. For the present there might be a truce in the war between religion and science as to development. The religious man believes that all the operations of nature, whether coming

by development or otherwise, are from God. Let both the religionist and the scientist acknowledge that at present we do not know what are the causes which have brought in these higher powers, such as sensation, consciousness, intelligence, that have appeared as the ages advance.

Mr. Spencer calls his work the "Data of Ethics." He does not look on himself, and does not wish others to regard him, as a sceptic; on the contrary, his philosophy demands a large amount of faith. In particular he admits, as all profound men do, certain truths as incapable of being proved, but which must be accepted by all. He started as a speculator when Hamilton and Mansel were the reigning metaphysicians of Britain, and he takes his views of the character and marks of first truths largely from them, modifying but not improving them. "The inconceivableness of its negation is that which shows a cognition to possess the highest rank—is the criterion by which its unsurpassable validity is known." "If its negation is inconceivable, the discovery of this is the discovery that we are obliged to accept it. And a cognition which we are thus obliged to accept is one which we class as having the highest possible certainty."

This criterion of first principles is so far a sound one, and may serve some good purposes. But it is mutilated, and has not been put in the proper form. I cannot give in to the maxim that a man should believe a proposition simply because he cannot conceive or act otherwise. This is a kind of fatalism against which the heart if not the head is apt to rebel. I hold in opposition to the prevailing agnosticism, founded by Hume and favored without their intending it by Kant and Hamilton, that man can so far know things and the relations of things. He knows self as thinking and feeling. He knows body as extended and resisting his energy. He perceives at once certain relations in things thus known, as, for example, that these two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and that these two things *plus* other two things make four things. He knows all this because he perceives things and what is in things. This gives us a criterion not only of "unsurpassable validity," which "we are obliged to accept," not only of the "highest class" and the "highest possible certainty" *to us*, which is avowedly all that is

done by Spencer's test, which might not hold good or apply in different circumstances; but as we know the thing, a certainty which cannot be set aside in any state of things. The primary mark of primitive truth thus comes to be, not necessity, as Kant maintains and as Spencer, following Hamilton, maintains, but self-evidence: we perceive things to exist and to be what they are by looking at them. Necessity follows from self-evidence, and is the secondary and not the primary criterion of first truths. Universality that is of the conviction follows as a tertiary test, because all men are so constituted as to know so much of things by barely perceiving them. It is most perverse to argue as Spencer does in answering Mill, that the external world exists because we cannot conceive the opposite; whereas the simpler and true statement is that we know the external world as existing, and so cannot conceive it not to exist. I call this "intuition," because it is looking immediately into things. It is not a form imposed on things by the mind out of its own furniture, as Kant maintains, but a perception of things. I perceive objects in space, and in looking at them I perceive and decide that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line.

This may be the most appropriate place for doing what, so far as I know, has never yet been done—that is, narrowly sifting Spencer's famous theory of the formation of what metaphysicians call first or fundamental truths, such as the axioms of Euclid, the principle of universal causation, and moral maxims. From the time of David Hume down to that of Mr. John S. Mill, it was the fashion of the sensational school to account for the formation of these by the principle of association of ideas. We have seen cause and effect associated in our experience from our earliest years, and so when we see an effect we are led irresistibly to look for its usual concomitant. I have done my best to expose this theory, which has now fallen to pieces from its own instability. These principles appear so early that there is not time for their being produced in the mind of the individual. And so Spencer has introduced a new theory which has superseded that of Hume and Mill. It is that these primordial or fundamental principles are the result of all the ancestral experiences which have accumulated from age to age, these experiences beginning, it is supposed, with the ascidian and coming

down to man. This is an hypothesis which supports itself on agencies which are very much unknown. We know nothing of the processes by which the virtue has come down from one individual and one race to another. The mystery of the virtue supposed to descend in apostolic succession is nothing to this. We cannot tell what was the experience laid up by the ascidian and descending down through the fish to the ape and early man. Was it conscious or unconscious in the ascidian? If not, when did it become conscious? What form did it take? It is an hypothesis which it is impossible to refute because it is an hypothesis which cannot spread out its proof. As an hypothesis it does not explain the whole phenomenon. We have in fact no anticipation of mathematical or metaphysical or moral truth among the lower animals.

I admit that heredity may explain so much: it may account for the formation and the action of the nervous system. But some of us deny that nervous action is mental action. I deny that mere nervous action can become moral action. The great body of our scientific men are proclaiming that bodily action and mental action are entirely different. The brain and nerves are not the mind, they are merely the organ of the mind. It is altogether gratuitous to assume that the heredity which can fashion our nervous structure can also form our fundamental laws of knowledge and belief. In an earlier number of this REVIEW (March, 1878), I asserted that it would be difficult to prove that the brain is anything more to the mind than an organ of sensation and locomotion.[1]

Supposing that the cerebro-spinal mass is the organ of the mind, it may be able in a great variety of ways to modify mental actions. It may constrain them to go in certain ways, and restrain them in others. The mind may be led to act in a particular manner by the ready concurrence of the nerves. On the other hand, when the organism does not co-operate, the thoughts and feelings may be greatly hindered. In this way a nervous structure may give tendencies which become hereditary. But this does not prove that the primary principles of reason are the product of brain or nervous action.

[1] Prof. Calderwood's recently published work, "The Relations of Mind and Brain," is clear, judicious, and free from hypotheses and fancies.

All this is the more evident when we consider what is the nature of our intuitions. They are of the nature of perceptions, of perceptions of things and the relations of things. We perceive that if two straight lines go on for an inch without coming nearer each other, they will go on forever without doing so; and that from the very nature of a breach of trust, it must be evil. There is no proof whatever that there is any apprehension of such truths or any approximation towards them on the part of the dog, the horse, or the highest of the animals.

Even on the supposition that these cognitions and beliefs and judgments have been generated by the experiences of ancestral races, it might be argued that they are valid, and this on the principles of Spencer. They have all the authority of the lengthened and uniform experience. They can stand his criterion of truth. We cannot conceive that hypocrisy should be good, and so we argue that this truth has "unsurpassable validity," and is of "the highest possible rank." I claim for it another validity. These truths, however generated, have the authority of the God who produced them, whether by development or otherwise. So in this article I feel myself at liberty to appeal to these first truths of our reason, whether speculative or moral.

When I found Spencer calling his work "Data of Ethics," I fondly wished (though I scarcely expected) that he would have exhibited and expounded what we see when we look directly on moral or immoral actions, say on mercy or cruelty. I half expected that, using his own test of necessity or inconceivability, he would show us what "we must accept as true" as to certain voluntary acts, as, for example, that we cannot conceive deceit to be good or benevolence evil. This would have formed a good basis to ethics, and thereon a goodly structure might have been reared. But instead of this he reaches his data by a long process, in which he takes in the conduct of "all living creatures," including the brutes, lower and higher, from the earliest monad up to man.

He opens his work with declaring that moral good is a relation of means and end. I simply put in a caveat here. By our higher moralists virtue is represented as an end rather than a mere means. It is commonly spoken of as consisting in an

affection of the mind, which is good in itself, say love or benevolence, and not a mere means towards something else, say happiness, which is with Mr. Spencer the only good. But let this pass for the present, that we may consider his account of moral good as a means.

"Morality," he says, "has to do with conduct," which he defines as "acts adjusted to ends, or else the adjustment of acts to ends." Conduct is good which accomplishes its end. "Always acts are called good or bad as they are well or ill adjusted to ends." A weapon is good when it inflicts an effective blow or wards off a blow. I have simply to interpose here that according to this view a robber's pistol, or a burglar's key, or a draught of poison, or a forged bank-note is good. There is certainly nothing morally good in the mere adjustment of means to end. We have not yet got a scientific basis to ethics.

"If from lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones, we similarly find that these words, in their current applications, refer to efficient subservience. The goodness and badness of a pointer or a hunter, of a sheep or an ox, ignoring all other attributes of these creatures, refer in the one case to the fitness of their actions for effecting the ends men use them for, and in the other case to the qualities of their flesh as adapting it to support life." Surely we have not yet come to ethics. But he proceeds to show that from this initial adjustment, "having intrinsically no moral character, we pass *by degrees*" (mark the language) "to the most complex adjustments," which are moral.

Looking to sentient life, he shows that it is good or bad according as it does or does not "bring a surplus of agreeable feelings;" that "conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful;" and concludes that, "taking into account immediate effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable." By these gradual steps he has led us up to ethics, declaring "that conduct with which morality is not concerned passes into conduct which is moral or immoral by small degrees and in countless ways."

The non-moral conduct is now developed into moral, and we see what his ethical theory is. He does not make moral good an affection or a voluntary act, or even, so far as I can see, a mental operation or state; it is whatever as a means on the

whole promotes pleasure. We are not yet prepared to criticise this doctrine. It is enough for the present to indicate the objections that may be taken to it. I maintain moral good is a mental act or state, and that it implies intention. I admit that pleasure is a good, and that it is to be promoted as an end, but I deny that it is the only good, or even the highest end. In particular I deny that whatever as a means promotes happiness is necessarily a virtue. In order to be morally good it must be intended to promote happiness by an agent. A machine, such as a telescope, or electric telegraph, or a telephone, may greatly increase the resources and the happiness of the race. But surely we do not regard it as a virtue like honesty, and temperance, and righteousness, and self-sacrifice. But instead of pursuing this farther at present, let us notice what he makes of the progression of happiness, in regard to which he has established, as I think, a most important truth.

He is successful in showing that as geological ages have run on there is a constant increase in the general amount of happiness. He cannot, indeed, tell us by his development theory how sensations of pleasure were produced; but having got these, he shows by that theory how they have become greater and greater, by the multiplication of the organs, as the animals become more special and more complex. Then there is the lengthening of the life of living creatures and its extension over wider regions. He thus summarizes:

"We saw that evolution, tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limit when individual life is the greatest both in length and breadth; and now we see that, leaving other ends aside, we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction. It was shown that along with increasing power of maintaining individual life, which evolution brings, there goes increasing power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny, and that in this direction evolution reaches its limit when the needful number of young, preserved to maturity, are then fit for a life which is complete in fulness and duration; and here it turns out that parental conduct is called good or bad as it approaches or falls short of this ideal result. Lastly, we inferred that the establishment of an associated state both makes possible and requires a form of life, such that life may be completed in each and in her offspring, not only without preventing completion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in others, and we have found above that this is the form of conduct most emphatically termed good. Moreover, just as we

there saw that evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men. so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived as best when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same time."

I have quoted this passage for *two* purposes: one is to show how he is developing his theory of morals, which I am about to examine; and the other and present purpose, to exhibit the process by which he shows, I think successfully, how the means of happiness have been multiplying and intensifying on our earth as the ages roll on. He unfolds in his best manner the provision (he would not use the word) which has been made for securing this end, and also to prepare the way for the introduction of morality.

PHYSICAL operation tends towards this end. "To-day's wanderings of a fish in search of food, though perhaps showing by their adjustments to catching different kinds of prey at different hours a slightly determined order, are unrelated to the wanderings of yesterday and to-morrow. But the higher animals, and especially man, display more coherent combination of motions; and all tends towards the increase of pleasure. There is produced by the advance a balanced combination of external actions in face of external forces tending to overthrow it, and the advance towards a higher state is an acquirement of ability to maintain the balance for a longer period by the successive additions of organic appliances, which counteract more and more fully the disturbing forces." BIOLOGICAL arrangements have the same tendency. There is a pleasure attached to the healthy exercise of the body thus securing an attention to that exercise, which secures an increase of happiness, and with him what promotes happiness is morality.

PSYCHOLOGICAL laws have the same influence. He gives here an epitome of his psychology, making it very much a department, not of the science of mind, as revealed by consciousness, but of the physiology of the nerves. He speaks of the three controls which restrain men—the political, that is government; the religious, or fear of the supernatural; and the social, or the influence of public opinion—and shows successfully that all these lead men to subordinate proximate satisfaction to ultimate good. He here comes in sight for the first time of what is

entitled to be called moral good. "Now we are prepared to see that the restraints properly distinguished as moral are unlike those restraints out of which they evolve and with which they are long confounded; in this they refer not to the extrinsic effects but to their intrinsic effects." If he had said intrinsic character which makes them end in themselves and truly moral, he would have been in the region of ethics. But he merely carries us to the portal of the temple and does not enter. SOCIOLOGY brings the same issue. Here he shows that the universal basis of co-operation is the proportion of benefits received to services rendered. He concludes: "The sociological view of ethics supplements the physical, the biological, and the psychological views, by disclosing those conditions under which associated activities can be so carried on that the complete living of each consists in and conduces to the complete living of all."

I have allowed our author to expound his argument in his own way. I accept his statement of facts as to the progression of nature. I admit that he thus establishes two very important truths. The first is that nature, as it progresses, makes for happiness. The means of enjoyment become higher as animated nature advances; is higher in the period of fishes than in that of mollusks, in the period of mammals than in that of fishes, and in that of man than in the times of the lower animals. This is a very interesting point, though it is not an ethical one. But he, so I think, establishes another point equally if not more important. It is that nature prepares for the introduction of morality. I hold, indeed, that till man appears with a conscience pointing to a moral law, there is and can be nothing either moral or immoral. We do not morally approve or condemn the acts of the reptile or the bird, of the dog or the cow. But there is a preparation made for man and for morality; a scene in which man can live, with the food needful for him, and in which he has opportunities of doing good, encouragements to do good, machinery to shut him up to good, and checks laid on the commission of evil.

I believe he has done good service by establishing these two truths. But he has not in all this entered the proper domain of morality, and least of all found a scientific foundation for the principles of right and wrong; he has merely constructed a

basement and has not laid a basis. Proceeding on his statement of facts, and interpreting them after the same manner, I discover other truths which furnish a foundation on which ethical science may rest securely.

First, I discover design in these arrangements made to promote happiness and moral good. The tendency which he has so acutely detected implies very many and very varied adjustments of one thing to another, and of all things to a beneficent end. To what are we to ascribe these? Mr. Spencer is too much of a philosopher to attribute them to such meaningless things as chance and fate. He is ready to admit that beyond the known phenomena there must be an unknown power to produce them. At this point I close in with him. This combination of adjustments producing a tendency towards an end, being an effect, implies a cause. From the effect we can argue, and so far know the cause. These arrangements towards an end point to an arranging and therefore an intelligent cause. Not only so, but as the end is happiness, they give evidence of a benevolent cause. As the effect is a reality, so must the cause, the intelligent and benevolent cause of an effect implying intelligence and benevolence. These grand laws of beneficent progress revealed in biology seem to me to argue as clearly as the special adaptations of bones, joints, and sinew adduced by Paley, that there is an intelligence organizing and guarding them towards discoverable ends. The circumstance that God proceeds by development in so many of his ways does not entitle us to shut him out from his works. It has been shown again and again, as by M. Janet in his work on "Final Cause," that in development as an organic process there is as clear proof of design as in the frame of the animal. I see purpose in the arrangements which produce the beneficent tendency which Spencer has traced quite as much as I see it in the constitution of a good society or a good government. I carry this truth with me as I explore the various compartments of nature, always keeping it in its own place, and I find it as a torch illuminating many places which would otherwise be dark.

Second. I discover another end in nature. I discover a moral end, or rather I discover that moral good is an end. I admit that the promotion of happiness is one end, the highest among

the lower creatures incapable of appreciating anything higher. But when a certain stage is reached I discover this other end, like happiness, a good in itself and an end in itself. Mr. Spencer mixes up the two ends, and they are often mixed together in the economy of nature; nevertheless they are distinct, and should be seen to be separate. The one end, happiness, is visible from the beginning. There seem to be anticipations of the other end, preparations for it in the animal reign, just as there were preparations for man in the cattle and cereals which preceded him and made it possible for him to appear. But the other end does not actually come forth till a morally endowed agent appears on the scene. The adjustment of means to end is a good thing, but before we regard it as morally good we have to see that the end is good, and that morally. A sword may be fitted to slay an enemy, but in order that the man be good who uses the sword he must employ it in a good cause. Happiness is good, but is there not also another good, and that is the love that promotes happiness, and the justice that guides and guards happiness and secures an equal means of happiness to all and each? Misery is an evil, but so also is the cruelty or deceit that produces evil. Benevolence is good, but is there not also a right and a wrong, and a justice which demands that every one has his due?

Third. At a certain stage there is the appearance of a being to know and appreciate the moral end. We have here an advance on what has gone before: an advance on the brutes, which had a love of pleasure, but not, therefore, a love of good; an aversion to pain, but not, therefore, an aversion to sin.

For our present purpose, which is not historical but ethical, it is not needful to determine how man appeared on the scene, and how he came to have a conscience to know the good and discern between it and evil. The advance is of the same kind as that which took place in the earlier ages from the inanimate to the animate, from the insentient to the sentient, from the unconscious to the conscious, from the uninstinctive to the instinctive. Spencer and his school will no doubt account for this by development. The old alternative immediately steps in and requires us to make our choice between the horns. If it be answered that the morality was potentially in the original matter,

I answer that there is really no proof that the moral power which led to the martyrdom of Socrates and the labors of Howard or Livingston was originally in the primitive molecules and thence passed through the flaccid mollusk and the chattering monkey. I add, for argument's sake, that even on this supposition we might infer that all this must have been arranged by a prearranging and therefore an intelligent power foreseeing, or rather planning, the end from the beginning, which power must be a moral power lending its sanction to the whole results, and so to the moral monitor with its precepts and prohibitions. If the other horn is preferred, and it is asserted that man and his moral nature have come from a superinduced power, then I claim for that power the sanction of that Higher Power who has superinduced it. Some of our savans seem to be very anxious to prove their descent from the brutes. I admit and maintain that man's body is formed of the dust of the ground, and that he is so far after the image of the lower animals, or rather that the lower animals and he are after the same type. "My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them." But I am anxious to claim for man in general and for our profound thinkers in particular another ancestry. I claim that in respect of their mind they were made in the image of God. We can discover traces of this even in the most degenerate of mankind, particularly in their capacity to ascend, as in the rise of the Britons from the days of Cæsar to their present state—a rise to which we can produce nothing parallel in any race of animals. Discovering it in the germ even among savages, I see it taking its full form in our poets and philosophers, among our patriots and philanthropists.

It is enough for me that man has a reasonable and moral nature, no matter whence derived. Whatever may have been its historical growth, that conscience is now an essential part of my being. The higher state may have grown out of the lower, as the fruit out of the seed; but the fruit is valued for its own sake, and not because it has come from the seed. Whether

man has come from the fish or no, he is no longer a fish but a man with a moral nature containing certain perceptions and prerogatives, and if he murders a fellow-man I treat him in a way very different from that in which I would treat a fish which had seized and destroyed another fish. That moral nature declares that there is an essential and indelible distinction between good and evil. Its decisions can stand even Spencer's criterion of truth which "must be accepted." We believe that the man who suffers rather than tell a lie, that he who risks his own life to save a neighbor's, is right; and that the man who betrays a cause committed to him, or who murders a fellow-man, is wrong. I am as certain of all this as I am of the existence of an external world, as I am of my own existence; I cannot be made to believe otherwise. I am as certain that I reprobate the cheat and the seducer as I am that there is a cheat and a seducer, and that I live to reprobate him. Let speculators, I may say, wrangle about the historical antecedents of all this as it suits. I know what I perceive, and I follow, and must follow, my conviction, or rather I follow it not because of any external compulsion, but because I perceive it. Having such a moral nature, I inquire into its data and find it declaring that happiness is an end to be aimed at, but also declaring that moral good, love, and reverence for what is good is an end and a higher end.

Fourth. There is an intuitive principle prompting to the performance of moral good. It has been shown again and again that the utilitarianism under all its forms—and Spencer's ethics is a form of utilitarianism—requires an intuitive principle and motive to carry it out. It proceeds on the principle not only that I may but that *I ought* to promote the happiness of others as well as my own, that I am bound to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There is no need of an intuitive moral principle to lead me to look after my own pleasures; though our sense of duty comes in to strengthen my purpose to sacrifice present pleasure for greater ultimate happiness. But why am I bound to promote my neighbor's good as well as my own? So far as I can see, the utilitarian theory, and the development theory as a form of it, has no answer to this question. You may prove to me that, upon the whole, there would be a greater sum of happiness in the universe were I to content myself with being the husband of one wife, but there would be a

greater pleasure to me, so I think, to have another whom I love more: what is there in the theory of development to lead me to lay restraint on myself? But at the stage at which morality comes in there comes in an intuitive conscience which insists that this ought to be done because it is right, and points to a God who sanctions the whole. We have thus and here a motive which leads us to promote the happiness of all, and prompts us to do good as we have opportunity.

Fifth. It should be farther noticed that intuitive morality requires us as a duty to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This is as much a precept of the intuitional as of the utilitarian or hedonist theory of morals, with this very important difference that the former carries within itself and with it a motive to induce us to do good to others.

It should be noticed of this intuitive conscience that it looks to a law above it and to which it is subordinate. This law is, "Do unto others even as ye would that others would do unto you." It follows that love is the grand, the essential virtue. I prefer the phrase "love" to altruism, the Comtean one, which the school is seeking to introduce, inasmuch as the former demands an inward affection, whereas the latter might be satisfied with the outward act. Now, the possession of love is the best, the only certain means of promoting happiness. Being a fountain, it will be flowing out and watering all. It prompts to the promotion of the happiness of all sentient beings, including the lower animals. Being regulated by law, it will flow out in furthering the happiness of those with whom we come in contact, by pleasing manners, by obliging acts, by honoring all men, by sympathy with distress, by relieving the wants of the poor, by securing the education of the young, and the spread of literature and the arts, and the propagating of truth and love all over the world. The greatest-happiness principle is as much a part of intuitive as of utilitarian morals. My inward law and the God who planted it there require me to labor to promote the good of all mankind. But the intuitive theory requires other duties. It enjoins that we love and revere and worship God, and that we promote the moral excellence as well as the felicity of our fellow-men.

Sixth. It is needful to expose a fallacy running through his whole argument that moral good has respect to happiness as its

end. It is that of making the conclusion wider than the premises, that of supposing that he has established the whole when he has proven only a part. He tries hard to show that all theories of virtue imply that happiness is the final end. With this view he examines the theory of perfection, as held in a general way; he says by Plato, and more distinctly by Jonathan Edwards, and argues that the perfection of man, considered as an agent, "means the being constituted for effecting complete adjustment to acts, to ends of every kind," and as the justification for whatever increases life is the reception of more happiness than misery, it follows that conduciveness to happiness is the ultimate test of perfection." Now, I admit that the happiness and the promotion of happiness is one good. But I am sure that the love which prompts to the production of happiness is another good, and perfection aims at both.

He also examines the theory of those moralists who suppose themselves to have conceptions of virtue as an end underived from any other, and who think that virtue is not resolvable into simpler ideas; he thinks that Aristotle held this view. He takes the virtues of courage and chastity, and argues, on the supposition that virtue is primordial and independent, no reason can be given why there should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleasurable in its total effects on self or others or both, and if there is not a necessary correspondence, it is conceivable that the conduct classed as virtuous should be paingiving in its total effects. The answer is easy and at hand. Virtue being regulated love, or at least containing love as its highest element, the effect of it as a whole cannot be paingiving. In the case of the two virtues named, courage and chastity, they need more stringent whet than merely the promotion of happiness, and this is to be found in a rule like the Christian one of doing to others as we would that others should do unto us. We thus see that in the end which we should contemplate there is not only happiness but an end in itself which promotes and so secures happiness.

He next examines, with the same view, the intuitional theory of morals. This theory has often been so stated as to make it indefensible. Properly enunciated it contains a truth which must have a place in a true theory of morals. Mind has a power of knowing and discerning things. In particular its

moral sense has a power of perceiving good and evil in certain voluntary acts, good in gratitude and evil in ingratitude. In particular it sees good in love under its various forms. This love does look to the happiness of sentient creation. The law to which the conscience looks guides and guards this love. It announces the objects to which it should flow and those from which it should turn away. It contains within itself a motive to the performance of the act; a compulsion, not a physical but a moral one, to act.

These six propositions can be drawn from the body of facts furnished by Mr. Spencer quite as validly as the two which he draws. With them we are now in a position to examine his own system. He rejects "(1) those theories that look to the character of the agent; (2) to the nature of the motives; (3) the quality of his deeds." In doing this he has set himself against the great body of our moralists in ancient and modern times, who maintain that one or the whole of these should be looked at in approving an action as good. An ethically good action is the act of a good agent (so far) swayed by good motives and doing a good act. If the man is a robber swayed by revenge, and doing a bad deed even of a useful tendency, say murdering another and more malignant robber, we do not give him our approbation. We always, in judging of moral acts, look and feel that we ought to look to the act, the agent, and the motive. We declare that act of charity to be good which is done by a man good at least for the moment with a benevolent motive. However we may admire his talents, we do not regard that man as specially virtuous who from money motives invents a machine which may add immeasurably to the resources and therefore the pleasures of humanity. We do not give credit to one who gives alms to be seen of men. It is the grand defect of this new moral theory that it does not demand a pure motive, and does not require or entitle us to look for one in judging of conduct.

We are now in a position to understand and to judge of this new and considerably pretentious theory which is to give a scientific basis to ethics. Conduct is acts adjusted to ends. Conduct is good when it accomplishes its ends. Conduct is morally good when it promotes the greatest happiness. There are passages which leave upon us the impression that mechani-

cal acts may be regarded as good when, on the whole, they favor the production of pleasure, and this without at all looking to an agent. "Beyond the conduct commonly approved of or reprobated as right or wrong, there is included all conduct which furthers or hinders in either direct or indirect ways the welfare of self and others." There may certainly be good in organic acts, in all vital acts. The lower animals certainly commit good acts when they do deeds which add to happiness. "There is a supposable formula for the activities of each species of animal which, could it be drawn out, would constitute a system of morality for that species"! Surely we have here a new ethical code. It seems the doctrine of the whole school. Darwin speaks deliberately of its being the duty of the hound to hunt. The morality of animals is supposed to rise insensibly and by degrees into that of man.

He makes the biological progression with its controls generate the conscience. "The intuitions of a moral faculty are the slowly-organized results of experience received by the race." In fact, the conscience seems to be merely a nervous structure. "I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding nervous modifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition." *Our moral intuitions are thus nervous modifications become hereditary!* Is this the highest product of development? this the copestone of the new philosophy?

He gives to this conscience a certain impulsive and guiding power. "That the intuitions of a moral faculty should guide our conduct is a proposition in which truth is contained, for these intuitions of a moral faculty are the slowly-organized results received of the race while living in presence of these conditions." The conscience thus generated evidently cannot furnish a standard or an ultimate criterion. In different circumstances and with a different heredity its decisions might have been different. In opposition to all this, I hold that conscience is an intuition looking into certain voluntary acts and declaring them to be good or evil in their very nature. This conscience can stand the tests of intuition, even that of Spencer. It is self-evident, and its negation is inconceivable; we cannot con-

ceive that hypocrisy, say religious hypocrisy, should be good. The culmination of our philosophy is thus Hamilton's favorite maxim: "On earth there is nothing great but man, in man there is nothing great but mind;" and I might add, in mind there is nothing great but love guided by law.

This carries with it Moral Obligation. Spencer takes much the same view of obligation as Bain. He supposes it to arise from a restraint imposed by force, such as a ruler, a government, or supernatural agency—in which Spencer does not believe. Interpreting the revelations of conscience as an intuition, I claim for it a higher place. It is an obligation to obey a law involving, as Kant powerfully argues, a law-giver, being evidently the very governor who has presided over organic development, as it contends with its environments, and causing it to make for happiness. The obligation is laid upon us to do what is right, and in doing so to give every one his due, and as much as within us lies to promote his welfare. This gives the idea of justice, and our obligation to attend to it.

Of the same character is the idea, the sense, and the obligation of Duty. Spencer argues that as morality advances from an act to a habit, the feeling of duty becomes less and less and may disappear. There is some truth here, but it is only partial truth. When the habit of good is completed, the work is done without restraint. But then the felt obligation of duty is necessary to form the habit. It is best when the sense of duty and love go together in the performance of an act. When the feeling of obligation is withdrawn, the feelings will be apt to waver and the conduct to become inconsistent. It is not necessary that people should always be thinking of the restraint; the habits and sentiments will often act best when they follow their own generated nature. But it is important that the law should ever be there, even as the horse will go all the steadier because of the curb in his mouth, though the rider may not always be using it.

His theory is avowedly a form of the utilitarian. But he thinks he can give it a better form than it takes in the systems of Bentham and Mill. He calls his own system rational utilitarianism, as distinguished from empirical. He sees the vagueness of the principles of the common utilitarianism, and the uselessness, for practical purposes, of the precepts derived from

them; it being so difficult to tell as to many acts whether they are or are not, upon the whole, fitted to produce a greater amount of happiness or misery. He tells us, however, "I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct." We will look with interest to his promised work, the "Principles of Morality," to see if he is able to accomplish this. If he can he will greatly benefit true ethics, which must always embrace the greatest-happiness principle. Meanwhile he has not done much to relieve the utilitarian or hedonist theory from the objections to which it is obviously liable: such as the difficulty of determining consequences, and its incapacity of supplying a motive to lead the great body of mankind to undertake to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He is evidently in difficulties in gendering benevolence out of self-love, or, as he expresses it, in getting altruism out of egoism. His method of reconciling the self-regarding and the altruistic virtues is very vague and unsatisfactory.

He has an Absolute Ethics, and thinks it of great moment that he should have. But it is like the meeting of the asymptotes of an hyperbola at an infinite distance. It will be reached when the external circumstances are brought into harmony with the internal life. "The coexistence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is impossible." I hold, on the contrary, that it may be, nay, that it has actually been, the work of a perfect man to labor to make society perfect. He tells us, farther, that "conduct which has any concomitant of pain or any painful consequence is partially wrong." With my views of morality I cannot coincide with this. I do not know that it is partially wrong to cut off a limb when by doing so life is preserved, still less to conquer a vice by an exertion which may be painful. "Actions of a kind purely pleasurable in their immediate and remote effects are absolutely right," and "they only." It is allowed that it must be unnumbered ages before there can be such actions. "Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of evolution," "these last stages in the evolution of being when man

is forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and more in presence of his fellows." We are told "that the conduct to which we apply the name good is the relatively more evolved conduct; and that bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved." It is clear that his absolute ethics can be reached only when development has advanced hundreds of thousands or millions of years. An old fisherman who lived eighteen hundred years ago knew somehow that this world was to be burned with fire; and it is a part of Spencer's philosophy that this must be so, and I suspect that this conflagration may be kindled before his perfect ethics are reached,—and then will not be reached, for then there will be intolerable pain. And, after all, what interest have the men and women now living, and anxious, it may be, to know what is their present duty, in this inconceivably remote state of things? After all, his perfect ethics do not consist in love, or in any voluntary acts or dispositions, but, to all appearance, simply in an advanced zoological concretion in which there will indeed be no pain (though how it is to be got rid of is not explained), but at the same time no room for heroism, self-sacrifice, and devotion.

He has also a Relative Ethics, but not, so far as I can see, of a high character. "It is the least wrong which is relatively right." His statements on this subject leave morality in a very uncertain and loose state, and might open the door to all sorts of excuses for the neglect of what is, after all, paramount duty.

"Throughout a considerable part of conduct no guiding, no method of estimation enables us to say whether a proposed course is even relatively right as causing proximately and remotely, specially and generally, the greatest surplus of good over evil."

How much room is left here for the crooked casuistry of the heart!

"As now carried on, life hourly sets the claims of present self against the claims of future self, and hourly brings individual interests face to face with the interests of other individuals, taken singly or as associated. In many such cases the *decisions can be nothing more than compromises.*"

What an encouragement in all this to compromises, to favor personal aggrandizement or sensual gratification! He gives the case of a farmer whose political principles prompt him to vote in opposition to his landlord.

"The man in such a case has to balance the evil that may arise to his family against the evil that may arise to his country. In countless such cases no one can decide by which of the alternative courses the least wrong is likely to be done."

Is this safe morality? And yet I believe it is the only morality that can result from the balancings of pleasures and pains. Call in a moral law, and it will decide the question at once and declare that the man ought to follow his principles and leave the issues to God.

Mr. Spencer has an ideal. All great men have. He thinks that there is a development now going on which must produce a better state of things. In this respect his system is, in my view, superior to that still more pretentious one of pessimism which has been gendered in disappointed and diseased minds as in a marsh, and after which some speculative youths are wondering. But I have doubts whether the agencies which he calls in can effect the end he is expecting—the removal of all evil. Hitherto the advance of intelligence and civilization, while it has removed certain evils, has introduced others, and apparently must continue to do so. Amidst all ameliorations of outward estate moral evil abideth—sin which Spencer has never ventured to look at. The happy close to our world's history which so many are looking for will not be brought about except by causes that remove the moral evil. I do expect that "at evening time it will be light." But I believe that it is to be brought about by a higher power superinduced on all that has gone before. Were such a power to appear, it would be in correspondence and analogy with all that has preceded. Just as Agassiz perceived in the lower animals the anticipation of man, so in man's intellectual and moral nature we may discover a prognostic of a spiritual character. At present the moral is very often immoral. I know no power in nature fitted to meet and overcome the moral evil; but I can conceive of such being superadded. I believe all that Spencer has established as to the progression in nature: of the animate being superinduced upon the inanimate, of the sentient upon the insentient, of the conscious upon the unconscious, of the intelligent upon the unintelligent, and of the moral upon the intellectual. But I may and I do cherish the expectation of a higher advancement coming in, as all the others have done, I know not how. "Thou

hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the spirit" in this coming dispensation.

I have written the article which I am now to close with a deep sense of responsibility, being awed at once by the masterly ability of my opponent and the vast interests, speculative and practical, at stake. I have endeavored to examine Mr. Spencer's philosophy, as in former years I did that of Mr. Mill (when his fame was the highest), fairly and candidly. My labor has been stiff because the book I review is a stiff one and presupposes a number of preparatory elaborate volumes. I see no difficulty in answering our author, provided I understand him. I believe I see his meaning and can estimate the drift of his speculations. I have followed the development of his system from his "FIRST Principles" onward to this the beginning of the consummation of his work. I have cheerfully accepted his scientific statement of facts and some of his interpretations of them, but have superadded others quite as important and quite as certain. I am aware that the little work published does not unfold his full ethical views, and if, in further unfolding his plan, he brings in truth fitted to fill the wide gaps which we see yawning before us, I will have more pleasure in withdrawing the objections I have taken than I have had in advancing them.

I am constrained to conclude that the work does not furnish a scientific basis to ethics. Had it been described as a *Præparatio Ethica*, I might have much to say in its behalf. He does show that in the earlier animal ages there was an advance in happiness, and that there was a preparation for morality to appear, and that there are aids to human virtue in prearrangements to call it forth and sustain it. This is what he has succeeded in. But he has not entered the subject of ethics, which has to look to character and to voluntary acts of human beings.

The system sketched implies a morality without a God, or at least without any God known or knowable. There is no obligation provided requiring us to love, to revere and worship God. The morality recommended has its sanction from a long process of development which has gone on for millions of years, carrying a mysterious power with it, but this not from a guide, governor, or law-giver — of whom, I believe, nature gives evi-

dence as conducting the development orderly and beneficently. It has sanctions from organic agencies working unconsciously, I believe for a purpose, but implying no responsibility to a ruler or a judge. It is not supposed to carry with it, as Kant maintained that the practical reason did, the necessity and certainty of a world to come and of a judgment-day. So far as I comprehend, it does not require or enjoin that virtue should be voluntary. It does not give love or benevolence a place, as I believe it ought to have the highest place, in all good conduct. It declares that morality is that which promotes happiness, but it has no constraining motive, such as the intuitive conscience supplies, for leading men to feel that they ought to labor for the welfare of others.

Our new ethics thus withdraws many of the motives which were supplied by the old morality. And it does not supply others likely to take their place and to sway the great body of mankind — men, women and children, civilized and savage — in joy and in sorrow, in prosperity and in adversity, in the hour of temptation and at death. I can conceive that some persons who have mastered the development theory, who believe in it enthusiastically, may be moved by it to high exertion, as feeling that they are thereby falling in with the whole evolution of nature. But what motive does it supply to the peasant, the laborer, the young man and maiden, to lead them to resist evil and follow the good? And what are we to do with our reading youth entering on life who are told in scientific lectures and journals that the old sanctions of morality are all undermined? What are we to do for them, and what are they to do in that transition period which Mr. Spencer acknowledges to be so perilous? You may say, Read Spencer's elaborate volumes and fill your mind with his system. But this is what the great body of mankind will not and cannot do, and if they did would any one thereby be interested or moved? Our author does not believe that "his conclusions will meet with any considerable acceptance." I believe the deluge of fire will come before they cover the earth. In these circumstances it is surely wisdom to rest on the old foundations, on an inward monitor guaranteed by God, till new ones are supplied on which we and others can rest.

JAMES MCCOSH.